Prima Pars
6. Dei Filius IV: How Reason Serves the Mysteries of Faith, Why Faith and Reason Cannot Contradict, and Why Theology Judges Philosophy
Class of 2005-12-22
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/006-dei-filius-iv-how-reason-serves-the-mysteries-of-faith-why/

[0:00] Okay, but now comes the second part here to talk about the role of reason in the consideration of the mysteries of faith. Huh? Now, how reason can be used in the understanding of the mysteries of faith. Now, reason does indeed, when it seeks, and notice the three words now, when it seeks persistently, right? Piously, right, and soberly.

[0:37] It does indeed, when it does seek this way, achieve by God's gifts some understanding, right? And that most what profitable, right, Perfect of the mysteries, whether by what analogy, huh? From what it knows naturally, huh?

[0:59] You see that in the case of the what Trinity, right? That they will try to see some analogy, some proportion between our mind and will, and so on, and our knowledge and our love between our mind, what knowing itself and loving itself, right? And God knowing and loving Himself, right? Huh? And of course, Augustine talks about the Trinity. No place is it what

[1:29] no mystery is considered with with more difficult to know than the Trinity, right? And nowhere is it more what dangerous to make a mistake, and but nowhere is it more fruitful to discover something, okay? And so let's remind you a little bit what Augustine says, huh? Um, soberly, what would be like its opposite? here What would be the sense of this word soberly? Here, like moderately, or what?

[1:57] Yeah, yeah, moderation. Yeah, I'm not trying to excel your own powers. You're trying to understand the thing more than is possible, right? Thomas always quotes that nice thing from Hilary you know that Hilary says he's going to proceed forward as long as he can, even though he knows he never arrived. Okay? but he always makes progress going forward, huh? The man is pursuing the infinite, right? Never arrives, but he always gets some more understanding as he goes along.

[2:33] Or from the connection of these mysteries with one another, okay, and with the final end of humanity or of man, huh? Okay. So those are two different ways, two or three different ways that he's saying that reason is helpful, right? One is by the what analogy. Analogy is a likeness of what ratios, right? From what it knows naturally, right? And then the connection among these mysteries, huh?

[3:09] Okay. And then the connection of these mysteries, what with the end of man, okay? Now, um, suppose we're going to talk about the the word of God, right? Okay. The thought of God, right? Huh? Okay.

[3:38] Now, someone might say, "Well, when I think of something, I form a what? Okay, a thought about it, right? Huh? Okay. Just like when I imagine something, I what form an image of it, right? Okay. So, in my imagining something, there proceeds in my imagination an image of what I'm imagining. And when I'm thinking of something, there proceeds from my thinking a what thought of what I'm thinking of, right?

[4:14] Well, it's something like that in God, right? Huh? Because God knows what himself, right? And so, and knowing himself by his understanding, right? And so, there proceeds from God's understanding himself a thought of himself.

[4:35] But since his understanding, as we learned earlier in theology, is his very what existence, right? Then this thought is also God, right? Okay. So, in the beginning was the word, and the word was towards God. Word was God, right? Okay. Okay. Now, there I just touch him out a little bit there, but no. This is by analogy of what I know naturally, right? Okay.

[5:02] You might say now, when when reason knows itself, like in Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? Um. And you know Shakespeare is urging us to use our reason, but telling us what a wonderful thing reason is, right? Okay. So, when reason knows itself and has a thought about itself, then you begin to what love reason, right? Okay. Now this is the Holy Spirit, now, right? He's proceeding, right, from this, huh?

[5:32] Okay. So, this is it's a little example there of what the use of reason by analogy from what it knows what naturally, okay. Now, how about the connection of these mysteries with one another? How is that?

[6:00] Well, they say you know, if I have the art to make something, right, and the thing I make gets broken or something, I can use that art whereby I made it to what. Yeah, yeah. See, there's a connection there, right? Okay. So,

[6:27] this word of God is like the what? Art of God, right? Huh? Whereby He makes everything, huh? Like we learn in the beginning of John's Gospel, right? Well, then, when that thing made man gets broken, then what? It's appropriate that the word whereby it was made also what fix it fix it right. So, therefore, it's appropriate that

[7:00] the word of God became man rather than say God the Father or God the Holy Spirit, right? Okay. Or you talk about the fine end of man. What's the fine end of man? huh? What's... Yeah, to see God as He is, huh? Face to face, huh? Okay. And of course, the word logos, even the Greek word, shows a connection between reason, which means it's also signified by the word logos, right?

[7:31] Okay. So, because man's end is to is to know God, huh? Then the the son who proceeds by way of what reason or of knowledge, yeah, yeah, is appropriate. The one is going to lead us, right? Okay. So this is the way you connect with these, son. So.

[7:54] You can say there's two ways here, or maybe three ways, right? The second one is kind of divided into two there, but there's two ways that reason has a role to play in the consideration of the mysteries of faith.

[8:15] As reason may see a connection between this mystery and that mystery, right? Okay. Or between this mystery and the end of man, right? Or it may see a likeness to things it knows naturally. Okay.

[8:37] But in the second way, there, especially the first way, talks about it. There you're comparing one mystery with another mystery, right? Okay. Now, let's take maybe a better example. That second thing there.

[8:55] This guy gets up in church there and he says she shouldn't be called the mother of God. She should be called the mother of what? Christ. Okay. Now this guy, his name was what Nestorius or something. Um. Well, is there a connection between Mary being the mother of God, which is a mystery, right? And the fact that it's the same person who's both God and man. Oh, there's an intimate connection.

[9:27] Yeah, yeah. Because to say that she's not the mother of God would be in a sense to break the two, right? Now she's not the mother

[9:44] of the Word according to his divine nature, right? Okay. But she is the mother of him according to his human nature, right? But because it's the same person who has the divine nature and the human nature, right? We can truly say she's the mother of God, right? So in a sense, to deny that Mary is the mother of God in a way is to deny something about the mystery of the what incarnation, right?

[10:09] And if you don't, yeah, okay. There you see two mysteries, right? Mary is the mother of God, and Christ is both God and what man, yeah, yeah. Okay.

[10:24] Or he's the what? He's the way, the road, right? Or he's also spoken of as the mediator, right? Okay. Well, there's connection between his being the mediator and his being both God and man, because he has something in common with God and common with man, and therefore he's the what in between. Insofar as he's both, right? Okay. So you see a connection between the mystery of him being the mediator, right?

[10:57] And his being what, both God and man, right? So you see a connection between one mystery and a another mystery. Um, yeah. Got another one for the final end of man. Yeah, the final end.

[11:31] Well, the final end of man is to what—to to to know and love God. We could say both, right? Okay. And so, who is sent to us? Both the Son and the what, Holy Spirit, right? Okay. But the Son. Enlightens us, right? And the Holy Spirit is what? Come, Holy Spirit, fill the hearts of thy faithful and kindle in them the fire of thy love, right? Okay. Well, we attribute to the Holy Spirit, appropriate these to him, right?

[12:11] On kindling charity in our heart, because he proceeds by way of what? Well, love. Okay. Okay. So, um, so there's two or three ways there that reason helps us in the understanding mysteries of faith, right?

[12:50] See that? One is by the analogy of faith. Okay, An analogy of from what it knows naturally, right? Now, what does analogy mean? Well, it's going to be a likeness. It's not something that's exactly the same. Okay, but get more precise than what kind of likeness is it? What? Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's a likeness of ratios, right? Okay. Okay. The Lord is my shepherd.

[13:33] God is to us as a what? Shepherd is to his what? Flock, right? Okay. Thomas's explanation there, if you see, in the 8th Psalm, you know,

[13:51] where you referred to both man ruling over the beast, right, but also to Christ ruling over us, right? And he takes it referring to Christ ruling over us. The sheep and the oxen are those in the fold, right? And then the what?

[14:08] The beasts and the fish and the birds, right, are those who are what? Well, it goes back to constantly back to the text of Saint John. All that's in the world is the lust of the eyes and the lust of the flesh, or the pride of life, right? And so the beasts are those who are in the sins of the flesh. The fish, because of the importance of maritime or commerce and so on, right?

[14:36] Those that have the lust of the eyes. The birds, those are the the fowl, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And Shakespeare plays upon that, huh? You know, in the sixth place, you know, where the falcons go up in the air, you know, and by falcon or falcon, they're fighting, you know, trying to you know excel everybody else' pride. So you see, kind of analogy there, right? Even in the metaphors, right?

[15:03] Okay. But when reason believes this mystery of faith and this mystery of the faith, and then it compares them, sees a certain what connection between them, and that's kind of a different thing it's doing, isn't it? Right. And then it's it's it's looking at the mysteries by themselves, right? And comparing one mystery to another and seeing connection between one mystery and another, right? So connection between the incarnation and Mary being the what the mother of God, right?

[15:46] Okay. Now sometimes you know I've known talking to you know Lutherans or Protestants and like that, they're kind of offended almost by Mary being called the mother of God, right? And maybe they're thinking of in terms of the mother of of the divinity, right? Well, strictly speaking, I mean she's the mother of God according to his what? Human nature. Yeah. But because the one who has human nature is God, then she can be said to be the mother of God, right?

[16:15] Huh? And so there's a real connection between that mystery and the mystery of the incarnation. And to deny one is, in a sense, to deny the other, right?

[16:32] Yeah. Okay. Now that we've seen how reason can be used, now we have to see how it cannot be used. Okay. But reason is never rendered capable of penetrating these mysteries in the way in which it penetrates those truths which form its proper object, like the Pythagorean theorem. For the divine mysteries, by their very nature, so far surpass the created understanding that even when a revelation has been given and accepted by faith, right?

[17:14] They remain covered, so they're not completely revealed, right? They remain covered by the veil of that same faith and wrapped, as it were, in a certain what obscurity, huh? That's why they're called mysteries of faith. Yeah. See in a mirror, darkly, Paul says, and then they give a biblical statement of this: as long as in this mortal life we are away from the Lord, for we walk by faith and not by what sight, huh?

[17:49] But then the next thing it's important to see is the impossibility of a true contradiction between faith and reason, huh? Even though faith is above reason, there can never be any real disagreement between faith and reason.

[18:13] Like who's that that Renaissance guy? Was he about Pomponazzi Was it the two truths? You know, huh? Oh, oh, yeah, yeah. That was there. I guess some of the some of the the Mohammedan teachers had that. Yeah, yeah, somebody because I know some. Was was this guy back at the time of Thomas? Because there was somebody back at the time. Maybe yeah, this this guy's later than Thomas.

[18:36] And he did get it from the Arabians. I forget. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Even though faith is above reason, there can never be any real disagreement between faith and reason, since it is the same God who reveals the mysteries and infuses faith, and who has endowed the human mind with the light of reason. God cannot deny Himself, nor can truth ever be in opposition to what truth, right?

[19:04] So he's giving a couple of reasons there, right? One is that both the natural light of reason and the light of faith have God as their source, so they're going to be in harmony, right? But what you know by the natural light of reason, what you what you really do know, that the whole is more than a part, huh? Um. Uh. And what God's revealed can neither deceive nor be deceived must be true, right?

[19:31] So can one truth contradict another truth? No, no. That's kind of hard to say. The same thing is both true and false. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[19:42] Truth is saying what is is and what is not is not, and falsehood is saying what is is not or what is not. Yeah, that's right. So two things can be. It's a contradiction. They can't be both true, right?

[20:02] So, since what reason really does know, and it does really know some things, must be true, and what God's revealed must be true, they they can't, for that reason, be in contradiction, right? But the other reason is that because the natural light of reason and the light of faith both come from God,

[20:21] so it's it's a very serious mistake to think they can contradict each other. But you find people sometimes saying it even today, you know, as explicitly maybe as the Renaissance character, but okay. But there can appear to be contradictions, right? Okay.

[20:44] You know, see, as a philosopher, I am aware of the fact that in philosophy, um, very often things that are reasonable seem to what contradict each other, right? I took that famous example there that I discovered in the DK twelve of Anaxagoras, right? Anaxagoras says the ruler must be separated from the ruled. That's reasonable.

[21:12] And you see that in the case of the judge, right? You must be impartial, not a part of, in order to judge, rule over these disagreeing men, right? And then he says that the mind is self-ruling. And as a logician, I put evidence that the mind can rule itself. Well, if the ruler must be separated from the ruled, and the mind is not separated from itself, we've got a contradiction here, right?

[21:39] Okay. So even things that I see as being reasonable, they sometimes seem to what? Yeah, yeah. So it shouldn't be that striking, huh? And you can actually construct an argument against the obvious that most people can't answer.

[22:01] And I told you the one where, right? Tell the students you know now the whole is more than the part, and they all agree, right? And they say, now, what is man? Well, he's an animal, right? But he's not just an animal; he's an animal that has reason. So, animal is only a part of what man is, right? Hopefully, all agree to that. And I say, now, what animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, and so on.

[22:25] And therefore, what is only a part of man includes more than man. So sometimes the part is more than the whole. Yeah, yeah. Well, I'm using the most common sophistical argument. Yeah, I'm confusing two senses of whole and part, right? The composed whole, right? And the definition is a composed whole. An animal is a composing part of the definition of man. Man is defined as an animal that has reason.

[22:56] So animal is only a part of the definition of man, and the definition of man, which is the whole, composed whole, has more than just animal in it. But When I say animal includes more than just man, I'm talking about the universal whole. Okay. And the universal whole is always said of more than one of its parts is said of, right? Okay, so I can, by sophistical argument, make even what is obvious seem not true, right?

[23:28] And everybody's heard of the paradoxes of Zeno, right? That you can't get out the door, right? Because you got to go halfway to the door to go the full way, and if you go half, you can go half of that way, and if you can go half of that, you can go half of that. So on, or that you know that the turtle gets a head start, and Achilles, the fastest runner, Achilles will never catch him, right?

[23:55] And you know those arguments. So even obvious things and things we all know are true, you can give arguments that most people can't answer, right? But even for throwing, you get things as far away as these. You can get what apparent contradictions, right? I mentioned how Heisenberg, the great physicist, there talking about the development of quantum theory and talking about the strange apparent contradictions in experiments. So even within science itself, right, there can be experiments that seem to contradict each other.

[24:32] And if you read today a newspaper or something like that, they're always getting a medical report that contradicts another medical report. It's always, you know. So it says the appearance of this kind of specious contradiction. Is chiefly due to the fact that either the dogmas of faith are not understood, right, and explained in accordance with the mind of the church, or unsound views are mistaken for the conclusions of what reason, right?

[25:04] Okay. So now he gives three little corollaries here in the text. Therefore, we define that every assertion contrary to the The truth of enlightened faith is totally what false, huh? Furthermore, the church, which together with its apostolic office of church teaching, has received the charge of preserving the deposit of faith, has by divine appointment the right and duty of condemning what wrongly passes for knowledge, huh? Lest anyone be led astray by philosophy and empty what deceit, huh?

[25:48] Hence, all faithful Christians are forbidden to defend as the legitimate conclusions of science those opinions which are known to be contrary to the doctrine of faith, particularly if they have been condemned by the church. And furthermore, they are absolutely bound to hold them to be errors which wear the deceptive appearance of what truth, huh?

[26:21] So Thomas on his deathbed there submitted all his what writings to the church to be judged, huh? But a lot of people don't have that what humility, right, huh? You know, if you read the decisions there of the the congregation for the defense of the faith, right? You are always getting some Jesuit or other theologian, right? Sometimes Dominican theologian too, who's having a hard time, right? Not, yeah, yeah, yeah, and giving up his errors, right, huh?

[27:06] As Deconic said, you know, you shouldn't love your opinions like your children. You know, you want to hold on to them, obviously, huh? You know,

[27:24] don't identify your opinions with yourself, huh? But so as most people love their opinions like their like the children, right? Not willing to give them up, right? They identify themselves with that, huh? They should. uh they should at least recognize them as opinions still. Hmm. And they couldn't love him so much.

[28:06] That goes back to the mutual help which reason and faith give each other now, looking in both directions now. Not only can faith and reason never be at odds with one another, but they mutually what? Oh. Support each other, huh?

[28:26] For on the one hand, right reason establishes the foundations of the faith, right? The so-called preambula to the faith, huh? And illuminated by the light of faith, it develops the science of divine things. I suppose by that analogy that we talked about before, right? And by seeing the connection from one mystery to another mystery, right?

[29:02] You see, why do we say, for example, we learn, let's say, by the faith that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, right? And not the reverse, right? Well, in trying to understand that, we use analogy of faith, right? Huh? We say that the what? It's the good as known in some way that is loved, right? So we have to know the good, we before we can love it, right?

[29:34] Huh? So that our love of the good proceeds in a way from our knowledge of the good, right? Well, that's something like, huh? What takes place in the Trinity, where the Holy Spirit who proceeds by way of love, right? Proceeds from the Son who proceeds by way of what? Oh, knowledge, yeah. Okay. So it helps us to kind of understand a little bit, right?

[30:09] Okay, so there is two ways then that reason what aids faith, right? These things that reason by itself can know, right? Huh? It can be used to what? Know those things that are kind of presupposed to faith, right? Okay. And then it can what help to develop theology itself, right? By the analogy that we spoke of before, and by seeing the connection among the mysteries with each other, huh?

[30:38] Okay, those two ways. On the other hand, faith delivers reason from what? From errors, right? And protects it, and furnishes with knowledge of many kinds. Okay, many interesting things to think about.

[31:01] So even the sacraments are interesting to think about, especially the the Eucharist. huh? If we realise how reason is is so weak and apt to fall into errors, right? And the disagreement of thinkers is a sign that most people are mistaken.

[31:25] So that that's really a very great need that we have. Especially to be mistaken about the most important things. So we take a little break here, I guess, sir. Yeah, should take me a little bit. About the church's attitude to human sciences, hence, so far as the church from hindering the development of human arts and studies, that in fact she assists and promotes them in many ways. And so the universities were a start of the what in the Middle Ages, right?

[32:08] Even though they both get the church, right? The church had a lot to do with the formation of the universities, for she is neither ignorant nor contemptuous of the advantages which derive from this source of human life. Rather, she acknowledges that those things flow from God, the Lord of sciences, and if they are properly used, lead to God by the help of His grace.

[32:34] Nor does the church forbid these studies to employ each within its own area, its own proper what principles and method. But while she admits this just freedom, she takes particular care that they do not become infected with errors by conflicting with divine teaching, or by going beyond their proper what limits, intrude upon what belongs to faith, and engender what confusion. So with Hegel, their philosophy was trying to judge the faith, right?

[33:09] So it's going beyond their proper limits. But all things inductively, I sometimes show, and that is in terms of the limits of different kinds of knowledge.

[33:31] The principle I would see here is that it always belongs to the higher knowledge and the knowledge that has more the character of wisdom to distinguish between itself and the lower knowledge, and to show the order between them. Okay. Now, the first place we see this is in the comparison between reason and the senses, or reason and the what imagination, right? To whom does the distinction between reason and the senses belong?

[34:15] Yeah, and there it's very clear because the senses cannot distinguish between themselves and reason, right? Let alone know the order of the senses to reason, and the distinction between thinking and imagining, between reason and imagination. To whom does that belong to make that distinction or to see that distinction?

[34:41] Yeah, and of course it's very clear in this case. Only reason can see that distinction and show the order of imagination to reason. Okay. Now, reason has more the character of wisdom than the senses, huh? That's why we're called the wise ape, right? Because we have reason, huh? Okay. Now,

[35:05] um, what about the distinction between mathematics and natural philosophy? To whom does it belong to distinguish between those two? Natural philosophy Natural philosophy does, yeah. And natural philosophy has more the character of wisdom than geometry, huh? So Aristotle, in the second book of Natural Hearing, distinguishes between natural math, natural philosophy, and mathematics, right? And natural philosophy or natural science is the judge of to what extent mathematics can be used or is useful in what natural philosophy.

[36:01] But it's not until the metaphysics, not until the sixth book of wisdom, that Aristotle distinguishes clearly between what natural philosophy and wisdom or first philosophy. So it always belongs to the knowledge which is higher and has more the character of wisdom to distinguish between itself and the lower one.

[36:26] Plato, in the dialogues, distinguishes between political philosophy and political rhetoric. And does it belong to political rhetoric to distinguish between those two? No, to political philosophy to distinguish between those two, and to see the order of political rhetoric, to political philosophy. Okay. Because the statesmen must sometimes use persuasion and sometimes use force, right? And so he sees the art of rhetoric and the military art as his two tools, right?

[37:05] He can't force everybody. Not a good idea to do that. And so he's got to persuade some and force some, right? Huh? So you need both persuasion and force, right? But to what extent he uses persuasion, by since he uses force, this belongs to the judgment of the statesman, right? The political, wise man, right? To whom belongs the distinction between philosophy and and fiction?

[37:45] Yeah, what a character of wisdom, huh? And fiction does, huh? Which has more the character of wisdom, revealed theology or philosophy? First, philosophy. Theology. Yeah, Thomas will show this in the first question when we get to the Summa, right? So the distinction between philosophy and theology

[38:13] belongs to what? Theology. Theology. Yeah, and to show the order between the two, right? Belongs to them. Okay. So, what happened in modern philosophy was that they revolted from theology, right? Revolted from the faith and so on, and then they could no longer what properly distinguish between the two, let alone see the order among them, huh? So, in a sense, once revealed theology is on the scene,

[38:51] if you don't have the faith and don't have revealed theology, you can't make the distinction, and so you find the modern philosophers doing in philosophy things that the Greek philosophers never tried to do, right? But try to find a substitute in philosophy for theology, okay? So you find them mixing up these things, huh? And trying to judge, you know, theology and so on. So you have Forerbach writing the essence of Christianity, right?

[39:19] What it all means, you know, and you see Hegel putting philosophy above theology, so they can't properly distinguish between the two, and they can't see the order among the two. So they're kind of in a in a bind, huh? A real bind.

[39:41] Okay. You see this too, you know, when you say the distinction between you take knowledge in in words and statements and knowledge in mathematical symbols and equations, which has more the character of wisdom, right?

[40:07] The words. Yeah, and in a way, you can say you can say in words what a word is, and you can make statements about statements as we do in logic and so on. But can you write a mathematical equation that tells you what a mathematical equation is?

[40:28] No, no. So it's a kind of knowledge that doesn't know itself, but you can express in words what a mathematical equation is, as well as what a statement is, right? So it belongs to the knowledge in words and statements to distinguish between itself. And the knowledge in what mathematical symbols and equations, and to talk about the order connection between the two, right? Okay.

[41:02] Um. Can you say metaphors what a metaphor is? Metaphorically. No, you can't metaphorically. So, a metaphor is. See, if you want to say what a figure of speech is, you can't. You can exemplify by figure of speech, right? But you can't say what a figure of speech is by figure of speech. You can't say what a metaphor is. By metaphor, you have to define what a metaphor is by definition.

[41:31] Then you're not speaking metaphorically. Um. So the distinction between knowledge, if you can speak of knowledge and metaphors, and knowledge in. Proper speech belongs to knowledge and proper speech, and to talk about the order of them, therefore belongs to it, right? So you can kind of see inductively, huh, that the distinction between higher and lower knowledge, between the knowledge which has more of the character of wisdom and that which has less so or not at all, belongs always to wisdom, right?

[42:10] And to the higher knowledge. And so the distinction between philosophy and theology belongs to theology, and not to philosophy. So I always objected, you know, to what they call the philosophy of religion, you know, you know, because there, in a sense, philosophy is trying to what distinguish between religion and theology in itself, and it doesn't belong to philosophy to do that. Philosophy can't do that.

[42:46] Only theology can do that. But you see, Aristotle anticipating that, right? When he when he when he has natural in natural philosophy, distinguishes between natural philosophy and geometry, and in first philosophy or wisdom, philosophical wisdom, he distinguishes between first philosophy and natural philosophy, right?

[43:10] But it's only in theology that we distinguish between philosophy and theology. Now, once the moderns had revolted against that, they could no longer what see the distinction, right? You see, the Greek philosophers,

[43:35] they could judge the religion of the poets, huh? For the simple reason that the religion of the poets was what based on imagination. Okay, so I mentioned how the great Xenophanes Xenophanes, you know, said, "Well, if horses could make statues and so on, they'd make their gods look like horses, right? " And the Ethiopians make their their gods black and snub nosed and so on, and Greeks make them blonde and so on.

[44:08] But they see that they're what speaking about the gods by their imagination, right? They imagine the gods to be like kind of superhuman beings, huh? And you know how Zeus is terribly concerned about domestic conflict there between his wife and so on. Gets on opposite sides of the Trojan War and so on. He's terribly disturbed about this.

[44:41] Well, I mean, you can see it, poets. As Plato points out, and in philosophers before him, you can see that the poets are speaking about the gods by what imagination, right? And imagination can be judged by reason, right? And so Plato and Aristotle, and so on, they they're correcting what the the poets say about the gods, right? And when Aristotle, you know, in the proemium, you may remember that in the proemium to wisdom, there, you know, and he's talking about the those who say the gods will what be envious of us if we pursue wisdom, and so on, right?

[45:21] And Aristotle says, well, God cannot be envious, right? But he's correcting, you know, this anthropomorphic imaginative picture the gods that the poets have. Well, you see that the modern philosophers, if they want to

[45:39] put Christianity below philosophy, or the Christian theology below philosophy, they would have to make what Christian theology something of the imagination, right? Which forces to misunderstand it, right? Okay.

[46:01] And Thomas, of course, in the first question, the Summa will be distinguishing between the way even which Scripture does sometimes use metaphors, right, and the way the poet does, right? And he can see those distinctions, but the modern philosophers cannot, right? Okay. Now, of course, kind of interesting, huh? What Plato and Aristotle say? As Plato says that philosophy is becoming like God, right? So far as possible, right?

[46:38] Okay. And Aristotle will say that God alone, or God most of all, is what wise, right? Huh? So, from their own principles, they would say that if we could have a share in God's wisdom, right, then that would be wisdom in a higher sense than what this wisdom that we got by using our reason alone, huh? Okay.

[47:08] Um. But the modern philosophers are forced, in a way, having given up the faith, right? What is this thing that's been around for a couple thousand years, right? Well, they kind of have to falsify and say, well, it's something of the imagination, right? Certainly not a higher wisdom than we philosophers have. Okay, so they have to downplay the motives of credibility and so on, right? And try to make it something merely what this, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[47:52] But since Christian theology is based on faith and a share, you might say, in God's wisdom, then its wisdom in a higher sense than what the philosopher has.

[48:03] But what the Greek poets had about the gods was something less than philosophy; it was something more imaginative, and imagination is less than reason.

[48:19] Okay, now the use of reason should never change the original meaning or sense of the mysteries of faith. This very great quote from Vincent, Vincent of Lérins, for the doctrine of the faith which God has revealed is put forward not as some philosophical discovery capable of being perfected by human intelligence. But as a divine deposit committed to the spouse of Christ to be faithfully protected and infallibly promulgated.

[48:52] Hence, too, that meaning of the sacred dogmas is ever to be maintained which has once been declared by Holy Mother Church, and there must never be any abandonment of this sense under the pretext or in the name of a more profound understanding.

[49:13] May understanding, knowledge, and wisdom increase as ages and centuries roll along and greatly and vigorously flourish in each and all, an individual and the whole Church. But this only in its proper kind has to say in the same doctrine, the same sense, and the same understanding. Let's go to Vincent of Lérins there.

[49:38] So let's look at the canons here now in faith and reason. If anyone says that in divine revelation there contain no true mysteries properly so called, but that all the dogmas of the faith can be understood and demonstrated by properly trained reason and natural principles, let him be what. Anathema.

[50:05] If anyone says that human studies are to be treated with such a degree of liberty that their assertions may be maintained as true, even when they are opposed to divine revelation, and that they may not be forbidden by the Church, let him be anathema.

[50:26] If anyone says that it is possible that at some time, given the advancement of knowledge, a sense may be assigned to the dogmas propounded by the Church which is different from that which the Church has understood and understands, let him be anathema. Incidentally, in the encyclical on the Eucharist, there by Paul VI, there. you are. I think I came to the passage in that, didn't I? When I was talking about the importance of

[50:59] of these general things in theology. The text there, where Paul the Sixth was saying that the dogmas of faith are expressed by means of universal necessary thoughts. Remember that passage. Thank you, for that. From the Mysterium Fide, the Encyclical and Eucharist, and that's why they're not tied to any particular age or time. Okay. But they're good for men for all time, right?

[51:37] So, give a very simple example. Nothing too profound here, but you know, suppose the Church says God has no parts. We're making use of the thought of whole and part, right? And that is a thought that everyone has in every age and every time, right? Okay, they belong to a universal and necessary experience—that thought of whole and part. So is that ever going to change? See, or would it be inappropriate for people at some age to, you know, no, because everybody would know what a whole and a part is, right?

[52:14] And so everybody, to some extent, will understand what it means to say God has no parts. Yeah, that casts a little light upon this, you know, how something can be defined, you know, in the fourth century BC or AD rather, and be good in the twentieth century, right? Huh? You know, because you're expressing these things with thoughts that are tied to universal, necessary experience, or common experiences, to be called sometimes.

[52:51] That's connected with this other truth that we know more what God is not than what He is, right? Huh? And it's more useful to negate the general than the what particular. So we we show in theology that God has no parts. We don't show that God doesn't have two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen. Well, that's true too, right? But when you say that God has no parts, you exclude any parts, right?

[53:17] You don't have to go through and say he doesn't have two legs. He doesn't have, you know, four legs and a back and a seat. He has no parts. Period, right? So you negate the general, right? And you're closer to God by negating the general than if you could only negate the particular. If you say God doesn't have two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen, that separates God from water, right?

[53:40] When you say God has no parts, you separate God from anything that has parts, right? So you're getting closer to what God is, huh? And by saying he by saying he has no parts, and by saying he doesn't have two atoms of hydrogen and one of oxygen, doesn't have the letters C A and T, you know, right? That separates him from the word cat. But say he has no parts, separates him from the word cat from the molecule of water from anything that has parts, right?

[54:10] And those most general things are thoughts that are tied to common experience, the whole and part. And so, in the performance of our supreme pastoral office, we beseech the love of Jesus Christ, and we command by the authority of Him who is also our God and Savior, all faithful Christians, especially those in authority, or who have the duty of teaching, that they contribute their zeal and labor to the warding off and elimination of these errors in the church.

[54:43] And to the spreading of the light of the pure faith. But since it is not enough to avoid the contamination of heresy unless those errors are carefully shunned, which approach it in greater or less degree, we warn all of their duty to observe the constitutions and decrees in which such wrong opinions, though not expressly mentioned in this document, have been banned and forbidden by this Holy See.

[55:12] So, read through the dogmatic, including some alarm, right? To make sure that you're you're all set there, you know. But there's some ones, you know, that take them more by, instead chronologically like that, you know, they take them by different subject matters, you know. But you shouldn't be aware of those things.

[55:34] So we begin summa next time then. When are we going to meet again now? But you're you're. January fifth. and we separate January Uh just started Sunday

[55:51] So the week after I think is the fifth So the Thursday after New Year's, right? Yes. Yeah, it comes on Sunday, doesn't it? This year, yeah. So second. It is the third, fourth. Yeah, fifth would be Thursday, right? Second, third, fourth, fifth. So we meet on January.