Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
17. Dividing the Categories: Substance, Quality, Relation, and Habitus
https://berquistcourse.com/course/philosophy/1-philosophy-1999/017-dividing-the-categories-substance-quality-relation-and-habitus/

[0:07] In various ways, something can be said of individual substances. Now, in the text that we have of Aristotle, the categories, and also in the the topics, right? He distinguishes these into ten right away.

[0:42] But Thomas, in his commentary on the physics, or the question of categories, comes up in his commentary in the fifth book of metaphysics, where Aristotle again refers to these ten. Thomas divides into two and three, right? As a way of arriving at what ten, right? Okay. He follows the rule of two or three that we'll talk about later on. Okay. And

[1:14] I had had some students at my house last night there, and we're looking at the sixth book of wisdom, right? Sixth book of after natural philosophy. the. Sixth book of metaphysics. And Aristotle, in the second reading, there he recalls four senses of being that he had talked about in the fifth book of the metaphysics, right? He just recalls the four of them, right? So he had four, right, rather than two or three, right?

[1:44] Okay. Now you go back though to the what fifth book where he originally does this, right? And he divides into two, and then he subdivides one of them into three. Right. Okay.

[2:02] Now sometimes, as Thomas says, you know, about Aristotle, you know, brevitati studens, you know, seeking brevity, which is a soul of wisdom, right? You know, he may, you know, run together, you know, a division with a subdivision, right? But in order to understand it, you have to what make explicit, right? Say. So here he he what divides into two, subdivides one into three, ends up with four, right?

[2:26] But in the next book, he just enumerates the four, right? Okay. Now we had an example of that something like that in Thomas, right? When Thomas was dividing order in comparison to reason, he divided it right away into four. Remember that? Right. If you examine the order, it really is based upon what? First, the division into two, and then the second. Yeah. Yeah. There's the order not made by reason, and the order made by reason, right?

[3:03] And then he subdivides the order made by reason by that in which it is made, right? The order made by reason in its own acts, which we're concerned with for this study of logic, right? The order made by reason in the acts of the will, that's where we're concerned with an ethics, right? And then the order made by reason in exterior matter, and that belongs to the art of carpentry and the art of metalwork and so on, right?

[3:28] Okay. So how does he get four orders? Not really by one division, does he? No, by division into two. Made by reason, not made by reason. That's two, right? And then made by reason in its own acts, the acts of the will, exterior matter.

[3:50] But brevitati studens, he says about Aristotle, right? He what? It gives a result of a division and a subdivision in one thing, right? But when we explain this, you'd have to take it apart, right, and say, hey, the last three orders he talks about are all orders made by reason. The first order he talks about is not made by reason. That's the fundamental distinction, isn't it? And it's very illuminating, right?

[4:23] And Thomas saw obviously that difference. That's why he put the order not made by reason first, because the natural order is more basic than the order made by reason. Comes before. You got to be orderly in talking about order, right? Do you see that?

[4:41] So sometimes you'll find that Aristotle or Thomas somewhere would make it more explicit the divisions, right? Other times you just have a text where you know we have to what do a little thinking ourselves, right, and take it apart, right? Okay. I just mentioned it because I happened to be doing this last night, and we're we're looking at the sixth book, and we've done some things in the fifth book.

[5:11] And they say in the sixth book, when he comes back to the various senses of being, he speaks of four groups of meanings of being, right? Right away. He could eliminate two of them as not the main concern of the wise man, and two he's not going to be concerned with. But you go back. That's obviously based upon the previous book, right? Go back to the previous book.

[5:34] He divides into two, and then the second he subdivides into three, right? See, but you don't always have that. Maybe what's come down to us from Aristotle, right? Okay. So what you find in the text of the categories, he divides it into ten, right? Right away. Okay. And then the the similar text in the topics, he has the same ten, exactly the same order. You know, those are the two main texts, right?

[6:01] But it's by the way to ten. What Thomas, knowing you know, all Aristotle, he knows the what various divisions, right? Okay, so you see, he does this in two places. One, one is in the third book of the physics, where he's talking about acting upon undergoing motion, and he has to explain the categories, right? Okay, we don't have any commentary by Thomas on the categories of Aristotle, so we have to kind of pull things out, right?

[6:40] Just like you know, there's no commentary in the Isagoge by Thomas, but you can pull that thing out and summa coniectura, Little bits, you know. So I go around, you know If, I find something, you know, it's relevant. I said, I'll pick it up and put it in my file.

[6:59] So he says, if you have an individual substance like a man, let's say, or a horse like champion, right? Something can be said of man, of Socrates, let's say, or champion by reason of what they are, right? Okay.

[7:19] By reason of what it is. So I can say, for example, of Socrates that he is a man, right? What is Socrates a man, right? What is champion a horse, right? What is Moppet? We get this beast at home, Moppet is a cat, right? Okay. They used to have her mother Tabitha. What is Tabitha a cat? Okay. And. These are all being said of individual substances like Socrates or champion or Moppet by reason of what they are, right?

[8:05] Okay. Aristotle, in the categories, he calls this highest genus substance, right? Huh? Okay. But in the topics, he calls it what it is. So he's

[8:24] obviously thinking of individual substances, huh? I can say more generally of what champion and of Socrates that they're animals, right? Okay. And more generally, that they're what living bodies, right? Which is common to them and the plants. More generally, body, right? Okay. And

[8:51] most generally, what substance, huh? Of course, in the beginning, the philosophers tend to identify body and substance almost because that's the only substance they know, right? But later on, they realize that they're not.

[9:06] So this gives rise to category of substance. Now, other things can be said of Socrates or champion or Moppet. not by reason of what they are, but by reason of something existing in them that is not what they are, right?

[9:30] By reason of something in them, in addition to what they are. Now. Eventually, Thomas is gonna eventually divide this into three. They first divide it into two. and then... Okay, but before we get involved in that, let's just exemplify some things. So we might say that Socrates is what, courageous, huh? We might say Socrates is wise. so they deny it We might say Socrates is healthy. Everybody else is at the table drunk in the symposium, right?

[10:30] Socrates walks up and takes his morning, you know, bop and usual day, right? The story used to tell me that the chronic didn't need all the days and the young go for two or three days without sleep, right? I'm y'all shocked to one day.

[10:57] The old story has told you that Aristotle sits there, you know, with a metal basin and a ball, you know, and he starts all, sleepy you know the drop, bang. and I tried to do that, you know, but it's interesting the way these stories begin, right? The legend about Aristotle's death is that he died by chronic, from chronic indigestion brought on by overwork. But they don't even know what these guys died, of, right?

[11:22] I mean, even you know, they don't know what Mozart died of for sure, you know. let alone Aristotle, or Alexander the Great they don't know what he died of either. Reason of something in them, right? Other than what they are, right? So we might say that they're healthy, or they're sick, or they're beautiful, or ugly, or they're bigger,

[11:46] they're little, right? Third thing is by reason of something outside of them. Let's take an example of health. Subdivide it. Now, what have been examples of something said of me, or reason of something outside of me? That's not what I am, right? It doesn't really exist in me, right? What's outside of me? One obvious example is that I am what, clothed, right?

[12:39] Very good example, right? My clothing is not what I am, and it's not in me, like my health is in me, right? And yet I am said to be clothed, right? For reason of something outside of me, right?

[13:04] Now Thomas will not subdivide the first one, right? I don't expect him to subdivide the first one. but he's going to see a reason for subdividing the second here, and the reason for subdividing the third, right? Okay. And he's going to get eventually three under the second, three highest genera, and under the third he's going to get six. But those six are not as important as these three, and of course, substance is the most important of all.

[13:44] Aristotle doesn't spend much time on the last six, but he does on the first four, right? Okay. So you got this fundamental division down. Now we've got to subdivide the second one here, right?

[14:10] When I was a freshman in college, I was in this classroom, had blackboards all around the room, right? And I had a math teacher, right? He would start to fill up equations and deduction He'd go all around the whole room. Even the thing, he'd be fun around. He'd be teaching, you know. He'd stop the whole board. He wouldn't raise his hand. Oh, no! Definitely not. Nice guy.

[14:32] He used to come to class and used to have a cigar, you know. I just, you know, don't complain about my hand and say, all right, you wouldn't dare, you know. And he had kind of stiff legs. He had been a paratrooper or something, you know. or you know, so he hurt his legs, a little bit. I can't do well. Paratrooper, He's a real tough guy. you know.

[14:51] Math, you know. He's kind of like when he was a modern mathematician. I can define anything I want, to, you know. My brother Marcus got arguing with him about this.

[15:09] Um. Yeah. Thomas says that something in the second way now something can be said of me by reason of something in me, either absolutely, he says, or towards another. Okay. So let's put up what we're dividing, subdividing. Said of individual substances, right?

[15:42] By reason of something in them, either absolutely. Absolutely means in itself, not towards another, right? Or. Towards another. Now the Greek here, the Greek for towards another, is pros ti right Okay Pros ti Pi there, right? Pros ti right? Toward something, right?

[16:37] You say towards something. Now in Latin, when they translate this very literally, they'll translate it as ad, aliquid, towards something, you might say. Sometimes they'll use the abstract word relation, right?

[17:08] But the word relation, being abstract, doesn't give you the idea so much of what this really is about, right? It's being towards another, right? I am taller than you, or I am shorter than right. A reason is something in me, right? But not in itself, but towards you, I am taller or shorter, right? Or I am your teacher, or I am your father or your son, right?

[17:39] A reason is something in me towards another, right? Okay. So let's now use the concrete way, pros ti. The thing about the word relation is, you know, and now we have a distraction of abstraction. You know, here everybody in their sermons talking about relationships, you know. So I always hear relationship. Well, that's an abstraction of abstraction, right? But you know, the word relation is kind of a can be a misleading word.

[18:15] We can speak of a relation between us, right? See, that's not really what this thing is. Something between us. It's me towards you, and what you are towards me, right? I might be to you a father, and you might be to me what a son. Or I may be to you shorter, and you are to me what taller, right? You know, it's not like relation is something in between us.

[18:42] And we tend to think, you know, use the word relation, right? There's some relation between me, you know, I got my son or my wife. there's some relation between us, right? No, I am to her a husband. She is to me a wife, right? I am to Marcus a father. He is to me a son, right? Okay, I'm a son towards somebody else, right?

[19:07] So it's better to use this pros ti towards something, towards another. I mentioned there, I think, when we went to the Gospel of Saint. John,

[19:23] that the actual Greek word there in the beginning is pros, right? We don't translate it maybe as good as we could. In beginning was the word, and the word was what?

[19:38] The Greek says pros. En arche en ho logos, kai ho logos en pros ton theon towards God. right. And then, and the word was God, right? Okay. And when you study the Trinity, huh, and the distinction, it's it's based upon what? Relatives. Mm He says subsisting relations, okay Uh but if you know Aristotle's chapter on relation, you know this word "pros ti. And then you look at the Greek of the beginning of John's Gospel right away, it leaps out, right?

[20:16] The distinction between the Father and the Son is a relative distinction. It'll be as much different than this kind of relation, right? Something in God with accents, right? But something of the character of relations found there, and that's very important for understanding Trinity. But I just mentioned that you know to point out how important it is to go to the very words that Aristotle uses in Greek pros ton theon you know, when he said "aliqoi, " but they don't translate, you know, and the word was toward God, but they say "apud in Latin right?

[20:54] I think in English we usually pronounce it as "with, " right? The word "was God, right? The word was God, right? But "with" is not really Greek word there. This is very important. I'm surprised that I haven't seen that together in Thomas anyway, or in the West another they see very clearly the distinction of this kind, right? I haven't seen them comment on the natural Greek word there, you.

[21:20] I haven't seen anybody. I don't see. I'm Christian. See this stuff, you know. It just jumps out of it, you know, because it was jumped into you in understanding this thing, you know, how what a bad word this was in some sense, right? And how Aristotle's words are much better than "pros ti so that's very much in mind in the Latin translations where they said "aliqoi, " and then the beginning of John's Gospel, we just.

[21:46] Let's say the Greek fathers maybe. Maybe yeah, yeah. If you run across something, I mean, I know everybody, obviously, I know everybody, and Christians too. You know, we've had Augustine and Thomas in mind, especially in this development of this.

[22:10] Now, absolutely, Thomas divides that into two. One, you know, fact, nitho the fact that these things are what material things, right? He ties it up with matter and form.

[22:30] With matter, he ties up quantity. So the question here: Let me get the concrete thing first. The Greek will say how much, how many.

[22:44] This gives rise to quantity, and the form. how this gives rise to the category of quality. So quantity is something that things, material substances, have. Because they are material, right?

[23:10] Yet their size, what they are, not the same thing, right? And even in speech, we kind of see that, right? A man, his size, to be a man and to be five foot ten, are they the same thing?

[23:29] If you are bigger than other man, are you more a man for that reason? No, you are more in some sense. Your size, you are bigger, huh? But you are not more a man.

[23:43] Now the Pythagoreans and to some extent the Platonists, they confuse quantity with what substance, right? And you have that same mistake repeated in Descartes in modern times, huh? Where they identify quantity, extension, right, with material substance, the very substance of these things. And when I argue against Descartes, I say kind of playfully, you know, Descartes never grew up. Because if your quantity was your substance, then when your quantity changed, you no longer have the same substance, right?

[24:20] So you never grew up. And to grow up, it means what? One of the same substance has a different what? Size, right? As you pull through your years of growth, right?

[24:37] And I made a theological application of that. This confusion and the error between quantity and substance contradicts the what? Eucharist, right? Because in Eucharist, we have, as the Church says, a transubstantiation, right? The substance of the bread is turned into the substance, right, of Christ's body, right? And the substance of the wine is turned into the what? Blood of Christ's body. But the accidents, as we say, right?

[25:17] The quantity of the bread remains, right? The quantity of the wine remains, and the qualities remain, right? The sense qualities, are the most quantity.

[25:32] But if you identify the quantity with the substance of these things, well, then the substance remains, right? You need your inherency now, right? So,

[25:48] no, for us, you know, a sign of the greater truthfulness of Aristotelian philosophy over Descartes is that Aristotelian philosophy is compatible with faith, right? But Descartes here was going to argue that. But notice that's not the reason why Aristotle's philosophy is useful. It's just the reverse, right? It's because it's true that it's useful in theology. It's not true because it's useful in theology. Go back to the question there in the Euthyphro, right?

[26:21] Man, the pious look the gods approve of. Socrates says, "Well, is it pious because the gods approve of it, or do they approve of it because it is pious, right? " And I sometimes ask students that question about the commandments, right? I say, "Is commandment to honor your father and mother. " Is commandment to not kill, right? I say, "Is it good to honor your father and mother because it's commanded to do so?

[26:48] " Or is there a commandment to do so because it is good? Did God give us that commandment so it would be good to honor your father and mother? Or did He give us that commandment so we would do what in fact is right and just? Right? Okay. And did you know murdering your neighbor become bad because God made a command against it? Or did He make a command against it because it is a bad thing to do?

[27:17] Your whole understanding of commandments depends upon the answer to that question, right? And even you know, even students today, they they see right away, you know, that that it's it's not bad because it's a commandment against it, but because it is bad, it's such a terrible thing He's made a commandment against it, right? Okay. Now there could be a commandment of another kind, right? You know, like you know, you stay in your room until I tell you to come out.

[27:47] That's not in itself, you know, or you drive on the right side of the street, right? And it's not bad to drive the left side of the street. Definitely make a commandment. It's arbitrary in that sense, right? But you decide one or the other to be consistent, right? And so it's important to see here is that Aristotle's philosophy is not true because it's useful in theology, or because it's compatible with theology.

[28:15] But it's not compatible with theology or useful because it is true. And Descartes' philosophy is not false because it's incompatible with theology. It contradicts theology, the faith, but it contradicts it because it's false. The false contradicts the true, right? The true doesn't contradict the true, but the false contradicts the true. We'll see a better way to get at what statements are, what have contradictions, right?

[28:41] So notice what Thomas does. He divides into two, absolutely, or towards something, right? And then he subdivides the first into two, right? Ends up with three, and so now we've got four altogether, right? Substance, quantity, quality, relation, right?

[29:06] He has a whole chapter worth in those four right now, but he's very brief with the last six. That's for the last six. Now you can see that absoluteness towards something—that's a, you know, division very clearly by opposites, right? Because absoluteness there means what in itself, as opposed to towards another. This here is no hard to see, but you see it better when we're studying matter and form, natural philosophy, with all material things, quantity,

[29:42] body, and such. I notice the word "how" here, right? See, it's just the word "how." By the definition of difference, we said it signifies how it is, what it is, right? If you're talking about a difference, up in substance that would be substance, right? Here you're talking about. Some accidental quality, opposed to substantial quality. What is that in Greek?

[30:10] How does it express that? Poyas. It says in Greek, and Latin, there's a more connection there between the concrete way and the abstract way. In English, you have to say howness, Poios and poiotes Now, the last group

[30:55] something can be said of individual substances by reason of something outside them. Now, this is going to be eventually divided into six, but Thomas again arrives at the six by dividing into two or what three, right? Never see Thomas take the rule two or three, but he seems to always, you know. I mean, for the most part, and it's always plain when you get to the rule of 2 or 3.

[31:43] It's uh, uh, true only for the most part. Sometimes we immediately divide into more than three, right? But usually, if you divide into more than three, you are either dividing and subdividing and giving results of several divisions, right? Or you are crisscrossing two divisions, right? If I divide human beings into good men, bad men, good women, bad women, clearly I am crisscrossing good and bad, male and female, right.

[32:14] So, to understand that you have to go back to two divisions of two, right? Or sometimes they say order is compared reason four ways, but he analyzes it and he has what two and then one of them divided into three, right? But sometimes he just puts it together, right? I think it's in the uh Peri Hermeneias commentary where Aristotle sometimes he he he'll define one thing, and then the next thing maybe has the same parts in its definition except the last part.

[32:52] Just give the last part. Seeking brevity. It's like if I was, you know, to define. Now, genus is a name said with one meaning of many things, other kinds signifying what it is. What the difference signifies, how it is, what it is. I haven't given you the definition explicitly of difference, right? Say by just giving you the you know last part huh I think Aristotle does that.

[33:21] now? and again he might do it, you know. So, rather than repeat yourself, right? Okay. Now Thomas usually divides this into two, right? He divides one of them against the other five. One of them is peculiar to man. Okay. So, common to man and other things, huh?

[34:03] And then private to man. That's a bit of an oversimplification to say private to man, but it doesn't belong to anything else except if it comes into the use of man. Now, in Greek, this is called hexis In Latin they translate habitus, right? Sometimes I take the liberty in English to say "outfitted." Okay, outfitted. This may not be the best way to translate it, but gives the idea there, right?

[34:41] An outfit, huh? An outfit is something that fits you outside, of you, right? Um. Why does man have this? Huh? Why does man have this? Huh? Because he needs it. It's not natural to him like animals have built it. Yeah. Man was not given by nature everything he needs,

[35:16] and why was that so? Right. The other animals have the tools they need for doing what they do as a part of them, right? So the animal has its what claws that needs claws, right? Or it's got its what horns that needs to butt other animals around, right? Okay. Or it's got its wings and it needs to fly away, right? Others It's got its stinger, you know.

[35:46] They're you know just all red. I thought something there. All red. Okay. So they have these you know tools you know for building into you or what.

[35:59] Why can't man have by nature the tools he needs? Well, I've been digging in the ground, so I needed a shovel this week, yeah? And then there's these roots down there, so I needed an axe to whack away, right? And then I'm leveling out the dirt, so I needed a rake, yeah? okay? And then when I go in the house, I need a knife and a fork and a spoon, right?

[36:27] And then I need a screwdriver, you know, because you're fixing up the fans, and so on. it's getting so hot, right? And I need a key to get in my house and so to get in my office, right? And then I guess I need a computer now. And I need a car, right? So a steering wheel and so on.

[36:51] There's a kind of an infinity of things that that man is able to do, right? And there's no end to the tools that he might require, right? This building's on fire. We need that fire extinguisher over there, right? Okay. So um,

[37:10] he needs a pen, obviously, right now. But can you imagine what it would be if I had the hammer and the saw and the axe and the knife and the fork and the spoon and all these other tools, right? Yeah, yeah. So instead, man, nature's given man a hand, right? Whereby he can fashion other tools, right? And what use them, right? So the hand is sometimes said to be the tool of tools, right?

[37:36] The hand corresponds to what? To reason, right? There's something unlimited about reason. When we look in natural philosophy at the fragment, the great fragment DK12 there of Anaxagoras on the mind, the first thing he says about it is it's unlimited, right? There's something infinite about the mind. You see that from the self to the universal, contains an infinity of things. But in the biological books, Aristotle says that Anaxagoras said that man is the most intelligent of animals because he has a hand instead of a hoof or a claw, right?

[38:14] Aristotle says, "Well, no, it's just the reverse of what he says. Because he's the most intelligent of animals, he has a hand. This is the tool of what reason, in a way, right?

[38:27] Interesting that first act of reason is called simple grasping, even by all the names. But the hand enables you to what? Make and pick up and use an infinity of different what? Tools, yeah. Okay. In the same way, man is not given by nature what? The clothing he needs, right now. Now the cat seems to be shedding some of her fur. My neighbor's dog there, they have, you know, she's getting all tangled up anyway, so it's good for her, you know, to be.

[38:58] Cuts of her fur, right? It's cooler, right now. Some people take a brush and they put it in the water and they brush the cat and the cats get to like it after a while, you know? Usually, they don't like water, but you know some cats get used to that. You know, cooling the hot weather you know You feel like pampering these cats, right? I know one time we went to one of these cat shows just to, you know, like the cat.

[39:23] where they? had cats around you know, It's kind of crazy those cat shows you know, People lay down, you know they're taking care of these cats. you know, all these fancy things. you know, more than most people take care of their children. So, not only does man not have maybe the fur that he needs in the winter and so on, right? But also the fact that man doesn't want to always wear the same thing, right?

[39:49] People give up. this human quality, to wear the same thing every day. In fact, men tend to do that, right? They have the same pants and same shirt. And my wife says, "You've had the same shirt." and pants. on for a week now And

[40:07] I change my suit at school about once a week. So, but you know, we certainly do need different clothing, right? And especially a woman does, right? You know, these pairs of shoes. But even apart from that, I mean, we do certainly need a different, you know, clothing, let's say, on the day of a wedding and graduation and different occasions, right? You see, so mannecking it shows something of the infinity of him, right?

[40:32] He needs different clothing for different occasions, right? Huh? And different weathers. So the other animals don't really have this unless they come into the service of man, like we put a, you know, saddle on a horse or something of that sort, right? Or sometimes, you know, they would protect the horse, right, going into battle or something.

[40:55] This is the one that's private to man. huh? So man is said to be shot with shoes or clothes or arms. They're considered dangerous. But they're talking about this idea, right? He's armed. They're considered dangerous. He kind of used to give a public talk about this category, right? It says it brings out something about man. In fact, this is man's only category. Okay. In a sense, I mean, you know, when the when the pope and so on, you know, talk about the importance of priests and religious and so on wearing their what their their vestments, right?

[41:41] It says something to people, right? It says something to the world and so on. So I mean, this is important for man, right? It's important, you know, for soldiers to have their own what particular thing, right? And certainly fitting the bride to be decked out, you know, you know, check this as a pair of like the spring, you know. Okay.

[42:06] Now, how does he distinguish the the category of habitus common to man and other things, right? Well, he says there are really two ways this takes place, right? Either by

[42:25] an extrinsic measure, or by a extrinsic cause or effect. Now Thomas here is using his vast knowledge of natural philosophy here, right? In talking about these things. In natural philosophy, we get to the third book of natural philosophy. Third book of natural hearing, or the physics as we translate in English. Aristotle talks about motion and place and what time, right? And place and time are the two what extrinsic measures, right?

[43:23] So either is taken from place or from time. So not only my clothes, but I am in the what twenty-first century, right? Okay, and I am in what Massachusetts. I am in this room, right? Okay, so you get from time when and from place what where, right? Okay, I am said to be in Massachusetts, right? I am said to be in the twentieth century, right? Now, there

[44:13] is another way we get something from place, huh? And that is from the order of parts in place, huh? And this gives rise to

[44:30] what they call the Greek 'keisthai', position huh Order of parts. in place. So I am what standing, right? Okay, I am what sitting, right? Okay. Now, my parts are arranged in places here in a way, huh?

[44:58] Now, am I sitting? My body could be.