Why Some Think the Distinct Is More Certain Than the Confused

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Why Some Think the Distinct Is More Certain Than the Confused

Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge

From his file: CERTITUDE OF CONFUSED&DISTINCT.doc.

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WHY SOME THINK THE DISTINCT IS MORE CERTAIN THAN THE CONFUSED

We maintain that the confused (vague) comes before the distinct (precise) both in time and in certitude. But why do some men think that the distinct is more sure than the confused?

One reason is that they confuse the determination of the object with the determination of reason’s assent to the truth. When reason fluctuates between affirming or denying something, reason is undetermined. But when reason assents firmly to either the affirmation or the negation, then reason is determined. If reason does not fluctuate between thinking that a whole is greater than its part and that a whole is not greater than its part, but assents firmly to the affirmation, then reason is determined or certain. But if reason fluctuates between thinking that the human soul is immortal and the human soul is not immortal (as do the people with Socrates in the Phaedo) and does not assent to either, then reason is undetermined or uncertain.

But the determination on the part of the object is something different. When we know what a plane figure is, we know an object that is undetermined as regards the number of sides; i.e., the definition of plane figure does not actually contain any determinate number of sides. The number of sides is left undetermined. Again if we add the determination of three sides and define triangle, we leave undetermined whether the sides are equal or unequal. This indetermination on the side of the object known is due to the nature of our reason which goes from the confused to the distinct, from the general to the particular. Now what is undetermined on the side of the object is known by our reason with greater certitude; i.e., with greater determination in the former sense of the firmness of assent of our reason. We are more sure, for example, that this chair is made out of wood than of the kind of wood it is made of. We are more sure of the difference between tragedy and comedy than of the differences between the various kinds of tragedy or between different kinds of comedy.

However, there is another indetermination on the side of the object known which is due, not to the nature of reason going from the confused to the distinct, but to something in the thing itself as matter in the object of natural science and free will in the object of the sciences of human action and society. What is undetermined due to matter or will is harder for reason to know than the determined objects of mathematics.

If one confuses any of these three kinds of determination, one can easily end up thinking that our distinct knowledge is more certain than our confused knowledge.

Another reason why people are confused as to which is more certain, the confused or the distinct, is confusion about the word confusion itself. Confusion seems to be either a mistake or the father of a mistake. Did we not just speak of the confusion of various senses of determination as being a cause of mistake or error? Indeed, reason’s inability to distinguish the senses of a word would seem to be a universal cause of deception. One of the six main kinds of mistake due to words and speech is the mistake from not distinguishing the senses of a word (which some call the fallacy of equivocation). When we call someone confused or mixed-up, we often imply that he is mistaken or on the road to being mistaken. LIkewise, the word vague which seems to be almost a synonym for confused comes from the Latin word for wandering and in Latin so does the word error. How then can greater certitude be attributed to the confused when it is either a mistake or the source of mistake? How can reason be more certain that it knows when it is mistaken or apt to be mistaken?

The above argument comes from a confusion of two senses of the word confused. The word confused in Latin originally meant poured-together. Aristotle in Ch. 1 of Bk. I of the Physics also uses the Greek word for poured-together.

Let us compare the words poured-together, mixed-up, and put together. All of these words in their first sense involve the bringing together of things that are actually distinct. But as we go from put-together to mixed-up to poured-together, we see a difference as regards the extent to which these things remain clearly distinct from each other when they are brought together (at least, as far as the senses are concerned). But if one wanted to speak of things together where they are not actually distinct, poured-together would be the best choice since liquids do not have fixed boundaries.

The species of a genus and their differences are not actually contained in the thought of the genus. Scalene, isosceles and equilateral are not and could not be actual parts of the definition of triangle. Hence, we could not in the first senses of the above three words say that the species and the differences were in the genus. The genus is not the result of putting together, mixing-up or pouring together the species. If it were, one could not give one definition of the genus or it could not be said of one of its species.

On the other hand, the species must be in the genus in some way. Otherwise, we could neither be said to know the species at all when we know the genus, nor would what had been shown to be true of the genus have been shown to be true of the species in any way at all. The species are in the genus in a way like forms are in matter before it has been formed.

Two questions remain: “Can we know the way species are in their genus?” and “How shall we name it?”