Whether Logic Is About Things

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Whether Logic Is About Things

Logic as a Whole · Subject of Logic

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WHETHER LOGIC IS ABOUT THINGS

The general problem whether logic is about things is especially relevant or most important to consider for the Categories of Aristotle.

If logic is ordered to getting a knowledge of things, logic must in some way consider things. For it is impossible to order anything towards an end if that end is not in some way known.

Moreover, if logic is not a creation of our imagination like the rules of monopoly, but is a reasoned out knowledge, it must be about what has at least a remote foundation in things. Knowledge in the strict sense (as we are using that word here) involves certitude. And nothing is certain or sure that is merely a creation of our imagination.

If someone wants to use the word logic for something that is neither ordered to getting a knowledge of things, nor is about what has at least a remote foundation in things, he is using the word purely equivocally.

Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, Tomus I, Distinctio XXXVIII, Quaest. I, Art. III, Solutio, Ad 2, Ad 3:

Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse ejus, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. Una quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III De anima, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. Alia autem comprehendit esse rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam, vel accidentis ad subjectum.

...intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent, non apprehendit illud esse nisi componendo et dividendo...

Ad tertium dicendum, quod operationi intellectus nostri componentis et dividentis admiscetur tempus duplici de causa: tum ex parte sua, quia accipit scientiam a continuo et tempore, scilicet a sensu et imaginatione; tum ex parte intellectorum, quae in tempore sunt.

LOGIC AND THINGS

One can approach logic by a division. Either all things are known by man or no things are known by man or some things are known by man and some things are not known by man. There is no fourth possibility. Clearly the third or middle case is the truth.

If all things were known by man, there would be no need for logic. Logic is an art for coming to know unknown things.

If no things were known by man, logic would be impossible. Logic is an art for coming to know things unknown through things that are known already.

If some things are known by man and some are not, either there is a road from one to the other or there is not. There is no third possibility. If there is such a road, logic is the art or reasoned-out knowledge about that road.

------------------------------------------------------------------ The first question about any reasoned-out knowledge would seem to be "What is it about?" A mistake, therefore, in the answer to this question is the most serious mistake that one could make about any reasoned-out knowledge. We must try, then, to make no mistake in answering the question whether logic is about things. As dialectic is a way to the beginnings of all reasoned-out knowledge, so sophistic (which is properly the opposite of dialectic) is a way of corrupting the beginnings of all reasoned-out knowledge or of being mistaken about them. Among the thirteen kinds of mistake distinguished by Aristotle in the book On Sophistical Refutations, there is one that plays an important role in corrupting the beginnings of logic. This is the mistake of simply and not simply. The importance of this kind of mistake in corrupting the beginnings of logic is seen in the Meno and also in the beginning of the Posterior Analytics where Aristotle again considers this mistake. (This mistake is also fundamental in misunderstanding the first road in our knowledge where confusing what is more known simply with what is more known to us is fatal.) If we consider the following statement of Albert the Great, we can see how it is possible to make this mistake in regard to the question whether logic is about things:

Quamvis logica considerat intentiones et non res, tamen considerat intentiones principaliter relatas ad res. If one considers the first part only (logica considerat intentiones et non res ), one might remove entirely from logic the consideration of things. Because logic is not about things simply or without qualification, someone might think that it is not about things in any way. Albert himself says later that logic is about things, following the Arabs (De Praedicabilibus, Tractatus I, Caput II, ed. Doyon, pp. 5b-6a):

Horum autem quae dicta sunt, rationem ponit Avicenna dicens res omnes tripliciter esse accipiendas. scilicet quod primo accipiantur in essentiae suae principiis: secundo in esse quod habent in singularibus propriis: tertio autem secundum quod acceptae sunt in intellectu...

Et secundum omnes istos tres modos sunt etiam consequentia accidentia quae vocantur propriae passiones ipsius. Et sic quolibet istorum modorum trium philosophia de ipsis intendit acquirere veritatem.

Et hoc est per ductum rationis aliquem qui ad logicam pertinet. Res enim prout habent esse in anima, accidentia habent propria, sicut aliquid esse notum apud hominem, et aliquid esse ignotum: et cum comparata ad invicem in aliquo se conjungant, erit via rationis, procedendo de noto ad ignotum, per comparationem noti ad ignotum secundum convenientiam vel differentiam noti ad ignotum. Ex quo comprehenditur, quod unum componitur cum alio, et praedicatur de illo: vel unum dividitur ab alio, et removetur ab ipso: secundum enim hunc modum devenitur de uno in alterum.

If someone said Albert contradicted himself, he would have refuted Albert sophistically, that is, apparently by the mistake of simply and not simply. To consider things, not in themselves, but as they are in reason, is not to consider things simply, but in some qualified way.