Whether the Genus in the Definition of the Skopos of a Logical Treatise Is Vocal Sound
Logic as a Whole · Subject of Logic
From his file: VOICE,GENUS IN LOGICAL SKOPUS.doc.
WHETHER THE GENUS IN THE DEFINITION OF THE SKOPOS OF A LOGICAL TREATISE IS VOCAL SOUND
Perhaps we can be led into this question by a more particular question. I used to wonder how to translate the Greek word λόγος which is the genus in the definition of definition and the definition of syllogism. Was Aristotle defining the λόγος in words and vocal sounds or the λόγος in thoughts and reason which is signified by those words?
The answer I then gave was that λόγος can have both meanings. The definitions could be understood in either way. Or better, it should be said that there are two definitions. These two definitions correspond to the λόγος that is in words and the λόγος that is in thoughts. There is a definition in the mind and a definition in words, a syllogism in the mind and a syllogism in words. Further, I would have said that the definition in words signified the definition in thoughts, and the syllogism in words signified the syllogism in thoughts.
When asked what logic was about, I would have said that it is chiefly about the definition in the mind or in thoughts and the syllogism in the mind or in thoughts. But in order to talk about the definition or syllogism that is in the mind. we must make use of the definition or syllogism that is in words.
Aristotle (I would have said) is chiefly interested in the λόγος in reason and only secondarily interested in the λόγος in words insofar as the latter signifies the former. Hence, although the definition could be adapted easily to both according as we took either sense of λόγος, it should be taken primarily as referring to the λόγος in reason and only secondarily to the λόγος in words. Hence, when I translated the definition of syllogism into English, I would translate by argument, which is or could be something in reason. rather than by speech which would again limit it to the in words (which in my understanding was only the secondary subject). But here I had difficulty in finding one word as I had found the word argument to translate in the definition of syllogism. I experimented with clumsy circumlocutions like a composition of thoughts etc.
When I then approached the definition of syllogism or the definition of definition in a logical treatise of Aristotle, I assumed that what was being primarily defined was a λόγος in the mind.
What led me to this position? I think I was partly led by authority and partly led by reasons. An example of authority is this text from Albert the great in his Tractatus on the Nature of logic in the beginning of his commentary on the predicables (De Praedicabilibus, Caput IV, De quo sit logica ut de subjecto. Doyon ed. , pp 9-10):
logicus et ad se et ad alterum utitur sermone per accidens, et non per se...Ratiocinatione autem utitur per se...Solus autem logicus sermone utitur prout est pars instrumenti per quod solum fides de incognito, cum notitia ipsius ex noto arguitur per complexionem argumenti. Propter alterum ergo sermone utitur et non propter seipsum.
There also seemed to be a good reason for saying that the λόγος in thoughts rather than the λόγος in words was the principal subject. Words are clearly for the sake of thoughts in logic and not thoughts for the sake of words. But when one thing is for the sake of another, the latter is clearly principal. Hence, the λόγος in thoughts was the chief subject.
Moreover, different vocal sounds in different languages (such as Greek, Latin and English) are used to signify the same definition in or syllogism in the mind. When Aristotle defines nature in Greek, for example, and Thomas, in Latin, do they have the same definition or not? They do not use the same vocal sounds, but they have the same thoughts in mind. Clearly their not using the same vocal sounds (or the same written signs of those vocal sounds) is secondary while their having the same thoughts or understanding the same is primary.
But after some time, I began to doubt this position. How did I begin to doubt this? It began with a re-reading of the Peri Hermeneias of Aristotle with the commentary of Thomas Aquinas. Aristotle begins that great work with a short proemium, in which he tells us what he is going to talk about. He is going to talk about noun and verb, negation and affirmation, enunciation (or statement) and λόγος. When he defines these, the genus is always voice or vocal sound, not thought or composite thought. The conclusion seemed unavoidable. Aristotle had written a book on a vocal sound, not one on a thought. I had been prevented by my preconceived notions ("intus existens, extraneum prohibet") from seeing what was staring me in the face. What was defined was a vocal sound or voice, the statement in words, not the statement in thoughts (even if this latter was signified by the former). But no disciple is above his master.
Thomas in his commentary makes clear that both the proemium and the division of the Tractatus all revolve around signifying vocal sounds (In I Peri Hermenias, Lectio II, n. 11):
Praemisso proemio, Philosophus accedit ad propositum exequendum. et quia ea, de quibus promiserat se dicturum, sunt voces significativae complexae vel incomplexae, ideo praemittit tractatum de significatione vocum: et deinde de vocibus significativis determinat de quibus in proemio se dicturum promiserat. Et hoc ibi, Nomen ergo est vox signficativa etc.
Now λόγος is the genus in the definition of statement, definition and syllogism. If the λόγος in the definition of statement is a vocal sound, in particular speech, rather than a thought, as is clear from the Peri Hermeneias, then likewise the λόγος in the definitions of definition and of syllogism should be translated as vocal sound or speech.
Further, since a syllogism is made up of statements, one could also reason from statement being in vocal sounds to syllogism being something in vocal sounds, a speech. Even though we give the statement or enunciation another name when it becomes part of the syllogism, corresponding to its new status as a premiss (in Latin this is propositio ) the premiss is still a statement. As Albert states (Commentaria in Liber I Priorum Analyticorum, Tractatus I, Caput II, ed. Doyon, p. 4r):
propositio et enuntiatio non differant secundum substantiam et secundum id quod sunt propositio et enuntiatio, differunt tamen secundum esse, et secundum intentiones nominum.
If the syllogism is made out of its premisses and these are statements and statements are vocal sounds, then syllogisms must be vocal sounds.
If the λόγος in both the definitions of statement and syllogism is a vocal sound (in particular, a speech), why not also the λόγος in the definition of definition? Indeed, if statements and syllogisms are sometimes made out of definitions, and the former are vocal sounds, so too must the definitions out of which they are made.
When Aristotle is teaching us how to define in the second book of the Posterior Analytics, he gives us a warning not to define by metaphors (end of Chapter 12). Since the metaphor is a word, he could hardly give this warning if the definition was not in words. But words are vocal sounds. Hence, the λόγος in the definition of definition is that vocal sound or voice called a speech.
Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, gives this definition of definition (In II Posteriorum Analyticorum, Lectio II, n. 419):
definitio est oratio significans quod quid est
This definition has three parts as does Aristotle's definition of definition at the beginning of Chapter 5 of Book One of the Places (Topics ). the three parts of each definition clearly corresponds to each other. But we are here concerned only with the first part of the definition, the genus in each. Where Aristotle has λόγος, Thomas has oratio. But oratio (being connected with oro and os, meaning mouth) corresponds to speech in English, just as orator does to speaker. It is significant that in the translation of λόγος in the definition of definition (and for that matter, in the definitions of statement and syllogism) into Latin, Thomas uses oratio rather than ratio. The former (oratio ) refers more to speech and vocal sounds while the latter (ratio ) can refer more to thought.
In the seventh book of the Metaphysics, when he discusses definition, Aristotle also calls it a λόγος (at the beginning of Chapter 10, 1034b 20). The Latin translation used by Thomas does not use oratio here, but ratio which word surely lends itself to an understanding of definition as something in thoughts. But notice how Thomas in his commentary on this passage does not understand it this way (In VII Metaphysicorum, Lectio IX, n. 1460):
Dicit ego primo, quod omnis "definitio est quaedam ratio", idest quaedam compositio nominum per rationem ordinata.
Unum enim nomen non potest esse definitio, quia definitio oportet quod distincte notificet principia rerum quae concurrunt ad essentiam rei constituendam; alias autem definitio non sufficienter manifestaret essentiam rei.
Et propter hoc dicitur in primo Physicorum, quod definitio dividit "definitum in singulare", idest exprimit distincte singula principia definiti. Hoc autem non potest fieri nisi per plures dictiones: unde una dictio non potest esse definitio, sed potest esse manifestiva eo modo, quo nomen minus notum manfestatur per magis notum.
Omnis autem ratio partes habet, quia est quaedam oratio composita et non simplex nomen.
Thomas is evidently speaking of the definition in words rather than in thoughts for he says that the definition is a composition of names ("compositio nominum"), not of thoughts. Names are not thoughts although they may signify thoughts. Thomas speaks of how among names that are synonyms, one may be more known than another. Synonyms must be vocal sounds, not thoughts. Hence, the definition is speech or ordered names rather than ordered thoughts. This is why Thomas, at the end of the passage, uses the word oratio in place of the translator's ratio. Logos should be translated here more by oratio than ratio.
The contrast between name and definition and the point that a definition cannot be one name makes sense only if one is thinking of definition as a composition of names. After defining definition in the Places (Topics, Book I Chapter 5, 101b 38) thus
ἔστι δ’ ὅρος μὲν λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἧν ἔιναι σημαίνων
Aristotle contrasts it with name, just as Thomas did above (Topics, Bk. I, ch. 5, 102a 2-5):
ὅσοι δ’ ὁπωσοῦν ὀνόματι τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ποιοῦνται, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἀποδιδόασιν ὅυτοι τὸν τοῦ πράγματος ὁρισμόν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶς ὁρισμὸς λόγος τίς ἐστιν.
Albert the Great's comment here also makes sense if he is thinking that the definition is a composition of names (Commentaria in Libris Topicorum, Liber I, Tractatus I, Caput II, Laval ed. , pp. 29-30):
Palam est, quoniam quicumque quolibet nomine uno suae significationis assignationem faciunt, cum multa essentialia explicite uno nomine significari non possunt: et ideo patet quod non assignant ejus rei quam nominant realem et explicitam diffinitionem, eo quod omnis definitio explicans per essentialia diffinitum est oratio: quia essentialia constituentia rem secundum quod sunt essentiae, uno nomine explicite significari non possunt, et ideo omnis definitio est oratio et non potest esse nomen unum.
Albert would not contrast definition with one name in the above text unless he was thinking of the definition as many names.
I would not deny that the words definition and enunciation (and syllogism ) could be used proportionally to name something in reason rather than in the voice. Perhaps Thomas does so in this passage from his commentary on the beginning of Gospel of St. John (Super Ioannem, Caput I, Lectio I, n. 25):
Illud ergo proprie dicitur verbum interius, quod intelligens intelligendo format. Intellectus autem duo format, secundum duas operationes. Nam secundum operationem suam quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, format definitionem; secundum operationem suam, qua componit et dividit, format enunciationem, vel aliquid huiumodi. Et ideo, illud sic formatum et expressum per operationem intellectus, vel definientis, vel enunciantis exteriori voce significatur. Unde dicit Philosophus quod ratio, quam significat nomen, est definitio.
In this text, Thomas is, of course, chiefly interested in the interior verbum because he wants to manifest the Verbum Dei. But in commenting on the logical treatises of Aristotle, he speaks of the definition as a composition of names. For example, In I Peri Hermeneias, Lectio VIII, n. 98:
Sic igitur Aristotles valde subtiliter manifestavit quod absoluta unitas enunciationis non impeditur, neque per compositionem quam importat verbum, neque per multitudinem nominum ex quibus constat definitio.
If either names or definitions are vocal sounds, then the other must also be vocal sounds.
Although Thomas does not have a commentary on the Categories, there are some texts where he seems to indicate that the subject of the Categories is the praedicatum and, at least, one where he calls the praedicatum a name. First, a statement of Thomas on the subject of logic (In I Posteriorum Analyticorum, Lectio XX, n. 171):
Considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta, syllogismum, enunciationem, praedicatum, aut aliquid huiusmodi.
The syllogism is the principal subject of the logic of the third act. The enunciation or statement is the subject of the logic of the second act. Does praedicatum pertain then to the logic of the first act? And is it the subject of the only book that has come down to us from Aristotle on the logic of the first act (the Categories )? When Thomas distinguishes the ten categories, he uses the word praedicatum (In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio IX,nn. 891-892):
Sciendum enim est quod praedicatum ad subiectum tripliciter se potest habere.
Uno modo cum est id quod est subiectum, ut cum dico, Socrates est animal. Nam Socrates est id quod est animal. Et hoc praedicatum dicitur significare substantiam primam, quae est substantia particularis, de qua omnia praedicantur.
Secundo modo ut praedicatum sumatur secundum quod inest subiecto: quae quidem praedicatum, vel inest ei per se et absolute...vel inest ei non absolute...
Tertio modo ut praedicatum sumatur ab eo quod est extra subiectum....
But in criticizing a position of Avicenna, Thomas seeems to indicate that we can understand these praedicata as names (In V Metaphysicorum., Lectio IX, n. 894):
Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico album et musicum. Nam album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum ex consequenti, in quantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi significet, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum.
Enough has been said for the present about the two positions on the subject of Aristotle's logical treatises. we must now try to untie the knot and answer the objections opposed to our solution.
We must first recall with the help of Thomas that logic is not studied for its own sake, but is a tool and about tools (In Boetii de Trinitate, Lectio II, Q. I, Art. 1, Ad 2):
scientiae speculativae, ut patet in principio Metaphys, sunt de illis quorum cognitio quaeritur propter seipsa.
Res autem de quibus est logica, non quaeruntur ad cognoscendum propter seipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias.
Et ideo logica non continetur sub philosophia speculativa quasi principalis pars, sed sicut quoddam reductum ad eam, prout ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismos et definitiones et alia huiusmodi, quibus in speculativis scientiis indigemus.
Unde secundum Boetium in Comment. super Porphyrium (L. 1, cap. 3) non tam est scientia quam scientiae instrumentum.
The second step in our solution is that speech and its parts can be instruments or tools of reason. Thomas again clearly teaches that speech and its parts can be used as instruments or tools by reason (In Peri Hermeneias, Lectio VI, n. 81):
ratio potest etiam uti oratione et eius partibus quasi instrumentis
Later while reiterating that speech is an instrument of reason, Thomas points out that it is useful insofar as it signifies thought (In I Peri Hermeneias, Lectio VII, nn. 83-84):
oratio, quamvis non sit instrumentum alicuius virtutis naturaliter operantis, est tamen instrumentum rationis, ut supra dictum est.
Omne autem instrumentum oportet definiri ex suo fine, qui est usus instrumenti: usus autem orationis, sicut et omnis vocis significativae, est significare conceptionem intellectus....
Here we see that speech is a tool of reason insofar as it signifies.
The third and last step in our solution is to see why these tools of speech and name are the tools considered in the logical treatises of Aristotle. If reason could order its thoughts enough to know things well without using names or speeches, then logic would not be about names or speeches. But reason cannot order its thoughts sufficiently without using names and speeches. And it is difficult, if not impossible, for man to use a tool that is not sensible. The teacher uses vocal sounds to order the thoughts of the student. And even when man tries to order his own thoughts by himself, he uses vocal sounds even if he only imagines them in his head.
Further, it is difficult, if not impossible, to talk about a tool that cannot be sensed. Further, the necessity of the beginner learning logic at the beginning of his philosophical education makes it especially difficult to talk about a tool that cannot be sensed.
Logic is about using names and speeches to order our thoughts about things so that we can come to know things or come to know them better. Logical treatises are about the names and speeches reason uses to order its thoughts about things so that it can come to now them. Names and speeches can be useful for ordering our thoughts only insofar as they signify in some way those thoughts and are used as such by reason.
We must now consider the objections from reason and from the authority of Albert the Great.
The first objection from reason is this: words are clearly for the sake of thoughts in logic and not thoughts for the sake of words. But when one thing is for the sake of another, the latter is clearly principal. Hence, the order in our thoughts rather than in our words is the principal concern of logical treatises.
It is true that, in logic, words are for the sake of thoughts. But likewise thoughts are for the sake of thinking. Is then the subject of logical treatises the acts of reason more than the tools needed for those acts? The goal of wisdom or metaphysics is to know the first causes, but they are not the subject of wisdom.
Perhaps this likeness from theology will be useful. There is a treatise on the sacraments in theology. Is this treatise about seven signs or about seven graces? There is an element of truth in both. Next question: is it about seven signs causing seven graces or about seven graces caused by seven signs? Since the treatise is about sacraments, we must ask what is a sacrament. Is a sacrament a grace caused by a sign or is it a sign which causes grace? Students of the sacraments know that a sacrament is a sign which causes grace. But when we say that a sacrament is a sign causing grace, are we saying that the sign is more important than the grace or that the sign is not for the sake of the grace? Of course not. Hence, even if thoughts are more important than words and words are for the sake of thoughts, it does not follow necessarily that the subject of logical treatises are thoughts more than words. (The sacraments are also an important likeness insofar as they exemplify the need of a sensible tool for man, the animal with reason.)
Another likeness from theology is the work of Dionysius On The Divine Names. Is this book about the names of God or about God? As the title indicates, it is about the names of God. Does this mean, then, that it is not about God? Whoever talks about the names of God and tries to explain them, will necessarily also talk about God, and about our knowledge of God (for we name things as we know them). Further, God is infinitely better than the names of God. Further, the purpose of talking about the names of God is so we can talk about God. But does all this mean that we should say that Dionysius' book is about God rather than the names of God. There is the little matter of the title of the book, Dionysius' stated intention (which is, as he says in the first sentence) "the unfolding of the divine names so far as possible") and the order which this book has among Dionysius' works. Thomas explains the last in his commentary (Expositio in Librum de Divinis Nominibus, Caput XIII, Lectio IV, n. 1007):
Et in hoc fit finis expositionis intelligibilium divinorum nominum quantum ad ipsam. sed intendit ulterius transire Deo duce ad symbolicam theologiam in qua scilicet nomina quae symbolice dicuntur de Deo, puta: quod dicitur leo, lapis, ignis et alia huiusmodi; qui quidem liber apud nos non habetur.
Hence, it is more correct to say that this book is about the names of God even though that does not exclude us from saying that it is also in some way about God.
The usefulness of this likeness can be further developed. The subject of theology is God (Thomas, Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. I, Art. 7, c):
Omnia autem pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei vel quia sunt ipse Deus; vel quia habent ordinem ad Deum, ut ad principium et finem. Unde sequitur quod Deus vere sit subjectum huius scientiae.
The subject of theology is God, not the names of God. Suppose someone proceeding from the above text came to the work of Dionysius which is a work in theology or sacred doctrine. He might conclude that Dionysius' work is about God rather than about the names of God. Or if it is about both, that it is more correct to say that it is about God. Such a person would be blinded from seeing what Dionysius actually wrote, a book about the divine names. Why Dionysius wrote a book about the divine names rather than a book about God is a further question that would be asked only after one knows that he wrote such a book. Likewise, even if (and we are not conceding this) logic is about the statement etc. in the mind, we would not be blinded from seeing the statement defined in the Peri Hermeneias is a voice. It is only after we have seen what Aristotle has done, that we should ask why he has done it. Even if one say that the chief subject of logic is the definition (statement and syllogism) in reason rather than in the voice, one could still say that Aristotle's books are about the latter; just as Thomas teaches that the subject of theology is God, but also that the book of Dionysius is about the divine names.
With the above supposition (which we do not admit), one might try to explain Aristotle's procedure following the difference between himself and Plato which Thomas notes and comments on in the De Substantiis Separatis (Caput 4):
Plato non coarctavit numerum intellectuum separatorum numero caelestium motuum: non enim ex hac causa movebatur ad ponendum intellectus separatos, sed ipsam naturam rerum secundum se considerans.
Aristotles vero a sensibilibus recedere nolens, ex sola consideratione motuum, ut supra dictum est, pervenit ad ponendum intellectuales substantias separatas; et ideo earum numerum coarctavit caelestibus motibus.
In Caput 2 (n. 54), Thomas points out the insufficiency of Aristotle's procedure for determining the number of separated substances. Quoting just the lines where Thomas uses the words non sufficienter:
Rationem autem finis non sufficienter aliquis accipere potest ex his quae sunt ad finem, sed potius a contrario. Unde magnitudinem et virtutem superiorum rerum non sufficienter aliquis accipere potest ex inferiorum rerum consideratione.
Assuming that in fact Aristotle's works in logic are about the statement etc. in words, not in thoughts or in reason, as we have tried to show previously, the above texts would cast a light on why Aristotle does this. At least, it would show that it is in accord with his procedure elsewhere. His a sensibilibus recedere nolens has been criticized in the study of natural things (where most of all one might think it is necessary) as impeding the origin of modern science. One could see a likeness between the difference of Plato and Aristotle noted by Thomas:
Plato...ipsam naturam rerum secundum se considerans, Aristoteles vero a sensibilibus recedere nolens.
and the difference between those who would want to have logic about second intentions or thoughts or something else in the mind and Aristotle who writes logical works about vocal sounds. If it is true that Aristotle does not want to recede from the sensible in the last part of the last part of philosophy which is to be acquired only by those of strong and developed mind, how much more so in the study of logic which in some ways pertains to the beginner, as Porphyry and others note.
But I do not think that it has been shown that making the skopos of a logical treatise a vocal sound (such as a name or speech) is insufficient, provided that the necessary differences are added to this genus to complete the definition of the skopos. In other words, I do not think that it can be shown that such a genus for the skopos of an Aristotelian treatise is insufficient in the same way that Thomas shows the insufficiency of Aristotle's way of determining the number of the separated substances. Indeed the case of logic and the study of the separated substance is quite different in that from sensible things one can understand the nature of the immaterial things studied in logic, but not the nature of those studied in metaphysics.
However, there is an enormous difference between theology or metaphysics and logic. For the former are about things which are considered for their own sake while logic is a tool and about tools. When things are considered for their own sake, the more noble or excellent object would seem to be the chief object. But when something is studied as a tool, what has more the character of a tool would seem to have some claim to being a chief object. Names and speeches, insofar as they signify things through thoughts, are tools for ordering our thoughts about things. And if man needs a sensible tool to order his thoughts, they could be the chief subject in the parts of logic.
If there is an art about making signs for the highway department, this is an art about signs even though stopping is more important than the stop-sign. Likewise, logic is about tools that signify something better than themselves.
The second objection from reason was that vocal sounds in different languages are different. Hence, if a definition is in vocal sounds rather than in thoughts, there would not be the same definition for those speaking and writing in different languages. The words in the definition of nature, for example, are not the same in Greek and Latin. Do Aristotle and Thomas then have a different definition because they have different vocal sounds? Of course not. Although the vocal sounds are different, what they understand is the same. Hence, the definition is primarily in the mind.
To this we answer that the logician is interested in vocal sounds only insofar as they signify thoughts about things. The difference that vocal sounds have in themselves or by themselves, apart from their signification, is not the concern of the logician but of the grammarian. If the definition of nature in Greek and in Latin signify the same thing through the same thoughts, these definitions do not differ from the point of view of logic. The grammarian, however, could consider whether the sounds were the same or different. Logic is not concerned with the difference in sound of the vocal sounds it considers (this is accidental to his consideration), but their difference, if any, in signification.
As regards the authority of Albert the Great, the reader may consult our Albert at the Crossroads.
Duane H. Berquist