A systematic introduction to Aristotelian logic and Thomistic philosophy. These lectures trace the natural progression of human knowledge from sensation to wisdom, examining the essential tools of logical reasoning—definition, division, and syllogistic demonstration—as presented in the works of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. en © 2025 Berquist Lectures Tue, 22 Sep 2026 23:54:57 +0000 Fri, 17 Oct 2025 00:00:00 +0000 Duane H. Berquist A systematic introduction to Aristotelian logic and Thomistic philosophy. These lectures trace the natural progression of human knowledge from sensation to wisdom, examining the essential tools of logical reasoning—definition, division, and syllogistic demonstration—as presented in the works of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas. false Duane H. Berquist info@example.com https://berquistcourse.com/images/cover-01.jpg https://berquistcourse.com serial Berquist opens Aristotle's Metaphysics proemium, reading "all men by nature desire to know" and tracing knowledge's ascent from sensation to art and science, on the way to defining wisdom as knowledge of causes. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/001-aristotles-proemium-i-the-natural-desire-to-know-and-wisdom/ Berquist works through the opening line of Aristotle's proemium to the Metaphysics, asking what it means to say all men by nature desire to know. He traces the natural progression from sensation through memory and experience up to art or science, unpacking along the way the etymology of "philosophy" and "proemium." Weighing Aristotle's humility against Heraclitus, Socrates, and Plato, he uses examples—doctors versus pharmacists, chief artists versus mere craftsmen, teachers who grasp causes—to show that wisdom is not knowledge of singular facts but knowledge of universals and first causes, setting up the fuller argument to come. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/001-aristotles-proemium-i-the-natural-desire-to-know-and-wisdom/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/001-aristotles-proemium-i-the-natural-desire-to-know-and-wisdom/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/001-1.mp3 0:58:38 1 full false Berquist works through the opening of Aristotle's Metaphysics, testing common opinions about the "wise man" to show wisdom is knowledge of the universal and, ultimately, of first causes. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/002-the-six-marks-of-the-wise-man-wisdom-as-knowledge-of-all/ Berquist opens Aristotle's Metaphysics by asking what people actually mean when they call someone wise, sifting popular marks of the wise man down to a core claim: wisdom is knowledge of the universal, and more strictly, knowledge of first causes. Following Aquinas's commentary, he distinguishes being universal "in predication" from being universal "in causing." He then takes up the proemium's further claims—that wisdom is sought for its own sake out of wonder rather than need, that it is the most liberal and most divine of the sciences, and that no man possesses it fully. Examples from Shakespeare, Euclid, Democritus, and Plato's Theaetetus illustrate certitude, causality, and wonder along the way. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/002-the-six-marks-of-the-wise-man-wisdom-as-knowledge-of-all/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/002-the-six-marks-of-the-wise-man-wisdom-as-knowledge-of-all/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/001-2.mp3 0:57:54 2 full false Berquist works through Aristotle's Metaphysics Book I on why wisdom is the most divine and most honorable science, then asks what it takes to actually love wisdom rather than power, wealth, or freedom in its name. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/003-wonder-liberal-knowledge-the-divine-science-and-how-the-philosopher/ Berquist takes up Aristotle's argument in Metaphysics Book I that wisdom is the most divine of the sciences, since it concerns God as first cause and is the knowledge God himself would possess most fully—honorable rather than merely necessary. From there he turns to what it means to be a philosopher in the strict sense: one who loves wisdom for its own sake, as life's highest end and a common good, not the truncated "philosophers" of Bacon, Adam Smith, Hegel, or Nietzsche, who really pursue power, wealth, or freedom. He closes on wonder as the root of philosophical inquiry, setting up the next class's treatment of philosophy's nature and divisions through Aristotle, Aquinas's proemium to the Ethics, and Shakespeare. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/003-wonder-liberal-knowledge-the-divine-science-and-how-the-philosopher/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/003-wonder-liberal-knowledge-the-divine-science-and-how-the-philosopher/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/001-3.mp3 1:04:03 3 full false Berquist locates philosophy's natural starting points—wonder, the desire to live well, and the road from sense to reason—drawing on Aristotle's Protrepticus and Metaphysics, the Posterior Analytics, and the handout "An Introduction to the First Road in Our Knowledge." Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/004-natural-beginnings-of-philosophy-wonder-the-natural-road/ Berquist takes up the fourth of his four guiding questions—how one should enter into philosophy—after reviewing its division into theoretical, practical, and logical parts. He argues that philosophy begins naturally in wonder and in the desire to live well, and that the mind travels a natural road from sense to reason, arriving at self-evident axioms it grasps without proof. Working through the handout "An Introduction to the First Road in Our Knowledge" and Friar Laurence's remarks on stumbling, he explains why we know sensible, material, composed, and effect-related things before the immaterial, simple, and causal, and why understanding moves from confused, outward, singular grasp toward distinct, inward, universal grasp. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/004-natural-beginnings-of-philosophy-wonder-the-natural-road/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/004-natural-beginnings-of-philosophy-wonder-the-natural-road/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/002-1.mp3 1:02:25 4 full false Berquist asks why philosophy has to start from nature's own beginnings rather than private opinion, reading Heraclitus's fragments on waking, sleeping, and following the common alongside handouts on the "before and after" in reasoning. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/005-why-begin-from-nature-beginnings-order-and-heraclitus-on/ Berquist takes up the question of why inquiry must begin from natural starting points—the desire to know causes, the wish to live well, the movement from sense to reason, and grasp of axioms like non-contradiction—rather than from private opinion. He works through Heraclitus's fragments contrasting waking and sleeping and insisting we follow what is common, reading from the handout on natural fragments and the one on the "before and after" in acts of reason. Examples from Euclid's geometry and Plato's Theaetetus and Meno illustrate how teacher and student, or equals in discussion, can only advance together from shared, commonly known premises. The lecture draws throughout on Aristotle's Physics, Ethics, and Poetics to show why order in beginning is not optional but necessary. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/005-why-begin-from-nature-beginnings-order-and-heraclitus-on/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/005-why-begin-from-nature-beginnings-order-and-heraclitus-on/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/002-2.mp3 1:04:19 5 full false Berquist opens with the natural roots of philosophy—wonder, hope, humility—before turning to reason itself, reading Shakespeare's "What is a man..." speech line by line to define reason as "the ability for large discourse, looking before and after." Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/006-coming-into-philosophy-through-reason-shakespeares-exhortation/ Berquist begins from the handout "Beginnings of Philosophy in the Senses and Reason," asking what dispositions—wonder, the desire to live well, hope, humility, fear of error, freedom from anger—must precede the use of reason. He then works through Shakespeare's exhortation ("What is a man..."), scanning its unrhymed iambic pentameter to draw out a working definition: reason as "the ability for large discourse, looking before and after," set against sense and imagination by its power to reach the unknown through the known. Plato's Phaedo and Boethius's account of self-evident truths help place this account of reason within Aristotelian psychology and human nature. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/006-coming-into-philosophy-through-reason-shakespeares-exhortation/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/006-coming-into-philosophy-through-reason-shakespeares-exhortation/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/002-3.mp3 0:50:49 6 full false Berquist works through Shakespeare's line that reason is "large discourse, looking before and after," breaking it down term by term as a logical definition in genus and difference. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/007-reason-as-ability-for-large-discourse-looking-before-and/ Berquist treats Shakespeare's phrase "large discourse, looking before and after" as if it were a proper logical definition of reason, examining it piece by piece: genus and difference, "discourse" as knowing one thing through another, "large" as scope or extent, and "looking" as reason's aim toward understanding. He offers the wise man's discourse as the fullest case of this ability, and draws on Euclid, Aristotle, Boethius, and a passage from Romeo and Juliet to trace the causal sense buried in words like "understand" and "ground"—showing how ordinary language still carries the logic of before and under. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/007-reason-as-ability-for-large-discourse-looking-before-and/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/007-reason-as-ability-for-large-discourse-looking-before-and/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/003-1.mp3 0:39:39 7 full false Berquist takes Shakespeare's line "large discourse, looking before and after" from Troilus and Cressida and unpacks Aristotle's several senses of "before"—in time, in being, in reasoning, in rank—to show what reason itself is for. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/008-the-senses-of-before-and-after-order-and-the-exhortations/ Starting from Shakespeare's definition of reason as "large discourse, looking before and after," Berquist asks what "before" actually means, and finds it is said in several ways: before in time, before in being, before in the order of reasoning, and before in goodness or rank, with a further "crowning" causal sense drawn from Aristotle's Categories and Metaphysics and Aquinas's commentary. He tests these distinctions against examples from geometry, chemistry, theology, and Shakespeare himself, including Two Gentlemen of Verona and Hamlet. The class closes by tying reason's power to order time, being, knowledge, and cause to the exhortation to use reason well—reason as what makes man like God and true to himself, rather than governed by passion alone. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/008-the-senses-of-before-and-after-order-and-the-exhortations/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/008-the-senses-of-before-and-after-order-and-the-exhortations/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/003-2.mp3 0:58:01 8 full false Berquist reads Shakespeare's 49-word "exhortation" defining reason as "large discourse, looking before and after" alongside a text from Aquinas, working out what "before," "after," and "order" mean and why philosophy demands the natural use of reason. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/009-why-philosophy-requires-reason-review-error-and-mistake-and/ Berquist takes Shakespeare's short exhortation contrasting man's chief good with that of the beast and shows its argument works by denial of the consequent, then uses it to distinguish several senses of "before" and "after"—especially priority in being, where something can exist without another but not conversely, versus priority in goodness. Breathing and philosophizing, faith and charity, illustrate that what is more necessary need not be better. Along the way he turns to Scriptural and Thomistic passages on error, wandering, and the road of wisdom, and briefly likens the crisscross division at work to the Trinitarian relations of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/009-why-philosophy-requires-reason-review-error-and-mistake-and/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/009-why-philosophy-requires-reason-review-error-and-mistake-and/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/003-3.mp3 1:04:13 9 full false Berquist reads Aquinas's prologues to the Peri Hermeneias and the Posterior Analytics to show why logic is called the "art of arts," working through the handout "The Proemia to Logic." Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/010-thomass-proemia-logic-as-the-art-of-arts-and-its-division/ Why does Aquinas call logic an art, and an art of arts at that? Berquist works through the proemium to the Peri Hermeneias and the longer proemium to the Posterior Analytics, showing how Aquinas grounds the division of the logical works in reason's three acts—simple apprehension, judgment, and reasoning—matching them to the Categories, the Peri Hermeneias, and the treatises on syllogism. He also draws out the further split among demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical or poetic argument by their degrees of certitude, illustrating the reflexivity of reason with examples from Plato's Timaeus and Phaedo. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/010-thomass-proemia-logic-as-the-art-of-arts-and-its-division/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/010-thomass-proemia-logic-as-the-art-of-arts-and-its-division/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/004-1.mp3 1:04:18 10 full false Berquist works through Aquinas's commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate to show why logic counts as an art, and why reasoning can only order its own thoughts through spoken words. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/011-logic-as-tool-and-liberal-art-ordering-thoughts-through-words/ Berquist asks what logic actually is, distinguishing its proper subject—definition, statement, and syllogism, matching the three acts of reason—from its end, which is to perfect and order those acts. Working through the commentary on Boethius's De Trinitate, alongside the proemium to the Ethics commentary and comparisons to Boethius on the liberal arts and Augustine on signs, he draws out a harder point: reason can order its own thinking only by means of sensible, spoken words, since thoughts themselves cannot be sensed or imagined the way images can. He illustrates this with examples ranging from perfect numbers and blank verse to Euclidean geometry, prayer, and Hamlet, treating logic's tools as a kind of telescope for the mind. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/011-logic-as-tool-and-liberal-art-ordering-thoughts-through-words/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/011-logic-as-tool-and-liberal-art-ordering-thoughts-through-words/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/004-2.mp3 0:35:13 11 full false Berquist distinguishes "name" and "speech" by whether their parts signify on their own, then works through the opening of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics on learning from prior knowledge, using Euclidean geometry as his example. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/012-name-and-speech-and-aristotle-on-learning-from-pre-existing/ Berquist opens by defining "name" and "speech" according to whether their component parts carry meaning independently, locating this within logic's threefold task of definition, statement, and syllogism. He then takes up Aristotle's claim that all learning proceeds from pre-existing knowledge, illustrating demonstration through Euclidean geometry and drawing on Plato's Theaetetus and Phaedo to set demonstrative reasoning against dialectical syllogism and induction, and against rhetorical enthymeme and example. He closes by weighing Albert the Great's twofold division of logic against Aquinas's threefold one, tracing both back to the structure of Plato's Meno. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/012-name-and-speech-and-aristotle-on-learning-from-pre-existing/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/012-name-and-speech-and-aristotle-on-learning-from-pre-existing/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/004-3.mp3 0:39:48 12 full false Berquist opens the art of definition by asking why names must be studied before definitions, working through Porphyry's fivefold distinction of names and the puzzle of "part," "whole," and "one's own." Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/013-why-names-come-before-definition-equivocal-words-parts-and/ Berquist begins Thomas's division of logic into the arts of definition, statement, and argument, asking why names come first: we name things before defining them, we use names to ask what a thing is, and definitions themselves are made of names. Drawing on Porphyry's fivefold distinction of names, Aristotle's Categories and Metaphysics V, and Boethius, he works out the definition of "name" itself and distinguishes the logician's use of words from the grammarian's and the poet's. He then takes up the puzzle of defining a thing by its own name rather than another's, and the equivocal senses of "part," "whole," and "one's own," closing with their bearing on demonstration, division, and reasoning about common goods. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/013-why-names-come-before-definition-equivocal-words-parts-and/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/013-why-names-come-before-definition-equivocal-words-parts-and/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/005-1.mp3 1:12:56 13 full false Berquist works through Porphyry's Isagoge on how things get named and defined, distinguishing proper from figurative speech and univocal from equivocal names, on the way to genus, species, and difference. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/014-defining-by-names-common-to-many-things-univocal-and-equivocal/ Berquist asks what it means to define a thing by a name "common" to it—shared rather than exclusive—likening this to how latitude and longitude together pinpoint a single location. He first separates calling something by its own proper name from calling it by another's, covering figurative uses like metaphor, irony, and synecdoche, and insists definitions must stick to proper names, illustrated with examples from Romeo and Juliet and Aristotle's Poetics. This sets up the distinction between univocal and equivocal naming, which Porphyry uses to introduce genus, species, and difference as the elements definitions are built from, moving the mind from confused to distinct knowledge of a thing's nature. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/014-defining-by-names-common-to-many-things-univocal-and-equivocal/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/014-defining-by-names-common-to-many-things-univocal-and-equivocal/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/005-2.mp3 1:09:02 14 full false Berquist works through Porphyry's five predicables, dividing what lies "outside the nature" of a thing into property and accident, then asks whether a lowest species or highest genus exists. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/015-porphyrys-five-predicables-property-accident-and-genus-vs/ Berquist takes up Porphyry's Isagoge and its division of names into genus, species, difference, property, and accident—asking why this fivefold scheme matters for definition, division, and demonstration. He illustrates property and accident with examples drawn from geometry, arithmetic, and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, showing how each attaches to a thing without belonging to its essence. He then turns to the difference between relative and absolute distinctions, contrasting genus and species with pairs like whole and part, or father and son, and uses this to press the question, drawn from Aristotle's Categories and Physics, of whether a lowest species or a highest genus can be found. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/015-porphyrys-five-predicables-property-accident-and-genus-vs/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/015-porphyrys-five-predicables-property-accident-and-genus-vs/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/006-1.mp3 1:09:30 15 full false Berquist returns to Porphyry's Isagoge to work out how genus, difference, and lowest species share and differ in their definitions, drawing on Aristotle's Poetics, Posterior Analytics, and Plato's Meno. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/016-genus-difference-and-lowest-species-reviewed-why-the-division/ Berquist continues through Porphyry's Isagoge, tracing the five predicables—genus, difference, species, property, accident—and asking precisely what genus, difference, and lowest species have in common and where their definitions part ways. He turns to Aristotle's Poetics for how differences order the definition of tragedy and comedy, then to the Posterior Analytics with Aquinas's commentary to explain why our confused, outward way of knowing forces definitions built from combinations of non-convertible differences. Brief detours through Aquinas's Summa contra Gentiles on univocal predication of God and creatures, and Plato's Meno on defining versus reasoning, set up a close of the class applying "before and after" to genus-species order and to causality and the eternity of the world. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/016-genus-difference-and-lowest-species-reviewed-why-the-division/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/016-genus-difference-and-lowest-species-reviewed-why-the-division/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/006-2.mp3 1:06:29 16 full false Berquist works through Aristotle's ten categories as a chain of twofold and threefold divisions, showing how substance, quantity, quality, relation, and six further accidents fall out of what can be said of Socrates or a horse. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/017-dividing-the-categories-substance-quality-relation-and-habitus/ Berquist traces Aristotle's ten categories as a schema built from successive divisions: what is said of an individual substance—Socrates, a horse—either names the substance itself or an accident, and accidents split into those said absolutely (quantity, quality), those said relatively, and six said through something extrinsic, among them habitus, the category of "outfit" peculiar to man. Working from Aristotle's Categories, Topics, and Metaphysics, and Aquinas's scattered commentary remarks, he shows Thomas's habit of dividing genera by twos and threes, pausing over quantity against Descartes, the Greek pros ti behind relation, and man's need for tools and clothing. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/017-dividing-the-categories-substance-quality-relation-and-habitus/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/017-dividing-the-categories-substance-quality-relation-and-habitus/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/007-1.mp3 0:45:11 17 full false Berquist asks why division into genus and species doesn't always bottom out neatly, then shows why "being" itself can't be a genus—working from Aristotle's Categories. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/018-lowest-species-and-highest-genera-why-being-is-not-a-genus/ Berquist takes up Aristotle's logic of genus and species, drawing on examples from geometry, drama, zoology, and politics to show that division doesn't always terminate in a clean "lowest species," and that a genus need not always have a further genus above it—an infinite regress of definitions would make knowledge impossible. He then examines words like "being," "thing," and "something," arguing these are equivocal rather than univocal, using the substance/accident distinction and Hamlet's "to be or not to be" as illustrations. This leads into Aristotle's Categories and its division of the highest genera, chiefly substance versus accident and universal versus individual. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/018-lowest-species-and-highest-genera-why-being-is-not-a-genus/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/018-lowest-species-and-highest-genera-why-being-is-not-a-genus/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/007-2.mp3 0:45:05 18 full false Berquist works through Aristotle's Categories—substance, quantity, and quality—then turns to Porphyry's Isagoge and its five predicables as the groundwork for definition and division. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/019-aristotles-ten-categories-and-porphyrys-isagoge-quantity/ Berquist traces the division of substance from material to immaterial, living to non-living, down through genus and species to an individual like Socrates, then examines quantity as discrete or continuous (number, line, surface, body) and quality (habit, natural ability, sensible qualities, shape). He draws out the discrete character of thought against the continuous character of bodily reality as a mark of reason's immateriality. Turning to Porphyry's Isagoge, he explains its role as an introduction to the Categories and works through the five predicables—genus, species, difference, property, and accident—as the tools definition, division, and demonstration depend on. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/019-aristotles-ten-categories-and-porphyrys-isagoge-quantity/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/019-aristotles-ten-categories-and-porphyrys-isagoge-quantity/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/007-3.mp3 0:50:00 19 full false Berquist works through the five kinds of figurative naming—synecdoche, antonomasia, metonymy, metaphor, and irony—then explains how a common name splits into properly-kept and newly-applied uses in analogous, "equivocal by reason" naming. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/020-figurative-naming-and-names-equivocal-by-reason-synecdoche/ Berquist asks how a single name comes to cover things that aren't strictly the same, working through five figures of speech in turn: synecdoche (whole for part, as finger for thumb), antonomasia, metonymy (cause for effect), metaphor (likeness), and irony (opposition), drawing examples from Scripture and from Aquinas's commentaries on the Psalms and on St. Paul. He then turns to names "equivocal by reason," showing two ways a common name divides: one thing keeps it properly while another gets a new name, either by adding something notable or by possessing the meaning only imperfectly—illustrated with animal and man, understanding and reason. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/020-figurative-naming-and-names-equivocal-by-reason-synecdoche/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/020-figurative-naming-and-names-equivocal-by-reason-synecdoche/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/008-1.mp3 0:58:56 20 full false Berquist tracks how words shift meaning by generalization or by proportion—"passion," "healthy," "philosophy"—and separates this analogical naming from metaphor, drawing on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias and Aquinas. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/021-names-carried-over-dropping-meaning-and-ratios-analogy-metaphor/ Berquist asks how a single word comes to carry more than one related meaning. He distinguishes two paths: dropping part of an original sense, as "passion" or "suffering" loosens from mere undergoing toward the perfection found in sensing and understanding; and naming by ratio or proportional likeness, as "healthy," "before," and "philosophy" get applied beyond their first, strict use. He then separates this analogical naming, where something is added to a common meaning, from metaphor proper, working through examples from Aristotle and Aquinas alongside illustrations drawn from Shakespeare, Dante, and Homer, and touching on Ammonius and the Summa Contra Gentiles. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/021-names-carried-over-dropping-meaning-and-ratios-analogy-metaphor/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/021-names-carried-over-dropping-meaning-and-ratios-analogy-metaphor/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/008-2.mp3 1:09:21 21 full false Berquist continues his treatment of definition, distinguishing the definition of a thing from the mere definition of a name, and full definition by genus and species from looser "encircling" definitions by property or effect. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/022-the-art-of-definition-i-definition-of-a-thing-vs-a-name-full/ Berquist asks what makes a definition full rather than merely approximate, contrasting definition of a name with definition of a thing, and full definition through genus and species-making difference with "encircling" definitions that work instead through a thing's property or effect. He works out the order between these kinds of definition and extends the same distinction to definition by cause versus definition by effect, using examples such as Socrates' questioning in the Euthyphro, Augustine's account of the good, and Aristotle's treatment of happiness to show why grasping a cause matters for real understanding. He closes by pointing toward division as the tool that complements definition in moving thought from confused to distinct knowledge. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/022-the-art-of-definition-i-definition-of-a-thing-vs-a-name-full/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/022-the-art-of-definition-i-definition-of-a-thing-vs-a-name-full/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/009-1.mp3 1:02:33 22 full false Berquist draws the distinction between substances, defined "by themselves," and accidents like health and wisdom, defined "as of another," then lays out three ways to hunt down a definition. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/023-the-art-of-definition-ii-substance-and-accident-and-how-to/ Berquist works out a third distinction in the logic of definition: some things, substances, are defined by themselves, while others, accidents such as health, wisdom, and love, can only be defined in relation to a subject—body, reason, heart. Turning to Aristotle's Categories and Metaphysics, he then asks a practical question: how does one actually find a definition? He answers with a military image—attacking a fortress from above, below, or the side—corresponding to three starting points, genus, examples, and convertible properties, each calling for its own reasoning: division, induction, and syllogism, illustrated through the Shakespearean sonnet, Euclid, and Aristotle's account of wisdom and moral virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/023-the-art-of-definition-ii-substance-and-accident-and-how-to/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/023-the-art-of-definition-ii-substance-and-accident-and-how-to/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/009-2.mp3 1:04:46 23 full false Berquist works out what division actually means—splitting an integral whole into its parts versus a universal whole into its kinds—then tests a "rule of two or three" against Plato's dichotomies and Aquinas's sevenfold division of the sacraments. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/024-the-art-of-division-integral-and-universal-wholes-distinction/ Berquist opens by distinguishing two senses of "whole" that division can cut: the integral whole, made of physical parts, and the universal whole, made of subordinate kinds, drawing examples from grammar, geometry, chemistry, and biology to keep the two straight. He then asks what governs a proper division, proposing a "rule of two or three" and setting Plato's habitual dichotomies against Hegel's trichotomies. He applies this to Aquinas's derivation of the seven sacraments through nested twofold and threefold cuts. He closes with a question about rank: why judging a lower science against a higher one—philosophy against theology, sense against reason—always falls to the higher, wisdom-bearing discipline. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/024-the-art-of-division-integral-and-universal-wholes-distinction/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/024-the-art-of-division-integral-and-universal-wholes-distinction/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/009-3.mp3 0:44:01 24 full false Berquist moves from the logic of definition to the logic of the statement, reviewing division and distinction before opening Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias to define statement as speech signifying true or false. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/025-logic-of-the-second-act-distinctions-division-and-the-statement/ Berquist closes out the logic of the first act by reviewing the division of composed and universal wholes and three governing distinctions—equivocal senses of words, per se versus per accidens, and simple versus qualified predication—before turning to the logic of the second act. Opening Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias, he works through the definition of statement as speech signifying true or false, distinguishes simple statements from compound ones joined by if-then or either-or, and divides the simple statement into noun and verb, or subject, predicate, and copula, ending with affirmation and negation. He draws on Aquinas and Ammonius alongside examples from Plato's Meno, Shakespeare, and ordinary speech. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/025-logic-of-the-second-act-distinctions-division-and-the-statement/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/025-logic-of-the-second-act-distinctions-division-and-the-statement/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/010-1.mp3 0:55:27 25 full false Berquist works through the handout "The Art About Statement" and DHB Vol. III to show how a simple statement is true by conforming to things, and false either by adding to or subtracting from that truth—then turns to contradictories. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/026-true-and-false-in-the-simple-statement-saying-more-or-less/ Berquist takes up truth and falsity in the simple statement, defined as the mind saying of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not. Falsity, he shows, comes in two forms: saying what is not, is (adding to the truth), or saying what is, is not (subtracting from it). He illustrates both errors with courtroom oath language, lines from King Lear and Othello, and the Christological and Trinitarian heresies—Arianism, Patripassianism, Nestorianism, Monophysitism—as historical cases of overshooting or falling short of a "modest" middle truth. He closes by defining contradictory statements and the three ways—sense, definition, reasoning—by which one determines which of a pair is true. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/026-true-and-false-in-the-simple-statement-saying-more-or-less/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/026-true-and-false-in-the-simple-statement-saying-more-or-less/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/010-2.mp3 0:45:17 26 full false Berquist works through hypothetical and disjunctive statements, then the square of opposition, reading a handout page ("The Art About Statement," p. 6) and Aquinas's commentary on the Posterior Analytics. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/027-compound-statements-and-the-square-of-opposition/ Berquist asks what makes an if-then or an either-or statement true, and shows that a conditional's truth turns not on whether its parts are true but on whether the connection between them is necessary—illustrated with the sixth theorem of Euclid's Book I, a line from Shakespeare, and an example from Aquinas. He then takes up the square of opposition, sorting which pairs of universal and particular affirmatives and negatives sharing a subject are genuine contradictories rather than mere contraries. The class closes by tying this back to Aristotle's distinction between demonstrative and dialectical reasoning, read alongside Aquinas's commentary on the Posterior Analytics and a page of the handout "The Art About Statement." Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/027-compound-statements-and-the-square-of-opposition/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/027-compound-statements-and-the-square-of-opposition/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/010-3.mp3 1:00:01 27 full false Berquist closes out the logic of judgment with the "Mr. Anti-Statement" device and the square of opposition, then opens the logic of reasoning, distinguishing it from guesswork and previewing example, induction, enthymeme, and syllogism. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/028-logic-of-the-second-act-wrap-up-mr-anti-statement-and-what/ Berquist ties together the three acts of the mind, showing why reasoning presupposes judgment, which presupposes simple apprehension. He revisits the second act through "Mr. Anti-Statement," a figure who contradicts every statement made to him, using the square of opposition to sharpen what contradiction and truth-value actually require. He then asks what reasoning itself is: a movement from statements already known or accepted to a new statement, illustrated with Socrates in the Meno, Heraclitus, and Einstein, and set apart from mere reasonable or wild guessing. He closes by naming the four kinds of argument—example, induction, enthymeme, and syllogism—to be taken up next. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/028-logic-of-the-second-act-wrap-up-mr-anti-statement-and-what/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/028-logic-of-the-second-act-wrap-up-mr-anti-statement-and-what/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/011-1.mp3 0:52:06 28 full false Berquist works through Aristotle's example, induction, and enthymeme—arguments that fall short of the syllogism—using Shakespeare, Cicero, and everyday cases like choosing a restaurant or a course. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/029-example-induction-and-enthymeme-arguments-near-the-senses/ Berquist takes up a handout on the four kinds of argument to ask what separates example, induction, and enthymeme from the strict syllogism. He shows that example argues from one particular to a similar particular, induction climbs from many singulars to a universal claim, and enthymeme reasons from likelihood or sign rather than necessity. Along the way he traces the etymologies linking sample to example and induction to introduction and inducement, drawing illustrations from Henry V, Julius Caesar, Richard III, and Cicero as well as homely cases like picking a restaurant or a car. The recurring point: none of these arguments produces a necessary conclusion, only a probability that varies with how close the likeness or sign really is. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/029-example-induction-and-enthymeme-arguments-near-the-senses/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/029-example-induction-and-enthymeme-arguments-near-the-senses/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/011-2.mp3 0:49:35 29 full false Berquist defines the syllogism against calculation, then sorts the four arguments—syllogism, induction, enthymeme, example—by resemblance and by use, with Othello and Aesop as test cases. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/030-the-syllogism-its-likeness-to-calculation-and-dividing-the/ Berquist takes up Aristotle's definition of the syllogism as speech in which stated premises necessarily yield a conclusion, and asks how this differs from mere calculation, which looks similar but belongs to a different art. He then divides the four kinds of argument two ways: by resemblance, pairing syllogism with enthymeme and induction with example, and by practical use, setting syllogism and induction toward universal, dialectical conclusions against enthymeme and example's work persuading about particulars in rhetoric. He tests these distinctions against Othello, Aesop's fables, and courtroom and political speech, showing how imagination can mislead where reasoning from premises would not. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/030-the-syllogism-its-likeness-to-calculation-and-dividing-the/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/030-the-syllogism-its-likeness-to-calculation-and-dividing-the/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/011-3.mp3 0:57:56 30 full false Berquist lays out Aristotle's three kinds of syllogism—categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive—and tests the valid and invalid forms of if-then reasoning against Euclid's Proposition 6 and Plato's Meno. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/031-three-kinds-of-syllogism-the-four-forms-of-if-then-speech/ Berquist distinguishes the three forms of syllogism: simple categorical, hypothetical (if-then), and disjunctive (either-or). He works through the four possible moves in a conditional argument, showing why affirming the antecedent and denying the consequent are valid while affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent are not, drawing examples from Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, and Poetics. He then turns to Euclid's Book I, Proposition 6, and to Plato's Meno, where Socrates builds rival hypothetical syllogisms over whether virtue can be taught. He closes by noting how modern scientific hypothesis-testing repeats the classic error of affirming the consequent. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/031-three-kinds-of-syllogism-the-four-forms-of-if-then-speech/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/031-three-kinds-of-syllogism-the-four-forms-of-if-then-speech/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/012-1.mp3 1:04:45 31 full false Berquist distinguishes the form of a syllogism from its matter, then works through disjunctive and conditional syllogisms—showing which of the four if-then patterns are valid and which fallacious, with examples from Euclid, Aquinas, and Plato's Socrates. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/032-form-and-matter-of-the-syllogism-either-or-and-if-then-syllogisms/ Berquist opens by separating formal logic—whether a conclusion necessarily follows—from material logic—whether the premises are true—citing Albert the Great's claim that the syllogism is logic's central act. He then works through either-or (disjunctive) syllogisms before turning at length to the four forms of if-then speech, showing that affirming the antecedent and denying the consequent are valid while the other two forms are fallacious, drawing examples from Euclid, Aquinas's Summa and Summa Contra Gentiles, and Socrates' reasoning in Plato. He closes by tracing how chained conditional syllogisms operate and how this reasoning appears implicitly in Socrates and Melissus before Aristotle gave it formal shape. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/032-form-and-matter-of-the-syllogism-either-or-and-if-then-syllogisms/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/032-form-and-matter-of-the-syllogism-either-or-and-if-then-syllogisms/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/012-2.mp3 1:07:44 32 full false Berquist works through the sixteen premise-combinations of the first-figure syllogism, using the "set of all" and "set of none" principles to sort valid from invalid, with examples running from animals and plants to dogs, cats, and stones. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/033-the-syllogism-set-of-all-set-of-none-and-the-sixteen-moods/ Berquist takes up the categorical syllogism from the handout on the form of the simple syllogism, asking why the middle term's position in the first figure lets some of the sixteen possible premise-pairs yield a necessary conclusion while others fail. He grounds the answer in two principles: the "dictum de omni," what is said of every member of a set, and the "dictum de nullo," what is said of none. Working through combinations with examples like animals, plants, dogs, cats, and stones, he shows concretely how invalid moods break down. He closes by touching on conversion of universal statements and a passage from Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles that uses a disjunctive syllogism about God's relation to creatures. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/033-the-syllogism-set-of-all-set-of-none-and-the-sixteen-moods/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/033-the-syllogism-set-of-all-set-of-none-and-the-sixteen-moods/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/013-1.mp3 1:09:14 33 full false Berquist works through all sixteen premise combinations of the second-figure syllogism, using counterexamples with animal, dog, cat, and stone to show why the figure yields only negative conclusions. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/034-second-figure-syllogisms-the-power-of-the-figures-and-why/ Berquist tests the second figure of the syllogism systematically, running every combination of universal, particular, affirmative, and negative premises to see which convert back to the first figure and actually necessitate a conclusion. Where the pattern fails, he builds counterexamples—animal, dog, cat, stone—showing true premises compatible with both a universal affirmative and a universal negative conclusion, so nothing follows of necessity. He illustrates the stakes with Socrates' argument against the soul-as-harmony thesis in the Phaedo and with reasoning about God's unchangeability, then closes comparing the three figures, noting that only the first can conclude to all four categorical forms. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/034-second-figure-syllogisms-the-power-of-the-figures-and-why/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/034-second-figure-syllogisms-the-power-of-the-figures-and-why/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/013-2.mp3 1:09:06 34 full false Berquist proves the convertibility of universal negatives and works through Aristotle's second-figure syllogisms, testing valid and invalid forms with animal, dog, and stone before turning to Plato's Phaedo and Aquinas on faith. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/035-conversion-and-the-second-figure-mixed-cases-then-nature/ Berquist continues his reading of the Prior Analytics, first proving that universal negative statements convert, then moving systematically through the second figure of the syllogism. He sorts valid mixed forms from invalid ones by building counterexamples with terms like animal, dog, and stone, showing why this figure yields only negative conclusions, unlike the broader first figure. He then draws the logic outward, using Plato's Phaedo, Shakespeare's As You Like It, and Aquinas's account of faith and belief to illustrate reasoning about opposites and about natural kinds. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/035-conversion-and-the-second-figure-mixed-cases-then-nature/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/035-conversion-and-the-second-figure-mixed-cases-then-nature/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/013-3.mp3 1:09:54 35 full false Berquist works through Aristotle's Posterior Analytics on demonstration as a syllogism that yields necessary knowledge of a cause, distinguishing demonstration propter quid from demonstration quia, with a brief reading from a handout on Shakespeare. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/036-demonstration-cause-necessity-and-through-itself/ Berquist traces how cause, necessity, and "through itself" bear on definition and certitude, drawing on the Posterior Analytics alongside Metaphysics Book V, the Prior Analytics, and Plato's Meno and Phaedo. He distinguishes demonstration propter quid, which gives the reasoned cause, from demonstration quia, which shows only that something is so, and sets demonstrative reasoning against dialectical reasoning. He closes with the four questions of inquiry from Book II of the Posterior Analytics—whether, what, that, and why—as the culmination of Aristotle's logic of wonder, after opening with a short reading from a handout titled "Shakespeare on Error" and personal reminiscences of deceased acquaintances. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/036-demonstration-cause-necessity-and-through-itself/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/036-demonstration-cause-necessity-and-through-itself/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/014-1.mp3 0:40:22 36 full false Berquist works through Aristotle's Sophistical Refutations, dividing the thirteen fallacies into those of language and those of things, with equivocation—drawn from Feuerbach, Scripture, and ordinary speech—as the chief example. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/037-dialectic-and-sophistical-refutations-fallacies-of-language/ Berquist picks up dialectic where he left off, first recalling its threefold usefulness from the Topics—as mental exercise, as a way of meeting others on their own ground, and as an aid to philosophy—before asking what makes a sophistical refutation false rather than a genuine exposure of self-contradiction. He then works through Aristotle's division of the thirteen fallacies into those arising from language and those from things, dwelling especially on equivocation and on composition and division. Examples come from Feuerbach, Scripture, everyday speech, Plato's Phaedo and Republic, St. Paul as glossed by Aquinas, and Shakespeare, all used to show why distinguishing the senses of key terms matters. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/037-dialectic-and-sophistical-refutations-fallacies-of-language/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/037-dialectic-and-sophistical-refutations-fallacies-of-language/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/014-2.mp3 0:40:09 37 full false Berquist works through Aristotle's fallacies of accident and of the simple versus the qualified, then turns to Meno's paradox and Socrates' slave-boy demonstration. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/038-fallacies-outside-language-accident-secundum-quid-and-the/ Berquist takes up two fallacies from Aristotle that don't depend on tricks of language: mistaking what belongs to a thing through itself for what merely happens to accompany it, and confusing what is true without qualification with what is only true in some respect. He works the distinctions through examples ranging from malaria's supposed cause in marsh air to Berkeley's idealism and Shakespeare's sonnets, showing how the same confusion corrupts moral reasoning. He then turns to Plato's Meno, examining Meno's paradox about the possibility of inquiry and Socrates' slave-boy demonstration, and flags that Plato himself will later be caught committing the fallacy of accident. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/038-fallacies-outside-language-accident-secundum-quid-and-the/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/038-fallacies-outside-language-accident-secundum-quid-and-the/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/014-3.mp3 1:07:01 38 full false Berquist works through the third figure of the categorical syllogism and its valid moods, then traces eight recurring argument-forms as they appear in Euclid's Proposition 1 and Aquinas on the causes of love. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/039-syllogism-figures-wisely-and-slow-and-the-eight-recurring/ Berquist takes up the third figure of the syllogism, showing which valid moods follow from universal premises and how conversion proves validity in the second and third figures. He then turns to eight recurring forms of argument—categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive—tracing how a chief syllogism is propped up by subordinate "backup" syllogisms defending its major and minor premises, worked out through Euclid's first proposition and Aquinas's question on the causes of love. Along the way he digresses through Shakespeare and Plato's Phaedo, dwelling on what it means for reasoning to be wise and slow rather than quick. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/039-syllogism-figures-wisely-and-slow-and-the-eight-recurring/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/039-syllogism-figures-wisely-and-slow-and-the-eight-recurring/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/015-1.mp3 0:51:33 39 full false Berquist works through Euclid's Elements, Book VII, Propositions 6 and 29, showing how these geometric proofs weave together categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive syllogisms into single continuous arguments. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/040-analyzing-arguments-in-euclid-and-aquinas-main-syllogisms/ Berquist asks what kind of reasoning actually underlies a geometric proof, and finds in Euclid's Elements, Book VII, Propositions 6 and 29, arguments that are not simple categorical syllogisms but continuous chains combining categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive forms. He traces the same nested pattern in Plato's Meno and in Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles, arguing that mathematics, philosophy, and theology share one underlying logical structure. He closes by distinguishing the "matter" of a syllogism—whether its premises are necessary, merely probable, or false—and previews coming treatment of equivocal terms and fallacies. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/040-analyzing-arguments-in-euclid-and-aquinas-main-syllogisms/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/040-analyzing-arguments-in-euclid-and-aquinas-main-syllogisms/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/015-2.mp3 0:31:45 40 full false Berquist works through Aristotle's split between demonstrative and dialectical syllogisms in the Posterior Analytics and Topics, showing why geometry proves necessity while opinion only reasons toward it. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/041-demonstration-versus-dialectic-necessity-per-se-properties/ Berquist asks what separates a proof from a mere argument. Turning to the Posterior Analytics and the Topics, he distinguishes demonstration, which proceeds from necessarily true premises as in Euclid's geometric proofs, from dialectic, which reasons from probable opinions held by everyone, by most, or by the wisest, toward conclusions that could go either way. He explains the "per se" (through itself) relation—properties like a triangle's angles or a number's oddness following necessarily from a thing's definition—as the key to necessity. Plato's Theaetetus and Meno illustrate dialectical inquiry into knowledge and contrary conclusions. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/041-demonstration-versus-dialectic-necessity-per-se-properties/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/041-demonstration-versus-dialectic-necessity-per-se-properties/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/016-1.mp3 1:00:28 41 full false Berquist works through the dialectician's tools from Aristotle's Topics, comparing dialectical syllogism and induction to rhetoric's enthymeme and example, then drills equivocal words like "dry," "liberal," and "healthy." Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/042-the-dialecticians-tools-probable-premises-senses-of-words/ Berquist continues his study of Aristotle's Topics, asking what distinguishes the dialectician's arguments—dialectical syllogism and induction—from rhetoric's enthymeme and example. He then turns to the four tools of dialectic laid out in Topics I, spending most of the class on the first two: selecting and ordering probable opinions by subject matter, from general to particular, using examples from ethics and politics; and distinguishing the several senses of equivocal words, worked through with terms like "dry," "liberal," "number," and "healthy." The class ends with an exercise applying this second tool to a list of paired terms, judging in each case whether the use is univocal or equivocal and why. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/042-the-dialecticians-tools-probable-premises-senses-of-words/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/042-the-dialecticians-tools-probable-premises-senses-of-words/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/017-1.mp3 1:04:21 42 full false Berquist explains the fourth dialectical tool—spotting likeness between things far apart—through Plato's Meno, Euclid, and analogies from physics, Shakespeare, and Scripture, then turns to Plato's Phaedo to trace Socrates's a fortiori argument for the soul's immortality. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/043-seeing-likeness-and-proportion-then-q-a-on-places-and-comedy/ How do you argue from things that seem to have nothing in common? Berquist takes up the fourth dialectical tool, proportional likeness across wide distances, setting it against the third tool's search for differences among near things. He tests it on Plato's Meno, Euclid's definitions, Aristotle on reason governing emotion, the inverse square law, Homer, Shakespeare, and biblical images of God as father and shepherd. The class then moves to the "places" of argument, focusing on a fortiori reasoning as Socrates uses it in the Phaedo, weighing the soul's fitness to survive death against the body's. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/043-seeing-likeness-and-proportion-then-q-a-on-places-and-comedy/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/043-seeing-likeness-and-proportion-then-q-a-on-places-and-comedy/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/017-2.mp3 1:07:58 43 full false Berquist walks through three fallacies of confusion — equivocal words, what belongs to a thing "as such" versus by accident, and being simply versus in a qualified sense — using lumber becoming a house and marble becoming Michelangelo's Pietà. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/044-equivocation-as-such-versus-accident-and-being-simply-or/ Berquist takes up three distinctions whose neglect breeds bad reasoning: equivocation in the meaning of words, what pertains to a thing "as such" against what is merely accidental to it, and being "simply" or without qualification against being "in a certain respect." He works through potency and act with the examples of lumber becoming a house and marble becoming Michelangelo's Pietà, then turns to moral cases, including abortion and the pursuit of an apparent good, to show how conflating these distinctions corrupts judgment. He closes over the opening lines of a text of Aquinas, in the manner of Charles De Koninck's teaching, urging slow, wondering re-reading of a short passage over rapid coverage of many pages. Notes and transcript: https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/044-equivocation-as-such-versus-accident-and-being-simply-or/ https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/044-equivocation-as-such-versus-accident-and-being-simply-or/ https://media.juskelis.com/episodes/v1/logic99/018-1.mp3 0:18:45 44 full false