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Two Kinds of Beginnings in Human Thought
Natural Philosophy · Physics Book 1
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TWO KINDS OF BEGINNINGS IN HUMAN THOUGHT
Aristotle, Physics, Book One, Chapter 5, 188b 27-30:
They all say that the elements and what they call the beginnings are contraries although they lay this down without giving a reason, as if being forced by the truth itself.
Aristotle, On the Universe, Book Three, Chapter 7, 306a 6-18:
It happens that, in speaking about the phenomena, they say things that do not agree with the phenomena. The cause of this is not taking well first principles, but wishing to reduce all things to some determined opinions...For these men, on account of their love of those principles, seem to do the same as those maintaining positions in dialectic. They endure everything that follows as though having true principles; as if there were not some principles which ought to be judged from their results, and especially from the end result. Now the end of a science that makes is the product while of natural science it is always what appears authoritatively according to the senses.
Christian Huygens, Preface to his Treatise on Light, Dover Publications, pp. vi-vii:
There will be seen in it [the Treatise] demonstrations of those kinds which do not produce as great a certitude as those of Geometry, and which even differ much therefrom, since whereas the Geometers prove their Propositions by fixed and incontestable Principles, here the Principles are verified by the conclusions to be drawn from them; the nature of these things not allowing of this being done otherwise. It is always possible to attain thereby to a degree of probability which very often is scarcely less than complete proof. To wit, when things which have been demonstrated by the Principles that have been assumed correspond perfectly to the phenomena which experiment has brought under observation; especially when there are a great number of them, and further, principally, when one can imagine and foresee new phenomena which ought to follow from the hypotheses which one employs, and when one finds that therein the fact corresponds to our prevision. But if all these proofs of probability are met with in that which I propose to discuss, as it seems to me they are, this ought to be a very strong confirmation of the success of my inquiry; and it must be ill if the facts are not pretty much as I represent them.
IN THE ABOVE PASSAGES, ARISTOTLE AND HUYGENS DISTINGUISH BETWEEN TWO KINDS OF BEGINNING IN OUR THOUGHT. ONE IS JUDGED BY ITS CONSEQUENCES, BY THE CONCLUSIONS THAT FOLLOW FROM IT; BUT THE OTHER IS THAT BY WHICH THE CONCLUSIONS THAT FOLLOW FROM IT ARE JUDGED. THE FORMER IS FOUND IN EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE AND THE LATTER IN GEOMETRY AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE. IF ONE IS ACCUSTOMED TO ONE OF THESE BEGINNINGS ONLY, HE MAY THINK THAT ALL BEGINNINGS ARE SIMILAR. THUS THE PYTHAGOREANS SOUGHT IN EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE THE KIND OF BEGINNING THEY HAD IN GEOMETRY AND MODERNS OFTEN SEEK EVERYWHERE THE KIND OF BEGINNING FOUND IN EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE. BUT ARISTOTLE AND HUYGENS RISE ABOVE THIS ENSLAVEMENT TO CUSTOM AND SEE WHERE EACH BEGINNING IS APPROPRIATE. THE FOLLOWING PASSAGE FOR THE METAPHYSICS IS ON THE DANGER OF CUSTOM IN HOW WE PROCEED:
Aristotle Metaphysics, Book Two, Chapter 3:
Listening happens in agreement with custom: we expect things to be said in the way we are accustomed to, and whatever is outside of this does not seem similar, but harder to know and strange because of its unfamiliarity - for the familiar is well known. The great strength of familiarity is shown by the laws in which mythical and childish things through custom prevail against our knowledge of them.
Thus, some men will not accept what is said if one does not speak mathematically; others will not, if one does not proceed by examples; others expect one to bring in a poet as witness.
And some want all things considered with certitude while others are pained by certitude, either through inability to follow the reasoning or through its pettiness [stinginess]; for certitude has something of this sort so that it seems illiberal to some in reasoning, just as in business transactions.
Hence, one ought to be educated as to how each should be received since it is absurd to seek at the same time knowledge and the way of knowledge; and it is not easy to get either.
Mathematical certitude should not be demanded everywhere, but in those things not having matter. Hence, this is not the way of natural science for probably all nature has matter. Thus, one should first consider what is nature and in this way it will become clear what natural science is about and whether it belongs to one science or more than one to consider the causes and beginnings.