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Whether End Is a Cause in the Natural World
Natural Philosophy · Physics Book 2
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WHETHER END IS A CAUSE IN THE NATURAL WORLD
THE QUESTION
The question is whether end is a cause in the natural world, whether nature acts for an end or is directed towards the good.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE QUESTION
This question is extremely important for natural science and the whole of human life. We know that where the end is a cause, it is the cause of all other causes and the best and most important thing. For everything else is for the sake of the end. Thus, it is absurd to seek to know natural things and not to be concerned with this question. Moreover the answer one gives to this question makes no little difference for the whole of human life, but it makes a great deal of difference or rather all the difference. For all of human life is ordered to its end. If this end exists by nature, man should find it and direct his life towards it. But if no end exists by nature, man is free to set up any end for himself. This too could be said of all the parts of man, such as his reason, feelings, tongue, hands, sexual organs etc. There could be no perversion or misuse of these parts if they had no natural end. We could not reason that your arm is more for the sake of you than for my knowledge of anatomy.
WHAT THE QUESTION MEANS PRECISELY
We should next understand what the question means and what it does not mean. An understanding of what the question means depends upon an understanding of its parts. By nature is meant the intrinsic cause of motion and rest in that in which it is as such and not accidentally, as explained in the second book of the Physics. By cause is meant that which is responsible for the existence or coming into existence of something. by end is meant that for the sake of which.
Many men misunderstand the question and what is meant by saying that end is a cause in the natural world. And because of this, they reject end as a cause in the natural world. We should clear up some of these misunderstandings. First, to say that end is a cause of natural things is not to say that it is the only cause of them. Second, it is not to say that end is a cause of all natural things, of everything that happens in the natural world or that everything is for a purpose. Third, it is not to say that where it is a cause, it is ever the only cause. Again, end is not a cause in the same sense as a mover or maker. Cause is not a univocal word, but a proportional one. The end is a cause in the sense of that for the sake of which. Sometimes people speak of the end as moving us or pulling us or attracting us, but none of these should be understood in the sense of the mover, the third kind of cause.
IT IS A QUESTION
Some people reject end in nature because the mathematical experimental sciences do not talk about it. They are so accustomed to looking at natural phenomena through “mathematical spectacles” that they are unable to see end in the natural world. It seems unscientific to them because of their customs. But custom is not a reason. And it does not make things obvious, even though it can make them seem or appear to be obvious. If one should accept the way of knowing in the math. sc. of nature as sufficient, he would even eliminate matter and the mover. Moreover, some of the great mathematical physicists of our century are not so ready to regard their method as sufficient in biology (e.g., Bohr and Heisenberg). Even biologists like Huxley who reject end as a cause admit the “appearance” of purposeful action by nature. What reason do they give for rejecting the reality of it?
However, one must not underestimate the difficulty of talking about end in the natural world. Aristotle recognized the difficulty of speaking about end as a cause. Actually the end is the last kind of cause we come to understand. How can that which does not yet exist, which is in the future, be a cause of what exists in the present?
HOW TO PROCEED TO DETERMINE THE QUESTION
1. The Praesupposita A. In considering this question, a man should not decide about the known or more known by the unknown or less known. B. End can be a cause only when mind is a cause. What does not exist can be a cause only if it is known and things are ordered to it. This is clear with Anaxagoras and Socrates in the history of Greek thought and in our experience of human doing and making C End can be a cause of nature’s operations only if nature has a mind or is a product of mind.
2. How not to proceed in natural science
A. We should not proceed from nature has a mind or nature is a product of mind to nature acts for an end or nature is directed towards the good, even if the former statements are true, because this would be to proceed from the less known (or unknown) to the more known (or known)
B. We should not proceed from nature neither has a mind nor is a product of mind to nature does to acts for an end, even if the former statements are true, because they are less known than nature’s way of operating.
C. We should not proceed from our ignorance of whether nature has a mind or is a product of mind to deny that nature acts for an end or even to neglect the question of whether it does. This would be to refuse to examine the effect because we are ignorant of the cause as if our mind knew the cause before the effect
D We should not begin our examination of ends in the natural world by looking for the end of the universe. The end of the eye is more known to us than the end of man, and this, than the end of the universe
E. we should not proceed in natural science to affirm that nature acts for an end from the statement in the Bible that God’s mind is the cause of nature. Again we should not neglect the question because theology gives an answer to it. Nothing prevents two sciences from knowing the same in different ways, as shape can be known by the eye and the hand although in different ways.
3. How to proceed
A. Nature’s way of operating is more known to us than whether it has a mind or is a product of mind
B Hence, we must proceed from nature’s way of operating to determine the question. Is nature’s way of operating such as to indicate that it is directed towards an en end or towards the good?
C. One should remember than nothing is worse for the truth than a bad defence of it.
REASONS FOR SAYING THAT NATURE ACTS FOR AN END
See S. Contra Gentes, Lib. III, capita 5 & 6 for first argument See S. Contra Gentes, Lib. III, cap. 4, 3rd argument for last argument
We can reason that nature acts for an end or the good in the following ways (after Aristotle):
1. Nature produces the good by chance (as defined in Physics II) or because it is inclined to it. But it does not produce the good by chance. Therefore, nature is inclined towards the good.
Proof of the second premiss: If nature produced the good by chance, it would not produce the good for the most part. But nature does produce the good for the most part. Therefore, nature does not produce the good by chance.
Or to state the proof of the second premiss in another way. If nature produced the good by chance, it would produce it rarely. But nature does not produce the good rarely. Therefore nature does not produce the good by chance.
2. Nature operates in the way that it is apt (like a courageous man operates courageously). but the operation of nature is such as to produce the good. Therefore, nature is apt to produce the good.
Proof of the second premiss: Nature produces the good by going through a determined number of steps such as to produce the good; as does human art (for example, in making a pie). If the production of the good was accidental to what nature does, it would not go through the same ordered steps to produce it.
Nature’s way of producing the good is to go through determined steps, as does human art. But when the good is repeatedly produced by going through the same determined number of steps, the good is a result of those steps as such, not by accident or happening. This can be seen in the arts where the good is produced (not accidentally or by happening) by going through the same number of steps over and over again. An ordered series of steps is found in the arts. Out of this, one obtains a definite result which is good. A recipe would be an example of an ordered series of steps and the cake would be a result. In living things, we find a definite series of steps in the embryo’s development leading to the final result. In this respect there is a likeness between the works of art and of nature; that is, the series of steps tends towards a definite result. Then why not say that the ordered series of steps in nature is for the definite result. There is no defined or determined series of steps in an accidental result. There is, however, in the world of nature and of art. The steps in an accidental result are not for the sake of it, but when a definite ordered series of steps leads to a definite result, they are for the sake of it. Nature goes through very ordered steps to produce a chicken. Hence, one can say that the steps nature takes are such as to lead to a good result. The steps that nature goes through are also such as to lead to a good result. We know that in art we have action for an end. Therefore, nature is such as to produce the good through definite steps, just as art is. Thus we can say that nature is also among the causes that act for an end.
3. Human art clearly acts for an end. But human art cannot act for an end without imitating nature. Therefore, nature acts for an end.
Proof of the second premiss: human art cannot act for an end without making its product out of a matter suitable to its function and without giving it a form suitable for its function. But this is the way nature makes the parts of the animals etc. Hence, if art were to make the products of nature, it would make them in the same way e.g., false teeth.
4. Human art, in helping nature, acts for an end. But we could not act for an end in helping nature if nature had no end. Therefore, nature does have an end.
The medical art acts for a purpose in helping nature by sewing up the body; optics helps the eye in preparing glasses; and logic has a purpose in helping our reason; the farmer in plowing the field etc.
5. The fifth argument is an induction from the many examples of actions for an end in animals and also in the plants. We readily recognize the parts of animals and plants as tools and call them so. The existence of vestigial organs in animals is like that of vestigial bureaus in government.
6. Matter is for the sake of form, just as the finished product is for the sake of its uses. Raw materials are to the hammer as the hammer is to hammering. The analogy is one of purpose. But the action of nature is such as to form matter. Therefore, nature acts for an end.
OBJECTIONS TO NATURE ACTING FOR AN END
We shall consider four main objections against nature acting for an end.
1. The first objection is that nature sometimes fails to produce the good, but produces bad things, as the defects in a baby. How then one say that nature is directed towards the good?
But human art which is aiming at the good also sometimes fails to produce the good. The cook sometimes overcooks the meat or the doctor makes a mistake. But does this mean that the cook or doctor is not acting for an end. Of course not since this is the rare case. It means the opposite for there can be failure or mistake only when an end is not realized. If nature also is seen to fail or make a mistake, this is a sign that nature is acting for an end.
2. The second objection is as follows: Action for an end requires a mind, But nature does not have a mind. Therefore, nature does not act for an end.
Action for an end does require a mind but not necessarily a mind in what acts for an end. The operations of a machine are directed toward an end although the machine does not have a mind. The mind of man has realized something of its art in the machine. This is possible because art, unlike foresight, operates through determined steps. Perhaps some other mind has put something of its art into nature. This is like a habit which we sometimes call a second nature. The habitual driver has realized something of the art of driving a car (like stopping it by putting on the brakes) in his reflexes or habit which accomplish this purpose without a mind (and it is well that it does). When a child runs in front of the car, one does not deliberate what to do, but does so out of habit. Slamming on the brakes is an action done for an end, but it is not deliberated about in the man to whom it has become second nature. Nature is like this. something of the art of building a tree is in the tree.
If nature is an object for our mind, if it appeals to our mind by its order and simplicity, is it so strange to say that it is a product of mind? If the products of our mind worked out without relation to the natural world have found an application in it, is it strange to say that nature is the product of a mind similar in some way to our own. Moreover like produces like and evolution has resulted in a mind. The products of man’s mind are starting to be a bit like our mind; e.g., computers. Hence some people wonder whether these computers have a mind, just as people wonder whether the bee etc. have intelligence. Of course, it does not belong to natural science to discuss this mind. On the other hand it does not belong to natural science to deny it either. However the evidence points to the existence of such a mind. If one wants to know that mind before admitting its effects, he wants to put the cart before the horse as far as our knowledge is concerned for we usually know effects before causes.
3. The third objection is this: Nature could produce the good we think is its end by mathematical chance (e.g., the seeds of a tree) But if the chances are great enough, there is a probability that a good combination will occur. But only good combinations can survive and reproduce themselves. This is why we see good for the most part in the products of nature, not because nature is inclined towards the good rather than to the bad. This would seem to be essentially the argument of Empedocles.
The first thing to be recognized here is that mathematical chance (which is expressed in a ratio) is not necessarily a cause outside of intention as is the chance defined in the second book of the Physics as an accidental cause of what happens rarely as a result of an action done for an end. Human art sometimes uses mathematical chance as a means of achieving an end; e.g., the pellets in a hunter’s gun. The production of seeds by a tree may be a means of insuring the reproduction of the tree and maintaining its kind in existence. Nature may use mathematical chance as one means of achieving its ends.
Thus that nature does sometimes achieve the good by mathematical chance is no reason for saying that it is not acting for an end. On the other hand it is not a reason for saying that it does. The problem is whether mathematical chance is a means toward an end, is directed towards an end or is the principal cause of the good in nature.
Mathematical chance left to itself, as a principal cause, is more apt to produce the bad than the good. This is because the good takes place in one way and the bad in many or rather an infinity of ways; so that the chances for the bad are infinitely greater than for the good. There is an infinity of ways to miss the bull’s-eye and only one way to hit it. Hence, if mathematical chance were the first and chief cause of good in the natural world, we would find the good rarely in the works of nature and, in the course of time, the natural world would be getting worse. Since neither of these is so in the natural world, we must conclude that mathematical chance in nature is limited and directed toward the good. Those who deny this are forced to say that the present state of nature where good is found for the most part, is a result of the opposite condition where it would be produced most rarely by a cause that is apt to continue the opposite.
4. The fourth objection proceeds from the principle of simplicity. If one can always point out a matter and a mover (or some combination) for what takes place in the natural world, it is superfluous to introduce a fourth cause, the end. But it is always possible to do the former. Therefore.
This objection leads to try reducing all living phenomena to physical principles. And in the physical sciences the principle of simplicity (or fewness) has reigned for along time.
The first things to be pointed out here is that the principle of simplicity was first adopted in the physical sciences in modern times because it was thought that superfluous principles would serve no purpose in nature. This is to admit that nature acts for an end. This is clearly seen in Newton’s first rule of reasoning in the Principia:
We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. To this purpose, the philosophers say that nature does nothing in vain; and more is in vain when less will serve; for nature is pleased with simplicity, and affects not the pomp of superfluous causes.
When Newton says “Nature does nothing in vain, and more is in vain when less will serve”, he is saying that for nature to have more causes than necessary would serve no purpose. Thus the principle of simplicity is based upon nature acting for an end. Hence, it is absurd to use the principle of simplicity to reject end or purpose in nature if the principle of simplicity is itself based on nature acting for an end. One would be saying that it is not so because it is so.
If someone says that he uses the principle of simplicity, not because of the first reason why it was adopted, but because of its success in modern science, one might argue that this very success is a sign that nature acts for an end. Human art which acts for an end delights in simplicity and is like nature in this respect.
But leaving aside the argument that the principle of simplicity is either based on nature acting for an end or is as sign of it, we can still not reject end in nature on the basis of it. First because the principle of simplicity is not opposed to adding another kind of cause if the others are insufficient. And matter, form and mover are not sufficient to explain the good in nature without end being a cause as can be seen in the reply to objection three. Second the principe of simplicity is not opposed to adding another cause on a higher level when the added cause unifies those already known. But the end does this, being the cause of all the other causes being causes. Newton’s principles did not violate the principle of simplicity when they were added to those of Galileo and Kepler. The former were on a higher level and unified those of Galileo and Kepler.