Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
20. Figurative Naming and Names Equivocal by Reason: Synecdoche, Antonomasia, Metonymy, Metaphor, Irony, and the Kept Name
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[0:03] I think that what you should do with figurative names is to get a understanding of the most common ones, okay? And I think there are five in number, right? The most common ones, and some of them have a name, and some of them don't. Some of them, the name has a name. Sometimes the way of naming has a name, right? Sometimes they have both, right? Okay. Give example

[0:38] what I mean here. A metaphorical name, right? That's one way of naming things figuratively. You can also name things by irony. Okay? But a name used metaphorically has a name. We call it a metaphor. Okay. I don't, to my knowledge, a name used ironically doesn't have a name.

[1:04] Do you know a name for it? I don't. So, we've spoken here, you know, a lot about antonomasia, right? Antonomasia, I think, is naming a way of naming things, right? Well, what do you call something that a name that's used in that way? See, I don't think antonomasia means that. It's a different meaning if you look up the dictionary. So I don't think that what is named by antonomasia has a name.

[1:31] That's not a name. That's the many things you'll find out that are names. I remember in class one day we were talking about, what's the name for the desire for food, and they all said hunger, right? And what's the name for desire for drink? Said thirst, right? And desire to know, wonder, right? And what's the name of sexual desire? Never have a name. People say lots of that.

[1:58] I mean, a name for it? Doesn't have a name. It says something is well known and talked about. It doesn't have a name. You know, doesn't seem to.

[2:12] Usually, you know, Aristotle says things that don't come into our experience don't have names, right? Now they're rare in our experience. Here's something very common. But even equilateral triangle doesn't seem to have a name. Does it? See, square is a name. But equilateral triangle doesn't have a name.

[2:35] Okay. So, now what's common to all figurative naming, huh? Or figurative speech, is that the meaning of the word is not the meaning of the speaker. That's the best way to look at it, huh? The meaning of the speaker is not the meaning of the word, huh?

[3:02] And if the meaning of the speaker became a meaning of the word, it would no longer be what? Yeah, yeah. Now, sometimes a dictionary is misleading in this way, right? Because if you look at the word "pig" in the dictionary, right, they might give as a meaning of "pig" what "glutton," right? But if that became a meaning of the word "pig, " then to call you a pig would be to call you a glutton.

[3:32] It would not be figurative speech anymore. Okay. So sometimes the metaphor becomes like like pig is so common that people you know almost want to call that a meaning of the word, right? And there may be, you know, historically some words, some things are named, you know, metaphorically or in some other figurative speech, right? And then they have any name themselves, right? That became the name, right?

[4:01] But then it's going to function as the thing's own name and not as a what metaphor, right? Okay. Let's see at the end I'll point out a little rule that Boethius gives, right? You know, when he's opposed to when a name is being named equivocally by reason, and when it's being named figuratively, but here it doesn't really, in many cases, have a name of its own, right?

[4:32] Okay. Here it already has its own name, but you don't use its own name, right? You use the name of another thing, right? Okay. Now, I think the five most important kinds of figurative naming are. I'm going to give them in order right now. Synecdoche, which seems to name the name itself, and antonomasia, and put those two together because you're going to have something in common. As we'll see,

[5:17] and then you have the metonym and metonymy, which is the name of the what way of naming. Now, synecdoche and antonomasia. I don't think there is, as I said, a name of the name, right? But a name of the way of naming, right? Okay. So maybe I make that a little more clear here if I can. Let me make a little chart here and put the name and the way of naming, right?

[5:57] The way of naming we're talking about figurative naming here. So metonymy is one way of naming things figuratively, right? And when a name is used in this way, it's called a metonym. Okay And antonomasia is another way of naming things figuratively,

[6:21] and you'll find in a big dictionary that we're in antonomasia. It's a small dictionary. I don't know myself of a name, used in this way. Synecdoche, I think, is more the name, of the name, okay, than the way of naming.

[6:45] Then you have the metaphor. You can speak of metaphorical naming, use a phrase like that, and then you have irony. These five, I think, are the most common.

[7:15] And maybe I need a little text here where I talk about these five and give you a few, you know, out of references in Thomas, but you'll find Thomas very often referring to one of these five, right? Okay. There's a text as I mentioned in one of the epistles of Saint Paul, where Saint Paul uses irony in his letter, right? And Thomas wants to explain that Saint Paul is not saying anything false.

[7:43] Although he's using irony, right? He's praising them when actually it's the reverse, right? Yeah. Just a slight aside Side, did you not go into this somewhat in your foreword to the Bible? Maybe did, yeah. Did that distinguish these five Not so much. Yeah, yeah. But that's a very interesting text. I think it's in that thing I'm going to leave you with. But Thomas explains that when a man speaks figuratively, right, the meaning of his words is not the meaning of the speaker, right?

[8:18] But an intelligent listener will gather the meaning of the speaker through the words, right? Okay. And he contrasts irony and metaphor there in that bigger text. Okay. We'll come down to what they are. Now, synecdoche and antonomasia. In these cases, the relation of the two is that of what? Part and whole, right? Okay. But in the case of Synecdoche, It's a composed whole in its part.

[9:02] A composed whole in its part. In the case of antonomasia it's the general in particular, so therefore the universal whole in its part. Now, the composed whole is the first meaning of whole and part. The composed whole is a whole, which is what composed means, put together from its parts, right? Okay. And they sometimes call it integral whole, right? Okay. So, if you give the name of a composed whole to one of its parts, or vice versa, that's an example of what's Synecdoche.

[9:47] Now, if you give the name of the general to the particular, or the name of the particular to the general, this is an example of antonomasia Okay. Now, as you can see in the English word particular, it comes in the word part, right? So it's it's like a part, but it has a secondary meaning of the word part. The Greek word for general comes in the Greek word for whole, right?

[10:13] So they call this universal whole. Now, give the example of synecdoche right? Well, the one that everybody's talks about in the Gospel of St. John is, and the word was made what? Flesh. Okay. Was it made?

[10:35] Made man. Yeah, it was made man. Yeah, yeah. Now, sometimes in Scripture, man is called flesh. All flesh must come to thee, right? Sometimes man is called soul in Scripture. Okay. Well, then you're giving the name of a part to a whole, right? Now, some, you know, one of the heresies you have in the early church is those who say that Christ didn't have a human soul, and place of human soul was the word.

[11:03] Well, they're taking it as being said non figuratively, but as being said in the form of a what? synecdoche, right? Um, but no, synecdoche is a very common thing in real life, daily life. You know, he's a brain. Okay.

[11:28] If if a part of the man stands out for some reason, right? He's so smart, right? He's a brain. Is he a brain? No. You're giving the name of a part to the what? Whole. The part that composes the whole. I suppose because of his muscles, he has muscles. Because somehow his muscles stand out, right? You don't challenge him, right?

[12:00] Or sometimes you know there's a guy who comes in, you know, at the time when they got to kick a field goal or kick the extra point, you know, and he never misses, right? And you call him the toe, right? You're calling that sometimes in sports, right? You know, because some of that stands out, right? Or some of these great wine connoisseurs, you know, they can sniff a wine, tell you not only what grape it is, but what country it came from, and what county, you know, they're really good at this, right?

[12:30] So you might call him the nose, right? The nose, right? Okay. So those are all examples of synecdoche. You'll find them very often in daily life, right? Okay. In where's God when he says, you know, reason more than anything else is man. That's a synecdoche, huh? Okay.

[12:57] Now we're more apt to name the whole from the part, but if you name the part from the whole, right, it'll still be the same figure of speech. Antonomasia, we often do both. We give the name of the general to the particular, and vice versa, right? And so, almost in several places, Saint Paul and many other places, Thomas will explain how the word Christ is said. What antonomasia, right?

[13:31] Christ means what? Anointed, right? But we use Christ meaning what? One man in particular, right? Okay, because among all those who are anointed, all the kings and priests and prophets that are anointed in the Old Testament, for example, he stands out, right? He's anointed with the Holy Spirit, right? Okay, so that's an example of antonomasia, or the Bible in English. Bible means what? Oh, yeah. So, say this is the Bible.

[14:06] We're saying we're using the general name for one particular book because among all books, this stands out because it is the Word of God.

[14:19] Okay. But if if a student is chasing girls and amorous, we might call him a what? Don Juan. A Don Juan or a Romeo, right? Or Casanova, or something, right? And then we're translating since the name of a particular but famous lover, right? Romeo or Casanova or Don Juan, and we're using that instead of the general name, right? Okay. So he's not Romeo; he's a lover. That's what he is.

[14:52] So call him a lover would be to use nonfigurative language. Right? That's means a lover, right? But it's more common to say he's a Romeo, right? Okay. Or someone who's hesitant and slow to act, they call it Hamlet sometimes, right? Okay. So they may take somebody famous in history, like Casanova, or some fictional character, like Romeo, right? But someone who what stands out, right?

[15:18] So this again is getting common. Now back in early fifties, there I was just interested in politics. Used to call Senator Taft Mister Republican, right? So when Dirksen nominates him at the Republican Convention, he says, "I give you what Mister Integrity, Mister Republican, my friend Bob Taft, right? Okay. " But he's called Bob Taft. That's nonfigurative, right? But Mister Republican, it's kind of but well, all kinds of Republicans, all conventionally Republicans.

[15:53] Right, but he is mystery public, you know. So you just say Mister Baseball or Mister Something, right? I say, antonomasia. So it is a very common thing. One thing is kind of interesting when you look at the epistles and so on in the New Testament. It's just Peter and Paul who are called apostles, and so they're called the apostles by antonomasia. A lot of times they see Paul or John Paul the second, the first, Peter and Paul as the what the princes of the apostles, right?

[16:29] But sometimes they're called simply the apostles. So Thomas Aquinas often refers to Aristotle as the philosopher, right? And he refers to Saint Paul as the what the apostle, yeah, to Saint Paul and say the apostle, capital A, right? He's the apostle of the Gentiles, right? So

[16:51] that's very common. So I put those two together; they're different, but they're both involve whole and part, right? But one the integral whole or composed whole, and the other universal whole as part. Do you see that?

[17:13] That's very close because you're naming a whole from its part or vice versa, right? Now in metonymy, you have one thing is something of the other; it's not a whole or a part comparative, right? But it's something of the other, right?

[17:32] And there seems to be at least three or four examples of metonymy. Sometimes a very common thing Thomas refers to is when you transfer the name of the container to the contained or vice versa. So you've got the container and the contained.

[18:05] If you say this is a holy place or this is a wicked place, Thomas says, "Well, the place is not wicked, huh? " But the people in the place are wicked, right? But now you transfer from the contained to the what container, right? Okay. Or you call this an unhappy age. Was the age the time unhappy? No, but the people or the events are unfortunate.

[18:41] Another way, sometimes the name of the cause or the effect, when it's transferred to the other. Shakespeare often sometimes he'll he'll signify the cause by a noun and the effect he'll use an adjective or vice versa. He'll have the effect named by a noun and its cause by a what adjective, right?

[19:21] So he might speak of scornful pride. Well, scorn is really the what effect of pride, right? It's not pride itself, right? Disgraceful action, right?

[19:48] The action leads to disgrace, right? So you find this in scripture. Sometimes it says. uh let. The earth praise the Lord. Somebody to take that as being what? Metonymy, right? It's not the earth that's going to praise the Lord, but those who are on the earth, right? Huh? Okay.

[20:21] Now, in the case of metaphor and irony, you have something, or one is not a part of the other, or something of the other, right? But there's a a likeness or a what? Opposite, right? Okay. And so,

[20:39] when the husband or the lover calls his beloved honey, right? That's an example of a what? Metaphor, right? Okay. And even sweet is an example of a metaphor, right? Okay.

[20:54] The metaphor is based upon some kind of what likeness. Again, this is very common, right? When I say you're a pig because you eat too much, right? Okay. Or you're a rat because you did something. It's beautiful, right? Huh? Okay. These are examples, metaphor. They're very common to express our emotion.

[21:17] Thomas, in the commentary of the Psalms, he has the fullest explanation of the metaphor of sweet that I've ever seen. And he's explaining the text there, you know taste and see how sweet is the Lord, right? And so,

[21:36] he says three things about the sweet, right? One is that the sweet is pleasant, right? Okay, pleasing. A second thing he says about the sweet is is it calms us, right? Okay. Now you can see that, you know, how when the police in the old days that was a common thing they find a kid and he can't, he's lost, right? He's crying and bawling, right? And they got to find the parents.

[22:04] Now you stop the kids from crying and bawling. We buy him an ice cream cone or something, right? See? Or if you're driving across country with little kids in the car, you know it's good to have a little bit of candy in them, right? And they get too restless, you pass back some candy and then they're quiet, you know, for a while. See? Okay. And the third thing about the sweet is it kind of what?

[22:28] It's refreshing, right? As we have candy in the factories and so on, right? You know, grinding down the machine, getting a candy bar so you can keep going, right? Huh? He says the sweet then is pleasing, right? Restful, right? And what? Refreshing, right? You see things then are seeking God, right? Okay.

[22:59] So the beautiful is called sweet sometimes. Shakespeare instead of saying your beautiful form, he says your sweet form, right? It's pleasing to the eyes, right? It's a sight for sore eyes, as we say. It's refreshing, right? And that's how we often describe the beautiful as what restful, don't we? Right? If you go to some place, you know, there's a beautiful scenery. It's so restful, you know. That's it, right?

[23:27] So it's pleasing, restful, and very refreshing. I used to study in this little room there in the College of Saint Thomas Library, right? And had this big famous painting on the wall there, saying. And I sit there reading my book, and then I look up, you know. Your eyes get kind of tired reading, and you get kind of tired. Kind of pleasing to look at this painting in front of me, you know.

[23:55] Kind of restful, right? Kind of refreshes you, you know. And you can go back, right? So metaphor is based on likeness. Irony is based on what? The opposite, right? So if you're mean to me, and you know in a way you're being mean to me, and I say gee, you're nice. Example I always give to students is I come in on the weekend, and you're under the table, they're drunk, and I say, what a fine example of an assumption college student, you know.

[24:26] But everybody knows that I don't mean what my words mean, right? Okay. I mean the what opposite, right? So the case of irony, I mean the opposite of what my words mean. In the case of metaphor, I mean something like what my words mean, but it's not the same thing. Okay. In the case of metonymy that's a little more obscure. Exactly how all the cases are, but the most common examples I find in Thomas is for container contained, one is transferred to the other, right?

[25:03] And then he speaks to me of cause and effect, one is said of the other. But it's antonomasia it's relation of whole and part, but the two kinds of whole, composed whole, universal whole, right?

[25:23] I think those are the most common kinds. Something like hyperbole. I'm finding references to hyperbole, you know, where someone says, "I've told you a million times not to leave your such and such." And everybody knows that you know you haven't told the person a million times, right? That's obviously figure of speech, right? Was it one different from all of these? Maybe it. It's something like just

[25:54] a metaphor because you've told them many times, right? You're taking, you know, a large number, right? But obviously, maybe it's got a little different basis for it, right?

[26:08] I'll murder you if you do that again, right? You know, well, you mean that, you know? But we're trying to, you know, make it very emphatic. You know,

[26:24] but these five are the ones you need the most. I think I find, you know, in metonymy the metaphor of most of all scripture, you know, but you find synecdoche a lot sometimes in metonymy, right? And sometimes arguments. I say Thomas is defending, you know,

[26:47] Paul from this idea of saying something false, right? To speak ironically is not to speak falsely, right? Socrates uses irony there in the in the apology, right? He proposes as a reward that he'd be pensioned off, right? I mean, it's a punishment, right? That he'd be pensioned off, right? Everybody knows he's proposing a reward rather than a punishment huh

[27:19] So I'll leave this little text here okay It's not that finished, but it's got some of these texts here, And let's spend a little bit the word figure of speech and so on. Okay Look at that text that you're asking for It's right there. Okay. The Corinthians, yeah. Okay As I say, to talk about the figures of speech is really more proper to to rhetoric and to the poetic art, right?

[27:58] Because they want to use these primarily, huh? The poet most of all, right? And for him, his great glory is in his metaphors and things like that. But the the in rhetoric we use metaphors sometimes too, right?

[28:15] So Nixon said the Democratic programs are retreads, right? And Pericles said that the young men killed in battle, it's as if spring had been taken out of the year, right? So that's a famous metaphor.

[28:34] So let's go back now to the other topic here. I don't know if it's, very important, and the idea of name equivocal by reason.

[28:56] Now. If you say that a name is univocal, you mean it had only one meaning, right? If you say that a name is equivocal, you mean it has what more than one meaning, right? And then we distinguish between a name equivocal by reason and a name equivocal by chance.

[29:26] Now sometimes they call a name equivocal by chance purely equivocal, right? And sometimes you see a name equivocal by reason called an analogous name, right? But I prefer to call it a name equivocal by reason because analogous comes from the Greek word for proportion, right? And that's only one way of naming things equivocally by reason, to name them by proportion, right? So

[29:56] this here, I think, is a better way of stating it. And don't confuse the idea of a name being equivocal with a name being said equivocally of many things. It's possible that if a name is equivocal, you might say it of many things having only one meaning in mind. Take the word bat. The word bat is equivocal by chance. It can mean the piece of wood used in baseball, right?

[30:26] Or it can mean the flying mouse, right? Okay. But if I said the word bat of three baseball bats, it would be said what univocally, right? It's being said of the three baseball bats with one meaning in mind, right? So even though the word does in fact have many meanings, right? In saying it of these three baseball bats, it's being said univocally, right? But if I say of the baseball bat and the flying mouse, it's being said according to different meanings it has.

[30:56] Okay. So we're going to talk about name equivocal by reason. A name that has many meanings, but there's some what reason for it having as many meanings. There's a connection among the meanings, huh? Okay.

[31:16] I don't think there's any one text in Thomas Aquinas or Aristotle where they lay it out as universal as I'm going to try to lay it out now. Okay.

[31:32] So what I'm saying is kind of my thinking about this, the putting together, you know, scattered texts, right? Okay. You often see, you know, how how Aristotle and Thomas they don't make all the distinctions that we made about something. They often make the distinctions that are relevant to what they're going to do here and now, right? Okay. But sometimes you find some place where they lay out the whole thing in a very universal way, right?

[32:01] But sometimes you don't. Okay. Just like I was mentioning before, we talked about the distinction of the roads in our knowledge, right? I think I've seen Dionne who brought that together, right? huh Which is not to say that Aristotle and Thomas can see it, but we don't have a one text, right? Where they lay it all out, huh? Okay.

[32:28] So to the best of my knowledge, now, I think a name becomes equivocal by reason in two ways. In both of these ways, we're going to subdivide, huh? Okay. And let's take the simplest case, just so you have a name said of two things equivocally by reason, right? Okay. To simplify the example, son.

[33:01] Now, one way, which is. As we'll see, less equivocal than the other, is we'll just take example two things. Sometimes a name that is said of two things

[33:20] is kept by one of them as its own name, and the other gets a new name. Okay. So let's have one reader. A name

[33:45] becomes equivocal by reason two ways, huh? One is by being kept as its own name by one of two things of which it is said.

[34:28] While the other gets a new name as its own. Sometimes a name that is said of two things, right, is kept by one of these as its own name,

[34:54] and then the other one gets its what? a new name as its own name. Now, there's two ways this happens. Before we go into those, I want to divide this into two ways. The other way a name becomes equivocal by reason is by being

[35:25] carried over from one thing to another. By being carried over from one thing to another. Sometimes a name has been placed upon one thing, and then we see a reason to carry it over, place it something else. Changing, you know, somehow the meaning, but having some connection to which meaning.

[36:09] Now, the first it seems to me takes place in two ways. Sometimes, huh? Sometimes a common name is all that one of the two things has, while the other has something special about it, something that makes it stand out in some way, or has something noteworthy in addition to what the common name says.

[36:47] And so it gets the new what name? I take the most familiar example of that. How many fingers do I have here in this hand? Five. Okay. So finger said of all five, right? Huh? Now you might say I have what? Four fingers and a thumb, right? Thumb gets the new name, right? Now, why does the thumb get the new name, and why do the other four keep the name finger?

[37:26] Is something special about this finger that helped me to pick up this class? Huh? No. I guess they call it biology the opposable thumb, right? Most people, the thumb sticks out sometimes, right? You know, you get a ride, use the thumb, right? Um, uh, there's something special about this finger, right? So the other four keep the name finger, right? At least in daily speech, they do, right?

[37:58] And this finger gets a new name, right? Okay. Now this is very close to univocal. So in one sense, a finger is a thumb is a finger. In another sense, it is what But not? Okay. Um.

[38:21] Take an example from us. Sometimes we say that man is an animal, right? The man and the beast are both animals, right? But sometimes we say that man is not an animal, right? So in some situations, to say you're an animal is no insult, right? That was doing a minute ago in logic, saying you're an animal, right? Man is an animal. But in other circumstances, if I call you an animal, that would be insulting, to you at least, right?

[39:01] So animal is said of man and beast, but sometimes animal is kept by the beast as its own name, right? And man is given a new name, man, right? Okay, because man is something noteworthy that separates it from the beast, namely reason, right? Okay. So though animal in general is said univocally of man and of what beast, right? Sometimes we hold man and animals, right?

[39:38] And so my mother would object when I was little if I called man an animal, right? She'd Say, well, he's not just an animal, mom. Well, okay, you know, She didn't like the idea of calling man an animal, right? But you're thinking of animal then to me really what beast, right? Okay. So there's some equivocation there, isn't there? Because in one sense man. is not an animal. He's not just an animal, but in some other sense, broader sense, he is an animal, right?

[40:08] Okay. So, this is one way this takes place then. And you know, Monsignor, Dionne when I talked to him about this, you know, he would hesitate to even want to call this analogous, isn't it? Because it's so close, to univocal right Okay. Okay. But I ran across a text one time, and Thomas, where he's saying the objection was saying, you don't distinguish the genus against the species.

[40:43] You would distinguish between square and quadrilateral, right? It's a different thing. But sometimes you do, if in terms of the meaning, right? Okay. Um. So it seems there is some distinction, however little, right, in meaning between animal as said of man and animals opposed to man, right? Okay. So. So it's kept in this case by the one that

[41:17] adds nothing noteworthy, let's say, to the common meaning, right? And the one that adds something noteworthy that stands out gets the new what name, right? Okay.

[41:46] The one that adds something that stands out gets the new name. Gets a name. Now we have an example of that in categories. When Aristotle talks about disposition, habit, right? Sometimes he'll say that habit is a disposition. Other times he'll distinguish between habit and disposition. Well, habit is a what firm disposition, right? A disposition not easily lost. So habit adds to the idea of disposition in general that it's something quasi permanent, right?

[42:39] Something stable, right? So habit gets a new name, and a disposition that is easily lost keeps the common name what disposition. Okay. What we call mood, often, right? You know, your mood. Changes very often during the day, right? For better, for worse. You see, well, mood is like a disposition, right? But it's easily lost, easily changed, right? While you are being a just man or an unjust man, or you know, courageous man or a coward, right?

[43:11] This is the more permanent, right? And easily lost, right? Okay. So you could divide disposition into disposition and habit. Obviously, disposition has a different meaning somewhat when it's said with disposition and habit, and when it's opposed to habit, huh?

[43:34] If you go to a nursery to buy a plant, right? They're thinking of something kind of small, right? And they might distinguish the trees from the plants, right?

[43:48] That's indeed a speech; it's not invented by us philosophers, right? Yes. But in some sense, you see a tree as a plant. But at other times, you might distinguish a plant from a tree, right?

[44:05] So if you say, "I want to buy a plant, " they're not thinking of a tree, probably, when you walk in there and say that, right?

[44:14] So a plant can be divided into plant and a tree, right? A little like animal into animal and man. You see that. And you know, you find this kind of commonplace in the parishes. You know, they're talking about sex and so on. We got to teach young men to look at the woman not as a thing, but as a person, right? So they distinguish between a thing and a person, right?

[44:43] I am supposed to treat you like a person, not a thing, right? But is a person in some sense a thing? If there weren't a thing in some sense, he'd be nothing, right?

[44:55] But very commonly we distinguish thing and person, don't we? So thing is divided into thing and person. In one sense, person is a thing. In another sense, person is divided into thing. But again, the person adds something of great dignity compared to common notional things, right? Reason and will, and so on. Can you read what you read up there? Yeah. Is kept by the one that adds nothing noteworthy, right?

[45:28] To the common meaning, and the one that adds something that is noteworthy or that stands out would get the what? New name. Okay. Sometimes, you know, you find authors will say that the Iliad of Homer is a poem, right? I forget how many lines they had, quite a few lines, right? But sometimes you would distinguish a poem from a what? Epic, right? And then the poem was something what?

[46:06] Small and short, right? By the epic. So you are going to find this again and again in daily speech and being used everywhere, not just by the philosophers, right? And people are constantly

[46:22] being puzzled by that, right? This is a common equivocation. Okay. Now, the other way it takes place, huh? Is when the common name. I have to give myself some more room right now. At least the second part of it. The other way it takes place is when

[46:57] only one of the two has fully, or completely, or perfectly the common meaning, and the other only in some imperfect way. And the one that has fully and perfectly and completely keeps the common name, right? And the one that has it only imperfectly is given a what? A new name, right? Okay. That's just quite different from this first case, huh?

[47:30] Sometimes it's kept by the one that has fully or perfectly the common meaning. When we say kept, I mean kept as its own, right? Kept as its own name.

[48:11] By the one that has fully or perfectly the common meaning, and the one that has imperfectly or imperfectly, gets a new name as its own.

[48:46] Now, if you read the modern philosophers, you might find a famous work by John Locke called an Essay on Human Understanding, right? He's talking about human reason, right? So he calls it an understanding, right?

[49:04] Now, understanding can be said of our understanding and of the understanding of my guardian angel, and even of what the divine understanding, right? And what does understanding in that sense mean? It means you have the ability to understand, right? Well, God and the angels are able to understand everything they naturally understand all at once. Not just thinking out, not reasoning out. No need any discourse, right? We don't have to think about things before they understand them.

[49:46] Understand what? One time, my son Mark he was at old school. He says, "Why can't we be born with knowing everything we need to know?" I said, "You want to be born an angel?" I said, "That's the way it is And their mind is full, right? Yeah, I think they naturally know,

[50:05] So the angels are God, they keep the name what understanding, and man who has a defective, and perfect, barely understands, and he has to think and think before he understands a little bit more. He's given a new name, and that is reason. See, so reason is defined as ability for what discourse, right? For a large discourse, looking before and after, right? Huh? See, why don't we define reason as the ability to understand?

[50:36] Because the way it is, ability to understand, right? But man doesn't understand very much, and he has to go through a discourse to understand the little that he does come to understand. So better to give him a new name, right? Because he has so perfectly right the ability to understand, huh? Excuse me. So in Latin you'd have the word intellectus, right, or understanding. You could divide intellectus into intellectus, which is what the angels and God have, and ratio, which man has.

[51:07] In English, you can divide understanding into the understanding and reason, right? So sometimes you'll see that Thomas will say, you know, our reason is an understanding, right? But sometimes he'll divide reason against understanding, huh? Meaning the power of understanding. Now

[51:29] it's just a little different than the first case, isn't it? See here, the one that keeps the common name is the one that has fully and perfectly and simply speaking, you might say, common meaning. The other one gets a new name, right?

[51:43] That's a very profound example, right? Giving you, but take a more familiar example here, huh? Daddy, what's the difference between a kitten and a puppy? Well, I might say kitten is a cat, right? Little cat, and a puppy is a little dog. Okay, so here I'm saying that a kitten is a cat and a puppy is a dog, right? But now sometimes we divide kitten against what?

[52:11] Cat. Cat, yeah. It's only kitten, right? It's not yet a cat. So cat could be divided to cat and what? Kitten. Cat keeps the common name because he's fully developed, right? The kitten gets a new name, right? Okay. Just like if we said that a boy is a man and a girl is a what? Woman, right? You can say that, right? But sometimes, very more often, we'll distinguish the man against the boy, huh?

[52:43] To separate the men from the boys, we say, right? Then obviously, to separate the men from the boys, the boys are not men, right? Okay. And then we say the girl, you know, maybe she has to poop or something, you know, say she's woman now, right? Okay. So that's an example, right? Of this, right? Because what distinguishes a man from a woman, only the adult has what fully, right?

[53:10] Okay. You see that? That's very important, huh? Aristotle sometimes calls the argument enthymeme called syllogism. At other times, he called rhetorical syllogism, and he called the argument called example, the argument from one singular to another singular of the same kind. He called that an induction, rhetorical induction sometimes, right? Other times, he'll divide syllogism against enthymeme, right? An induction against what? Example, yeah. Sometimes he'll say, you know, there's only two arguments, kinds of argument, syllogism and induction, right?

[53:57] And so enthymeme's got to be one of them, example the other. So example, enthymeme is a syllogism, example is induction, is that right? So notice, syllogism is said of syllogism and enthymeme. Induction is said of what? Induction and example. Same kind of thing, right? And enthymeme is is like an imperfect, incomplete syllogism. It is something of the syllogism, but not fully or perfectly.

[54:33] And example has something of what an induction has, but imperfectly, right? So if we send, you know, a hundred people to this one restaurant, and we have a hundred reports that they get a lousy meal, and so we conclude that, you know, all meals at the restaurant are lousy. That's a kind of induction, right? But if I go to eat there once and have a lousy meal, and you're asking me what restaurant to go to, and I say, "Don't go there," you know, from my experience, I have something of induction there, don't I?

[55:15] I'm taking the one meal I had there as representative of meals at that restaurant. So something like an induction going from the particulars to the general, but obviously it's very what? Very imperfect, yeah. So simply speaking, without qualification, fully speaking, it's not an induction, right? It's the argument called example.

[55:45] Example, by the way, is equivocal by reason. Example can mean a singular used to illustrate the principle. Or can be an argument from one singular to another singular of the same kind. There's some connection between those two meanings, right? Both cases are using a singular to make known something in a way. So

[56:13] most texts where Thomas talks about analogous names, he doesn't talk about these two, but he does talk about these two ways of speaking in other texts. So and they are very common, very common in daily speech and in what

[56:30] philosophy, right? And in theology. Okay. So that was a subdivision of the first way that a name becomes equivocal by reason. It seems to be said of two things, sometimes, but then it's kept by one of them as its own name, right? And then the other one gets a new name. It almost seems, especially that first one, or the first of those two particular ways of doing it, almost like univocal right?

[57:24] So, but like as we'll see later on when we compare the natures of things to numbers, right? It's like if you had what two said of what two and two plus one.

[57:45] Well, this would keep the name two, and two plus one would get a new name, three. Because notice three in a way has a two in it, but it's not just two. And because it has something added to the two, right, gets a new name, right? But it's just two, keeps the name two, right? What's an animal? An animal is a living body, a sensation. But man has something in addition to, right?

[58:16] He's more than that, Shakespeare says, right? He has reason addition to sensation, right? So what is just an animal, just a living body, sensation, keeps the name animal, right? And the other one gets a new name. So you

[58:44] run across these about philosophy. Very common. Okay.