# To the Ten Categories by the Rule of Two or Three

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Both in his commentary on the third book of *Natural Hearing* and in his commentary on the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* or *First Philosophy,* Thomas Aquinas arrives at the ten categories by eight divisions following the rule of two or three.

There is one division into three and seven divisions into two. The division into three is the same in both commentaries and is also the first in both.

Five of the seven divisions into two are the same in both, and two are different.

Two of the five which are the same in both are the division of the second part of the division into three into two and the sub-division of one of these into two more.

The different divisions are found in two of the five divisions necessary to distinguish the third part of the first division eventually into the six remaining genera.

The division of those based on cause and effect is the same as is also the division of those based on measure as well as the subdivision of one of those based on measure.

But the first division of the last six genera in both is different and consequently one of the subsequent divisions must be other.

For in the third book of *Natural Hearing*, outfitted is divided against the remaining five because it is found specially in man and the remaining five are found in common.

But in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics,* outfitted with the three based on outside measure are distinguished from acting upon and undergoing. For the former are denominating from something entirely outside and the latter from something partly inside and partly outside.

Hence, in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics,* it is necessary to divide outfitted against the three based on outside measure. And in the third book of *Natural Hearing*, it is necessary to divide the three based on outside measure against the two based on cause and effect.

But the division and the sub-division of those based on extrinsic measure is the same in both as well as the division of the two based on cause and effect (or which are from something partly inside and partly outside),