Wisdom Goes Forward by Way of Understanding

← Library · Wisdom about Beginnings

Wisdom Goes Forward by Way of Understanding

Wisdom about Beginnings · Roads in Our Knowledge

From his file: WISDOM BY UNDERSTANDING.doc.

Word doc

Read from in 4 classes

WISDOM GOES FORWARD BY WAY OF UNDERSTANDING

Aristotle begins his Proemium to Wisdom with the statement that all men by birth (or nature) want to understand. The last word in Greek is eidenai which is most properly translated by to understand, not as well by to know or by scire as in Moerbeke's translation. The second reason given by Thomas for this statement is first given for intelligere, not scire:

…quaelibet res naturalem inclinationem habet ad suam propriam operationem: sicut calidum ad calefaciendum, et grave ut deorsum moveatur. Propria autem operatio hominis inquantum est homo, est intelligere. Per hoc enim ab omnibus aliis differt. Unde naturaliter desiderium hominis inclinatur ad intelligendum, et per consequens ad sciendum.[1]

It is fitting for many reasons that Aristotle begins the Proemium with this statement. But we shall note here only the connection of wisdom or the wise man with understanding. This connection can be brought out in three truths: (1) The wise man most of all understands, (2) Wisdom is about the most understandable, and (3) One goes forward in wisdom by way of understanding.

Since wisdom names the highest or greatest perfection of reason, and the perfection of reason consists in understanding, not in thinking or reasoning (although these are necessary to reach the perfection of reason), clearly the wise man most of all understands.

And if the wise man most of all understands, it seems that wisdom must be about what is most understandable. For how could one understand without knowing the understandable? And how could one most of all understand without knowing what is most understandable?

And if the way of going forward in any reasoned out knowledge must fit what is known and the knower, how could the wise man come most of all to understand by knowing the most understandable if he did not go forward by way of understanding more than anyone else? And this is what the great Boethius teaches us in his work On the Trinity that one goes forward in wisdom intellectualiter which I translate as by way of understanding.

But what exactly does it mean to go forward most of all by way of understanding? Thomas Aquinas, in laying out Boethius’ work, contrasts it with the way of going forward in natural philosophy which is most of all by way of reason:

…sicut rationabiliter procedere attribuitur naturali philosophiae, eo quod in ipsa maxime observatur modus rationis, ita intellectualiter procedere attribuitur divinae scientiae, eo quod in ipsa maxime observatur modus intellectus.

Differt autem ratio ab intellectu, sicut multitudo ab unitate. Unde dicit Boethius in IV de Consolatione quod similiter se habent ratio ad intelligentiam et tempus ad aeternitatem et circulus ad centrum. Est enim rationis proprium circa multa diffundi et ex eis unam simplicem cognitionem colligere. Unde Dionysius dicit 7 c. de Divinis Nominibus quod animae secundum hoc habent rationalitatem quod diffusive circueunt exsistentium veritatem, et in hoc deficiunt ab Angelis; sed in quantum convolvunt multa ad unum, quodam modo Angelis aequantur. Intellectus autem e converso per prius unam et simplicem veritatem considerat et in illa totius multitudinis cognitionem capit, sicut Deus intelligendo suam essentiam omnia cognoscit. Unde Dionysius ibidem dicit quod angelicae mentes habent intellectualitatem, in quantum uniformiter intelligibilia divinorum intelligunt.

Sic ergo patet quod rationalis consideratio ad intellectualem terminatur secundum viam resolutionis, in quantum ratio ex multis colligit unam et simplicem veritatem. Et rursum intellectualis consideratio est principium rationalis secundum viam compositionis vel inventionis, in quantum intellectus in uno multitudinem comprehendit.[2]

Thinking or reasoning is to understanding, as motion is to rest. And as motion ends in rest, so thinking and reasoning end in understanding if they are complete. We must think out or reason out something before we understand it.

Thomas then goes on to distinguish two ways in which the wise man goes forward most of all by way of understanding:

Illa ergo consideratio, quae est terminus totius humanae ratiocinationis, maxime est intellectualis consideratio. Tota autem consideratio rationis resolventis in omnibus scientiis ad considerationem divinae scientiae terminatur.

Ratio enim, ut prius dictum est, procedit quandoque de uno in aliud secundum rem, ut quando est demonstratio per causas vel effectus extrinsecos: componendo quidem, cum proceditur a causis ad effectus; quasi resolvendo, cum proceditur ab effectibus ad causas, eo quod causae sunt effectibus simpliciores et magis immobiliter et uniformiter permanentes. Ultimus ergo terminus resolutionis in hac via est, cum pervenitur ad causas supremas maxime simplices, quae sunt substantiae separatae.

Quandoque vero procedit de uno in aliud secundum rationem, ut quando est processus secundum causas intrinsecas: componendo quidem, quando a formis maxime universalibus in magis particulata proceditur; resolvendo autem quando e converso, eo quod universalius est simplicius. Maxime autem universalia sunt, quae sunt communia omnibus entibus. Et ideo terminus resolutionis in hac via ultimus est consideratio entis et eorum quae sunt entis in quantum huiusmodi.

Haec autem sunt, de quibus scientia divina considerat, ut supra dictum est, scilicet substantiae separatae et communia omnibus entibus. Unde patet quod sua consideratio est maxime intellectualis.[3]

The two ways that wisdom goes forward by way of understanding here correspond to the two things considered by the wise man: the separated substances which are the first causes and what is common to all things in the sense of said of all of them which are being, one and the other most universals.

We can approach these two ways a little differently than Thomas does in the following way.

Reason thinks about something before understanding it. And it is by thinking out something that we come to understand it. But there seems to be two chief kinds of thinking out in reasoned out knowledge. We think out what something is and we think out why it is as it is. Although the questions what and why can come together in various ways as is shown in the second book of the Posterior Analytics, we can also see them as leading to different ends, as can be seen in the following.

When we think out what something is, we think out something more universal than it. This can be seen most easily in the thinking out of a definition for the genus is more universal than the species being defined for it is said of many species. And even the difference, although not as universal as the genus, is more universal than the species, as is clear from the definition of Porphyry. Thus when we think out the definition of square as an equilateral and right angled quadrilateral, not only the genus quadrilateral is more universal than square, but also the differences equilateral and right-angled. Therefore by resolving to or thinking out the more universal in the less universal, we come to understand the less universal. But if we understand what the less universal is by the more universal, we understand what everything is by the most universal. But that through which we understand other things would seem to be more understandable.[4]

But when we think out why something is so, we think out its cause which explains why it is so. And since the outside causes are the causes of the causality of the inward causes, we eventually think out in this way the first mover and end. And this is the end of wisdom.

If we understand the effect by its cause and the less universal by the more universal, then the first cause and the most universal would seem to be most understandable. For that through which another is understood must be more understood.

But the first causes and the most universal (in being said of) would seem to be most understandable in distinct ways. Since the general or more universal is more known to our reason than the particular or less universal, the most universal would seem to be most known to us.[5] But the first cause would seem to be least known to us and therefore also least understood by us for a number of reasons.[6] But if the most universals said of all are more known to us than the first causes, they must be known before the first causes in wisdom. And this can be seen in the fourteen books of Wisdom or First Philosophy (the fourteen books meta ta phusika, after the books in natural philosophy) where Aristotle considers the most universals said of all in books five through ten before the first causes in books eleven through fourteen.[7]

Can we unfold further than Thomas does in his laying out of the text of Boethius the meaning and truth of wisdom, or the wise man, going forward by way of understanding?

Perhaps one way of doing so is suggested by a diligent comparison of Thomas’ article laying out how the wise man goes forward[8] intellectualiter, or by way of understanding, with his Proemium to the fourteen books of Wisdom of Aristotle.

In both texts, Thomas states that wisdom is maxime intellectualis. And in the Proemium to Wisdom, Thomas says that the science which is maxime intellectualis is the science which is about the maxime intelligibilia. Wisdom is most understanding because wisdom is about the most understandable. Or the wise man most of all understands because he considers the most understandable.

But in his Proemium to the Fourteen Books of Wisdom of Aristotle, Thomas distinguishes three ways of considering what is most understandable:

..scientia debet esse naturaliter aliarum regulatrix, quae maxime intellectualis est, quae circa maxime intelligibilia versatur.

Maxime autem intelligibilia tripliciter accipere possumus.

Primo quidem ex ordine intelligendi. Nam ex quibus intellectus certitudinem accipit, videntur esse intelligibilia magis. Unde, cum certitudo scientiae per intellectum acquiratur ex causis, causarum cognitio maxime intellectualis esse videtur. Unde et illa scientia quae primas causas considerat, videtur esse maxime aliarum regulatrix.

Secundo ex comparatione intellectus ad sensum. Nam, cum sensus sit cognitio particularium, intellectus per hoc ab ipso differre videtur, quod universalia comprehendit. Unde et illa scientia maxime est intellectualis quae circa principia maxime universalia versatur. Quae quidem sunt ens, et ea quae consequuntur ens, ut unum et multa, potentia et actus…

Tertio ex ipsa cognitione intellectus. Nam cum unaquaeque res ex hoc ipso vim intellectivam habeat, quod est a materia immunis, oportet illa esse maxime intelligibilia, quae sunt maxime a materia separata. Intelligibile enim et intellectum oportet esse proportionata, et unius generis, cum intellectus et intelligibile in actu sunt unum…

Haec autem triplex consideratio, non diversis, sed uni scientiae attribui debet. Nam praedictae substantiae separatae sunt universales et primae causae essendi. Eiusdem autem scientiae est considerare causas proprias alicuius generis et genus ipsum: sicut naturalis considerat principia corporis naturalis. Unde oportet quod ad eamdem scientiam pertineat considerare substantias separatas, et ens commune, quod est genus, cuius sunt praedictae substantiae communes et universales causae.

We have indicated before that there is a connection between the wise man going forward by way of understanding and that wisdom is about the most understandable. And the two ways in which Thomas explains how the wise man goes forward intellectualiter in his laying out of the text of Boethius correspond to the first two way of determining the most understandable here in his Proemium to the fourteen books of Wisdom or First Philosophy of Aristotle. And they are also in the same order.

And if there is, as we have indicated, a connection between the wise man considering what is most understandable and his going forward by way of understanding, is there a third way of going forward by way of understanding besides the two noted in the laying out of the text of Boethius? Or is there some other way in which a third way of considering what is most understandable will cast light upon the wise man going forward by way of understanding?

Does the third way correspond to a third way of going forward by way of understanding? I do not think this is the way to go. Rather I think one should see that this illuminates both the consideration of the most common things and the consideration of the separated substances and also the order of their consideration.

The consideration of the private way of going forward in any reasoned out knowledge has three chief parts. We can speak of the way of defining, the way of demonstrating, and the order of consideration. Since then something is understandable insofar as it is immaterial, the wise man goes forward in all three parts of his private way most of all by way of understanding.

Since he defines without matter, without the sensible matter of definitions in natural philosophy and even without the imaginable matter of the geometer’s definitions, his way of defining is more by way of understanding.

Boethius has pointed out in the De Trinitate (and Thomas has an article expanding on it) that one must transcend the imagination in considering the separated substances and especially God. But this is also true in considering the most universal things, such as being and one.[9] Thus the wise man’s way of judging or demonstrating is by way of understanding since he must go beyond what can be sensed or imagined to understand.

The wise man also goes forward by way of understanding in his order of determination or consideration. The order of determination, or the order in which things are considered, is different in the three kinds of looking philosophy. In geometry, the simple is considered before the composed and the equal before the unequal. In natural philosophy, the general is considered before the particular and the consideration goes toward matter. But in wisdom or first philosophy, one goes towards the immaterial (as Msgr. Dionne taught us) and to some extent from the particular to the general.[10] One goes in wisdom first towards those things which are immaterial in that, although they can be in matter, they need not be in matter. These are the communia, the common things, like act and ability, the one and the many, substance etc. Then one tends towards the separated substances which cannot be in matter or be material. And to some extent in wisdom, we also go from the less universal toward the more universal in the consideration of the common things as is especially clear in the ninth book of Wisdom which is devoted to the consideration of act and ability in general. For in the first part of that book, Aristotle considers the act which is motion and the abilities for that act. And it is not until the second part that he ascends to a completely universal consideration of act and ability. Likewise, in the consideration of the one and the many, it is necessary to ascend from the one that is the beginning of number to the one that is convertible with being. And in the consideration of substance, one ascends from a consideration of material substance to a more general understanding of substance.

And in both aspects of the order of consideration, the wise man is going forward by way of understanding. Since the immaterial is the understandable in act, in going towards the immaterial, the wise man is going forward by way of understanding. This cannot be said so much of the natural philosopher who is going towards matter.[11]

* * *

Heraclitus, the central thinker in human thought, seems to anticipate what wisdom is about and Boethius’ teaching that it goes forward by way of understanding. This can be seen in one of the royal fragments of Heraclitus:

Those who speak with understanding must be strong in what is common to all, as much as a city is strong in its law, and even more so. For all human laws are fed by one divine law which governs as far as it wishes and is more than sufficient for all.[12]

Now the wise are by antonomasia those who speak with understanding. Hence, Heraclitus is teaching us that the wise must be strong in what is common to all. The wise go forward by becoming strong in what is common to all. And in so doing, they most of all go forward by way of understanding. Thus it can said that to go forward by way of understanding means most of all to go forward by becoming strong in what is common to all.

But what is meant by common to all and what does it mean to become strong in it?

Common to all can mean common to all things or common to all men. Now what is said of all is common to all things in one way and what is a cause of all is common to all in another way.[13] And the wise man becomes strong in both when he considers being and one and then the first causes. But he also considers the axioms which are the statements known by all men and becomes strong in them.

Now wisdom, as we learn from Aristotle in the Proemium to Wisdom and in the first part of the fourth Book of Wisdom, is about what is common to all in three senses. Wisdom is about what is common to all things by causality; namely, the first causes. And it is about what is common to all things in being said of all things: being and what is convertible with being. And it is about what is common to all men in their understanding. All understand in a confused way the axioms and their parts.

But what does it mean to become strong in what is common to all? It means to see the distinction and order of what is common to all.

That it means seeing the distinction of things can be seen from the fact that the true and understandable must be one:

verum…praesupponit unum, cum veri ratio ex apprehensione intellectus perficiatur; unumquodque autem intelligibile est in quantum est unum; qui enim non intelligit unum, nihil intelligit, ut dicit Philosophus in IV Metaphysicorum.[14]

And one here could be said to include not only undivided in itself, but also distinct from all others. For it belongs to the perfection of knowledge or understanding that the known be distinguished from all other things:

discretio quae pertinet ad perfectionem cognitionis, non est discretio qua distinguuntur quod intelligitur et quo intelligitur, quia sic divina cognitio qua se cognoscit, esset imperfectissima; sed est discretio qua id quod cognoscitur, distinguitur ab omnibus aliis.[15]

Hence, definition, which makes us most of all understand what something is, must distinguish the defined from everything else:

Per hoc autem quod scitur de re quid est, scitur res prout est ab aliis distincta: unde et definitio, quae significat quid est res, distinguit definitum ab omnibus aliis.[16]

The wise man also casts a light upon distinction since he especially considers contradiction and this is the cause of all distinction.[17]

We have explained elsewhere that reason cannot understand without seeing also the order of things distinguished. Hence, Shakespeare defines reason by its looking before and after for looking means trying to understand and before and after define order.

Thus we become strong in the most universals (what are said of all) when we see (1) their distinction and order (the distinction and order of being, thing, one, true and good) and (2) their distinction from their opposites (they are opposed to their opposites by different kinds of opposition) and (3) the distinction and order of the senses under each of these most universal names. It should be noted that we have here both a distinction which is of things and one that is in thought only. For the distinction between substance and quantity, for example, is a distinction of things and the distinction of act and ability is a distinction of things or ways of being. But the distinction of being and one is in thought only and not a distinction of things.

It should be considered that there is a correspondence at the most universal level between the distinction of the particular kinds of something and the distinction of the senses of the name of that something. This is not usually true on the less universal level. When Euclid, for example, distinguishes the particular kinds of quadrilateral (square, oblong, rhombus, rhomboid and trapezium), this is not a distinction of meanings of the name quadrilateral. For quadrilateral has the same sense or meaning when said of each of the particular kinds. But to show the correspondence of a distinction of kinds of things and of the senses of a word, we can take three examples from respectively the three parts of the fifth book of Wisdom.

The distinction of the four kinds of cause in the world is also a distinction of four basic senses of the word cause. In the first part of the first book of Wisdom or First Philosophy after the Proemium, Aristotle is confirming that there are only four kinds of cause in the world: matter, form, mover and end. But cause is not said of these four with exactly the same meaning. And when Aristotle distinguishes in the fifth book of Wisdom the names used especially in wisdom and in the axioms, he first distinguishes the meanings of cause into these same four. Understanding the four kinds of cause distinctly involves not only seeing that they are different kinds of cause, but also seeing that they are not causes in exactly the same sense of the word cause.

Likewise, the distinction of substance, quantity, quality, and relation is both a distinction of kinds of thing found in the world and a distinction of four meanings of the word being orthing.

And the distinction of the senses of part and whole in the fifth book of Wisdom also corresponds to the distinction of the kinds of whole and part found in the world and in our reason.

The distinction of the kinds of cause or things or whole & parts in the world and the distinction of the senses of the words cause, thing and whole are not the same kind of distinction. But at the most universal level they tend to correspond. This was a very important discovery of the Philosopher. Understanding distinctly matter, form, mover and end involves seeing both that they are different kinds of cause in the world and at the same time seeing that they are not causes in exactly the same sense. Likewise, understanding distinctly substance, quantity, quality and relation involves both seeing that they are different kinds of things in the world and that they are not a thing in the same sense of the word. And understanding distinctly the kinds of whole and part there are in the world and in our reason also involves seeing that they are not whole and part in the same sense of the word.

Because of this double kind of distinction, it is also necessary to see a double kind of order in the distinguished. For insofar as it is a distinction of the senses of a name and we name things as we know them, there is an order in our knowledge of the many distinguished. But insofar as it is also a distinction of what is found in the world, there is also an order in the world or in things.[18] Because of this double distinction and double order in what the wise man considers, he most of all goes forward by way of understanding – for we understand by seeing the distinction and order of things.

This also helps us to become strong in the axioms which are composed of these most common names. The wise man understands the axioms better than we all do by the habit of natural understanding. For the wise man can distinguish the senses of the words used in the axioms.

The division of being into act and ability seems to be even more universal than the division of being according to the figures of predication. And it also seems to cast more direct light upon the four kinds of cause and their distinction and order. Likewise, as we come to understand act and ability most universally in the ninth book of Wisdom or First Philosophy, in its first and then second parts, we are more able to see the before and after of them. And this is the beginning for understanding the existence of the first cause and its distinction from all its effects and their order. Thus becoming strong in what is common to all in the sense of said of all enables us to become strong in regard to the first cause.[19]

Thus we can say that to go forward by way of understanding means to go forward by becoming strong in what is common to all.

* * *

Msgr. Dionne taught us that the word in one language for the same thing is sometimes better than that in another language. Perhaps the main reason for this must be sought in the id a quo nomen imponitur or the etymology of the words if the meaning of the two words is the same. Sometimes the etymology of a word contributes much to an understanding of its meaning and/or use.

I think, for example, that the Greek word episteme is better than the Latin word scientia. For in the etymology of the Greek word is coming to a halt or stop, as both Plato and Aristotle note. And thus episteme names a knowledge in which reason becomes certain or sure after a movement. Hence, I carry this over into English as a reasoned out understanding or a reasoned out knowledge.

But sapientia in Latin is, I think, better than sophia in Greek if the etymology of sapientia is sapida scientia or savoury knowledge.

Likewise, I think that, because of its etymology, the English word understanding is better than the Greek word nous and even the Latin word intellectus. Hence, in considering the truth of Boethius’ statement that wisdom proceeds intellectualiter or by way of understanding, I think it useful to use the English word understanding.

We must first consider the etymology of the word understanding and the light this casts upon its meaning and use. We see in this etymology an example of how all our words are taken from the continuous and place.

Shakespeare, the master of the English language, puns on the etymology and the meaning of the word understanding.[20] If we connect the meaning of the word with its etymology, to understand something means to know what is said to stand under it or to know it through knowing what is said to stand under it. Thus to understand an effect means to know its underlying cause or causes. And to understand a word means to know the meanings or the things that stand under it. And if it is equivocal by reason, to know also the order of these meanings and things.

Although even in other languages the cause may be said to stand under or to underlie the effect, this is especially true In English where the native word for cause seems to be ground.[21]

And in our other major example of what it means to understand a word, we often speak of the name as placed upon its meaning or the thing it signifies. Hence, in Latin, Thomas often speak of the impositio nominis or the placing upon of a name. And we speak of putting a label upon something. Master Ford does not want to go around under the name of cuckold.[22]

To speak then in English, we can say that the wise man goes forward most of all by way of understanding in that he most of all looks under things.

First, he looks under the effect for its cause or ground. And further he looks under the cause for the cause of the cause. And then he looks under the cause of the cause eventually for the first cause which stands under everything else.

And in considering his subject which is being as being, he most of all considers substance which we learn in the fourth book of Wisdom or First Philosophy is the chief subject of wisdom. Thus one of the essential parts of the dialectic in the first and third books of wisdom is about substances. And substance is put with being and one as names of the subject of wisdom as a whole to be considered in the fifth book of Wisdom. And the whole of the seventh and eighth books of wisdom are devoted to a consideration of especially material substance. And in the twelfth book of wisdom, he recalls what has been shown about material substance and completes the consideration of substance by thinking out what are or are not the immaterial substances in the rest of book twelve and the thirteenth and fourteenth books of Wisdom (which are the last books of wisdom come down to us from Aristotle). Now it is easy to see that the Latin derived word substance has the same etymology as the English word understanding. And this suggests to our mind that in such a long consideration of substance, the wise man is most of all going forward by way of understanding. For in knowing substance, we are knowing what stands under other things.

The wise man considers not only the first cause or causes and being as being, but also the axioms. Now in considering the axioms, he is also going forward by way of understanding for the axioms stand under all other statements. And he especially considers the axiom(s) of being and non-being which stand under all the other axioms as their natural beginning. And he looks under the names or words used in the axioms. Aristotle discovered that the words or names used in the axioms are names equivocal by reason. When we look under these words, we find both many meanings and many things, but in a certain order. Hence, the wise man most all understands the axioms since he knows the many meanings and things that stand under these words and their order. In the fifth book of Wisdom or First Philosophy, Aristotle goes forward by way of understanding these words. And since these words are also the words or names used especially in wisdom (the reason for these being the same is that they are the most common names), the wise man begins his consideration of being as being and the one and many, going forward by way of understanding the words to be used throughout the later books. And as the wise man looks under the effect and then under the cause if it has a cause until he reaches the first cause, so likewise there is an order of levels of looking under a word. For example, in the fifth book of Wisdom, Aristotle finds under the word being both being by happening and being as such. And under being by happening, he finds three kinds. And under being as such, he finds being according to the figures of predication and being as true and being as act & ability. And especially in the ninth book of wisdom, he looks under the words ability and act and sees the order, both of their meanings and of the things under them.

Besides these three first matters of wisdom, the wise man also looks under the forms of reasoned out knowledge, especially the looking ones. For we speak of the subject of a reasoned out knowledge as if the subject is under the reasoned out knowledge. And since a reasoned out knowledge is a methodos or over a road, the wise man also distinguishes the privates roads of the forms of reasoned out knowledge, as Boethius did in the De Trinitate and Aristotle somewhat in the sixth book of Wisdom or First Philosophy.

And he looks under the private roads of the various forms of reasoned out knowledge and finds the common road of reasoned out knowledge and, in general, the road of reason as reason. And he looks under this road and finds the natural road in human knowledge. One cannot understand the private road of some particular reasoned out knowledge without knowing the common road of reasoned out knowledge. And one cannot understand the common road of reasoned out knowledge without understanding the natural road in human knowledge. Hence, again, understanding requires one to look under on a number of levels.

Duane H. Berquist

----------------------- [1] In I Metaphysicorum, Lectio I, n. 3 [2] Super De Trinitate, Q. 6 Art. 1, corpus [3] Super De Trinitate, Q. 6 Art. 1, corpus

[4] In the proemium to the eight books of Natural Hearing, Aristotle reasons that we should consider natural things and their causes in general before in particular because we naturally know the confused before the distinct and the general or more universal is confused in comparison to the particular or less universal.

Our reason moves from the second to the third sense of before in the Categories by seeing a likeness of ratios. The second sense of before there is in the sequence of being. A is said to be before B if A can be without B, but B cannot be without A. The third sense of before in the Categories is in the discourse of reason and more generally in our knowledge. And what is most proportionally like the second sense is when something can be known without knowing something else, but the latter cannot be known without knowing the former. And the more universal, it seems, can be known without knowing the less universal, but the reverse is not possible. One can know what a number is without knowing what a composite number is. But not vice-versa. Likewise, one can know what a composite number is without knowing what a perfect number is, but not vice-versa.

Now if the less universal cannot be understood before the more universal is understood, two interesting conclusions follow. One is that if nothing is most universal, nothing can be understood. And second, that the most universal must be understood before anything else can be understood. The less universal can be understood perhaps in a confused way before the most universal is understood distinctly. But in this case, the most universal is understood in at least a confused way. And a distinct knowledge of the most universal is before an altogether distinct knowledge of the less universal. So if the wise man most of all goes forward by way of understanding, the wise man most of all understands the most universal.

The wise man most of all knows that if nothing is most universal, that nothing can be understood. This is shown somewhat in the second book of Wisdom although logic is like wisdom in also to some extent showing this.

The wise man most of all knows the distinction and order of the most universal names, and the distinctions between the most universal names and their opposites, and the distinction and order of the meanings of the most universal names.

[5] I say seems because one must qualify this because of the necessity of transcending what is imagined to understand the most universal. This can be seen from the common opinion both of men and of the first philosophers that whatever is must be in some place. [6] We know effects before causes for the most part because our knowledge begins with our senses which know more effects than causes. [7] One would guess perhaps that there is only one most universal because as one goes from the less universal to the more universal, one is going from many to one. (Thus, for example, one genus, is said of many species.) However, if we stick to univocal predication, there is not one most universal genus said of all things. But can there be more than one name, not synonyms, said equivocally by reason of all things? If so, how can this be? The distinction of the most universals said of all is most subtle. [8] Super De Trinitate, Q. 6 Art. 1 [9] We can also say that the wise man, not only in knowing the separated or immaterial substances, but also in knowing the most common things that pertain to being as being, must transcend the imagination (and the senses) which is most of all to go forward by way of understanding rather than by sensing and imagining. For if one could not go beyond the imagined, one would think that to be in place belongs to being as being. Thomas bring this out in commenting on the thought of the early Greek philosophers that whatever is must be in place and if it is nowhere, it does not exist. Thomas Aquinas, In IV Physicorum, Lectio I, n. 407:

Sed si esse in loco convenit omnibus entibus, videtur quod locus magis pertineat ad considerationem metaphysici quam physici.

Et dicendum est quod hic argumentatur ab opinione ponentium omnia entia esse sensibilia, propter hoc quod imaginationem corporum transcendere non possunt: et secundum hos naturalis scientia est philosophia prima, communis omnibus entibus.

[10] In explaining the names of wisdom in his Proemium to the Fourteen books of Wisdom of Aristotle, Thomas says about the name metaphysics:

Dicitur…Metaphysica, inquantum considerat ens et ea quae consequuntur ipsum. Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis communia post minus communia.

We can see that an understanding of matter and form in the first book of Natural Hearing (the so-called Physics), and an understanding of what motion is in the third book, must both eventually resolve into an understanding of act and ability in general. And ability and act are to being, as matter and form are to mobile being or natural thing. Clearly the most general parts of natural philosophy, those found in the eight books of Natural Hearing and the three books About the Soul, are closest to the most universal knowledge of wisdom. And it is interesting to note that in these two works of Aristotle in natural philosophy, one goes towards the immaterial somewhat although natural philosophy as a whole goes towards matter. For in going from motion toward the unmoved mover, one is moving towards the immaterial and in going from the powers of the living soul to the powers of the sensing soul to the powers of the understanding soul, one is again going towards the immaterial. And without the arguments for the unmoved mover and the immateriality of the ability to understand all the nature of material things. one would never get to anything more universal than what is in place. One could never go up to see something more universal that what is in place. But one would be like the early natural philosophers for whom the investigation of natural things is the same as the investigation of what is. And for whom whatever is, is in some place; and if it is not somewhere, it does not exist.

[11] When Aristotle distinguishes the virtues of reason itself, he distinguishes wisdom from both episteme and nous. Does wisdom proceed more by way of understanding than does nous which is named from understanding? The wise man knows more what stands under the words in the axioms than does everyone by nous. But nous proceeds only by way of understanding while the wise man must reason out many things.

[12] ξὺν νόωι λέγοντας ἰσχυρίζεσθαι χρὴ τῶι ξυνῶι πάντων, ὅκωσπερ νόμωι πόλις, καὶ πολὺ ἰσχυροτέρως. τρέφονται γὰρ πάντες οἱ ἀνθρώπειοι νόμοι ὑπὸ ἑνὸς τοῦ θείου· κρατεῖ γὰρ τοσοῦτον ὁκόσον ἐθέλει καὶ ἐξαρκεῖ πᾶσι καὶ περιγίνεται. (Heraclitus, DK 114)

[13] Thomas often touches upon this distinction. For example In X Metaphysicorum, Lectio III, n. 1964: “Sed alia est communitas universalis et causae. Nam causa non praedicatur de suis effectibus, quia non est idem causa suiipsius. Sed universale est commune, quasi aliquid praedicatum de multis; et sic oportet quod aliquo modo sit unum in multis, et non seorsum subsistens ab eis.” And Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 78 Art. 4, Ad 1: “sensus interior non dicitur communis per praedicationem, sicut genus; sed sicut communis radix et principium exteriorum sensuum.” The common good is common by way of causality, not predication or being said of what it is common to. [14] Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, Q. 21, Art. 3, C and Ad 3

[15] Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate et Bonitate, Q. 10, Art 9. Ad Obj. 4

[16] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber III, Caput XLVI

[17] Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist. V, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 1:

affirmatio et negatio dicuntur maxime opponi, quia in eis non importatur aliqua convenientia:

in privative enim oppositis importatur convenientia quantum ad subjectum, quia nata sunt fieri circa idem:

in contrariis autem et relativis etiam quantum ad genus, quia scilicet sunt in eodem genere. Unde in utraque oppositione utrumque extremorum significatur per modum entis et naturae cujusdam.

Illud autem in quo invenitur aliquid non permixtum contrario, est maximum et primum in genere illo, et causa omnium aliorum;

et ideo oppositio affirmationis et negationis, cui non admiscetur aliqua convenientia, est prima et maxima oppositio, et causa omnis oppositionis et distinctionis;

et ideo oportet quod in qualibet alia oppositione includatur affirmatio et negatio, sicut primum in posteriori.

Unde plura requiruntur ad alias oppositiones quam ad oppositionem contradictionis, quia se habent ex additione ad ipsam.

Unde non oportet quod, si contrarietas non inveniatur nisi in diversis realiter, quod affirmatio et negatio inveniatur in diversis realiter. [objection was: essentia non est generans, Pater est generans, ergo Pater non est essentia]

immo sufficit etiam distinctio rationis ad affirmationem et negationem: et talis distinctio, scilicet rationis, est inter essentiam et personam.

Sed opposita relative aliquando requirunt diversitatem vel distinctionem realem; et talia sunt quae divinas personas distinguunt: aliquando autem distinctionem rationis tantum; ut cum dicitur idem eidem idem.

[18] For example, consider the meanings of the word nature:

Thomas Aquinas, In V Metaphysicorum, Lectio 5, nn. 17-19:

Deinde dum dicit ex dictis reducit omnes modos praedictos ad unum. Sciendum est autem, quod reductio aliorum modorum ad unum primum, fieri potest dupliciter. Uno modo secundum ordinem rerum. Alio modo secundum ordinem, qui attenditur quantum ad nominis impositionem. Nomina enim imponuntur a nobis secundum quod nos intelligimus, quia nomina sunt intellectuum signa. Intelligimus autem quandoque priora ex posterioribus. Unde aliquid per prius apud nos sortitur nomen, cui res nominis per posterius convenit: et sic est in proposito. Quia enim formae et virtutes rerum ex actibus cognoscuntur, per prius ipsa generatio vel nativitas, naturae nomen accepit, et ultimo forma.

Sed secundum rerum ordinem, formae prius competit ratio naturae, quia, ut dictum est, nihil dicitur habere naturam, nisi secundum quod habet formam.

Unde patet ex dictis, quod primo et proprie natura dicitur substantia, idest forma rerum habentium in se principium motus inquantum huiusmodi. Materia enim dicitur esse natura, quia est formae susceptibilis. Et generationes habent nomen naturae, quia sunt motus procedentes a forma, et iterum ad formas. Et idipsum, scilicet forma est principium motus rerum existentium secundum naturam, aut in actu, aut in potentia. Forma enim non semper facit motum in actu, sed quandoque in potentia tantum: sicut quando impeditur motus naturalis ab aliquo exteriori prohibente, vel etiam quando impeditur actio naturalis ex materiae defectu.

[19] If some things are understandable by knowing their distinction and order, then the separated substances are more understandable. With the truth all things harmonize. For there is more distinction and order in the separated substances than in material ones. We know, of course, the distinction and order or the separated substances in a very imperfect way. Here is one text where Thomas touches upon the greater order in the separated substances.

Quaestio disputata de Spiritualibus Creaturis, Art. 8. corpus:

Manifestum est enim quod duplex est bonum universi: quoddam separatum, scilicet Deus, qui est sicut dux in exercitu; et quoddam in ipsis rebus, et hoc est ordo partium universi, sicut ordo partium exercitus est bonum exercitus. Unde Apostolus dicit Rom. XIII: quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.

Oportet autem quod superiores universi partes magis de bono universi participent, quod est ordo. Perfectius autem participant ordinem ea in quibus est ordo per se, quam ea in quibus est ordo per accidens tantum.

Manifestum est autem quod in omnibus individuis unius speciei non est ordo nisi secundum accidens: conveniunt enim in natura speciei, et differunt secundum principia individuantia, et diversa accidentia, quae per accidens se habent ad naturam speciei.

Quae autem specie differunt, ordinem habent per se et secundum essentialia principia. Invenitur enim in speciebus rerum una abundare super aliam, sicut et in speciebus numerorum, ut dicitur in VIII Metaph.

In istis autem inferioribus, quae sunt generabilia et corruptibilia, et infima pars universi, et minus participant de ordine, invenitur non omnia diversa habere ordinem per se; sed quaedam habent ordinem per accidens tantum, sicut individua unius speciei.

In superiori autem parte universi, scilicet in corporibus caelestibus, non invenitur ordo per accidens, sed solum per se; cum omnia corpora caelestia ab invicem specie differant, nec sint in eis plura individua unius speciei, sed unus tantum sol et una luna, et sic de aliis.

Multo ergo magis in suprema parte universi non invenitur aliqua ordinata per accidens et non per se. Et sic relinquitur quod omnes Angeli ab invicem specie differunt secundum maiorem et minorem perfectionem formarum simplicium, ex maiori vel minori propinquitate ad Deum, qui est actus purus, et infinitae perfectionis.

[20] In the Comedy of Errors, Act II, Sc. 1:

Adriana: Say, is your tardy master now at hand?

Dromio: Nay, he's at two hands with me, and that my two ears can witness.

Adriana: Say, didst thou speak with him? Know'st thou his mind?

Dromio: Ay, ay, he told his mind upon mine ear. Beshrew his hand, I scarce could understand it.

Luciana: Spake he so doubtfully, thou couldst not feel his meaning?

Dromio: Nay, he struck so plainly, I could too well feel his blows; and withal so doubtfully, that I could scarce understand them.

And in The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Act II, Sc. 5:

Speed: What an ass art thou! I understand thee not.

Launce: What a block art thou, that thou canst not! My staff understands me.

Speed: What thou sayest?

Launce: Ay, and what I do too. Look thee, I'll but lean, and my staff understands me.

Speed: It stands under thee, indeed.

Launce: Why, stand-under and under-stand is all one.

And in Twelfth Night, Act II, Sc. 1:

Toby: Taste your legs, Sir; put them to motion.

Viola: My legs do better understand me, Sir, than I understand what you mean by bidding me to taste my legs.

[21] In the following lines, Shakespeare uses cause and ground as synonyms and puns on two senses of ground:

Titus Andronicus, Act II, Sc. 1, Aaron to Chiron and Demetrius:

Full well I wot the ground of all this grudge: I would not for a million of gold The cause were known to them it most concerns…

Young lords, beware! An should the empress know This discord’s ground, the music would not please.

[Rolfe: There is a play upon the musical sense of ground ]

And the clown, takes ground in the sense of where Hamlet supposedly went mad rather than in the sense of why he went mad

Hamlet, Act V, Sc. 1:

Hamlet: How came he mad?

1 Clown: Very strangely, they say.

Hamlet: How 'strangely'?

1 Clown: Faith, e'en with losing his wits.

Hamlet: Upon what ground?

1 Clown: Why, here in Denmark. I have been sexton here, man and boy, thirty years.

And the watch sees the ground on which the bodies lie, but not yet the ground or cause of their death.

Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Sc. 3. first watch:

Pitiful sight! Here lies the county slain, And Juliet bleeding warm, and newly dead, Who here hath lain these two days buried. Go, tell the prince, run to the Capulets, Raise up the Montagues, some others search:

We see the ground whereon these woes do lie; But the true ground of all these piteous woes We cannot without circumstance descry.

King Lear, Act II, Sc. 4, Regan:

I cannot think my sister in the least Would fail her obligation: if, sir, perchance She have restrain’d the riots of your followers, ’Tis on such ground, and to such wholesome end, As clears her from all blame.

And in the following lines, we see the connection between knowing why or wherefore and upon some ground

Coriolanus, Act II, Sc. 2, 2nd Officer:

Faith, there hath been many great men that have flatter'd the people who ne'er loved them; and there be many that they have loved, they know not wherefore: so, that if they love they know not why, they hate upon no better a ground.

Hence, to tell whereupon can mean to tell the cause.

Henry IV, Part Two, Act II, Sc. 4, line 77, Hostess:

I can tell whereupon

[Kittredge note, p. 178: whereupon: for what reason. On or upon was common in a causal sense. This use survives in on compulsion, on purpose ] This fits with the English word ground for cause and with the word understanding.

Even without the word ground, it is common to use the word upon in speaking of the cause. For example in Henry IV. Part One, Act IV, Sc. 1, Blunt says:

But to my charge. The king hath sent to know The nature of your griefs; and whereupon You conjure from the breast of civil peace Such bold hostility, teaching his duteous land Audacious cruelty.

[22] In The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act II, Sc. 2, Master Ford fears standing under the name cuckold:

Who says this is improvident jealousy? my wife hath sent to him, the hour is fixed, the match is made. Would any man have thought this? See the hell of having a false woman! My bed shall be abused, my coffers ransacked, my reputation gnawed at; and I shall not only receive this villainous wrong, but stand under the adoption of abominable terms, and by him that does me this wrong. Terms! names! Amaimon sounds well; Lucifer, well; Barbason, well; yet they are devils' additions, the names of fiends; but Cuckold! Wittol! - Cuckold! the devil himself hath not such a name