Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
2. The Six Marks of the Wise Man: Wisdom as Knowledge of All and of First Causes
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[0:00] second reading, more precisely, what causes is it about, right? So he begins by saying, since we seek such knowledge, the knowledge of causes, that is to say, right? This ought to be considered about what sort of causes and about what sort of beginnings is wisdom and knowledge.

[0:23] Perhaps it would be clearer if one took the thoughts we have about the wise man. That's not the editorial view, you know. It's meaning we human beings in general have about the wise man about wisdom. Aristotle is going to work out a six-part description of wisdom for the wise man. And. He's going to reason from the first three of those parts to wisdom being about, what is said of all, and for the last three, it's being about causes.

[1:02] You notice, you have enough material in the first reading to say, "Hey, who's wiser? The man who knows the cause, the man who really knows that in itself. So the man knows the cause. Who's wiser? Well, if the cause has a cause, right?

[1:23] You hit me. Why? Because you're angry, at me, right? So anger is the cause of your hitting me, right? But anger is a kind of cause that has a cause, right? So why are you angry, right? So the man who knows the cause of the cause would obviously be wiser, right? And so on until you come to the first cause, assuming that there are first causes, right?

[1:45] It's just something that Aristotle shows in this book, right? Okay? He's going to develop this more slowly, right? Now the first thing we think about the wise man, we think first that the wise man knows all things so far as possible, not having a knowledge of these in particular. Because no one human being can know all things in particular, right? But you think in someone he knows all things in some general way.

[2:21] You hear people saying even daily life, he's got it all together, right? What does that mean? He's everything, right? At least in some general way, right? Even the pejorative sense of wise. Are you a wise man? Are you a know it all, right? We think of the wise man in some way, knowing all about something, right? But he can't know all about something particular, but in general.

[3:00] Then we think wise the one who is able to know things difficult and not easy for man to know. The sense is common to all, hence it is easy enough to think what Wise. So we think that wisdom is thinking knowledge of things that are what difficult to know, right? That's why we attach such an honor to the wise man, right? He knows things that most men don't know, things that are difficult to know, right?

[3:36] Further, on the next paragraph, he's got two things: the third and fourth one. Further, we think wise in every science the man who is more certain or more sure.

[3:52] Now, take it by itself. You're not so sure about something, right? Don't you consult someone you think might be wiser in this matter than you?

[4:06] Even after I had my PhD in philosophy, I used to go up and see Monsignor Dionne on CVI Every Thanksgiving and, every Easter vacation, right? And sometimes I'd send him my questions ahead, right?

[4:24] But these are difficult questions, and I worked out my own answer to the questions. Then I asked what he thought of them, you know, and almost all the time he'd agree with my own answer. But once in a while he'd say something right, and then if I thought about it again, I'd see he was right. I was wrong, right? But I go to him because he seems what Wise, right?

[4:50] And there's a little paradox there, right? You're saying that wisdom is about things that are difficult for man to know, right? We we think about the wise man, right? We admire the wise man for knowing things that difficult to know, right? We also think of the wise man as being more sure, but himself, and therefore we go to the wise man when we're doubt, right? Now, there's a little paradox there, right?

[5:19] Because how can the wise man be characterized by being more certain in what he knows, right? He's knowing things that are difficult. The things that are easy to know, that you can be more sure about. Yet we have both of these opinions about the wise man, don't we?

[5:45] Reminds me when Aristotle talks about the soul in the De Anima, right? And he talks about the excellence of the knowledge of the soul, right? Is such a noble thing, but it's also excellent because of the great certainty we have about the soul. But then later on, he says that to know what the soul is is one of the most difficult things in the world.

[6:10] So how can the knowledge of the soul be most what? Certain, yet the knowledge of the soul be one of the most difficult knowledge in the world to acquire?

[6:27] Yeah, how can that which is difficult to know, right, very difficult to know, how can that knowledge be characterized by? aptitude? But Even if you've done everything you could do, right? It's still such a difficult thing to know. How can you be sure? Yeah, no, but it is.

[7:05] You know Descartes saying is cogito ergo sum, right? As the objectors pointed out, this was really originally used by Augustine against the skeptical academics of his time, right? People denying everything, right? How can they deny that they're doubting? everything and therefore they're thinking, right? So in some way, there's a great certitude in that, right? Even the skeptic has to admit that. I doubt, therefore I am. Couldn't doubt I exist, right?

[7:40] Tell me the story of these classes at some philosophy class years ago, and somebody asked me, "do I exist?" The teacher supposed to have said, "Said who's asking?" It's

[7:56] obvious, right? So it may not be that wisdom is most certain in the same way that it's about the most difficult things. Right? It takes a long time to know a lot more about wisdom. Oh no, I'm just here to see that.

[8:19] Now the fourth thing is he's the one more able to teach. You might want to put in brackets the causes because you're going to kind of develop that more. So you think the wise man is more able to teach what others, right? Huh? You can still read Heisenberg's lecture, right? He came over to the United States to teach the American physicists quantum theory, right? He still gave lectures there University of Chicago Um Niels Bohr, forced to, get all the reporters out of the room, right?

[9:05] To explain the possibility of the bomb, now, right? But the man who teaches seems to be what Wiser than the men who are learning, from him, right?

[9:19] Now the fifth thing he says about wisdom that the one for itself and for the sake of knowing is more wisdom than that for the sake of its results. And they say that's more difficult for us to see. In the modern world, because this world is entirely given over to practice, right? But they say you can see, to some extent, that people would regard Shakespeare as wiser than any carpenter or plumber, right?

[9:50] And they would, you know, they make Einstein the man of the century because he's supposed to have known something, right? But not in terms of Einstein particularly making something, right?

[10:11] Now the last one, of course, comes right out of what we saw: the chief artist is wiser than the man he commands, and the one ruling the science that rules others is more wisdom than the one obeying. For the wise man ought not to receive orders, but to give orders. He ought to direct others. He ought not to be persuaded by another, the less wise by him.

[10:36] So if anybody else directed the wise man, that other man would be the wise man. So the wise man directs everybody else, or wisdom is the knowledge that directs other knowledge, and not vice versa, that kind of comes out of what we saw. We all think of the chief artist, right? Napoleon who commands the head of the cavalry, right? The medical doctor who commands the pharmacists as being wise, right?

[11:01] So wisdom, in the full sense, is going to be the man who commands everybody else. This is the knowledge, right? That directs all the rest.

[11:16] So he knows all things in some way, right? In ways possible for man in general, he knows things difficult to know, right? He's more certain, right? He's more able to teach. His knowledge more honorable, desirable for its own sake, and directs or commands all others, right?

[11:40] Such and so many are the thoughts we have about wise men and wisdom. You take either one, because you can change one into the other easily.

[11:51] I say the wise man knows all things in some way. Wisdom is knowledge of all things in some way, right? Turn one into the other.

[12:05] Now he could reason from the first three to speak about the first causes, but in order to kind of separate these two things in our mind, he's going to, in the next three paragraphs, reason from the first three attributes of the wise man to his knowledge being a knowledge of what is said of all, what is most universal in that sense, and from the last three he's going to reason.

[12:31] to wisdom being a knowledge of first, causes And of course people often confuse what is said of all with what is the cause of all.

[12:51] Two different meanings. In Latin, they speak of the universale in praedicando universal being said of things, right? And then universale in causando. Thomas, in the first book of the Summa contra Gentiles, he has one of those chapters devoted to showing that those two are not the same, and that God, right, who is the cause of all things, is not said of all things, right? The God who said "I am, who am" is not the being which is said of all things.

[13:34] Okay, There's a whole chapter devoted to that. Um, Hegel very clearly identifies the two. Look at Hegel's logic. Hegel identifies the being which is said of all things, right, with the one who said "I am, who am." Terrible, what confusion, right? And it leads to pantheism. and things of that sort. If you look at the Enchiridion Symbolorum in the 19th century, even the Catholic universities, the Catholic theologians, so on in Germany, they're always being corrected by Rome for their pantheistic, what tendencies, right?

[14:18] Even our own century, you know, Küng and Rahner and so on, tend to be somewhat pantheistic at times. And the other statements are more orthodox, you know. But some of these quotes, indeed, very questionable. So it's a very common thing. And Alexis de Tocqueville, in the chapter on the influence of democratic customs on the mind, says that it encourages pantheistic ideas. The force be with you, and you become a part of the force, right?

[14:55] So pantheism is something endemic in the 19th century, and 20th century. But there's really a gross confusion between said of all and cause of all.

[15:16] Two senses of universal being said of and universal cause. You have the same thing with the English word general. Suppose you have an army out there, right?

[15:30] And everybody in the army is a soldier, right? Very general, right? With the generals, captains, lieutenants, and privates and all that. Everybody is a what? Soldier. Very general, right? Then you have, let's say, general of the army, Douglas MacArthur, right? Is he general in the same sense that soldiers?

[15:56] He's a real. cause, yeah! He's moving the whole army. He's directing the whole army. Is soldier directing the army? Soldier in general. Soldier in general is said of everything in the army. It doesn't have any causality for the whole army. does it? That's really a very gross confusion, but it's made by a lot of people. Made by Hegel, I mean, most clearly in modern times.

[16:25] Anticipated by Spinoza. That's why I always say Shakespeare is wiser. than what the modern philosophers? Because he puns in the two senses of general, right? In Troilus and Cressida, you know, black satire. And Cressida comes over to the Greek camp, you know. The general of the army at Agamemnon right, gives her a kiss, right. Ulysses sees this. right She's kind of a, you know, hot issue here. And Ulysses says uh she's been kissed by the general, but she hasn't been kissed in general yet.

[17:10] We all want to get to the act. This is the downfall. of Cressida, you know, you know, with a loose woman, you know, actually. But two different senses of general, right?

[17:26] Shakespeare sees those two senses of general, but Hegel is confusing those two senses. So although Aristotle could reason, you know, from let's say wisdom being about the things most difficult to know, because it's about the first causes, right? He doesn't reason from that. He reasons from the first three that's about what is said of all, and from the last three to what is a cause of all.

[17:51] He wants to keep those two things distinct from our mind, just like Thomas does, and he has a whole chapter devoted to that. God is a cause of all, but is not said of all. People get mixed up when they say, well, being is said of everything, right? Everything that is to be, everything that is could be said to be in some way, and therefore be a being.

[18:16] And God is what says, "I am who am." Being itself, they can easily confuse the two, right? So Thomas has a whole chapter devoted to that. Distinction between those two. It's like you know Aristotle foresaw this, right? Because to some extent Plato made the confusion too, trying to take what was said of many and put it in the world by itself, and we partake of that. The man himself, apart from individual men, in a way, he's trying to make the same mistake.

[18:57] So let's see how he starts to reason now. So the first attribute of the wise man is he knows all things in some way, right? Wisdom is a knowledge of all things in some way, but nobody could know all things. No man could know all things in particular. He says that these to know, it's next to the last paragraph in page two. These to know all things necessarily belongs to the man most of all having a knowledge universal, for he knows in some way all things placed on the universe.

[19:36] Now. Someone might say, you know, how can anybody know all things? Right, because it seems to be an infinity of things, right? But notice, do you know what an odd number is? Huh? You know what an even number is? And do you know that no odd number is even? In a way, you're making a statement about how many things. All odd numbers. Yeah, infinity of odd numbers, right?

[20:04] Infinity of even numbers. So, in knowing universal, odd number, the way of knowing an infinity of things. Knowing universal even number. Pfortiori, knowing number, right? Knowing prime number and composite number, I know an infinity of things. Kind of opposite is an infinity of composite numbers, right? Euclid has a theorem, right, which shows there's an infinity of prime numbers too. Kind of harder, you know, than what he does.

[20:39] So, in some way, knowing infinity of things, right? Knowing universal. So, if the wise man knows all things in some way, he must know what is most universal, right?

[20:57] Now, in the second thing he says, and perhaps the most universal, let's use the word "perhaps," right? Because the first cause is even more difficult to know, right? He says, and perhaps the most universal are the most difficult for men to know, for they are furthest from the senses. So, if the senses know the singular, and that's the beginning of our knowledge, the most universal would seem to be furthest away, right?

[21:26] Okay. Now, if you have any experience of teaching philosophy, I notice this is a common statement, especially for women. But this is so abstract, right? You know, I have a hard time understanding philosophy. It's so abstract, you know. Hear

[21:49] that again and again, right? And what does he mean when he say "abstract"? What do you mean? Universal, man. Yeah, it's very universal, right? Separated, right? Abstract and separated, right? That's a common thing. We can do something more concrete.

[22:13] So, in some way, it seems to be That's why Thomas in question 117 article 1 Prima Pars Summa Theologiae he has a question on the teacher, right? And says the teacher has to lead the student from what? ab propositionibus minus universalibus from, less universal statements, right? To understand the more universal statements, use sensibilia exempla sensible examples, and so on.

[22:47] Now, the third thing about the wise man or wisdom is that the wise man is more sure than other men are, and wisdom is more certain than other sciences. Now, Aristotle recalls something that we learned in logic in Posterior Analytics. It's a very standard example he gives. Which is more certain, arithmetic or geometry?

[23:16] The reasoned out knowledge of numbers, the reasoned out knowledge of lines and angles and plane and solid figures. Which is more certain? Yeah. Now, what's the reason why it's more certain than geometry?

[23:38] Yeah. And a lot of times they take the simplest thing in arithmetic, which is the one, the unit, and the simplest thing in geometry, which is the point, right? And the point adds something to the one. It's indivisible like the one, but it has a position. It's here or there, right? So when I consider three points, they can all be in the same line or just two of them, right?

[24:02] And I consider the three ones of three. I don't consider that, but is it not here or there? Are they more abstract science? Now, if you study, Euclid with the, you know, Heath edition, for example, right? The edition you had out there, and now he reports edition what? Yeah, Heath notes.

[24:27] Yeah. Now, in Heath notes, he reports what the great commentators like Proclus and so on point out about it, right? That when he's in geometry, he's proving a theorem. Sometimes you have to distinguish a number of cases of that theorem because the line can be drawn in positions a little different.

[24:51] And what they they see is that Euclid doesn't give all the cases. His custom is to give the most difficult cases. And these easier cases for us dumbbells, right? But the commentators like Proclus and other ones, they will what? Distinguish the cases. Sometimes get very away and there's too many cases, but down for the centuries they done this right. Now, in arithmetic, you don't have to do that because the points can't be in a different position.

[25:25] Excuse me, the ones can't be in a different position. I know from practice and experience that sometimes you know when I'm thinking about the cases, if I distinguished all the necessary cases. Sometimes they say people distinguish more than is necessary that they really aren't you know essentially different, right? So you have a little you know uncertainty there, right? Have I distinguished all the cases so I really see that this covers anything, right?

[25:56] Never had that problem. You don't have to consider position. So the ancient mathematician says that a point is one having position. So you add more to be considered, you have less certainty. And you go from geometry to natural philosophy. There's more things to be considered. When you go from let's say sphere in geometry to the earth, well, the earth is not just a sphere, but it's what material, and certain things happen like what the poles get flattened and so on. And so, you have to take into account, what's found in the earth because of matter and the variations of matter, and so on, you don't have to consider in geometry.

[26:47] We talk about the shape of a tire and the size of the tire is like circular, right? But look at the tire out there in the parking lot. The bottom of the tire is flattened out, right? Does the geometry have to worry about the bottom of the circle getting flattened out? No, because now you're adding something to the sphere, the circle, and so on, namely matter, right?

[27:14] So arithmetic is more certain than geometry. because geometry adds more to be considered, more to take into account. Natural philosophy is less certain than geometry, because you add matter there, right? But now, when you go from what man is by nature to 20th century or 21st century American man, now you're adding what? Yeah, because man, 20th century American man, is what he is, not just by what he has by nature, but by what customs and by choice, and so on, right?

[27:52] So you have to consider many more things now, right? than you had to there, right? Talk about Israelites and Palestinians, right? You consider they're human beings. Now you have to consider all these, you know, things they're accustomed to do, choices they've made, and all that sort of thing. right? It's very complicated and very uncertain area. So that's basically the order suited to arithmetic, geometry, natural philosophy, political philosophy.

[28:27] It's easier for me to count and be sure the number of people here in this room than to go to Yankee Stadium and be what sure that I've counted everybody, right? And. The more things you have to take into account, the less sure you are. That's a principle, right? Now, as you go to what's most universal,

[28:52] you have more or less things to consider. Yeah, as you go from the more universal to the less universal, you keep on adding, don't you? When I go from figure to plane figure to rectilineal plane figure to quadrilateral to square, right? I keep on adding more things to be taken into account. So in a way, if he talks about what is said of all what's most universal, he has to take into account the least, and that is going to be more sure than anybody else.

[29:23] Kind of a subtle thing, right? I say there are many ways to argue these two things. but Aristotle is reasoning from all of the first three things. To his knowledge of being most universal, it's about what is most universal, what is said of all.

[29:44] Now, from the last, three, he's going to argue that it's about the first causes, and the science which considers causes, the second paragraph, page four, is more fit for teaching for those teach who give the causes of each thing. So the man who can give what Not only the cause, but the cause of the cause, he can what? Yeah. Yeah why are these guys throwing things at each other down there?

[30:19] You know? because they hate each other, right? Okay, now why do they hate each other? The man who can teach the cause of the cause can teach more, right? It's all the way till you get to the what First. right? He's most able to teach.

[30:40] I was going to argue in the next paragraph that if wisdom is a knowledge that's most desirable for its own sake, most desirable as knowledge, right, is because it most of all makes us know, right.

[30:57] What most of all makes us know? It's the cause that illuminates the effect, right, and explains the effect. And the man who explains the cause of something he seems to illuminate that, right?

[31:11] So he says, understanding and knowledge for the sake of themselves, especially belong to the knowledge of the most knowable. For the man who desires to know for itself will most desire what is most knowledge, and such is that of the most knowable. And most knowable are the first things and the causes, not to us. He doesn't mean right. Because the things are the most light, illuminating of all.

[31:41] For other things are known through these and from them, but not these through what comes under them. Most of all, it's the cause it's the effect, right? If? You know the effect, but not the cause. You are still kind of in the dark about

[32:04] this, right? So, if he's seeking what's most knowable and what's most illuminating, he's seeking the first causes. Now, when you study the four kinds of causes, you realize that the chief cause is the end or purpose. And he says that is the chief science and more ruling than the subordinate, which knows that for the sake of which, which is the definition of end, each thing ought to be done.

[32:31] This, however, is the good of each, and as a whole, take all things in account the best in all nature. If you knew the end or purpose of the whole universe, right? You always direct others by knowing the end, right? So, the man who knows the end of the whole universe is most of all able to direct others.

[32:52] Of course, God is both the Alpha and the Omega, right? He became the end of all things. Now, the final conclusion of the second reading: From all the fore said, the name, sought namely wisdom falls in the same science. For it is necessary that this looks at the first beginnings and causes, for one of the causes is the good, and that for the sake of which.

[33:22] That's the end of the first of the two parts of the reading, right? What he's been showing up to this point is what is wisdom aiming at, right? And the Greek word "skopos" is the word he uses to talk about aiming at a target, right? So he's aiming at causes, and most of all at the what first causes of the first causes. Okay This sentence that says when all the force that the name sought falls in the same science do you understand So he says names wisdom Yeah You know falls in the same science

[34:01] The science of the first causes and we've been talking about it Now, how long can we go today? You want to continue to the third reading. or not?

[34:30] Okay. Now, as I mentioned at the end of the three, we're going to have epilogue, right? If you recall the second thing he did and the first thing he did, right?

[34:44] Now, in the third reading here, these readings are taken from Thomas's. Commentary, right? The third reading here is the second part of the proemium. What kind of knowledge is wisdom? Aristotle is going to say four things about the kind of knowledge, wisdom is, And what will kind of lead into the next one? He's going to say that it's a looking knowledge, right? Not practical knowledge. Sometimes you see the Greek word theoretical, that means looking knowledge.

[35:18] He's going to show that it's the most liberal knowledge there is. That's going to follow from its being the most looking knowledge. He's going to show that it's not a human possession, because man is enslaved in many ways. And finally, he's going to show that it's the most honorable and the best knowledge because it's the most divine. And one of these we'll see it leads into the next one.

[35:44] Now, it is not a making. Generally, we'd say practical science. He's going to give two signs this knowledge is not quite practical, but that it's for the sake of understanding, right? And the first sign is going to be that it arose not because of hunger or thirst or something like that, but it arose from wonder, and therefore simply from the desire to know. So he says that it is not a making science.

[36:25] It's clear also from those first philosophers, for men both now and at first begin to philosophize through wonder. This is something that Plato had said before Aristotle. We have to read the text of that. Plato says it right.

[36:53] For men both now and at first begin to philosophize through wonder. In the beginning, it shows an orderliness. Wondering about strange things close at hand, Then little by, excuse me, colder. Then little by little, thus going forward, raising questions about the greater things, and about the change of the moon, now the sun and the stars, finally

[37:23] about the very origin of the universe. So the wonder grew, right? But the man in doubt and wondering thinks himself to be ignorant right,

[37:37] And we'll come back to what he says about the philomuthos in a second. Hence, if men philosophize to escape ignorance. It is clear that they sought knowledge for the sake of understanding and not for use.

[37:55] Now, to give a little sign, what is a philomuthos Yeah, A muthos first means a myth, something like our fairy tales. Then muthos takes on the broader sense of any story. And finally, Aristotle uses the poetics for plot. So the lover of fairy tales, right, the lover of stories, the lover of plots, is in some way philosopher. There's an affinity between the philomuthos and the philosopher, and the likeness consists in that the myth is put together from what?

[38:45] Wonders, right? So a friend of my brother's, who teaches literature, says great literature ends in wonder, and philosophy begins in wonder, right? So great literature kind of aroused the kind of wonder in the philomuthos, and this wonder is a stepping stone to the wonder of philosophy

[39:12] Albert the Great the teacher of Thomas, comments in this passage. He says that great poetry, great fiction, dat modum admirandi. It teaches us how to what? Wonder, right? So it is not by chance that Homer came before the philosophers. Homer is the greatest of the poets, huh? He's among the ancients. and the Iliad and the Odyssey, so on. they arouse a wonder, which is not quite the wonder of the philosopher, is a stepping stone, to that wonder right

[39:50] And it shows some decadence in moderns that they didn't become better philosophers under the influence of Shakespeare. I know myself, there when I first got interested in philosophy, my brother had the basic books of Aristotle, there right? I'm kind of looking at all these books, right? And the book that got my attention was a book called Poetics, right? That was much involved in that high school, right?

[40:20] But then when I became a freshman in college, I was in a special class dealing with my grammar and so on, right? And we were doing interesting things, and the professor says, "We're going to read some Shakespeare. You probably never read in high school." So we read a number of Shakespeare's plays, in this course, and this was the occasion for my to get a complete volume of Shakespeare, right?

[40:39] I read all of Shakespeare's plays at freshman year, and we're doing historical stuff. But that completed my transition from what a man. Concerned with the fate of his country, to what a philosopher, right? That wonder, that Shakespeare aroused, right. It's only a poet like like Homer or Sophocles or Shakespeare that really arouses that wonder, huh? Shakespeare's Farewell to the Stage, The Tempest, right? Miranda her name is taken from wonder.

[41:12] Pretty beautiful Not a wonderful thing isn't it So Aristotle is saying there's an affinity of the philomuthos to the philosopher. Sometimes people, you know, become a Philo Muthas is kind of a substitute for being a philosopher. It's something like the philosopher, right? Okay. My brother Richard was very much interested in fiction and drama and all those sort of things. He eventually became a philosopher, right? But the philomuthos on the way to being a philosopher.

[41:43] so Monsignor Dionne, you know, he agreed when I said there would have been no philosophers without Homer. And uh, they say Albert is very insistent upon that. It's just wonder. And so I've known, I've never known a good philosopher who's not a philomythos I've known a philomythos who's not a philosopher, but I've never known a philosopher who's not a philomythos. So

[42:20] this is very, you know, brought in here to bring out that philosophy did begin in wonder, right? And therefore, if it had begun in hunger, or thirst, or, desire to get warm, or, then it would have led to something practical, right? The art of hunting, or the art of farming, right? The fact it began in wonder, that desire of something to know, is the sign that it's like looking now, right?

[42:47] I'm going to give you a little, another page or two page. Here's the three main texts that I know of with the Greeks on wonder, right? And I'll reproduce things here from this proemium What will be new to you is the text from Plato, the Theaetetus, and then a nice fragment of Democritus. Democritus's fragment said, "I would rather discover one cause than be master of the kingdom of Persians."

[43:24] So I have to explain to the students, you know, that that was the greatest king in the world at the time. So if I was master of the kingdom of Persians, I, I'd be the wealthiest man in the world, right? I read that they had a thousand chefs to prepare dinner every night. Wasn't good, you know. I'm sure they had a harem, you know, and so all the things that men want right?

[43:45] The master of the kingdom of Persians has access But Democritus says, "I would rather discover one cause than be master of the Persians The intense wonder of the philosopher." right Plato's very nice text in the Theaetetus you know. So I'll give you a copy of it in the class here. Now the second sign that Aristotle gives. What happened witnesses this?

[44:14] When almost all necessary things, and those recreation, amusement existed. Then such knowledge as philosophy began to be sought, right? So it is clear that we seek this knowledge through no other need. I sometimes witness that with my own family. I come from a family of three boys, and we're all philosophers. My mother was just used to raise you up, right? Now my father was a businessman, right?

[44:47] My grandfather was a blacksmith. My Grandfather came over from Sweden at the age of fifteen, and he became the blacksmith in Parkers Prairie, Minnesota. And you think he's going to be philosophizing this man? No. See, this is you know this is very tiring work, right? So would my father be a philosopher? Be the son the blacksmith?

[45:15] No. And in fact, Parkers Prairie, at, the time my father was a boy, such a you know little town, it didn't even have a high school. So my father wanted to go to high school. He went to college, right? He wanted to go to high school at least, right? So he went to Alexandria, Minnesota, which is a larger town, not too far from Parkers Prairie, and he enrolled in the high school, right?

[45:42] But he had to support himself to go through the high school. So he worked in a shop that he found, right? But he didn't make enough money to be able to afford a room. So he asked the owner of the shop if he could sleep in the shop at night. The guy felt sorry for him, so then worked in the shop at night. Now, do you think my father is thinking of philosophizing?

[46:08] See, so my father, you know, he's an intelligent man, right? If he had more education, who knows what he would have done right. But eventually, you know, he got into a managerial position, right? And men with money started to back him up, right? And eventually, he got his own company, right? But now there is a little bit of, yeah, a little bit of money, you know. My father always made us work in the summer you know, sitting around, right?

[46:38] But he always helped us, you know, and give us as much education as we can, right? Ends up with three sons who are philosophers, right? We know what Aristotle's talking about, right? there was no philosopher in my grandfather's generation, and my father's generation also began peacefully, right? I see

[46:58] my children, you know, I'm not quite so wealthy as a professor, and they do other things, right? Maybe the third generation will be a philosopher. But that's the sign that Aristotle's talking about. You see, in my own family, right?

[47:15] So the average student suddenly gets a little interest in philosophy, you know, but I can make a living, right? And that's the truth of that, obviously, right? Aristotle's talking about it. Those are the two signs, but the main one is from wonder, right? It's knowledge, looking knowledge.

[47:32] Now, the second thing he says about this knowledge is that it's liberal as opposed to servile, right? Now, most people don't understand the origin of the term liberal education and servile education. It goes back to the not only Romans but all the way back to the Greek society, if I didn't play them, and of course, all those societies had. Free men and slaves, and by a analogy, proportion to the difference between a free man and a slave in that society, that they called some knowledge liberal or free, and others what servile or slaves.

[48:11] Now the obvious difference between the free man and the slave is that the slave exists not for his own sake; the slave exists for the sake of the master. I'm not saying whether that's good or bad. That's the fact, right? By the master he exists; the free man he exists for his own sake. So by analogy to that difference, a knowledge that's not for its own sake, but for the sake of making shoes or the sake of making dinner or whatever it might be, right, is called servile or slaves.

[48:47] And this is very common, you know, right up to Shakespeare's time. To speak of the servile arts, sometimes they call them mechanical arts. By liberal knowledge would be a knowledge that's desirable for its own sake, and what we call the liberal arts is like the beginning of that. Now, how does one say? But wisdom is the most liberal.

[49:14] But notice you can reason from it being looking knowledge to it being liberal, because looking means it's for the sake of doing, right, for its own sake,

[49:24] and therefore liberal or free. But as we call a man free that is for himself and not for another, so this alone is free among the sciences, because to some extent they're all studied for the sake ultimately of wisdom, right? For this alone is only for that you might say, for the sake of itself. right? There's A little passage of Thomas, which says, "I study the body," he says, "so I can study the soul, and I study the soul," he says, "so I can study the angels, and I study the angels, so I can study God.

[50:03] That's it. I'm not saying God or anything else. Those who the knowledge of God is first cause is most for its own sake, right? The lower kinds of knowledge to some extent are higher kinds.

[50:19] Now, you can see Aristotle's common sense here in the next paragraph. because what is the condition of man? He's all kinds of needs, right? And in many, you know, conditions of man, he could spend his whole day trying to get the necessities of life and still not get them every day, right?

[50:48] So he says, hence it might justly be thought. That it is not a human possession. Now he's not contradicting himself when he talked before about the natural desire to know, right? Because that indicated in some ways possible. But in saying it's not a human possession, he means it's not the sort of thing that you can use and pursue any time you want to, because you have all these practical needs, right?

[51:20] For in many ways, he says, the nature of man is enslaved. Some people point to this as an indication that there's some awareness of the effects of original sin, right? But in a way, my reason is enslaved to my body and its needs, right?

[51:42] And to some extent, I got to paint the house this summer. My reason is enslaved to my house, right? And I got to, get you know, food, the money to buy the food, right? Okay. So there's some kinds of slavery we can't avoid, right? Alfarabi is teaching the philosophy of all the old days, talking about slavery. Says today each man is his own slave. He says, you see?

[52:11] So it says to me, if you have a house or a yard, or you know, you know, uh, most likely you're going to be cutting the grass yourself, and paying the house yourself, you know, unless you have an awful lot of money, right? So in a way you're enslaved to your possession, right? You're enslaved to your what? Car, right? I get up there and say, someday I'll get a flat tire.

[52:35] So we're out there the sticks. I don't throw up, you know, because today you finally got the flat tire. You know how complicated it is. You know, we're out in the countryside there, and you got to, you know, get somebody to tow you out or something, right?

[52:47] Now in addition to that, men are slaves, what? Of their passion, right? I was quoting Hamlet's words there. Give me that man that is not passion slave.

[53:02] So some men are slaves of their own fear. Some men are slaves of their own anger, right? Some men are slaves of their desire to eat or to drink, or their sexual desire, right? Men are very often enslaved to some passion, right? And that makes it difficult for them to pursue knowledge that's altogether. liberal for its own sake, right? You know, they can maybe do something about being enslaved to their passions.

[53:30] but. They can't do much about being enslaved to their body in a way. It's got to be fed, right? Their car, their house, whatever it is. they have to have in their society, right? And then we're enslaved to what? Custom, right? Shakespeare calls custom a tyrant, right? Enslaved to fashion, you know. I'm not enslaved to fashion, though. If

[54:00] you wear the same clothes every day, you're kind of freed from one kind of unnecessary slavery, you know. Aristotle kind of continuing that quotes the poet, but then rejects what the poet says. Thus, according to Simonides, the poet, God alone could have this honor, right? As if this is more a divine possession than a human possession. This Knowledge is desirable for its own sake. Man, however, is not worthy to seek knowledge for itself.

[54:42] Now, that's a very old idea in man's natural religion. Do that. If you look in the world historian there, McNeill in the this is the best world history book we have called it. In the beginning, there he has a picture of a Sumerian religious base,

[55:02] and it's got three levels on the base. The lowest level are the beasts. The middle level is men, and the highest level are the gods, right? And apparently the theology behind it is that the animals were created to relieve man of some of his labor, like the horse and the ox and so on, right? Man was created to relieve the gods of labor, right? So it's only the gods.

[55:28] This is what the gods are. It's only the gods that have this knowledge, for its own sake, right? And then if you try to pursue that knowledge, you're trying to pursue a divine prerogative, and God will be envious, of you, right? Okay. And um, so he says, if the poets are saying something, right, and the divine is able to envy, it is likely, especially to happen about this, it's excellent knowledge.

[55:56] And unfortunate are all those who excel in knowledge, right? But then he rejects his opinion. None of what the poets, right? But the divine is not able to be envious. I know it's envy is a form of sadness it can't be sadness in God right. And envy is over what the good of another. that seems to prevent your good, right? Nothing can prevent God's goodness, right? So Aristotle is saying it's impossible for God to be envious.

[56:25] And according to the proverb poets say many false things. Notice what Christ says there about Martha and Mary. Mary represents what Contemplative, and Martha the practical, right? And um, uh, Martha comes to complain to Christ about Mary not helping her at the meal, right? And Christ says, Mary hath chosen the better part. Secondly, and shall not be taken away from her. And when they comment on that, Thomas and the Church Fathers they say, well, there's two lives?

[57:10] the contemplative life and the active life, right? And just like Rachel and Leah represent these two lives in the Old Testament. So these two women in the New Testament, but the active life goes up to the end of this life.

[57:26] But the contemplative life begins in this life and continues in a fuller way in the next life. So Mary hath chosen the better part. That's the part that actually stays eternal, right? And it shall not be taken away from her and continue this life. So he's not envious, obviously. Christ, right? He wants to share that. Knowledge which he has in himself.