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What Is Philosophy and the Beginnings of Philosophy
Wisdom about Beginnings
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WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY AND THE BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY
It would be laughable to try to find the beginnings of philosophy if we did not know what philosophy is.
WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?
We begin to answer the question what is philosophy by finding its genus.
What is the genus of philosophy?
The Philosopher usually places philosophy in the genus of ἐπιστήμη or μέθοδος. In many or most places, he seems to use these words interchangeably, as if synonyms, but sometimes he uses these with some distinction. We should look at the more common and synonymous use of these words to name the genus of philosophy first and then at the main text(s) where he uses them with some distinction.
Natural philosophy is called both, in the beginning of Book One of Natural Hearing:
Aristotle, PUSIKHS AKROASEWS A, 184a 10-16:
Ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς μεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἴτια ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν...δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.
Aristotle sometimes distinguishes between ἐπιστήμη (scientia in Latin) and σοφία (wisdom, sapientia in Latin):
Aristotle, HQIKWN NIKOMACEIWN Z, 1139b 15-17:
ἔστω δὴ οἷς ἀληθεύει ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ καταφάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν· ταῦτα δ’ ἐστὶ τέχνη ἐπιστήμη φρόνησις σοφία νοῦς.
But it is clear that in the broad sense even wisdom is an ἐπιστήμη:
Aristotle, TWN META TA FUSIKA A, 982a 1-6:
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ σοφία περί τινας ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, δῆλον. Ἐπει δὲ ταύτὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ζητοῦμεν, τοῦτ’ ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον, ἡ περὶ ποίας αἰτίας καὶ περὶ ποίας ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη σοφία ἐστίν.
Aristotle, TWN META TA FUSIKA A, 982b 7-10:
ἐξ ἁπάντων οὖν τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐπιστήμην πίπτει τὸ ζητούμενον ὄνομα· δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὴν τῶν πρώτων ἀρχῶν καὶ αἰτιῶν εἶναι θεωρητικήν:
Aristotle, TWN META TA FUSIKA A ELATTON, 993b19-20:
ὀρθῶς δ’ ἔχει καὶ τὸ καλεῖσθαι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμην τῆς ἀληθείας.
Aristotle, TWN META TA FUSIKA G, 1003a 21-22:
'´Estin ἐπιστήμη τις } θεωρεῖ τὸ ἓν Ç ἓν καὶ τὰ τούτῳ ὑπάρχοντα καθ’ αὑτό.
Aristotle often calls wisdom first philosophy, but in the following passage where he points out that natural philosophy would be wisdom if there were no other substances than natural or material ones, he uses the phrase of πρώτη ἐπιστήμη instead.
Aristotle, TWN META TA FUSIKA A, 1026a 27-32:
εἰ μὲν οὖν μὴ ἔστι τις ἑτέρα οὐσία παρὰ τὰς φύσει συνεστηκυίας, ἡ φυσικὴ ἂν εἴη πρώτη ἐπιστήμη· εἰ δ’ ἔστι τις οὐσία ἀκίνητος, αὕτη προτέρα καὶ φιλοσοφία πρώτη, καὶ καθόλου οὕτως ὅτι πρώτη· καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὄντος Ç ἓν ταύτης ἂν εἴη θεωρῆσαι, καὶ τί ἐστι καὶ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα Ç ὄν.
Wisdom is also called a μέθοδος.
Aristotle, TWN META TA FUSIKA A, 983a 21-23:
Τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ζητουμένης, εἴρηται, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς ο” δεῖ τυγχάνειν τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην μέθοδον.
It is also clear that the other kind of philosophy, what Aristotle calls practical or political or the philosophy about human things, is also a μέθοδος and an ἐπιστήμη.
Aristotle, HQIKWN NIKOMACEIWN A, 1094b 10-11:
] μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα
Aristotle, POLITIKWN B, 1260b 35-37:
...διὰ τὸ μὴ καλῶς ἔχειν ταύτας τὰς νῦν ὑπαρχούσας, διὰ τοῦτο ταύτην δοκῶμεν ἐπιβαλέσθαι τὴν μέθοδον.
Aristotle, POLITIKWN D, 1288b 22-23:
ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ πολιτείαν τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμης τὴν ἀρίστην θεωρῆσαι τίς ἐστι...
Aristotle, POLITIKWN D, 1289a 26-27:
...d' ἐν τῇ πρώτῃ μεθόδῳ περὶ τῶν πολιτειῶν διειλόμεθα τρεῖς μὲν τὰς ὀρθὰς πολιτείας
Aristotle also speaks of dialectic as a μέθοδος:
Aristotle, TOPIKWN A, 100a18-21:
"H μὲν πρόθεσις τῆς πραγματείας μέθοδον εὑρεῖν ἀφ’ ἧς δυνησόμεθα συλλογίζεσθαι περὶ παντὸς τοῦ προτεθέντος προβλήματος ἐξ ἐνδόξων, καὶ αὐτοὶ λόγον ὑπέχοντες μηθὲν ἐροῦμεν ὑπεναντίον.
And in the following passage, he calls it an ἐπιστήμη in-between calling it a μέθοδος:
Aristotle, TOPIKWN A, 101b 5-11:
"´Exomen δὲ τελέως τὴν μέθοδον ὅταν ὁμοίως ἔχωμεν ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ῥητορικῆς καὶ ἰατρικῆς καὶ τῶν τοιούτων δυνάμεων· τοῦτο δ’ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ποιεῖν 2 προαιρούμεθα. οὔτε γὰρ ὁ ῥητορικὸς ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου πείσει οὔθ’ ὁ ἰατρικὸς ὑγιάσει, ἀλλ’ ἐὰν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων μηδὲν παραλίπῃ, ἱκανῶς αὐτὸν ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην φήσομεν.
Πρῶτον οὖν θεωρητέον ἐκ τίνων ἡ μέθοδος.
And in the following passage, in speaking of how dialectic is useful for philosophy, he speaks of how it is useful to arrive at the beginnings of an ἐπιστήμη and then how it has a road to the beginnings of every μέθοδος, speaking as if they were the same.
Aristotle, TOPIKWN A, 101a 25-101b 4:
"Επόμενον δ’ ἂν εἴη τοῖς εἰρημένοις εἰπεῖν πρὸς πόσα τε καὶ τίνα χρήσιμος ἡ πραγματεία.ἔστι δὴ πρὸς τρία, πρὸς γυμνασίαν, πρὸς τὰς ἐντεύξεις, πρὸς τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας.ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρὸς γυμνασίαν χρήσιμος, ἐξ αὐτων καταφανές ἐστι· μέθοδον γὰρ ἔχοντες ῥᾷον περὶ τοῦ προτεθέντος ἐπιχειρεῖν δυνησόμεθα· πρὸς δὲ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, διότι τὰς τῶν πολλῶν κατηριθμημένοι δόξας οὐκ ἐκ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων δογμάτων ὁμιλήσομεν πρὸς αὐτούς, μεταβιβάζοντες ὅ τι ἂν μὴ καλῶς φαίνωνται λέγειν ἡμῖν· πρὸς δὲ τὰς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν ἐπιστήμας, ὅτι δυνάμενοι πρὸς ἀμφότερα διαπορῆσαι ῥᾷον ἐν ἑκάστοις κατοψόμεθα τἀληθές τε καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος· ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τὰ πρῶτα τῶν περὶ ἑκάστην ἐπιστήμην. ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τῶν οἰκείων τῶν κατὰ τὴν προτεθεῖσαν ἐπιστήμην ἀρχῶν ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν τι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὴ πρῶται αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἁπάντων εἰσί, διὰ δὲ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα ἐνδόξων ἀνάγκη περὶ αὐτῶν διελθεῖν. τοῦτο δ’ ἴδιον ἢ μάλιστα οἰκεῖον τῆς διαλεκτικῆς ἐστιν· ἐξεταστικὴ γὰρ οὖσα πρὸς τὰς ἁπασῶν τῶν μεθόδων ἀρχὰς ὁδὸν ἔχει.
Moerbeke is not altogether sure how to translate these two words. In the text from the Physics, he translates both by scientia.
Aristotle, PUSIKHS AKROASEWS A, 184a 10-16:
Ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς μεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἴτια ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν...δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.
Moerbeke's translation:
Quoniam quidem intelligere et scire contingit circa omnes scientias, quarum sunt principia aut causae aut elementa, ex horum cognitione...manifestum quidem quod quae sunt circa principia scientiae quae de natura est, prius determinare tentandum.
In the text at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, he translates μέθοδος by doctrina :
Aristotle, HQIKWN NIKOMACEIWN A, 1094a 1-2, 6-8:
Πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ...πολλῶν δὲ πράξεων οὐσῶν καὶ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν πολλὰ γίνεται καὶ τὰ τέλη:
Moerbeke's translation:
Omnis ars, et omnis doctrina, similiter autem et actus et electio, bonum quoddam appetere videtur...Multis autem operationibus existentibus, et artibus et doctrinis, multi sunt et fines.
Sometimes, he transliterates as in the following two passages:
Aristotle, HQIKWN NIKOMACEIWN A, 1094b 10-11:
] μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα
Moerbeke's translation:
Methodus quidem igitur haec appetit, civilis quaedam existens.
Aristotle, TWN META TA FUSIKA A, 983a 21-23:
Τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ζητουμένης, εἴρηται, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς ο” δεῖ τυγχάνειν τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην μέθοδον.
Moerbeke's translation:
Quae quidem igitur natura scientiae quaesitae dictum est, et quae sit intentio, qua oportet adipisci quaestionem et totam methodum.
Here Moerbeke translates ἐπιστήμης by scientiae and transliterates the Greek word μέθοδον into methodum in Latin. But in the beginning of the first book of Natural Hearing (the Physics), he translated both by scientia.
When Moerbeke translates both Greek words by scientia in the text at the begining of the Physics, his translation witnesses the more or less synonymous use of the words there. However, the Latin word does not do justice to either of the two Greek words or to the wealth of what they bring out about philosophy, due to their diverse etymologies The word μέθοδος (whose etymology is after a road orover a road ) brings out that philosophy is knowledge over a road or knowledge following a road. The word ἐπιστήμη (whose etymology is from coming to a halt or stop) brings out that philosophy is a reasoned out knowledge or a reasoned out understanding. All of this is lost in the Latin word. And in English, we must use a phrase to capture the richness of the Greek words. It is not hard to see that reasoned out knowledge must be knowledge over a road or knowledge that follows a road. For a road in our knowledge is a before and after in our knowledge and there is a before and after in all reasoning.
Perhaps the main text where Aristotle uses ἐπιστήμη and μέθοδος with some distinction in in the Parts of Animals:
Aristotle, PERI ZWIWN MORIWN, 639a 1-7:
Περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ’ οἷον παιδείαν τινά.
πεπαιδευμένου γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τρόπον τὸ δύνασθαι κρῖναι εὐστόχως τί καλῶς ἢ μὴ καλῶς ἀποδίδωσιν ὁ λέγων.
If we understand μέθοδος to mean knowledge over a road, one can begin to have such knowledge by knowing its way or road or, more fully, by going down that road and coming to its end.
One calls philosophy an ἐπιστήμη rather than a παιδεία because we name something by its utmost. In the same way, although philosophy begins in wonder, it is named, not from wonder, but from the love of wisdom. The love of wisdom is more perfect than wonder and is found in the end. As Thomas explains in the S. C. Gentiles, love is even stronger in the possession of the true good than in its pursuit. The true philosopher must love wisdom as a common good (just as he must love truth as a common good) and the common good of reason.
Sometimes, however, μέθοδος seems to mean the same as τρόπος:
Aristotle, PERI YUCHS A, 402a 12-23:
καὶ γὰρ ὄντος κοινοῦ τοῦ ζητήματος πολλοῖς ἑτέροις, λέγω δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τοῦ τί ἐστι, τάχ’ ἄν τῳ δόξειε μία τις εἶναι μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων περὶ ὧν βουλόμεθα γνῶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων ἀπόδειξις, ὥστε ζητητέον ἂν εἴη τὴν μέθοδον ταύτην. εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι μία τις καὶ κοινὴ μέθοδος περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἔτι χαλεπώτερον γίνεται τὸ πραγματευθῆναι· δεήσει γὰρ λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τίς ὁ τρόπος, ἐὰν δὲ φανερὸν ώ πότερον ἀπόδειξίς τίς ἐστιν ἢ διαίρεσις ἢ καί τις ἄλλη μέθοδος, ἔτι πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ πλάνας, ἐκ τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν· ἄλλαι γὰρ ἄλλων ἀρχαί, καθάπερ ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἐπιπέδων.
Thomas Aquinas, In I De Anima, Lectio I, n. 9:
Ostendit difficultatem huius tractatus. Et hoc quantum ad duo. Primo quantum ad cognoscendum substantiam animae. Secundo quantum ad cognoscendum accidentia seu propria passiones...Quantum autem ad primum, ostendit duplicem difficultatem. Et primo quantum ad modum definiendi ipsam. Secundo quantum ad ea quae intrant definitionem...
Dicit ergo: quamvis sit utilis scientia de anima, tamen difficile est scire de anima quid est: et haec est difficultas in qualibet re, cum sit una communis quaestio animae et multis aliis, circa substantiam eorum, et circa quod quid est..
Est ergo prima difficultas, quia nos nescimus per quam viam procedendum sit ad definitionem: quia quidam dicunt, quod demonstrando: quidam, quod dividendo: quidam vero, quod componendo. Aristoteles autem voluit, quod componendo.
Secunda difficultas est de his quae ponuntur in definitione. Definitio enim notificat essentiam rei, quae non potest sciri nisi sciantur principia: sed diversorum sunt diversa principia: et ideo difficile est scire , ex quibus sumantur principia. ------------------------------------------------------------------ Perhaps, there is another use of μέθοδος which is particular. A knowledge that is not only over a road, but about a road, has a special reason to be called a μέθοδος.
Thomas Aquinas, In I Metaphysicorum, Lectio III, n. 68:
Patet igitur ex praedictis quae sit natura huius scientiae, quia est speculativa, libera, non humana, sed divina: et quae est eius intentio, qua oportet habere quaestionem et totam methodum et totam hanc artem.
Aristotle, HQIKWN NIKOMACEIWN A, 1094b 10-11:
] μὲν οὖν μέθοδος τούτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα
Moerbeke's translation:
Methodus quidem igitur haec appetit, civilis quaedam existens.
Thomas Aquinas on the above word, In I Ethicorum, Lectio II, n. 31:
Hoc autem bonum, scilicet quod est commune uni vel pluribus civitatibus, intendit methodus, idest quaedam ars, quae vocatur civilis.
Compare the above with the odopoiein of the Rhetoric. Aristotle, TECNHS RHTORIKHS A, 1354a 2:
δῆλον ὅτι εἴη ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁδοποιεῖν: di' + γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οἵ τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, τὴν αἰτίαν θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον \dh πάντες ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι.
Aristotle, TWN META TA FUSIKA E, 1025b 6-7:
πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη διανοητικὴ ἢ μετέχουσά τι διανοίας περὶ αἰτίας καὶ ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἢ ἀκριβεστέρας ἢ ἁπλουστέρας.
Aristotle, PERI YUCHS A, 402a 1-7:
Τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων τὴν εἴδησιν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δ’ ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἢ κατ’ ἀκρίβειαν ἢ τῷ βελτιόνων τε καὶ θαυμασιωτέρων εἶναι, δι’ ἀμφότερα ταῦτα τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἱστορίαν εὐλόγως ἂν ἐν πρώτοις τιθείημεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν ἡ γνῶσις αὐτῆς μεγάλα συμβάλλεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν:
If we define a thing by its utmost, then philosophy is a reasoned out knowledge and especially the reasoned out knowledge which is most justly called wisdom. It can also be called a reasoned out understanding if understanding means a kind of knowledge.
This does not mean, however, that a philosopher necessarily has reasoned out knowledge. Often, he has only a reasonable guess. And many times philosophers are mistaken (as their disagreement shows).
Nevertheless, the philosopher seeks a reasoned out knowledge where and when this is possible and sometimes he reaches this goal.
But where reasoned out knowledge is not possible or before it is possible, the philosopher seeks a reasonable guess. We say before it is possible as well as where it is not possible because, even where reasoned out knowledge is possible, we usually guess the truth before we know it. Even the geometer will guess that something is true before he finds the reason why it must be so. (And if he had not guessed that it was true, he might never have looked for a reason why it must be so.) Thus a reasonable guess is sometimes as far as reason can get and sometimes a reasonable guess is a stepping stone to a later reasoned out knowledge. The philosopher seeks a reasoned out knowledge where this is possible. But where it is not possible, or before it is possible, he seeks a reasonable guess. I say before it is possible because even where a reasoned out knowledge is possible we guess the truth before we know it. Even the geometer guesses the truth of a theorem before he finds a demonstration that it must be so. Indeed, if he had not guessed that it was true, he probably would not even look for the demonstration that it must be so.
Further, when we are making reasonable guesses, it is usually not clear to us whether a reasoned out knowledge will eventually be possible. However, it is often not clear where a reasoned out knowledge is possible or when it has been achieved. Socrates is pushed by Simmias and Cebes in the Phaedo to pursue a reasoned out knowledge of the human soul's immortality. They think that he has made only a reasonable guess about the matter. Although all are convinced of the soul's immortality by the end of the discussion, it is not clear that Socrates has reached a reasoned out knowledge of the matter.
Aristotle, TWN META TA FUSIKA A, 983a 21-23:
Τίς μὲν οὖν ἡ φύσις τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ζητουμένης, εἴρηται, καὶ τίς ὁ σκοπὸς ο” δεῖ τυγχάνειν τὴν ζήτησιν καὶ τὴν ὅλην μέθοδον.
ζήτησις, ]: a seeking, seeking for, search for Plato Theaetetus, 196D 2. a searching, search 3. inquiry, investigation Plato Cratylus 406A, Apology 29C, Timaeus, 47A, Phaedrus, 244C, 66D
ζητητής, =: a seeker, an inquirer, Plato Republic, 618C; Charmides, 175E
zhtéw: to seek, seek for
Moerbeke translates ζήτησις by quaestio which means first a seeking or a searching from quaero meaning to seek or search for
Aristotle, PERI ZWIWN MORIWN, 639a 1-7:
Περὶ πᾶσαν θεωρίαν τε καὶ μέθοδον, ὁμοίως ταπεινοτέραν τε καὶ τιμιωτέραν, δύο φαίνονται τρόποι τῆς ἕξεως εἶναι, ὧν τὴν μὲν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πράγματος καλῶς ἔχει προσαγορεύειν, τὴν δ’ οἷον παιδείαν τινά.
qewría, ]: a looking at, viewing, beholding Plato Republic, 556C 2. of the mind, contemplation, speculation, philosophic reasoning Plato Laws 951C, Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 8, 16
A reasoned out knowledge of plane and solid figures is possible. Likewise, a reasoned out knowledge of numbers is possible. Both of these can be found in Euclid's Elements.
In the Organon of Aristotle, we find a reasoned out knowledge of definition, statement and syllogism.
But is it possible to have a reasoned out knowledge of natural things and of human things? This is not so clear.
If a reasoned out knowledge of natural things in general is possible, it does not follow that a reasoned out knowledge of natural things in particular is possible. And if a reasoned out knowledge of natural things in particular is impossible, it does not follow that a reasoned out knowledge of natural things in general is impossible. The reason for these statements must be sought in the beginning of Aristotle's Eight Books of Natural Hearing. (The customary partial translation of the title as the Physics has three defects: first it translates only one of the words in the title; second, the one word it does attempt to translate would be better captured in English by the word nature; and third, not only do we not think of nature when we say physics in English, but we think of the first part of experimental science as if Aristotle was trying to do what we do in physics.) It is only after the Eight Books of Natural Hearing have been understood (a labor of many years) that we are in a position to judge that some reasoned out knowledge of natural things is possible.
Like care is necessary before we can judge that a reasoned out knowledge of the soul is possible. Aristotle's Three Books About the Soul contain some such knowledge.
And in the Nicomachean Ethics, we reach a general reasoned out knowledge of human things.
Wisdom itself is a reasoned out knowledge of things in general.
The philosopher tries to avoid mistakes, but he never succeeds in avoiding them entirely.
We can see from the above that logic is the tool of the philosopher and why the art about arguments has three parts. One part is about reasoned out knowledge. A second part is about reasonable guesses. And the third part is about mistakes. In the works of the father of logic, Aristotle, the Prior and Posterior Analytics are about reasoned out knowledge (or demonstration which produces such knowledge), the Places is about reasonable guesses and the book On Sophistical Refutations is about mistakes.
What is a reasoned-out knowledge
Knowledge, in the strict sense, differs from a guess, even from a reasonable guess. In knowledge, we are sure or certain. But in a guess, we are not sure or not certain.
But what is reasoned out knowledge? Before we can understand reasoning out, we must understand thinking out. Reasoning out is one form of thinking out and there are forms of thinking out that come before reasoning out.
Reasoning out is a form of thinking out. Every reasoning out is a thinking out, but not every thinking out is a reasoning out. We are said not only to think out a conclusion, but also to think out a definition or a division. Strictly speaking, reasoning out is thinking out a conclusion. We think out a conclusion most of all by a syllogism in which the conclusion follows necessarily from the premisses. Such a conclusion is fully contained in the power of its premisses.
It should not remain hidden to us that the various forms of thinking out correspond to various senses of out and that various senses of out correspond to various senses of in among those distinguished by Aristotle in Book Four of Natural Hearing (called the Physics by those who imperfectly and misleadingly translate the title) and ordered by Thomas in his Commentary thereon. Thus, thinking out the division of a composed whole into its parts corresponds to the second sense of in while thinking out a definition to the third sense. Thinking out the division of a genus into its species corresponds to the fourth sense of in while thinking out the order of the senses of a word equivocal by reason corresponds to the fifth sense. And thinking out a conclusion corresponds to to the seventh sense. It is interesting to note that the order in which we think out in these various ways corresponds somewhat to the order in which the senses of in (and therefore of out are distinguished).
Since reasoning out conclusions presupposes thinking out definitions and divisions, when we speak of reasoned-out knowledge we include the thinking out of definitions and divisions that go into such knowledge. We define a thing by its utmost. Just as when we say that a man can lift 100 pds., we include his ability to lift a lesser amount, so when we speak of reasoned-out knowledge we include the other kinds of thinking out.
If we define philosophy then by its utmost (as everything must be defined by its utmost), clearly it is reasoned out knowledge. No one is a philosopher by thinking alone if he does not think out anything.
From reasonable guesses to reasoned-out knowledge
We can see in the Greek philosophers the movement of our reason from reasonable guesses to reasoned out knowledge.
Heraclitus begins this with his exhortation "Let us not guess at random about the greatest things."
The middle of this movement is thinking out definitions, divisions, distinctions and proportions.
Reasonable guesses are a help to thinking out definitions, divisions, distinctions and proportions.
And one can reason out a knowledge of conclusions only after one has thought out definitions, divisions, distinctions and proportions.
DK 22
χρυσὸν γὰρ οἱ διζήμενοι γῆν πολλὴν ὀρύσσουσι καὶ εὑρίσκουσιν ὀλίγον.
Those seeking gold dig up [through] much earth and find a little.
DK 47
μὴ εἰκῆ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων συμβαλλώμεθα
Let us not guess at random about the greatest things. (DK 47)
Yes, I am going to ask that terrible question which is the downfall of most philosophers. We must ask this question for we can hardly find the beginnings of philosophy if we do not know what philosophy is.
Philosophy is knowledge over a road or knowledge that follows a road and reasoned out knowledge or reasoned out understanding. The three names in Greek are a sign that there are three kinds of beginning in philosophy. Indeed the division or distinction of the beginnings of philosophy correspond to these three names.