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Two Kinds of Beginning in Our Thinking
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TWO KINDS OF BEGINNING IN OUR THINKING
In the Preface to his Treatise on Light, Christiaan Huygens touches upon a distinction between two kinds of principle or beginning in our thinking. The distinction he makes seems to have disappeared from the modern mind since his time, or if it is ever brought up, it is only to be rejected. The distinction is worth considering for a number of reasons. But we should first see how Huygens touches upon it. Speaking of his own Treatise, he says:
There will be seen in it, demonstrations of those kinds which do not produce as great a certitude as those of Geometry, and which even differ much therefrom, since whereas the Geometers prove their Propositions by fixed and incontestable Principles, here the Principles are verified by the conclusions to be drawn from them; the nature of these things not allowing of this being done otherwise.[1]
Huygens here touches upon the difference between a beginning or principle that is to be judged by its consequences or by the conclusions that follow from it, and a beginning by which we judge what follows from it.
The ancients were inclined to ask whether the second kind of beginning could be found elsewhere than in geometry (and the rest of mathematics) while the modern world has come to doubt that the second kind of beginning is to be found even in geometry. This is not a small difference about the beginning of our thinking. And since even a small difference in the beginning is a great one in the end, the necessity of considering Huygens' distinction cannot be denied.
It should not remain hidden to us that there are three possible positions regarding the distinction that Huygens has mentioned, and that all three seem to have been held in the course of history.
One could say that every beginning in our thinking is an hypothesis to be judged or tested by its consequences. This has become the dominant position in our century and was indeed clearly stated in the nineteenth century by thinkers such as Claude Bernard.[2] Or one could say the contrary, that every beginning in our thinking should be the basis for judging what follows form it. Aristotle attributes this position to some Pythagoreans in his work On The Universe:
It happens that in speaking about phenomena, they say things that do not agree with the phenomena. The cause of this is not taking well first beginnings, but wishing to reduce all things to some determined opinions...For these men, on account of their love of these beginnings, seem to do the same thing as those maintaining positions in dialectic. They endure everything that follows as though having true beginnings; as if there were not some beginnings which ought to be judged from their results, and especially from the end result. Now the end of a science that makes is the product while of natural science it is always what appears authoritatively according to the senses.[3]
Some of the rationalists in the seventeenth century, like Descartes, who wanted to proceed geometrically everywhere, have also spoken at times as if they were seeking only the kind of beginning which is a beginning for judging conclusions that can be deduced from it.
There is a third possible position which is the middle one of admitting both kinds of beginning in our thinking, but not in the same place. Huygens is an example of this position among the early moderns and Aristotle, in the above passage, criticizes the Pythagoreans for not seeing that there are these two kinds of beginning. The distinction sometimes made between philosophy and science, if both are regarded as legitimate, is connected with the viability of this middle position. Claude Bernard clearly calls into question the acceptability of both philosophy and theology because they do not use their beginnings in the same way as the true experimental scientist does his beginnings; that is, they do not regard their beginnings as mere hypotheses to be tested by their consequences.[4]
A sign of the truth of them middle position is that it can more explain the extreme positions than they can explain it or each other. Since probable but false opinions are based on some part of the truth, it is difficult for the extreme positions to explain each other's existence. If all beginnings in our thinking should be considered as hypotheses to be tested by their consequences, why should anyone think that al beginnings are of the opposite kind? Their position would not seem to be based on any part of the truth. Likewise, if every beginning in our thinking should be so firm as to be the basis for judging what can be deduced from it, why should anyone think that the reverse is true of all beginnings? But if both beginnings are found in our thinking, as the middle position maintains, then there is a basis in part of the truth for both extreme positions.
Those who maintain that all beginnings in our thinking are hypotheses to be tested by their consequences would probably answer to this that custom makes some beginnings seem obvious and not in need of testing. When men become accustomed to a beginning and it is not challenged in their experience, they begin to accept that beginning without question as if it were obvious.
Even those who would maintain that here are two kinds of beginning would admit that custom can make something seem obvious that is not obvious. Thus Thomas Aquinas, who, as a follower of Aristotle, would admit the two kinds of beginning, points out the effect of custom when he asks why some think that the existence of God is not in need of proof. Speaking of this opinion in the Summa Contra Gentiles, he says:
The foresaid opinion comes partly from the custom by which some from the beginning are accustomed to hear and call upon the name of God. Custom, however, and especially that from childhood, obtains the strength of nature: from which it happens that those things which the soul imbibes from youth are thus firmly held as if they were naturally and per se known.[5]
But, if someone can make them mistake of thinking that something customary is natural, one can also make the reverse mistake of thinking that something natural is customary. Indeed either mistake arises from the difficulty of distinguishing between nature and custom (or second nature as it is sometimes called). And that the customary is sometimes confused with the natural is a sign that the distinction is not always easy. Hence, those who reject the natural and attempt to explain by the force of custom why others think the natural exists are themselves called upon to realize that their own position may be nourished by the same root - our difficulty in distinguishing between nature and custom.
Moreover, if there were not both natural and customary beginnings in our thinking, why would the confusion of the two arise?
Again, custom call more into question the extreme positions, as is true in general of extreme positions. The Pythagoreans, and men like them, want to proceed in what today would be called the domain of the experimental sciences as they did in the mathematical sciences to which they were accustomed. But we, living in the age of experimental science and technology (and remember, as Aristotle pointed out in the above text, technology has the same kind of beginning as the experimental sciences), are accustomed to another kind of beginning so much so that we think all beginnings must be of the kind to which we are accustomed. Those in the middle can better explain the existence of the extremes by custom than they could explain the middle by custom. Custom is called a tyrant by Shakespeare and for a good reason: it aims only at the good of a part, the part in which it is a custom.
The man who says that every thought is an hypothesis to be tested by its consequences must regard his own statement as an hypothesis to be so tested. But in more than one way, it cannot stand up to such a test. There are thoughts which no acts with as if he thought them to be hypotheses. Who acts as if he thought that a whole is larger than one of its parts was an hypothesis to be tested by its consequences? Again, in the deduction of consequences, whether by syllogism as in dialectic or by mathematical calculation as in the physical sciences, necessity is required: for the consequence could not be used to judge the beginning if it had no necessary connection with it. The beginnings of the categorical syllogism, the said of all and the said of one, cannot be tested by the syllogism without using them and, thus, presupposing them. Necessary deduction must be based on something that is not itself deduced, but that is known by itself and not by other statements, as are the said of all and the said of none. Moreover, we test hypotheses and such beginnings by whether they contradict something else. For obvious reasons, this something else cannot be an hypothesis or, if it is, one must eventually test it against something that is not regarded as an hypothesis. Again, such testing accepts the beginning of the impossibility of the same thing both being and not being at the same time and in the same way, not as a beginning to be tested by its consequences. This is why Plato represents well Socrates as learning the "Socratic" method from Parmenides and Zeno (whatever the historical truth is or is not) since Parmenides was the first to recognize in words the beginning of the impossibility of a real contradiction as a beginning among statements and the first one. This beginning could not be tested by whether it contradicts any thing else without obviously presupposing it. Thus the testing of some beginnings by whether their necessary consequences contradicts something or not presupposes beginnings that are not tested by their consequences.
Perhaps someone will say that the beginning of the impossibility of a real contradiction should itself be judged by its consequences. But, as has been shown above, it would be impossible to test this beginning without using it or to reject it without using it. If one rejected it because it contradicted something else, one would be saying it is not so because it is so. The beginning about contradiction is untestable. Since this beginning is presupposed to all testing in more than one way (both in the validity of deductions; e.g., the said of all clearly involves the beginning about contradiction; and in the comparison of the result of the deduction with other things - Does it contradict anything else?), if one insists on the necessity of testing every beginning, one would make all testing impossible. but what one says, one does not always think.
The existence of the kind of beginning which justifies what follows from it, is also tied to the question of seeds in human knowledge.
The word seed is borrowed from growing bodies because one kind of beginning in our knowledge is like them. A seed is (1) a beginning (2) which is natural, (3) small in size but great in its power and what it gives rise to, (4) from which other things come to be by an ordered number of steps. Further, (5) different seeds give rise to determined different things.
Likewise, there are beginnings in our knowledge which naturally come to be in our reason. These beginnings are small in comparison to the conclusions (and other things) to which they give rise in our reason. Further, one goes forward from these beginnings by an ordered number of steps to other things. The fifth likeness fits what are called the private beginnings of a reasoned out knowledge rather than the common beginnings (such as the beginning about contradiction or the beginning about whole and part). There are seeds that give rise to logic and other seeds that give rise to geometry, and yet other seeds that give rise to natural philosophy and so on. This likeness is not true of the beginnings common to all forms of reasoned out knowledge, such as the beginning about contradiction, unless it is adapted to a particular matter. Further the seeds that give rise to logic are naturally apt to do so. They could not, for example, give rise to natural philosophy. Likewise, logic could not grow from the seeds of natural philosophy.
But the word seed does not fit so well the other kind of beginning which is tested and judged by its conclusions. Such a beginning is not so natural that it arises in at least a confused way in everyone's mind. But we do find in the history of science that the same scientific hypothesis has sometimes arisen at the same time in different minds working independently of each other. "Ripeness is all!" as the Poet says. At a certain stage of scientific development, with certain experiences or experiments in mind and also certain difficulties, the same hypothesis may arise more or less simultaneously in the minds of more than one gifted individual scientist who is immersed in the latest experiences and difficulty. But one could never approach such beginnings from our common way of speaking, as Aristotle does in the first book of the Physics,[6] for such hypotheses are never beginnings natural or common to all men. Yet the simultaneous origin of the same hypothesis in a number of scientists when they are immersed in the same special experience makes more plausible the natural origin of some beginnings in our mind from the experience which is common to all men.
The denial of the existence of any natural beginning in our thought leads to the denial that anything is naturally more known than anything else to our reason. But the latter is hard to maintain. Further, it would lead to complete chaos in our reasoning since there could be no reason for arguing from one thing to another if the former was not in some way more known than the latter.
THE BEGINNINGS OF GEOMETRY IN PARTICULAR
We cannot here enter into a long discussion of the necessity of the beginnings and conclusions of Euclid's Elements. But it is important to note the weakness of many so-called refutations of that necessity. How often we meet in those "refutations" the fallacy of equivocation and the facile identification of quantities. One finds, for example, straight line used not only in the sense of Euclid's definition, but also for the shortest distance between two points on a curved surface or triangle used for the plane figure and for the figure contained by lines drawn from the North Pole of a globe to a base on the equator. Take, for example, the beginning of Heath's note on the sixteenth proposition of Book I of Euclid's Elements:
As is well known, this proposition is not universally true under the Riemann hypothesis of a space endless in extent but not infinite in size. On this hypothesis a straight line is a "closed series" and returns on itself.[7]
Who does not see that straight line is being taken equivocally in Euclid and Riemann?
At other times, these refutations take the form that the truth of the Elements depends upon the quantity therein studied and divided, being identified with the quantity of natural things or the supposed space in which they are located; and that this latter has been found to be of a different character in relativity physics. We know that Aristotle[8] and perhaps Plato as well[9] did not identify the quantity studied in pure mathematics with the quantity of natural things. Further, the numbers of the physicist are not the numbers of natural things; for example, sixty degrees is not the number of something natural as four is the number of a dog's legs. Hence, there is great weakness in any argument that would try to refute the necessity of Euclidean geometry from modern physics through the quantity of natural things. Sometimes people are involved in both defects as when they argue from the "fourth dimension" in modern physics to some kind of apparent refutation of Euclid's insistence that there are only three dimensions. No less a scientist than Louis de Broglie warns us in these words about such sloppy thinking:
the theory of relativity leads to combining, to fusing somehow, into a single continuum the three coordinates of space and the coordinate of time whose physical aspect is so different.
We must not, of course, conclude from this that the theory of relativity has thereby come to an identification of time and space.
Not only do space and time remain essentially heterogeneous by their very physical nature, but this heterogeneity is treated very clearly in the mathematical theory of Minkowski space-time by the fact that time does not play the same role as the coordinates of space.[10]
As I said before, we cannot here enter into any detailed consideration of the necessity of the beginnings and conclusions of the Elements; but I think it behooves us to be extremely careful of the alleged refutations of that necessity.
Non-Euclidean Geometry, by Robert Bonola, Dover Publications Inc., 1955, p. 92, pp. pp. 92-93 quote and text concerning the effect of being unable to demonstrate Euclid's fifth Postulate or some equivalent:
Lobatschewsky expresses this thought clearly in the New Principles of Geometry of 1825 where he says:
"The fruitlessness of the attempts made, since Euclid's time, for the space of 2000 years, aroused in me the suspicion that the truth, which it was desired to prove, was not contained in the data themselves; that to establish it the aid of experiment would be needed, for example, of astronomical observations, as is the case of other laws of nature. when I had finally convinced myself of the justice of my conjecture and believed that I had completely solved this difficult question, I wrote, in 1826, a memoir on this subject."
The words of Lobatschewsky afford evidence of a philosophical conception of space, opposed to that of Kant, which was then generally accepted. The Kantian doctrine considered space as a subjective intuition, a necessary presupposition of every experience. Lobatschewsky's doctrine was rather allied to sensualism and the current empiricism, and compelled geometry to take its place among the experimental sciences.
ibid., p. 138, Bonola, commenting on the later developments of Non-Euclidean geometry in comparison to the work of Beltrami and Riemann, observes:
...the geometry upon a surface of constant positive or negative curvature can be considered as a concrete interpretation of the Non-Euclidean Geometry, obtained in a bounded plane area, with the aid of the Hypothesis of the Obtuse Angle or that of the Acute Angle
Evolution of Mathematical Thought, by Herbert Meschkowski, Holden-Day Inc., 1965, p. 22:
We recognized the definitions of Euclid as inadequate, but we did not succeed in making them better. Since we are not bound by a valid definition, we are free to conceive of "point", "straight line", and "plane" in a manner other than is customary. In order to distinguish them from their Euclidean counter-parts, the new objects of our mental image shall be called pseudo-points and pseudo-straight lines lying in a pseudo-plane.
Science and Hypothesis, Henri Poincare, New York, 1905, p. 38:
The axioms of geometry are neither synthetic a priori judgments nor experimental facts. They are conventions; our choice among all possible conventions is guided by experimental facts; but it remains free and is only limited by the necessity of avoiding all contradictions. ----------------------- [1]Treatise on Light, Dover Publications ed., p. vi-vii [2]See his Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medecine, Part One [3]Aristotle, On the Universe (De Caelo et Mundo), Book III, Chapter 7 , 306a 6-18 [4]Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medecine, Part One [5]Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber I, Caput XI [6]Chapter 7, 189b 32 seq. [7]Euclid's Elements, With Introduction and Commentary by Sir Thomas Heath, Dover Publications, Inc., N.Y. , 1956 [8]See Physics Bk I, Chapter 4, 187b 13-188a 1; Bk. II, Chapter 2. 193b 22-194a 12 [9]Republic, Bk. VII, 522C-531D [10]The Revolution in Physics, The Noonday Press Inc., 1953, p. 89