Introduction to Philosophy & Logic (1999)
30. The Syllogism, Its Likeness to Calculation, and Dividing the Four Arguments
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[0:00] Now, the last kind of argument is the one we call the syllogism, and this is the chief subject of the logical third act. Next time, we'll be starting to study the syllogism So, the syllogism. is defined thus. You could say it's an argument, or you can say it's a speech. A speech in which some statements laid down

[0:41] another. Follows necessarily because of those laid down. So it's speech in which some statements laid down—just two, really, in every syllogism—another follows necessarily because of those laid down.

[1:16] You know what speech is, huh? Vocal sound, right? Signifying by custom or human agreement, having parts that signify by themselves, right? And in this speech, which you call syllogism, some statements are what laid down, right? Okay. Now that that's the word Aristotle uses. In Latin, they'll say "positis. In English we translate that "laid down." And Thomas gives I think, a good explanation of this word "laid down" in the commentaries.

[1:52] on This is Saint Paul, right? huh? Where Saint Paul said, "right, laid down," He says, "Well, you don't lay yourself down; something else lays you down." And "laid down" has the idea of what firmness, right? But also the idea of order towards something, right?

[2:14] So you say the statements are laid down. It's reason that lays down the statements, right? And laid down implies that the statements have a certain what firmness, they're at rest in the mind,

[2:30] and that they are laid down that they in order to something, right? Yes, right. Okay. So Thomas explains those three elements in the word, laid down in the context, right?

[2:46] St. Paul has been laid down as an apostle, right? He's been laid down by God. God has placed him, here right? And there's a firmness, right? there, in his position, his authority, and he has a certain task now, right? He's ordered to some task. In English, you see this in some times in the same phrase in regard to the law, right? Maybe your mother said something to you here.

[3:14] I'm going to lay down the law, right? Okay. And you lay down the law. The law doesn't lay itself down. Someone lays it down, right? There's a firmness. You say, "I'm going to lay down the law, right? " And you expect a certain behavior to follow from what's been laid down, right? You have those three elements, right? Something lays it down. There's a firmness there, right? The laid down law is a firmness there.

[3:41] by the way, You're not going to be fooling anymore. Laying down the law right? Like they say in Washington D. C. now. They've got these machines that automatically photograph you when you drive through. Over at the speed limit, and then you get your notice in the mail.

[4:00] But, you know, eventually we'll come to that around here too, because you know, people would if you knew that, you're not photographed. you would take your license plate. and automatic, right? Okay. I used to joke to have a machine where on the speed limit it turns around and throws a canopy over. your car That engages I suppose cause accidents. but. I mean, this is a firmness, right?

[4:28] You lay down the law, right? There's a firmness there, right? It wasn't before, and it's also ordered. So it's speech in which reason, right, has firmly placed, right, some statements, right, in order to what? A conclusion, right? Okay. Statements that are, what, in some sense related to a conclusion, right? They're having order.

[5:09] And then another statement, right, which is not really part of the syllogism, but a conclusion of it, right? an effect of it, right? Is going to follow necessarily, right? Now, this follows necessarily really separates the syllogism from the other three kinds of argument.

[5:30] If I, you know, lay it down and say that the meal at this restaurant was good last week, it doesn't follow necessarily that it'll be good this week. If I lay it down. That every student is in black. I mean, this student is in black. This student is in black. This student is in black. therefore. Every student is in black.

[5:55] It doesn't follow necessarily that every student is going to be in black, right? And again, Caesar refused the crown three times. It doesn't follow necessarily, right? That he was not ambitious, right? Okay.

[6:20] But the syllogism, right? Conclusion, but follows necessarily, right? Okay. If it follows necessarily, it doesn't mean the conclusion is necessarily what true, right? Because if the premises laid down, if even one of them was not necessarily true, then even the conclusion follows necessarily, it isn't necessarily what true, right? You see the difference, right? Just like in calculating, right? You know,

[6:53] if I multiply the numbers correctly, right, and without making any mistake here in the multiplication, the number that I get is not necessarily the correct number. If one of the numbers that I multiply it was only probable, right? I mean you would be mistaken, huh?

[7:11] Now, it's necessary as Aristotle does to add this last part in the definition of syllogism because of those laid down that necessary. I often borrow Shakespeare there, you know. This above all, to thine own self be true, and it must follow as the night the day. It cannot then be false to man, right? I notice,

[7:44] does night follow day necessarily? Yes. Yeah. But is it because of day that night follows? Day is not responsible for night. It's a third. day. Instead of going around the earth, or maybe the earth turning on its axis, there's a cause of day and night and the necessary succession to the other, right? Okay.

[8:14] So something could follow something else necessarily and not be because of it. Night might follow day necessarily if the earth necessarily turns on its axis, right? Okay. But it would not be because of day that night follows, right? You see that? Okay. So Aristotle wants to bring out by this last part of the definition of syllogism that it's because of those statements laid down that the conclusion, this other statement, follows necessarily.

[8:57] Okay. Is it for statements? If the statements follow necessarily, would it always be because of those laid down? Could you have statements that would follow?

[9:15] Well, I don't know, but I mean, what I'm putting out here simply is is the phrase "follows necessarily" doesn't mean necessarily because of that, right? Okay.

[9:36] You might say learning necessarily follows ignorance, right? Or necessarily precedes ignorance, let's put that way. But but the ignorance is not the cause of the learning, right? The error of ignorance shapes the sentence.

[10:04] This is bringing out the fact that these are in some sense the cause of the thing, right? That the maker of them, the producer of them.

[10:15] Now, some people want to say, you know, that syllogism is a reverse induction. Induction goes in parts to the whole, and syllogism is reverse. But I think it's more. It's sort of more like reproduction, right?

[10:28] More like the two dogs producing a third dog, right? Or the two numbers producing a third number, right? Okay. So you can see why this kind of argument is going to have a great importance. If you look at Euclid, you know all the arguments in Euclid there are what syllogisms, right? Okay.

[10:56] I notice something. The word syllogism there comes originally from the Greek word for reckoning or calculating, right? Okay. And we point out a couple of likenesses between the two. When you add, subtract, multiply, divide, you need at least two numbers to get a third number, right? And likewise, in the syllogism, you need at least what two statements to get a third statement? Then there's a certain what rigor in both, right?

[11:24] Okay. But notice neither Aristotle nor the Greeks in general would try to make one art out of these two, right? The art of calculating and the art of what reasoning, right? Okay. There's a likeness there, right? And even the word for syllogism is borrowed from that, right? In English, we sometimes do that. We say, "I reckon that's so" in the hillbilly language, right? Or we say, "I figure that's so," right?

[11:54] We're thinking of mathematical figures, you know. Okay. What does that add up to, right? You know, we're talking about statements, right? And as a child, you learn how to add and subtract, multiply and divide more than you learn about the syllogism, right? So there's a certain likeness there, but Aristotle never tried to make one art out of the two, right? But the mathematical logicians they tried to lump these two under what they call deduction, right?

[12:22] You know, and they don't really belong to the same art. What's fundamental in the art of calculating is counting, right? Because you have to count before you have any numbers to add, subtract, multiply, divide. Huh? What's fundamental? Fundamental in Aristotle's logic is not counting, but understanding what something is. Okay. And if you go back to this fundamental thing, you can see that understanding what water is doesn't tell me how much water is in the glass, right?

[12:55] Understanding what a man is doesn't tell me how many men are in this room. And vice versa, counting the men in this room, I have to be able to recognize a man some way. It doesn't really help me to define what a man is.

[13:11] So the question, what is something? The question, how many or how much? One is not really what reduced to the other, right? By knowing what a man is, an animal with reason, that no way is the basis of my calculating how many people are here. I have to, I have to be able to define man to count. I have to be able to identify him in some way, right?

[13:39] The physicist is always counting things, but he doesn't know what they are. Isn't it? But you have to understand what a a man is, or understand what an odd number is. Let's say, to understand what an even number is, to understand that no odd number is even, right? And you have to understand the statements from which you reason, right? So you can't really make one art out of the two.

[14:04] But there's a likeness there, right? I think the moderns are deceived by the likeness. They want to make one thing called the science of deduction, right? I think it's interesting to compare this because there's a likeness between the two. When I get into the syllogism, I often compare it to adding and subtracting, and point out the difference between adding correctly and having the correct numbers to add.

[14:29] And you know, Aristotle talks about demonstration, which is a syllogism whose conclusion is necessarily true. Well, the conclusion has to follow necessarily from the premises, and the premises have to be necessarily true. And the prior and the posterior analytics are about that. The prior analytics is taking apart the argument to see if the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. And the posterior, how do you know if the premises are necessarily true?

[14:59] Two different things, right? For example, when you're counting your your checkbook or something like that, I can't count you, but checkbook never worked out right anyway. But there's there's how'd you get the wrong number, right? Well, either because you didn't add or subtract correctly, or because you added or subtracted the wrong numbers, right? Now, from my experience, I found both things in checkbooks, right? That something wasn't subtracted correctly, or maybe you know you wrote the number and you misread it, right?

[15:28] And get the wrong number now. Okay. So it's kind of a attempt there, in going back to Leibniz and people like that, right, to unite the art of calculation and the art of logic, them, logike and logistike Not really the same art,

[15:57] but there is a likeness between them. So when they do that, what are they doing? Would you say that? Well, it's not making a monster.

[16:24] The fish don't follow that. You see, the art of calculating is one that's easier for us, right, and one where there's going to be what less disagreement, right? I mean, if you make a mistake, I have a mistake, but you come back and check it over, then you'll agree with me, right? But logic is much more, much more difficult things, right? You know, the art of calculating is not mechanical, right?

[16:53] And the art of logic, as they tell the students, is not a substitute for thinking; it's a help to thinking, right? But don't think it's going to do the thinking for you, right?

[17:04] You know, one of my colleagues said, you know, students think the computer is going to write the paper for them. But instead, they're looking for something that will what mechanically do what has to be done in some cases by thinking out something.

[17:23] That's reference I have to Richard II there, huh? Dull barren, unfeeling ignorance, do you know that kind of phrase? But he called ignorance what Baron because it has no what offspring, right? But knowledge of two numbers, right, can give rise to another number, right? Knowledge of two statements in some cases can give rise to a what? Another, another statement, okay?

[17:55] Nicholas. Okay, gonna put the arguments here in kind of boxes, okay? Syllogism in the upper corner. And put the enthymeme down in the other corner, the little syllogism. I put the induction over this upper right corner, and I put example down in the lower right now. So we got syllogism in the upper left, the enthymeme in the lower left, right? Induction in the upper right, and example in the lower right.

[18:53] That's going to take. Okay. Now, would you put syllogism with induction, or would you put syllogism with what? enthymeme, right? Well, if you talk about the kind of argument it is, enthymeme is like the syllogism. In the syllogism, you have true universality, right? You get a kind of, I guess, example here. If I say no odd number is even, right?

[19:36] That is true universality, right? And then I say, let's say every three is odd, it's an odd number. Then it follows necessarily that every three is not even, right? Now the enthymeme, right?

[20:00] He's a boy, right? Therefore, he's what? Acts like a boy, right? Okay. Boys will be boys, right? Proceeding from a very universal statement, right? But is it really true universal? Boys always be boys? Well, boy never do the deeds of a man.

[20:23] Sometimes it is very different things, right? You see them praised in newspapers or some occasion, right? Okay. So it's like a imperfect what? Syllogism, right? Okay.

[20:41] It's a syllogism secundum quid, right? So sometimes Aristotle calls the enthymeme a syllogism, right? Other times he distinguishes the enthymeme against the syllogism. It's a little bit like we were saying before, you know. You might divide the boy against the man, right? Another time, we'd see the boy as a man, right? Okay. The kitten is a cat. Puppy is a dog. At least, might just divide the puppy against the dog.

[21:09] because not a fully mature dog, right? Okay. So the enthymeme is like a syllogism, right? Sometimes Aristotle calls it a rhetorical syllogism, right? It's used in rhetoric, enthymeme, huh? But not a syllogism, simply speaking. You don't have the complete universality of the syllogism.

[21:36] If every man who staggers out of the bar, right, you know, is drunk, then you have syllogism, right? This man staggers out of the bar, okay. But if it's possible that a man might have some, what?

[21:55] Yeah, some ailment in his leg, right? Okay. Then he might, what, stumble, right, without being, what, drunk, right? So it lacks the in itself that you require to have the conclusion be necessarily what, so, right? You see how it resembles the syllogism, right? It's indicated by the word enthymeme it's in the mind, right? Something, is it worth the mind sees, right? There's not something that's simple singular.

[22:24] Now, so it's in terms now of likeness, huh? I'm drawing likeness there, writing likeness above the line here that separates, on the one hand, syllogism and enthymeme from induction, example, because enthymeme is like the syllogism, right? like the Puppy is like the dog, right? Okay. Now, is example in some way like induction? Well, notice, huh? You asked me what restaurant should I go to tonight. I've been to restaurants A and B, and I had a wonderful meal at A and a lousy meal at B, right?

[23:08] I said, "Well, I had a wonderful meal at A, right? Okay. " You said, "Well, then I'll go to A then, right? " Okay. Now, in a way, aren't I implying that the wonderful meal I had at A is symptomatic or emblematic of the kind of meals you get at that restaurant, right? So it's almost like a what? Extremely imperfect induction, right? Because obviously the meal I had last week is not the meal you're going to have this week.

[23:39] It's not the same meal individually, right? So how can I reason from the one that I had last week being good, right, to the one being that you're going to have this week being good, right? Well, it's because I take the good meal I had last week as somewhat indicative of the way meals are at the restaurant. Is if all meals. I don't say that because you see immediately the weakness of the argument, right?

[24:03] You know, I had a good meal last week, therefore all meals are good, right? But I must be implying something about meals in general there in order to be able to. what's your meal this week?

[24:18] So example is like an imperfect induction what? Induction, right? Involves something of induction, right? Okay. So Aristotle sometimes calls the example a rhetorical induction, huh? Okay.

[24:39] But it's not an induction simply speaking. There's an example, there of the word that way of naming, where we say sometimes the name that's common to two things is kept by one, right? One that has fully the meaning of it, right? The one that has imperfectly or effectively gets a new name, right? It's like when I divide definitions sometimes of a thing into definition of the thing and encircling, right?

[25:16] But encircling doesn't fully tell you what the thing is, right? What is wisdom? It's the best knowledge. I draw a line around it, but it's no other knowledge, so I separate it from other knowledge. We didn't tell you what wisdom is, huh? It's the best knowledge, huh? Hadn't even begun to tell you what it's a knowledge of, right? So is that a definition of wisdom? I can give that answer to the question, "What is wisdom?

[25:46] " But it's not a definition in full sense. So we call it an encircling, right? You might call a definition in the what, in contrast, no, rather sense, no. So if you classify these arguments in terms of likeness,

[26:07] basically you put the enthymeme with the syllogism, and example with induction, right? And so Aristotle is talking about the arguments used in rhetoric. He says one argument is either a syllogism or induction. So the enthymeme must be a syllogism, and the example must be a what? Induction.

[26:33] If they're just two, right? Like I must outside all that. The human being must be either male or female, right? So boy and girl, one must be a male, one to be female, right? The boy is a male, the female is a girl, the girl is a female, right? Okay. So he proceeds as if, you know, in terms of likeness, right? Okay.

[26:59] Now there's another way you might divide these arguments, and that is not in terms of likeness, but in terms of their what? Usefulness, right? Okay.

[27:22] Now in some ways, this division according to usefulness is more practical to logic, because logic is not for the sake of what? Knowing these things, but for the sake of what? Using them, right? Logic is not for its own sake. Okay. Now the syllogism and induction are useful for conclusions about the universal. So induction is an argument from many singulars to the what universal, right? So you can use induction to conclude something about universal, and syllogism can be used about the universal, right?

[28:18] So syllogism and induction are used in dialectic, which is reasoning to conclusions about the universal. And so in the dialogues of Plato, where Socrates is reasoning about philosophical questions, questions about the universal, he uses sometimes induction, sometimes what syllogism, right? Because those two arguments are useful for drawing conclusions about the universal.

[28:48] The enthymeme and the example are useful for conclusions about the singular, especially in human affairs, about the singular, in human things, huh? So in the rhetoric, huh? Which is about persuading men about human things, Aristotle will talk about the enthymeme and the what example, right? And the rhetorician will use both enthymeme and example, right? Now Aristotle points out that in political rhetoric, we use example more than the courtroom rhetoric, In courtroom rhetoric we use the enthymeme more, right?

[29:37] You kind of see that, right? In political rhetoric, you're debating what to do in the future, right? Huh? In the chamber and whatever it might be, and so you tend to take what the past, right? And reason from that, right? So a lot of times in legislation, they'll take the example, of similar situation in in some state or in some other country, right? And the effect that that had, you know, and reason from that, right?

[30:02] From one example to another one, right? Like they did in the Federalist Papers. But in courtroom, you say who's likely? This question is when somebody gets murdered, who's likely to have what done it, right? Huh? The likelihood here is very important, right?

[30:18] But nevertheless, in both kinds of rhetoric, you can use both. If you want a good example of the art of rhetoric, there in a way, you can see in Shakespeare's play *Othello*, right? Where Iago, the villain, is trying to persuade Othello that his wife is unfaithful, right? Now there's absolutely no basis for this at all, okay? But sometimes Iago uses an enthymeme, right? Sometimes uses an example, right?

[30:54] Now example, among other ones. Desdemona, you know, she ran off with uh, Othello, right? without getting permission from her father, right? She deceived her father, right? Okay, that's interesting, huh? Because after you know, Othello was in the service of the Venetian government, right? So they can't really squash it because of this, elopement But the last thing the father says, you know, the father says, "She deceived me.

[31:29] She may deceive you." Well, Iago picks up with that, right? And look how she deceived her father. You have the size idea, right? You know, what she's up to, right? You know, and so you know, so that's kind of like the example, right? She deceived her father. You know, we're doing the same thing to you, right? You know, the size idea the same thing. See, but then the enthymeme right?

[31:56] And there he uses likelihood right? A likelihood is what opinion, custom, right? And Iago, of course, is very knowledgeable about people, so you don't understand Venetian women, right? You know, you know, they're very good at deceiving their husbands, right? You know, and you know, it goes on like that. See, so you know, she's a Venetian woman, right? That's what they're known for, right? So it's likely, right, that she'd be a Venetian woman, that she would be adept at the art of cuckolding her husband, right?

[32:26] See, so he's using both enthymeme and example, right? He uses no syllogism and no what induction, right? Then you know, Iago, he what he gets a hold of this precious handkerchief, you know, that uh, uh, Othello was very attached to, you know, with his wife that he'd given testimony, right? And she dropped it, you know, and he gets a hold of it, right? And he gives it to a man, and he's like. Trying to persuade him, he's not paid for his wife, right?

[32:59] It seems like you've given him this you know, so that's the sign that he needs, right? Well, it's a very weak sign, but it's a sign, right?

[33:12] It's like you know, if your wife gives you a ring or something, you know, to somebody else, you know, I mean, you know, that's a sign of infidelity, right? Well, it's not a ring, something like this, I mean, it's pressure between them, right? Something amazing, you know, Yago, you know, never loses, you know, that sort of thing. And now this guy, that's it, you know,

[33:40] it's a sign, huh? But no, see, if the husband found his wedding ring, or the wedding ring that the wife had, on this man that he's already suspicious of, because other things said, right? Maybe the man what found the ring and put it on him, but you know, but could be exception, but he would take as a sign that this is final confirmation of infidelity, right? Of course, in rhetoric, as Aristotle points out, rhetoric is really an offshoot of not only logic, insofar as using these arguments, right?

[34:18] But it's also an offshoot of you know, ethical, political studies because it tries to persuade even more by moving the emotions, right? And most of all by projecting an image of yourself as a believable person, right? And Iago does those as well, right? But here I mentioned Anthony with an example, right? He does use the enthymeme as an example, but he himself says that to a man who's jealous, as he's got Othello, even the weakest proofs will seem like holy scripture, you know, the scripture.

[34:51] You know, so it doesn't take much to convince a man, you know, Because if he's been unfaithful, he's already in this state of jealousy, right?

[35:02] But even before Yago, you know, giving himself image of a man who understands people, sees into people, right? A man who has Yago, a fellow who's good in mind, right? A man who doesn't speak his suspicions lightly, you know, and all these things that would make you to believe this man, right? You think he really has your good in mind? You think he's a very knowledgeable man, a man who sees into people, right?

[35:27] A man who's slow and cautious to state his suspicions, you know. Then he rouses emotions he gets these. Okay. so, enthymemes and, examples are useful for reasoning about the singular, right? For persuading the jury, or persuading the crowd, or persuading an individual, right? So we put these two together as an example. and then we put soldiers and induction together, as far as their usefulness is concerned.

[36:07] Sometimes I make—I don't know if I do it here or not—but I make this homely comparison to knives and forks, which are also tools, right? And you know, when you set the table, right? You put the forks on the left, right, and the knives on the right. So if it's a fancy meal, you might have a dinner fork and a salad fork, right? You might have a dinner knife and a, let's say, a butter knife or something, right?

[36:33] Okay. So here they're separated by what? Likeness, right? Okay. The two forks are put together—The salad fork is like a dinner fork, right? And the little butter knife is like the bigger knife, right? Okay. But now when they put the steak down on, the plate, what do you do? You grab the two forks? You grab the two knives? No. Now the question is not likeness, but what?

[36:59] What's useful for getting at the steak? You grab the fork. You grab the knife. You go at it, right? Even though the knife and the fork are what? Not as like each other as the two forks are, right?

[37:13] The same thing here, right? See, if I'm thinking the likeness of these things, well, this is like that, right? But falls short of it. This has something with that. But now when we want to discuss the general question in philosophy, what do we do? We grab syllogism and induction. Now we want to persuade a fellow that his life is unfaithful, and we grab enthymemes and examples, huh?

[37:40] After you look for his emotions. Okay. You see? Or example, like the biological example where we say, you know, we imitate nature, right? Okay. Now, if you're talking about man, woman, boy, and girl, if you talk about them in terms of likeness, you put the boy with the what? Man. And the girl with the woman, right? Not going to reproduce. Another person, you put the man and woman together, right?

[38:19] Okay. Because that's in terms of what? Usefulness, Usefulness, right? Not in terms of likeness, right? Right. You see? See Daniel? So I think you can kind of get a sense of how we divide these four arguments, right? We can divide them on the basis of likeness, on the basis of usefulness. And I think it's good to see both. Maybe in the final analysis, what you're interested in is usefulness of these things.

[38:52] The likeness, though, is useful for understanding them, right? But you want to find the say, how do we? How is Jacky going to reason? How is Jacob going to reason, or how are the Federalists going to reason? But then we have to divide them by usefulness.

[39:13] Okay. The four. So do you know another kind of argument? Side deals four. Oh, the argument. Okay. Okay. Now, when Aristotle talks about the example, right?

[40:00] He gives a. He distinguishes three kinds of examples in the rhetoric kind. And the first kind is historical example, right? And then he talks about the invented example.

[40:18] And he talks about the proportional example, right? You know, proportion is the likeness, of ratios. And then he talks about the fable, right? Okay. So

[40:37] the fables of Aesop were used, right? As arguments, right? You know, the famous one: Aesop was defending a guy who had been in office for a while and made some money graft, you know, and so on, got wealthy from his office. And they wanted to replace this man, right? With somebody, and you know the fable that Aesop was supposed to have told in his defense. He said there was an animal, right?

[41:03] I think it was a hedgehog or something, and he was crossing this stream of rocks, right? And he's jumping, you know, between the rocks, right? And he fell between the rocks and got wedged in and couldn't get out. And he started to bleed, right? Okay. Along come the bugs, one, so down, start to drink his blood, right? The little animal comes along and sees the poor hedgehog, and he's not big enough to get him free from the rocks.

[41:29] And he says to him, "But you want me to chase away the the flies and so on, the bugs, right?" He says, "No, no. They've taken all they're going to take. They're they're filled up. Chase them away, and new bugs will come, and bugs will have them, right?" He says, "So, is it my client, huh? I think he's gotten wealthy, but he's satisfied now. He's going to get rid of somebody else, and they'll take the rest of your money."

[42:05] That's pretty, pretty, pretty good. That's what Aesop had right. And I just take an example in class, and I thought the students should take an example that kind of stick.

[42:15] The example of trying to persuade somebody who's a student in college not to get married while he's in college, right? Okay, it's not an advisable thing to do, right? And you might have historical examples, right? You might mention so and so, right? In fact, a few years, how he was, you know, was a sophomore in college, and he got married, and then the kids came, and he got a job, and he couldn't keep up with his college studies, and he didn't drop off, and you know, he never finished his college degree, and so on.

[42:45] That's an argument, right? Of the first kind, historical example, right? Okay. But then, you know, you give maybe the first kind of invented example, right? Say, well, you know, say that nations never what appreciate their freedom until they lose it, right? Nations have sometimes, you know, elected, you know, they say like Hitler elected, right? You know, a dictator, right? And then when they lose their freedom, then they, realize the precious of life, right?

[43:15] Oh, a bachelor doesn't really appreciate his freedom until he's married, right? This is weaker because the likeness is what is parallel, right? You see that nations don't appreciate their freedom until they lose it, right? Bachelors don't appreciate their freedom until they lose it, right? But you can see how the nation regrets, right? having come to this dictator, now you're going to what Lose your freedom, right? See, but no,

[43:46] it's not. Invented example, also, but proportional, right? But then you take the parable, right? The parable was the goose laid the golden egg, right? Okay, you say now, no, each day the goose lays a golden egg, right? You say, no, that's right, right? And gee, that's nice. Let's get all the gold, right? Let's kill the goose, and what? Now they have what? Nothing. See, see. So you're going out on these dates, you know, with this girl, each date is golden, right?

[44:20] And you say, well, now I want to have her all the time, right? And everybody used to say, high neck spoils romance, right? You know, it's not so golden much, but you know, here, you know, who moves over to it, right? You see, but but no, that's that's much weaker, right? But it's feeble, right? So in in a way, the the poetic argument is a what kind of a group?

[44:45] It's like an example in a sense, you know, it's kind of an invented one. You can, you know, place it under this in a way, right? Though in another sense, maybe not strictly speaking, an argument, right?

[45:08] It was saying during the Second World War there when we were trying to be friendly with the Russians, right? They made some movies in Hollywood, you know, which represented society in Russian falsely, right? In order that what

[45:29] we would think that they're, you know, that the Soviet government, so on, you know, allows freedom of religion and so on, right? Like you have over here, right? Okay, so someone sees that movie and then they draw a conclusion as to how things were, right, in Russia at that time. That's obviously if it's an argument at all it's very weak, right? Okay. If you go see a movie, you know, historical set movie, right?

[45:55] Okay. If you go see a movie, you know, historical set movie, right? In a certain period of time, and you know, it's not really authentic, right? What things were? Is that an argument, or what would you just call that

[46:07] Inducement? Yeah, yeah, yeah, Because it's represented, thus, right? I remember as a child there, two examples there. The next door neighbor was there. They had one son, right, Kenneth, and Kenneth was the only child, and his mother died, right? Okay, and so eventually Kenneth's father decided to marry again, right? And we heard about this from my mother my brother Rich and my brother Marcus that Kenneth was going to be getting a stepmother, right?

[46:49] Well, my mother overheard us at the table discussing how we're going to protect Kenneth from his stepmother, you know, in case you know she is mean and cruel, you know, like stepmothers are. And anyway, my mother, you know, she stopped and explained to us, you know, that stepmothers in real life are not, you know, like the stepmothers. But why we had that idea in our head? Because of the fairy tales, or things of that sort, right?

[47:13] You know, like you know Snow White's mother, stepmother, right? You know, the stepmothers represented in the fairy tales as being what evil and cruel and so on, right? And so when he's, when you say when he's drawing a conclusion there, or he's just kind of what accepting it because of what he's represented there, you know.

[47:41] But you can see, that led us to this, right? In, the same way, you know, you know, Uncle Tom's Cabin, this may have been a true thing, but it's represented, right? Certain conditions down the south with slavery. You know, the splitting up of families and so on, right? Huh? Okay. So this this is persuasive, right?

[48:05] But is it really an argument at all? You know. Would you say it's more like custom, or something. You know, it. it would you know. through emotions right Primarily huh Um

[48:30] Thomas says Poetae est inducere ad aliquid virtuosum right Per convenientem representationem It belongs to the poet to lead us into something virtuous, for a suitable representation, right?

[48:45] But then Thomas gives an example that's kind of interesting: that how a food becomes abominable, right, if it's represented to us under the likeness of something disagreeable. You know. And I had a speculation, you know, when I was a boy, I got to hate milk. And I remember my mother trying to get me to drink milk, trying everything, right? And you know, fifty cents a drink of milk or something, you know, get me to drink milk.

[49:14] And finally, you know, ended up sending me down to the drugstore to get my milkshake, right, which I didn't mind having you know. I had an impression that I was sick one time, and I was given milk of magnesia, a kind of disgusting thing, and that afterwards I thought of milk under the likeness of what milk of magnesia, right? You see. And

[49:41] well, if you think of it, you know, something good under the likeness of something disgusting, then it becomes what unattractive, right? Huh? So I think that happens a lot with foods, right? You kind of you have a kind of irrational dislike of food because the way you picture it,

[50:03] so to speak, right? But it seems to be affecting the appetite there, you know. Um It's just the art of rhetoric they say the art of rhetoric Uh. The second means of persuasion is the way you move the emotions of the people, right? Okay, first the poet can move the emotions the way too, right? So you represent them. So you see that

[50:35] good things and bad things can be represented, you know, In a way that's like that's not what they are, right? I mean, you know, Hollywood you can see in a lot of movies, right, things that are bad as if they were acceptable, right? You know.

[50:57] So you're judging by your imagination. Well, yeah, but your emotions primarily, right? it's like the art of persuasion, but more like the art of persuasion in its ability to move the emotions than in its what argumentative aspect, huh?

[51:21] But I think it's working through the imagination too, in a sense, huh? False imagination. You know, C. S. Lewis there. There's a passage there that somebody quoted in one of his logic books, but C. S. Lewis is going down to some part of England he'd never been before, and he's uh being met at the station there by an uncle or some something like that, and they start to drive through, and C.

[51:52] S. Lewis is struck by the fact that the place is so different than what he imagined it. And of course, Uncle's saying, "What right did you have to think it was this other way? You didn't, you know. " This is kind of you know kind of of a popular introduction to logic, right? You know, you know. And very often we imagine a place we've never been to, right?

[52:10] Or we imagine, you know, somebody we're going to meet that we've never met before, and we're kind of surprised when we actually meet them, right? You see. And I know my wife met some of my my friends back home, right? You know, like Jim, the former boxer,

[52:29] and the hard drinking Jim, and so on. You know, kind of surprised that you know they have friends like this, right? And I remember myself when I was in high school. I imagined what it would be like to be in college.

[52:46] I was an intoppy. I was a big college athlete, and I was in college. I imagined what it would be like to be in graduate school, and it didn't turn out to be what I exactly expected, right? And when I was in graduate school, I expected, I imagined what it would be like to be. Teacher on a faculty, right? That would not be the same either, right? You know.

[53:01] So I mean, I think everybody finds that, right? That things are not the way you imagine them to be. And so you're deceived in a way by imagination. For example, false imagination. Is that an argument? See?

[53:17] Did I have an argument that, like I thought when I'd be on a faculty, let's say that that you'd be having, you know, intellectual conversations all the time with interesting people, you know. Well, I mean, if so and so's out in some abstruse kind of mathematics, and someone else is doing economic analysis, he's going to be talking, making small talk if we happen to end up at a lunch table together or something, right?

[53:41] You know. So I think it makes it different, you know. I didn't really have any reason to think that it was going to be this way, but I just thought it'd be that way, you know.

[53:50] But you see, it happens more of this, right? You know, everybody's doing the same, you know, but everybody's doing their own thing, right? Then you tend to talk about something unintellectual, maybe, right? You know. So I mean, you constantly are imagining things to be different, right? Then

[54:13] they are, right? You talk to a foreigner, you know. and I had a student in Arabia. he used to joke with me about what the Americans imagine Arabia to be like, right? And he said, "I never seen a camel in my life," he says, and all that sort of stuff.

[54:34] And uh, uh, uh, that's not an argument, is it? It seems to me that there's something that's in effect right it gets you to imagine things a certain way, right? I know, you know, people who have a kind of superficial interest in history, and they love historical novels or something like that, right? Because they're learning about the past, or you know, it's kind of an easy way.

[55:03] Well, sometimes these novels do capture something true about the past, but a lot of times they're quite false, right? But you kind of imagine things to be that way, so it kind of pushes you that way, right? But say, even without that, you know, from my own experience, you know, no one—I haven't seen any movie about graduate school or any movie about college professors, but I imagined things to be a certain way.

[55:26] and they aren't that way, You know. Um, before we get married, you imagine married life to be a certain way. and not all the way you imagined it to be, right? It may be better, maybe worse, you know. But see, it's not going to be the way you imagined it to be, right? And that is true. of all kinds of things in life.

[55:49] Um. Yeah. so this doesn't even hurt me at all, does it? See? It's not from statements. Yeah. yeah. Although, in, by imagining, you might be forming

[56:26] by forming different opinions, or you're gathering different pieces of information, and the ability of imagination. Yeah. Yeah, there's something like that in the sense that you put together things in imagination. Yeah, yeah. And you're probably doing it for a reason. Yeah. So whether it turns out or not, you imagined it might show you how far off your imaginative reason- Yeah. reasoning is if you had such an animal.

[56:55] You see. like next year I was talking about CS Lewis. and he comes down and says, Well, I always thought this part of England was, you know, and and it's not at all the way he thought, right? Huh? You know. Um, I went to Sahara Desert. I found this not this way. I imagined, you know, there'd probably be a lot of things here and there, you know, not simply rolled in sand.

[57:20] So. But it pushes that people that's always departing away from the strict example. Okay. Yeah. Go.