What Logic Is About

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What Logic Is About

Logic as a Whole · Subject of Logic

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WHAT LOGIC IS ABOUT

Perhaps the most basic question one can ask about a science or book is the question what it is about. One cannot understand a science or book without knowing what it is about.

But does this question admit of only one true answer? Even the most careful of authors in determining this question, Aristotle among the ancients and Thomas Aquinas among the medievals, often give more than one answer to the question what a book or science is about.

But if more than one true answer can be given to the question what a science or book is about, it behooves us to see the differences among these answers, why there are many answers, and the order among these answers.

In the beginning of the Metaphysics, for example, Aristotle shows that wisdom is about causes and then that it is about the first causes. The difference between these two answers is not difficult to see. The second answer is more precise or particular than the first. The first answer is not sufficient to distinguish wisdom from any other art or science that is about causes. Likewise, why there are these two answers and the order among them is not difficult to see. The reason for these two answers and the order among them can both be seen from the natural way in which our reason proceeds which is from the confused to the distinct and therefore from the general to the particular, as Aristotle shows abundantly at the beginning of the Hearing about Nature.

Later, in the beginning of the fourth book of the Metaphysics, Aristotle determines that wisdom is about being as being. Here we have another answer to the question what wisdom is about. If the answers given in Book One were true, is this answer false? Or vice-versa?

No, both answers are true, but we must understand their difference. Perhaps the difference is this: in the first book, he determined what wisdom is about in the sense of its end or goal; and in the fourth book, he determines what wisdom is about in the sense of its subject.

From this difference, one does not have to go far to see why both answers must be given - it is necessary to know both the subject of a science and its end or goal.

The order is also based on what is more known and less known to us. It is more known to all that the wise man knows why than that he knows being as being. Hence, Aristotle proves the later through the former. For all reasoning should proceed from the more known to us to the less known to us.

Then, Aristotle determine that wisdom is about substance. Here one is still speaking of what wisdom is about as a subject, but the difference is that here one is saying what it is chiefly about while before one was determining what the subject was as a whole.

Again it is not difficult to see why one should know what a science is about as a whole and what it is chiefly about. The order emerges here also if one considers how there can be a science of being as being for being is not a genus, but is said chiefly of substance and others in order to substance.

Aristotle goes on to say that wisdom is about one as well as being or that it is about being and one. Here, he is still talking about the subject. But what is the difference between saying it is about being and it is about one (or about being and one)? This reminds me of the way in which Aristotle and Thomas describe the subject of natural science or natural philosophy. Sometimes, they say it is about natural things (or mobile being or mobile thing) and sometimes it is about motion (or the motion of natural things) and sometimes it is about both. Here the subjects are more or less equivalent and it is harder to see the differences of things so close together, why there are differences and the order along them.

We can see from this lengthy example how difficult and involved can be the question of what a science or book is about.

When Thomas Aquinas answers the question what is logic about, he gives more than one answer. Assuming that each of his answers is true, we can ask what is the difference between these answers, why does he give more than one, and what is the order among them.

The first answer that Thomas gives to this question in his major proemium to logic as a whole in the beginning of his commentary on the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle is that it is about the act of reason (In I Post. Analyticorum, Proemium, n. 2):

Logica...est circa ipsum actum rationis, sicut circa propriam materiam.

Thomas then goes on to distinguish three acts of reason.

But in his minor proemium to logic as a whole in the beginning of his commentary on the Peri Hermeneias (In I Peri Herm, Proemium, n. 2), after giving the same three acts of reason, he gives a slightly different answer:

Cum autem Logica dicitur rationalis scientia, necesse est quod eius consideratio versetur circa ea quae pertinent ad tres praedictas operationes rationis.

In exemplifying ea quae pertinent to these three acts of reason, he speaks of what he calls elsewhere (in the Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, for example) the tools of reason, such as definition, statement, syllogism etc. One could say that logic is about the tools needed for these three acts of reason.

Thus logic can be said to be about three acts of reason or about the tools necessary for these three acts. It would be a mistake to say that logic is about one of these and not about the other; or that one of these statements is true and the other is false. But surely one must see some difference between these two answers and ask why there are two answers and what is the order among them.

The difference between these answers seems to me to be this: logic is about three acts of reason more as about its end and about the tools necessary for these three acts more as its subject. A sign is that when demonstration is defined by its end, it is defined by the act. Likewise, definition is defined as speech making known what a thing is whence it can be seen that definition is a tool for the act of understanding what a thing is. It is clearly necessary to know what a science is about both as its subject and as its end or purpose.

But concerning the order: which is more known to us, that logic is about the acts of reason or about the tools necessary to perfect these acts? Deception is possible here. Men who are accustomed to talk about definitions or statements or arguments may think that these are more known to us than the acts they perfect. But does an outsider have in mind the tool before the act or the act first? Which is more known to us: that we imagine or that we form images, that we think or that we form thoughts? Do we know first that we are thinking of triangle or that we have formed a thought about triangle?

However, apart from the question of which is more known, it is clear that the three acts of reason are more the end of logic and the tools that perfect these acts more the subject of logic. We make definitions, for example, for the sake of understanding what a thing is. So the tool (in this example, the definition) is for the sake of the act (in this example, understanding what a thing is)

Sometimes, however, Thomas combines these two as in the beginning of his commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (nn. 1-2):

Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quia sunt voces significativae...Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis adinvicem, et ordinem principiorum adinvicem et ad conclusiones.

WHAT LOGIC IS ABOUT

"Wisely and slow: they stumble that run fast"

Logic is a science that has, as Aquinas says, the greatest difficulty. And the first difficulty in logic is in trying to know what it is about. In order to understand what logic is about, we must proceed slowly through two steps which are numbered below.

1. Logic is about three acts of looking reason.

Logic is used in the original sense of the word which goes back to Aristotle, the "father of logic."

The looking reason differs from the doing reason by its end. The end of looking reason is to know or understand while the end of doing reason is to do or make.

The three acts are (1) understanding what a thing is, (2) understanding the true or the false and (3) reasoning.

Understanding what-a-thing-is is presupposed to understanding the true or the false, as understanding what a man is and what an animal is and what a stone is are presupposed to understanding that a man is an animal or a man is not a stone or an animal is not a stone. Likewise, understanding the true or the false is presupposed to reasoning because we reason from the true or the false. Hence, the above three acts are rightly called the first, second and third acts respectively of the looking reason.

There are other acts of the looking reason, such as counting and calculating, which belong to a different art than logic. Mathematical logic is an offshoot of this other art and logic. As a child resembles his parents and yet is a distinct individual, so mathematical logic in some ways resembles logic and the art of counting and calculating and yet is a distinct discipline differing from them in important ways. But one cannot see how mathematical logic differs from logic in the original sense of the word before one has understood the latter.

(Readings from Thomas Aquinas' two proemia to logic)

2. Logic is about the tools needed for these three acts of looking reason.

A tool is a thing used for some act. A knife is a tool for cutting and a pen is a tool for writing.

Animals have by nature the tools which they need for their acts. They have legs to run with and wings to fly with, teeth to bite with and claws to tear with, eyes to see with, ears to hear with, noses to smell with etc. Man also has some of these tools, but nature has not provided man with all the tools that he needs or finds useful. But nature has provided man with reason and hands whereby he can make and use other tools that he needs such a knife, fork and spoon, hammer, ax, saw, pen etc. There seems to be no end to these tools so that nature would have to be unlimited to provide man with all of these tools and man would be an enormously cluttered animal if he had all these tools growing out of him. Hence, man is said to be the tool-making animal. There is undoubtedly a connection between man's unlimited need for tools and the unlimited character of his reason and the things it can think of doing.

Just as man does not have by nature all the tools the practical reason needs, so looking reason is in need of tools which nature has not provided. Looking reason has need of tools for its acts and these tools are not something we are born with.

Reason understanding what a thing is has need of many tools. The chief among these is definition. When reason tries to understand what a square is or what a circle is, it has need of the definitions of square and circle to understand distinctly what these things are. But man is not born with these tools or definitions. Hence he needs an art about making and using such tools just as he needs arts for making and using the tools required by the doing reason. Logic is the name of the art about making and using definitions.

Reason trying to understand the true or the false has need for statements because the true or the false is found only in statements. Again man is not born with the statements he needs in order to understand the true or the false. Logic is also about these tools called statements

When reason is reasoning (which is the act most characteristic of it), it has need of a third kind of tool called an argument. One especially has need of an art for this tool since men are often unable to see whether an argument is good or bad; and if good, whether necessary or probable. Likewise man is not born with these tools in his reason.

(Readings from Thomas Aquinas on reason and its tools)

3. Logic is about ens rationis or ens ut verum

In IV Metaphysicorum, Lectio IV, n. 574:

Differunt autem abinvicem. Philosophus quidem a dialectico secundum potestatem. Nam maioris virtutis est consideratio philosophi quam consideratio dialectici. Philosophus enim de praedictis communibus procedit demonstrative. Et ideo eius est habere scientiam de praedictis, et est cognoscitivus eorum per certitudinem. Dialecticus autem circa omnia praedicta procedit ex probabilibus; unde non facit scientiam, sed quamdam opinionem.

Et hoc ideo est, quia ens est duplex: ens scilicet rationis et ens naturae.

Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus, quas ratio adinvenit in rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis. speciei et similium, quae quidem non inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subiectum logicae.

Huiusmodi autem intentiones intelligibiles, entibus naturae aequiparantur, eo quod omnia entia naturae sub consideratione rationis cadunt.

Et ideo subiectum logicae ad omnia se extendit, de quibus ens naturae praedicatur. Unde concludit, quod subiectum logicae aequiparatur subiecto philosophiae, quod est ens naturae.

Philosophus igitur ex principiis ipsius procedit ad probandum ea quae sunt consideranda circa huiusmodi communia accidentia entis. Dialecticus autem procedit ad ea consideranda ex intentionibus rationis, quae sunt extranea a natura rerum. Et ideo dicitur, quod dialectica est tentativa, quia tentare proprium est ex principiis extraneis procedere.

In VI Metaphysicorum, Lectio IV, n. 1233:

Verum et falsum, etsi sint in mente, non tamen sunt circa illam operationem mentis, qua intellectus format simplices conceptiones, et quod quid est rerum. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod "verum et falsum, circa simplicia et quod quid est, nec in mente est.' Unde relinquitur per locum a divisione, quod ex quo non est in rebus, nec est in mente circa simplicia et quod quid est, quod sit circa compositionem et divisionem mentis primo et principaliter; et secundario vocis, quae significat conceptionem mentis.

Et ulterius concludit, quod quaecumque oportet speculari circa ens and non ens sic dictum, scilicet prout ens significat verum, et non ens falsum, "posterius perscrutandum est", scilicet in fine noni et etiam in libro de Anima, et in logicalibus.

Tota enim logica videtur esse de ente et non ente sic dicto.

Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist XIX, Q. V, Art. I, Solutio and Ad 5:

eorum quae significantur nominibus, invenitur triplex diversitas.

Quaedam enim sunt quae secundum esse totum completum sunt extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt entia completa, sicut homo et lapis.

Quaedam autem sunt quae nihil habent extra animam, sicut somnia et imaginatio chimerae.

Quaedam autem sunt quae habent fundamentum in re extra animam, sed complementum rationis eorum quantum ad id quod est formale, est per operationem animae, ut patet in universali. Humanitas enim est aliquid in re, non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis, cum non sit extra animam aliqua humanitas multis communis; sed secundum quod accipitur in intellectu, adjungitur ei per operationem intellectus intentio secundum quam dicitur species:

et similiter est de tempore, quod habet fundamentum in motu, scilicet prius et posterius ipsius motus; sed quantum ad id quod est formale in tempore, scilicet numeratio, completur per operationem intellectus numerantis.

Similiter dico de veritate, quod habet fundamentum in re sed ratio ejus completur per actionem intellectus, quando scilicet apprehenditur eo modo quo est. Unde dicit Philosophus VI Metaph., text. 8, quod verum et falsum sunt in anima; sed bonum et malum in rebus.

Cum autem in re sit quidditas ejus et suum esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur; et in ipsa operatione intellectus accipentis esse rei sicut est per quamdam similationem ad ipsum, completur relatio adaequationis, in qua consistit ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis, secundum quod est in cognitione intellectus. Sed tamen ratio veritatis per prius invenitiur in intellectu quam in re.

Ad 5: semper veritati respondet aliquod esse; nec oportet quod semper respondeat sibi esse in re extra animam, cum ratio veritatis compleatur in ratione animae.

Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist XLVI, Q. I, Art. 2, Ad 1:

Veritas est de his quorum ratio completur per operationem animae et fundamentum habent in re.

Non est autem inconveniens quod de re mala sit operatio animae bona; sicut etiam non ens in re dicitur ens in anima ratiocinante, ut negationes et privationes, sicut patet ex IV Metaph., text. 2, secundum Commentatorem.

Unde si procedatur a bonitate veritatis secundum quod completur in operatione animae ad bonitatem ejus quod est in re, erit fallacia accidenti; hoc enim quod est mala esse, accidit huic quod est intelligible vel significabile sicut est in re, in quo consistit ratio veri, ut scilicet significetur vel intelligatur aliquid sicut est in re. Unde nihil prohibet dicere quod mala esse est verum; sed haec veritas qua vere dicitur vel significatur mala esse, est bonum quamvis mala esse sit malum.

Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum, Distinctio XXXVII, Quaest I, Art. II, Ad 3:

...ens dicitur dupliciter.

Uno modo quod significat essentiam rei extra animam existentis, et hoc modo non potest dici ens deformitas peccati, quae privatio quaedam est; privationes enim essentiam non habent in rerum natura.

Alio modo secundum quod significat veritatem propositionis, et sic deformitas dicitur esse, non propter hoc quod in re esse habeat, sed quia intellectus componit privationem cum subjecto, sicut formam quamdam. Unde sicut ex compositione formae ad subjectum vel ad materiam, relinquitur quoddam esse substantiale vel accidentale, ita etiam intellectus compositionem privationis cum subjecto per quoddam esse significat. Sed hoc esse non est nisi esse rationis, cum in re potius sit non esse

Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist II, Q. 1, Art. III, Solutio:

ipsa conceptio intellectus tripliciter se habet ad rem quae est extra animam.

Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine "homo" et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate, inquantum res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus, et quod nomen significans illum intellectum proprie de re dicatur.

Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit, sicut significatum hujus nominis "genus" non est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis; et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re, sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. Unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et simile est de omnibus aliis qui consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathematicorum et hujusmodi.

Aliquando vero id quod significatur per nomen, non habet fundamentum in re, neque proximum, neque remotum, sicut conceptio chimerae: quia neque est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam, neque consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem aliquam vere: et ideo ista conceptio est falsa.

Unde patet secundum, scilicet quod ratio dicitur esse in re, inquantum significatum nominis, cui accidit esse rationem, est in re: et hoc contingit proprie quando conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei.

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXX, Quaest. I, Art. III, Solutio & Ad 1:

...secundum theologos et philosophos verum est communiter, quod relationes quibus Deus ad creaturam refertur, non sunt in Deo secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum; quia intellectus noster non potest accipere aliquid relative ad alterum dici, nisi ipsum sub opposita habitudine intelligat.

Sciendum tamen est, quod ratio in intellectu rerum tripliciter se habet.

Quandoque enim apprehendit aliquid quod est in re secundum quod apprehenditur, ut quando apprehenditur forma lapidis.

Quandoque vero apprehendit aliquid quod nullo modo in re est, ut quando quis imaginatur chimaeram, vel aliquid hujusmodi.

Aliquando autem apprehenditur aliquid cui subest in re natura quaedam, non tamen secundum rationem qua apprehenditur; sicut patet quando apprehendit intentionem generis substantiae, quae in re est natura quaedam non determinata secundum se ad hanc vel illam speciem; et huic naturae apprehensae, secundum modum quo est in intellectu apprehendente, qui ex omnibus accipit unum quid commune in quibus invenitur natura illa, attribuit rationem generis, quae quidem ratio non est in re.

Ita etiam est in hujusmodi relationibus, quas intellectus noster attribuit Deo. Invenit enim in ipso virtutem, et essentiam, et operationem, qua creatura producitur in ipsum relationem habens; et ideo essentiae illi vel operationi habitudinem attribuit, et secundum quod intelligit, nomina relativa imponit.

Unde patet responsio ad primam: quia intellectus noster neque cassus neque vanus est quia habet aliquid respondens in re, quamvis non secundum modum quo est in ratione; sicut etiam intellectus mathematicorum non est falsus neque vanus est, quamvis nulla linea sit abstracta a materia in re, sicut ipsi considerant. Unde dicit Philosophus, II Physic., text 18: "Abstrahentium non est mendacium."

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Distinctio XXVI, Quaest. II, Art.I, Solutio:

...in relatione, sicut in omnibus accidentibus, est duo considerare: scilicet esse suum, secundum quod ponit aliquid in ipso, prout est accidens; et rationem suam, secundum quam ad aliud refertur, ex qua in genere determinato collocatur; et ex hac ratione non habet quod ponat aliquid in eo de quo dicitur; sicut omnes aliae formae absolutae ex ipsa sua ratione habent quod aliquid in eo de quo dicuntur, ponant.

Et ideo inveniuntur quaedam relationes nihil ponentes in eo de quo dicuntur; et hoc attendentes quidam philosphi dixerunt, quod relatio non est aliquod unum genus entium, nec est aliquid in rerum natura; sed est tantum quidam respectus respersus in omnibus entibus, et quod relationes sunt de intentionibus secundis quae non habent esse nisi in anima. Cui etiam Porretanorum opinio consentire videtur. Sed hoc falsum est: quia nihil quod est ens tantum in anima, in genere determinato collocatur.

Unde distinguendum est inter relationes. Quaedam enim sunt quae habent aliquid in re, supra quod esse eorum fundatur, sicut aequalitas fundatur supra quantitatam; et hujusmodi relationes aliquid realiter in re sunt.

Quaedam vero sunt quae non habent fundamentum in re de qua dicuntur, sicut dextrum et sinistrum in illis in quibus non sunt determinatae istae positiones secundum naturam sicut in partibus animalis. Ibi enim, scilicet in animali, istae relationes realiter sunt, quia fundantur in diversis virtutibus determinatarum partium; sed in aliis non sunt nisi secundum rationem habitudinis unius ad alterum; et ideo dicuntur relationes rationis.

Et hoc contingit quatuor modis, scilicet quod sint relationes rationis, et non rei.

Uno modo, ut dictum est, quando relatio non habet aliquid in rei natura supra quod fundetur: et inde est quod quandoque contingit quod relatio realiter est in uno et non in altero: quia in uno habet motum quemdam supra quem fundatur, quem non habet in alio; sicut est in omnibus illis relationibus quibus Deus ad creaturam refertur, quae quidem realiter sunt in creatura, et non in Deo.

Secundo modo quando relatio non habet aliquam realem diversitatem inter extrema, sicut relatio identitatis; et ideo hoc nihil ponit secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem, ut cum dicitur idem eidem idem.

Tertio modo quando designatur relatio aliqua entis ad non ens, ut cum dicitur quod nos sumus priores illis qui futuri sunt: ista enim prioritas non est aliqua relatio secundum rem, sed solum secundum rationem: quia relatio realis exigit utrumque extremorum in actu.

Quarto modo quando ponitur relatio relationis: ipsa enim relatio per seipsam refertur, non per aliam relationem. Unde in creaturis paternitas non conjungitur subjecto per aliquam relationem mediam.

Et hos ultimos duos modos ponit Avicennna, tract. III Metaphy., cap. X. Primi duo possunt etiam extrahi ex verbis Philosophi, V. Metaph., text. 10.

One could also say that logic is about one kind of relation of reason, those that belong to things as understood:

De Potentia, Q. 7, Art. 11, c.:

sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum; quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere:

Uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem.

Alio modo secundum quod huiusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud; licet illum ordinem intellectus non adveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate consequatur modum intelligendi. Et huiusmodi relationes intellectus non attribuit ei quod est in intellectu, sed ei quod est in re.

Et hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligat ea habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus.

Ad hoc autem quod aliqua habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque distinctum (quia eiusdem ad seipsum non est ordo) et utrumque ordinabile ad aliud.

Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens: sicut cum accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et aliud futurum, et intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud, dicens alterum esse prius altero; unde istae relationes sunt rationis tantum, utpote modum intelligendi consequentes.

Quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo, et intelligit ea cum quodam ordine: sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibi; et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum.

Quandoque vero accipit aliqua duo ut ordinabilia ad invicem, inter quae non est ordo medius, immo alterum ipsorum essentialiter est ordo: sicut cum dicit relationem accidere subiecto; unde talis relatio relationis ad quodcumque aliud rationis est tantum.

Quandoque vero accipit aliquid cum ordine ad aliud, inquantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud: sicut accipiendo scibile ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum, nomen scibilis relative significat; et est relatio rationis tantum. Et similiter aliqua nomina relativa Deo attribuit intellectus noster, in quantum accipit Deum ut terminum relationis creaturarum ad ipsum; unde huiusmodi relationes sunt rationis tantum.

3. Praeterea, hoc nomen Dominus relationem significat, cum sit relativum secundum esse. Sed Deus est Dominus non secundum rationem tantum. Ergo nec huiusmodi relationes sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut aliquis est idem sibi realiter, et non solum secundum rationem, licet relatio sit secundum rationem tantum, propter hoc quod relationis causa est realis, scilicet unitas substantiae quam intellectus sub relatione intelligit: ita potestas coërcendi subditos est in Deo realiter, quam intellectus intelligit in ordine ad subditos propter ordinem subditorum ad ipsum; et propter hoc dicitur dominus realiter, licet relatio sit rationis tantum. Et eodem modo apparet quod Dominus esset, nullo existente intellectu.

4. Logic is about one kind of relation of reason. See De Potentia for which kind.