Wonder and the Love of Wisdom

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Wonder and the Love of Wisdom

Wisdom about Beginnings · Beginning of Philosophy in the Will

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WONDER AND THE LOVE OF WISDOM

Although wonder is the necessary beginning of philosophy and no one can become a philosopher without wondering, nevertheless philosophy and the philosopher are named from the love of wisdom and not from wonder. We must consider the difference between wonder and the love of wisdom and why the philosopher is named from the love of wisdom rather than from wonder.

The first difference to be considered is their genera. The genus of wonder is desire and the genus of love of wisdom is, of course, love.

Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 11, 1371A:

en μὲν γὰρ τῷ θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν ἐστίν, ὥστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν

Desire is for a good not had and the desire is replaced by delight or pleasure when the object has been acquired or reached. Thus hunger is satisfied by food and is replaced by the pleasure of eating. Likewise, wonder diminishes as the reason comes to know. Hence, Shakespeare says

As You Like It, Act V, Sc. 4:

Feed yourselves with questioning; That reason wonder may diminish, How thus we met, and these things finish.

A Midsummer Night's Dream, Act V, Sc. 1:

Gentles, perchance you wonder at this show; But wonder on, till truth make all things plain.

Julius Caesar, Act I, Sc. 3, Cassius:

You are dull, Casca, and these sparks of life That should be in a Roman you do want. Or else you use not. You look pale and gaze, And put on fear, and cast yourself in wonder, To see the strange impatience of the heavens; But if you would consider the true cause Why all these fires, why all these gliding ghosts, Why birds and beasts, from quality and kind, Why old men, fools, and children calculate, Why all these things change from their ordinance, Their natures, and pre-formed faculties, To monstrous quality, - why you shall find That heaven hath infus'd them with these spirits To make them instruments of fear and warning Unto some monstrous state.

King Henry VI, Part Three, Act IV, Sc. 5:

Leave off to wonder why I drew you hither, Into this chiefest thicket of the park. Thus stands the case: you know our king, my brother Is prisoner to the bishop here, at whose hands He hath good usage and great liberty And, often but attended with weak guard, Comes hunting this way to disport himself. I have advertised him by secret means, That if about this hour he make this way Under the colour of his usual game, He shall here find his friends with horse and men To set him free from his captivity.

Hence, too, the Philosopher says (Metaphysics, Proemium, Book One, Chapter 2, 983a 12-21):

It is necessary, however, to place the possession of this in the opposite for us of the searches in the beginning. For all began, as we have said, from wondering that things are thus; as about the turnings of the sun or the incommensurability of the diagonal - for it seems wonderful to all that have not seen the cause if something is not measured by the smallest. It is necessary therefore to finish in the contrary and the better, according to the proverb, just as in those when they have learned - for the geometer would wonder at nothing so much as if the diagonal were to become commensurable.

Love, however, is found both in the presence and absence of its object and is stronger in its presence as Thomas explains in the Summa Contra Gentiles (Liber I, Caput XCI) when speaking of why love can be found in God (but not desire):

Amor ex parte obiecti non importat aliquid repugnans Deo: cum sit boni. Nec ex modo se habendi ad obiectum: nam amor est alicuius rei non minus cum habetur, sed magis, quia bonum aliquod fit nobis affinius cum habetur; unde et motus ad finem in rebus naturalibus ex propinquitate finis intenditur (quandoque autem contrarium per accidens accidit, utpote quando in amato experimur aliquid quod repugnat amori: tunc enim minus amatur quando habetur).

Since love is the conformity of the heart with its object, it is not less, but even more in the presence of that object. One then is not less a philosopher when one has acquired some wisdom, but even more a philosopher. It is the wonder that diminishes as one comes to know, at least that wonder which was a desire to know what one now does know. Augustine also taught this, as Thomas points out in another text. Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Distinctio XXVI, Quaest I, Art. III, Responsio:

Amor enim importat habitudinem concupiscibilis ad bonum, odium vero ad malum; quia amor amatum ponit connaturale et quasi unum amanti, cujus contrarium odium facit.

Et quia haec habitudo perficitur ex praesentia objecti, ideo amor secundum perfectam sui rationem est habiti, ut Augustinus dicit (In Psal. CXVIII, serm. 8; L. 36, 1518)

We must also consider how the true philosopher loves wisdom. First, he must love wisdom for its own sake. If he loves wisdom for the sake of fame or money, he is more a sophist than a philosopher. He should be called a lover of fame or money. If a man loves a woman for her money, he should not be said to love the woman, but to love her money. No one then should be called a philosopher who does not love wisdom for its own sake.

Second, he should love wisdom more than anything else which he may love for its own sake. If I love wisdom for its own sake and candy for its own sake, but candy more than wisdom, I am rightly called a lover of candy rather than a lover of wisdom.

Third, he must love wisdom as the end of his life and this would seem to follow from the first two. For the end is desired for its own sake and more than anything else.

Fourth, he must love wisdom, or that truth of which wisdom is the knowledge, as a common good. That truth of which wisdom is the knowledge can be considered as the common good of the universe according to the argument of Thomas in the beginning of the Summa Contra Gentiles (Liber I, Capitulum 1):

Moreover, wisdom is the common good of reason and all the other particular forms of knowledge possessed by reason. They are all in some way ordered to wisdom as an end and they all partake of the goodness of wisdom, even the habit of natural understanding. Hence, wisdom is the called the head.

The more that one loves wisdom, the more one also loves all the other parts of philosophy. Two reasons for this can be seen from the Summa Contra Gentiles (Liber I, Capitulum LXXV):

Quicumque amat aliquid secundum se et propter ipsum, amat per consequens omnia in quibus illud invenitur: ut qui amat dulcedinem propter ipsam, oportet quod omnia dulcia amet.

Item. Quanto aliquid est perfectioris virtutis, tanto sua causalitas ad plura se extendit et in magis remotum, ut supra dictum est. Causalitas autem finis in hoc consistit quod propter ipsum alia desiderantur. Quanto igitur finis est perfectior et magis volitus, tanto voluntas volentis finem ad plura extenditur ratione finis illius.

The other parts of philosophy are each a wisdom secundum quid and all are ordered to wisdom as an end and are necessary to acquire wisdom.

The distinction and order of wonder and the ove of wisdom can be seen in the following text of thomas on desire and love. Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum, Dist XXVI, Q. II, Art III, Solutio II:

...desiderium et amor in hoc differunt quod amor importat quamdam convenientiam et connaturalitatem ad amatum, quod quidem perficitur dum amatum aliquo modo habetur; desiderium autem importat motum in ipsum amabile nondum habitum.

Unde motus appetitus incipit in desiderio et terminatur in amore completo.

Et ideo desiderium est quaedam inchoatio amoris et quasi quidam amor imperfectus. [See Plato in Symposium]

Sed quia primum habere rei est secundum quod est in potentia - quia quod est in facultate habentis, quasi jam haberi reputatur - ideo primum quod amorem inducit, est facultas habendi id quod desideratur. Et ideo amor rei distantis quae actu non habetur, praesupponit spem. Et quia spes non est nisi boni, et primus motus appetitus in bonum, est desiderium; [reason takes the small as nothing sometimes - See Physics] ideo spes praesupponit desiderium et est media inter amorem et desiderium.

Et hoc rationabiliter accidit. Quia enim irascibilis est propter concupiscibilem, ideo actus irascibilis a concupiscibili incipit et in concupiscibili terminatur. Amor enim et desiderium in concupiscibli sunt, spes autem in irascibili; et similis est eorum ordo secundum quod sunt in voluntate.