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What Road Should the Philosopher Follow
Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge
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WHAT ROAD SHOULD THE PHILOSOPHER FOLLOW
The first road that philosophy should follow is, of course, the natural road in our knowledge. For the nature of a thing, or what it is, is first in it. A thing must be what it is before it can be anything else.
Since man is by nature an animal with reason, the natural road in our knowledge is the road from the senses into reason. For animal is defined by having senses. But man is not just an animal, but an animal that has reason. And what is more general in a thing is before in time and generation what is more particular. Hence, the road for man is from his senses into his reason. And experience confirms this. Babies and children and even men first think about what they can sense.
The philosopher follows this road for a number of reasons. First, he follows it because he is a man, an animal with reason. All men by nature follow this road more or less.
Second, he follows it because he is a philosopher or lover of wisdom, and this road is the road to wisdom. As we go along this natural road, we can see that it is going in the direction of wisdom. The animal which has senses seems wiser than the stone or even the tree that is not aware of its surroundings. And the animal that has memory seems wiser than the animal that only senses. And the man of experience seems wiser than the man of one memory. And the man of experience who knows only that something is so does not seem as wise as the man of art or science who knows why it is so.
The third reason why he follows the natural road is because it enters into the other roads he follows and they are acquired by following it since what is not natural is acquired through what is natural (as we learn our native language by imitation which is natural to man and as we acquire artificial tools through our hands which are by nature).
Since philosophy is in reason as a subject and is a perfection of reason and is acquired by the use of reason, it is clear that the second road followed by the philosopher is the road of reason as reason. Philosophy is a work of reason as reason although it presupposes what reason naturally understands or comes to understand. Hence, philosophy follows the road of reason as reason.
What is this road of reason as reason? What is the before and after in this road?
This is the road from reasonable guesses toward reasoned out knowledge. It is also the road from thinking about things to understanding them. For we get from thinking about something to understanding it by thinking it out and the last sense of thinking out is thinking out a conclusion or rasoning out a concluion
Since a road in our knowledge is a before and after, what is this before and after?
There are two fundamental befores in reason's way of going forward. One is that reason guesses before it knows. And often reason gets no further than a guess or a reasonable guess. The other is that reason thinks about something before understanding it.[1] And often reason thinks about something, but does not get to understanding it. Each of these befores can be considered briefly here. They seem to be closely connected and perhaps somewhat overlap.
Reason guesses before it knows. Reason guesses what a thing is before it knows what it is. Reason also guesses that something is true before it knows why it must be true. Is there a road from guesses. or from reasonable guesses, to a reasoned out knowledge of things? I say from reasonable guesses because they are more apt to lead to knowledge eventually than wild guesses.
Reason also thinks about something before understanding it. Reason goes from thinking about something to understanding it by thinking it out. Thus, there is a beginning, middle and end in what reason does. The beginning is thinking about something, the middle is thinking it out, and the end is understanding it. Thus the road of reason could be said to have a beginning, middle and end. The beginning is thinking about something; the middle is thinking it out; and the end is understanding it.
Hence, this road is from reasonable guesses to reasoned out knowledge. Reasoned out knowledge is the complete having of knowledge over a road.
Is there a way of thinking out something? This is not really one question because there are perhaps seven or eight senses of thinking out corresponding to the first seven ordered senses of the word in. Reason thinks out the senses of a word or phrase. Reason thinks out the parts of a whole. Reason thinks out the definition of a thing. Reason thinks out the forms of one kind of thing. Reason thinks out the order of many things. Reason thinks out a statement from its parts. And reason thinks out a conclusion. These are all different senses or meanings of the words thinking out.
But there is a difference between guessing before knowing in geometry (or arithmetic) as in Euclid's Elements, and guessing before knowing in natural philosophy or in wisdom. Geometers also guess that something is true before they have a reason why it must be true. But geometers and arithmeticians are not apt to guess opposites before they know the truth. For example: one would guess that the angles opposite equal sides in a triangle would also be equal before one has a reason why they must be so. But geometers are not apt to guess opposites, some thinking that they are equal and some thinking that they are not equal.
But natural philosophers and men in pursuit of wisdom commonly guess opposites. Experience tells us that this is so, but in the beginning of little Alpha, Aristotle touches upon the reasons for this. But since guessing is by the imagination and mathematics begins from some imaginings and judges by the imagination, the guess of men in mathematics is much more apt to be close to the truth.
After the proemium in the first book of Natural Hearing, Aristotle gives a somewhat discouraging division and subdivisions of the opinions of his predecessors. Euclid has nothing of this sort with his predecessors. And in the first book of the Metaphysics after the proemium, Aristotle again gives a bewildering diversity of opinions about causes and the first causes.
The natural effect of this diversity of opinion is first to stop reason from going forward, either temporarily or permanently. Some give up at this point and others persevere.
But how is it possible to go forward when reasonable men disagree? Perhaps related to this is the question why do reasonable men disagree. If men disagree because they see only a part of the truth (and other parts) and boast and imagine it to be the whole, then we can go forward by shrinking each of them to his proper size. In this way, we can go forward from a part of the truth to the whole. Empedocles touches upon this.
But since men also contradict each other, it is not possible always to go forward in this way unless one is willing to admit that it is possible both to be and not be. Socrates reasons in the third part of the Meno that virtue can and cannot be taught. But he cannot accept this. Parmenides first emphasized the impossibility of both being and not being and of our thinking they are the same.
In Book Beta of the Metaphysics, Aristotle presents us with a common situation when men guess before they know. They guess opposites or opposites follow from their guesses. If their guesses are reasonable, reason is stopped from going forward.
The third road followed by a philosopher is the private road of each reasoned out knowledge.
----------------------- [1]If reason understands something without having to think about it first, it would be something it naturally understands or naturally comes to understand. Such understanding would belong to reason as a nature rather than as reason. We are speaking of reason as reason. The same could be said if reason knows something before it guesses.