Prima Pars
7. Summa Theologiae I, Q.1: Prologue, Overview, and Art. 1–2 (Why Sacred Doctrine Is Necessary; Objections to It Being a Science)
Class of 2006-01-05
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/007-summa-theologiae-i-q-1-prologue-overview-and-art-1-2-why/

[0:00] Okay. Name of the Father and the Son of the Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlightenment. Guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray. for us and help us to be able to do that to understand all that you've written. Name of the Father and the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. So let's look at the prologue first.

[0:30] The Latin word, I guess, meaning forward. Okay. Guys, don't have that. Some of them don't. Okay, but it's a fairly short one, huh? Because what Thomas has, you know, if you look at the prologue to the the Psalms, let's say, other works, it's much longer. But a lot of the things you have in that longer prologue will be found in the first question of the Summa. What the book is about, what the order is, and so on.

[1:00] So Thomas says, because the teacher of Catholic truth ought to instruct not only those who are proficient, right, those who are advanced, but it also pertains to him to instruct those beginning. According to the words of the Apostle, which is Saint Paul in the Epistle of the Corinthians, as little ones in Christ, I gave you milk to drink, right? Not food, huh? So the intention or the proposal of our intention of this work is those things which pertain to the Christian religion to treat in a way that is suitable to the instruction of what beginners.

[1:41] This reminds me of what Porphyry says, right? He's writing for beginners, right? He's going to abstain from certain questions. Then this next paragraph is shows you what a good teacher Thomas is, because he's taking into account the difficulties that what he's seen his students have in learning theology. We have considered, huh, that beginners in this doctrine or teaching, in those things which have been written by diverse people, are impeded much many ways.

[2:19] How are they impeded, huh? By what they come across. First, he says an account of the multiplication of useless questions, articles, and arguments. Okay.

[2:36] So that's a sin of what? Too much, huh? Okay. Partly because those things which are necessary for them to know are not treated in the order of what? Learning, huh? That's a very important point. This is often what neglected, right? When I first came to Assumption College, you know, everybody had to take four courses in philosophy, and they were ordered by Laval people in the order of learning.

[3:18] That order of learning is lost. You can't really what teach so well, huh? Of course, Thomas even makes the point sometimes that when Saint Paul in the epistles says enumerating virtues and vices, he's not doing so according to the order of learning, huh? But he's singling out those virtues or vices that are important to emphasize with these particular people, right?

[3:51] So those things which are necessary for knowing are not treated according to the order of learning, but according as regards the what exposition of books, huh? Okay.

[4:06] Of course, you see a little bit of that dissipated in Dionysius the Divine Names, huh? Because how many times in Scripture will you find it said that God is good?

[4:21] Well, countless times, right? So what do you do every time it says that God is good? Is going to stop and explain what it means to say that God is good? Then you are going to be repeating yourself again and again, right? Okay. So what did Dionysius did? He wrote the book of the Divine Names, right? So he brings together everything he can think of to say about God's goodness, and then what he think about God's knowledge, et cetera, et cetera, right?

[4:48] And then you can kind of what see it all together, right? Or according as the occasion for disputing arises, huh? Okay. So if you look even at Thomas's, you know, questions disputatae, they're not as what much in the order of learning as is the two Summas, huh? Okay. The Fortiori question is disputatae the quodlibet Thomas. What you will, right? He was got your mind any question, you know, that's here, right?

[5:25] And they may have very little to do with each other. One question, another question, and they presuppose things, you know, to answer one question, some other question.

[5:37] Partly because the frequent repetition of these things, right, generates what boredom and confusion in the souls of hearers right? Or complained to Cicero about repeating something. He says, "Well, I am going to repeat it to understand myself," he said. Somebody said the repetition of the motherhood studies, but there could be a point where it produces certain confusion, right? In in boredom in the minds of of hearers, huh?

[6:10] So he says these, therefore, and other things of this sort, striving to avoid, huh? We will try with hope in divine aid to what follow those things that pertain to sacrum doctrina, and this is now more the name of it. This is sacred what? Sacred knowledge. That sacred teaching, right? Okay. Now, Augustine has written a book called what? Doctrina Christiana, right? Kind of the same thing, huh?

[6:39] But notice in both of those titles, as I pointed out, I think before, the emphasis is upon the teacher. And at the other extreme, you have mathematics, which is named from the what? The student, huh? Now, at the end of the Gospel Saint John, when he says, "Go forth and make, you know, students of all men," then you have the word mathetes, huh? We get the word mathematics, right?

[7:04] So, in that sense, this is the furthest from what mathematics, huh? Requires authority the most, huh? In geometry, arithmetic, mathematics, the the least, okay?

[7:23] Intends to to proceed to those things or to pursue those things breviter et lucide, huh? He's going to be what brief, huh? Brevity is the soul of wit, huh? And what Clear? Yeah, Lucidae comes from what light? Okay. He's going to proceed in a brief and enlightening way. Which is quite true, huh? According as what the matter what admits, huh? Okay, because the matter does admit of for us, right, to be completely elucidated, huh?

[8:08] Okay. So let's look now at the question one, and that our intention and that our aim, huh, might be contained within certain limits, is necessary first to investigate about sacred doctrine itself, what sort of knowledge it is, and to what things it what extends, huh? Okay. And about this, he says, ten things are going to be examined or questioned, and first about the necessity of this what teaching, huh?

[8:55] Secondly, whether it is a a science, and of course we have to see what the word science means a bit, and then third, whether it be one science or many sciences.

[9:09] Of course, he's going to conclude that it's one science and not many. And fourth, whether it is speculative, looking knowledge or practical doing. Because that, of course, is the famous division of philosophy into speculative philosophy, theoretical philosophy, looking philosophy, to use English word, and practical philosophy, which is the philosophy of doing, right? So, Lady wisdom comes down, you know, to console. Boethius in the consolation of philosophy, she has a theta on her garments, which represents Theoretica, huh?

[9:44] theoretical philosophy, and then a pi, which represents the practical philosophy. huh? Theoretica is put upon the practical, right? Those are the two kinds of philosophy. Sometimes, yeah, logic is a third part, but that's more the tool philosophy. Then five about its comparison to the sciences is above them or below them, right? Or midst them? And then six, whether it be a what, a wisdom, right? Okay.

[10:18] Now, when Aristotle distinguishes the virtues of reason, huh, in the sixth book of Nicomachean Ethics, Scientia and Sapientia are divided against each other, right? But then other times we say sapientia is a scientia, although it's the highest one, right? Okay. So you can say even if it's a sapientia, it could still be scientia, right? But if it's a scientia, science it isn't necessarily wisdom, right? Okay. It's a bit like if we said in English, no, knowledge and wisdom, right?

[10:54] Well, something can be knowledge without being wisdom, but it can't be wisdom without being knowledge, right? But sometimes we might divide wisdom against knowledge because of its having something particularly excellent, right, about it. We've talked about that many things before. Now, notice articles two through six, right, could be grouped together, right? Because you're asking, in a sense, what kind of knowledge is this, right? Okay. Is it a science?

[11:30] Is it one of many sciences? Is speculative science or practical science, right? How's it compared to the other sciences, and is it a wisdom? But now seven is something quite different, right? Seven is what is the subject of this science? What is this science about, right? Okay.

[11:51] And then the last three articles are more about how this science or how this knowledge, how this teaching proceeds, right? Now, if you've seen the sentences, Peter Lombard, or Thomas's exposition of that, he has an article entitled "Whither Sacred Doctrine Proceeds," Artfully, in accordance with the what matter, right? And there he gives a much more what complete, you might say, right, distinction of the many ways that Scripture proceeds, right?

[12:39] Here he's limiting himself more to just mainly one way that Scripture proceeds, and that is that it proceeds sometimes argumentatively, like in the Book of Job, he says, right? Or in the Epistles of Saint Paul, you know, where he's analyzing syllogisms, you know, where the premises are backed up and so on. But the other books that proceed in quite different ways, right? Some proceed in a modus narrativus, like.

[13:05] The historical books, right? Others like the Psalms and orativus, et laudativus, prayerful and praising, right? Others in a revelatory way, like the Book of Apocalypse, and so on, right? So there's all kinds of different ways it proceeds, right? But Thomas in the Summa Theologiae is going to be proceeding in this argumentative mode, right? So he singles out that and says, is it appropriate in this doctrine to proceed at least sometimes by argument, right?

[13:36] And that will be the what, eighth article, right? See? Then it's kind of striking that he, in the ninth article, asks whether it ought to use what, metaphors, right? Metaphor and symbol there are used, synonymously, right? So Dionysius, for example, wrote a book about the divine names, which is the names set properly of God. Then there's another book on symbolic theology, which is about the names set of God metaphorically, like he's fire or he's water, he's a rock, and so on, right?

[14:14] And now Thomas, in this book, if he's going to be proceeding argumentatively, he's not going to be proceeding metaphorically or symbolically. So it's kind of interesting that he what, brings an article in, huh? But it's relevant nevertheless because sometimes you'll see in the objections that a man will take something that is being said figuratively or metaphorically as if it's being taken properly, right? And so you have to be aware of the fact that Scripture will speak sometimes what, metaphorically, right?

[14:48] But maybe he also wants to kind to make you what, be aware of the fact that, that this matter doesn't admit of being what, being perfectly accessible, right?

[15:02] By argument, right? And again, of course, if the Bible is addressed to all men, that's another reason why it might want to use metaphors sometimes, huh? But in general, metaphors have a certain, we'll see the reason for that when we get to that part, anyway. And then the tenth article, whether the sacred Scripture of this teaching should be laid out according to many senses, huh? And there Thomas will talk about the distinction between the sense of the letter and the spiritual sense, and the various kinds of spiritual senses and so on.

[15:41] Okay. So notice those last three articles are about how this teaching proceeds, right? Okay. The seventh one is what is the subject, right? But the ones before that, down to except the first one, is about the kind of knowledge this is, okay? So you could divide perhaps these ten articles into four parts, right? Yeah.

[16:12] But maybe you can divide the first article against the other nine because the first one is really talking about does there exist such a thing? The question does something exist, right? Is before, right? And then the other nine articles, the kind of knowledge this is what it's about and how it proceeds, right? Okay, makes sense. Okay. As I mentioned, talking about the fairly short prologue here in the prologue, say to the to the St.

[16:42] Paul's epistles or the prologue to to the Psalms and so on, you'll find Thomas deals with many of the things that are taken up in this first question, right, for that particular book.

[16:57] Now, notice in this first. I didn't put that up. I hear it. Good exhortation. In this first article, Thomas is going to ask whether this teaching is sacred teaching is necessary, right? Okay. And the word "necessary" is a word that's equivocal by what reason, right? Okay.

[17:35] And in the fifth book of wisdom, Aristotle takes up the word "necessary." What's interesting where he takes up the word "necessary"? He takes it up at the end of the first part, which is about the names of causes. So, in that first part, you have the name beginning, then the name cause itself, then the name element, and then the name nature, right? No, these are names of causes, but attached to those names of causes is the name what necessary, right?

[18:19] Now, why is the name necessary attached to the names of causes? There's a connection between necessary and cause, okay? And Aristotle distinguishes there four senses of the word necessary, right?

[18:41] And three of these senses are connected with the extrinsic causes, huh? And one of them with the intrinsic causes. So, if I say, for example, that two is necessarily half of four, that's due to what two is intrinsically, right? If I say that a triangle necessarily has interior angles that are two right angles, that's tied up with what a triangle is. If I say man is necessarily corruptible, right?

[19:19] It's tied up with the fact that he has matter as a part of him, right? My matter is able to be a lion or worms or dust, right? So something in me that's able to be something other than me, so I'm necessarily corruptible. Okay. So that's one sense of necessary tied up with the intrinsic causes.

[19:42] But that's not the sense of necessary here in this first question. Another sense of necessary is tied up with the extrinsic cause called the what? Mover, the mover, the mover.

[19:56] And we've had some big winds down there, you know, so on, huh? And maybe there's some winds that you can't what resist, right? If you're there and the wind comes, you necessarily are moved from where you are to God knows where, right? Okay, maybe out of this world, for all you know. Okay, well that's necessity now from an extrinsic cause, right? Okay. Or if they grab me, you know, the the terrorist, whatever it is, and and pinion my arms, and you know, I must go along with them because they are too powerful for me, right?

[20:30] Okay, they're too strong for me, right? But now the other two sentences are necessary, are tied up at the end, and the idea that some end cannot be without this what

[20:51] need, you might say, right? Okay. And the distinction that Aristotle makes here is between what is necessary for the being and what is necessary for the well-being, huh? Okay. So if I say that, let's say, food is necessary in this life, right? It's necessary because you can't be without food, right? Okay. But it's not necessary in the sense of the efficient cause or from intrinsic cause, right?

[21:27] Because I'm a man, I don't necessarily have food. Some men have starved to death, et cetera, et cetera, right? Okay. But you can say, if I'm going to live, right, then I must what have food, right? If I'm going to live, I must breathe, right? Okay. Now, other things necessary for well-being, like Thomas says, you need a horse. Okay, You need to bring some distance, right? So it's necessary for me to have a car to get in this class.

[22:03] What do you think? Depends upon your strength. Well, you're taking an awful long time to walk up here, right? You wouldn't see me too often, I guess. And in the winter, I might not make it at all, right? Okay. So in order to get here well and efficiently and so on, I need a car, right? Okay. You went out to California, and when you get back there, everything, at least the old, we were still students, the faculty of philosophy was still in the old city, right?

[22:39] So you had your room in the old city, and your classrooms there, your entertainment, your restaurants, and everything. Everything was in walking distance, huh? You get out to California to teach. First thing you learn is you can't get anywhere in California without a car, right? And so it's necessary, right? Okay. Now

[23:02] let's apply this a little more to something close enough to this first article, right? Because in the first article we're asking whether this knowledge called sacra doctrina, right? Whether this knowledge is necessary.

[23:18] Now, if someone asked me as a philosopher, something more known, is logic necessary for philosophy? Is logic necessary for the philosopher? Well, I would answer the question yes. But is it necessary in the sense of philosophy cannot be at all without logic, or it can't be well without logic? I'd probably say it can't be well without logic, right? Logic was, in fact, the last part of philosophy to be what discovered, right?

[23:59] Aristotle comes at the end of the golden age of Greek philosophy. Is called the father of logic, right? But people were doing natural philosophy. They were doing geometry, right? They were doing even ethics, right? They were doing all these things before, right? Aristotle found logic, right? But they were making more mistakes than they had to be, right? Okay, and other difficulties they were having, right? So you could say that logic is necessary, maybe not absolutely for philosophy.

[24:39] You can do philosophy without logic, but you can't do it well, right? So it's necessary for not for doing philosophy, but for doing it well. It's necessary in this sense there. Do you see? Okay.

[24:57] But if you couldn't use your reason at all without logic, you wouldn't never even get logic, right? Okay. You see that? Now take an example of the other.

[25:10] Um, my two greatest teachers, Charles De Koninck and Monsignor Dionne After all, Charles De Koninck always taught courses in philosophy of nature. So he taught a course in the first book of Natural Hearing, the first book of the Physics, or a course in the second book for the first-year students always. If you're there for more than one year, you get both of these. Then he taught a course on one of the later books for the advanced students, huh?

[25:43] And so I had a course on place in Book Four and time in Book Four and so on. Monsignor Dionne was teaching things more dealing with logic and things of that sort, right? Now, why did the two great teachers not teach wisdom, metaphysics? Right. Well, it goes back to the order of learning, right? You have to know natural philosophy and logic before you can really what learn wisdom.

[26:15] Okay. That's part of the reason why wisdom is called meta ta physica, right? After the books in natural philosophy. Now, what am I doing in a course in metaphysics at Assumption College? Right. To students who have, you know, a very minimal background in logic and in philosophy of nature, right?

[26:44] Well, I tell them I'm not going to really teach you wisdom. I'm not going to be wise by the end of this course. I'm going to give you a little foretaste of what wisdom is, right?

[26:58] And there's two reasons why it's important that you get this foretaste of wisdom. One is that if you're philosophers, or you aspire to be philosophers, that is to be lovers of wisdom, right? You can't love something if you don't know what it is in some way, right?

[27:21] So you could say to know what wisdom is is necessary, right? To be a philosopher, because a philosopher is a lover of wisdom, and it's impossible to love wisdom without, in some way, knowing what it is. So what I'm doing is necessary for you guys, right? But this is necessary now in the first sentence, right? You cannot be a philosopher without loving wisdom, and you can't love wisdom without knowing, in some way, what wisdom is.

[27:57] But secondly, I said if you are a lover of wisdom, if wisdom is your end or goal, then all of your philosophical studies, right, even in geometry and in logic and in natural philosophy and even ethics and so on, all of this should be ordered to eventually getting to what wisdom, right?

[28:19] You can't order all your studies to wisdom if you don't, in some way, however imperfectly, know what everything is being ordered what to to.

[28:31] So it's necessary to know what wisdom is to be a lover of wisdom, and it's necessary to know, in some way, what wisdom is to direct all of your what studies to this last end and goal of the whole philosophy. Do you see that? Okay. Now, in which sense is necessary? If you had a chance to read this article. Which sense of necessary is Thomas going to be saying?

[29:00] Yes, this knowledge called Sacra doctrina is necessary. Yeah, both. Yeah, but not with respect exactly to the same things, right? He's going to say that man is directed to an end that surpasses the grasp of his what? Reason. Actual reason, right? Okay. And he can't direct his whole life and his actions and so on to this end unless he be made aware of it, at least by faith and so on.

[29:40] So, in that sense, you can say that's a reason why this doctrine is what absolutely necessary, right? Okay, you can't pursue an end and direct your all your activities towards that end without some foreknowledge of that end. That's like what I was saying about wisdom, right? and Philosophy. Unless you know what philosophical wisdom is, but first philosophy is right. You can't direct all of your philosophical thinking and so on to that end.

[30:15] But then he'll say, "What about these things of natural reason can find out about God? is necessary for salvation necessary for those? " See? And he says, "Well, not in this first sense, in the sense of being, but in the sense of well-being, right? That unless you had sacra doctrina, most men would never have any knowledge, even of those things that natural reason can find out. And those who have some ability to find them out, right?

[30:55] If they're willing to put in the time, it will take them most of their life, right? And because of the great difficulty of these things, they'd have many what mistakes, right? Okay. And therefore, you need, huh,

[31:10] this doctrine, right? Now, both those points were made. You may remember in the in the Constitution there, the first Vatican Council, right? You know, you're plagiarizing the Constitution. You know, if I was correcting this first Vatican Council, say, "Hey, I think I've heard this before now. " You should acknowledge where you got this from.

[31:40] Okay. So let's look at the first article here, which, like most reasonable things, are divided into three parts, right? And the first is kind of a contraction of the what back and forth arguments that you have in the quaestionis disputatae, right? But Thomas will cut it down to the most essential arguments, huh? And main the arguments against, but he's going to maintain the body of the article, right?

[32:14] But you should have said contra, right, Because it's more an authority in many cases than an argument. But you should have a little difficulty there, right? And then the body article, he will think out the answer, and then in the third part, he will reply to the objections on the opposite side, right? Now, occasionally, like in the quaestionis disputatae, you have to reply to both sides if the truth is somewhere in between.

[32:39] But the most part, it's on the opposite side of the major objections. To the first, thus one proceeds. And of course, as we said before, this first article recently comes first, right? And this goes back to something we learned logic: that the question "Does it exist?" is before the question "What it is." What it is, yeah. Just like the question whether this is that, before the question why this is that, right?

[33:08] If you don't know that this is that, you don't ask why is this that. And if you don't know that something exists, you don't ask what it is, right? You might ask what the word means, not what the thing is. So, reason wants to know what is and what it is, but in that order, right?

[33:27] To the first, one proceeds thus: it seems that is not necessary to have some other teaching besides the philosophical teaching. philosophical discipline, something. You also use the word disciplina there, right? Taken from the what schooled right? Postulatura. To those things which are above reason, this is the first objection. Man ought not to try, right? According to that of the Ecclesiasticus huh Chapter 3 Do not seek those things that are above you, right?

[34:10] But those things which are subject to reason are sufficiently treated in the philosophical disciplines. Therefore, it seems to be what superfluous to have some other teaching besides the teachings of the philosophers, right?

[34:29] Good objection, right? Moreover, teaching cannot be except about what is about being, for nothing is known except the true, which is convertible with being. We learned that in the ninth book the ninth book of wisdom,

[34:52] but about all beings, there is treatment in the philosophical disciplines, and even about God, right? Hence, a certain part of philosophy is called theology or the divine science. This is clear from the what philosopher he called Aristotle by antonomasia, right? The philosopher in the sixth book of metaphysics, right? So, in the sixth book, if you may recall, wisdom there he distinguished what wisdom from all the other knowledge, right?

[35:22] He distinguished the theoretical sciences from the practical and productive, and so on. And then he distinguished the theoretical into natural philosophy and mathematics and and wisdom, right? But then he called wisdom there theology.

[35:43] Sometimes we call that natural what theology. Okay. As we'll see when you get to septimo seventh article, the reason why this teaching here has got more right to be called theology than first philosophy does.

[36:04] This first philosophy is not about God as its subject. Its subject is being and what? But God is the what? The end of the goal. But so we'll find out in the seventh article, in this science, not only is God the end of the goal, but He's also the what? Subject. So this is much more theology than first philosophy is. Okay.

[36:32] Okay, so philosophy talks about everything. Is to talk about. And being covers everything, right? Then it's not necessary that, in addition to or besides the philosophical disciplines, that there be add some other what teaching, right?

[36:52] Now against this is what is said in the second epistle to Timothy, that all Scripture, divinely inspired, is useful for what? For teaching, for refuting, huh? Correcting. For correcting and instructing to justice, right? And also, as first, two to teaching and to refuting,

[37:19] makes it seem to be like the theoretical, right? Because Aristotle says that's the duty of the wise man, right? To teach the truth and refute errors. And then the practical though comes up with the idea of correcting people, right? And teaching them how to act, which is to instruct them to justice. So that would give rise to that in fourth article, whether this knowledge is speculative or practical, seems to be both what?

[37:44] What the great Saint Paul here is saying. But Scripture, divinely inspired, does not pertain to the philosophical disciplines, which are found by what human reason, huh?

[38:01] So Saint Paul is saying it's useful, right? It's useful therefore apart from the philosophical disciplines, for there to be another divinely inspired what? Knowledge or science, huh?

[38:19] I answer. It should be said, is necessary for human what? Salvation. For there to be some teaching by divine revelation, in addition to or apart from the philosophical disciplines, which are investigated by what human reason, right?

[38:45] And first, because man is ordered to God, as to a end that exceeds the grasp of his what? Reason, huh? According to that of Isaiah, and I guess St. Paul repeats this, doesn't he? I has not seen, right? Ear has not heard. It's added sometimes on this text here. I has not seen God without you. It does not see without God. The things that you have prepared for those who love you, right?

[39:23] So, taking by authority, that man is directed to an end above what reason, right? Above comprehension of reason. So, I think it's in St. Paul. I has not seen nor has your heard. as entered the heart of man, the things that God has prepared for those who love him. It. Reminds me of that fragment of Heraclitus. You know, he says the things that can be seen, heard, and learned are what I prize most.

[39:48] He has no knowledge of this, right? But neither eye is seen nor ear is heard. It's interesting to the heart of the mind, you mean the mind of the man, right? The things that God has prepared for those who love Him. So the end is what necessarily has to be foreknown by men, right? Who are ought to direct their what intentions and their actions to the end, right?

[40:15] Whence it is necessary for the salvation of man that certain things become known through divine revelation, which itself what human reason. Okay, so I was comparing that to my saints and students, right? It's not unnecessary, right, that you have a certain foretaste of first philosophy, right? Because this is your end as a philosopher, right? This is your goal, and you can't direct all your studies to this goal if you are not somewhere aware of what this goal is.

[40:53] Well, the same thing here, huh? If there is an end, right, that's above the grasp for our reason, that God is directing us towards, but man is not, you know, just a automaton, right? He's got to, you know, direct himself, right? God who created you without you, and not save you without you. Well, then we have to, in some way, know about this end to direct our intentions and our actions to it, right?

[41:22] I think the Vatican I would say that's absolutely necessary for that, right? Okay, but necessary in the sense here, right? Cannot be, huh? You cannot be directing your life and actions to this end if you don't have some foreknowledge of it. Makes sense, okay?

[41:43] But to those things which can be investigated about God or found out about God by human reason, it is necessary for man to be instructed by divine revelation, right? Now, this is necessary, seems to me, in that second sense, huh? Because these things can be without what revelation, right? And we saw in Vatican I that's an article of faith now that God can be known by natural reason.

[42:14] Doesn't mean that very many men would know by natural reason, right? Or know very well, maybe, right? But that He can be, right? And in terms of divine providence, um,

[42:28] that Plato and Aristotle and the Greek philosophers didn't have revelation, right? But arrived at certain knowledge of God, huh? Actually, Plato saw, you know, something in the definition of eternity, right? There is no before and after. He saw eternity. You know, most people think of eternity as being endless time, right? But even endless time would not be eternity because an endless time is still a before and after.

[42:53] But Plato in the Timaeus there sees that eternity has no before and after, right? So. Plato and Aristotle could arrive at a certain knowledge of God, and the fact that they didn't have revelation is confirmation of what the Vatican one is is saying, right? If only Christians had used their reason to arrive at the knowledge that can be known by reason alone, you might say, "Well, that's you're self-deceiving yourself," right?

[43:21] Okay. And you heard me compare that to the other thing that the Church Fathers say, you know, that the non-conversion of many of the Jews, right, was not good, but God brought this good out of it, that they were witnesses to the authenticity and the antiquity of the books of the Old Testament, right, which prophesied about Christ, right. And the pagans, you know, might say, you know, we just invented those books, so you, you know, but when the enemies of the Christians, right, witness to the authenticity of those works, did that say what?

[43:57] Impressive right? Yeah. Okay what do they say about the testimony of the enemy is the most convincing, right? What did George the Third say? You know, wasn't very happy about about the American Revolution, right? But he's kind of amazed that you know Washington's going to step down at the end of the war there, right, and not assume power over the country, right? He says if he walks away, he says he'll be the greatest man in the world.

[44:32] Real admiration there, you know. Despite you know you know being very mad about the revolution, he was here about about George Washington, right? He'll be the greatest man in the world. Okay. But anyway, the fact that the Jews then, right, witness to the authenticity of those books, despite these horrid Christians, right, It's a sign that Christians did not have somebody invented; those books, okay.

[45:01] The same way, you know, you know, people are saying now, you know, the Ten Commandments are well, that's a matter of religion, right? Then you go back to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, and he says he doesn't believe the religions of his time and like that, right? But for him, adultery is always wrong. there's no mean, he says. You know, either too much or too little, right? But but it's always wrong.

[45:28] It's already bad in its definition, you know, in excess, right? So a man can see this, right? Or when he says, you know, in the in the in the topics that if a man doesn't want to honor his father and mother, or as he should honor his father and mother, he doesn't need to to be convinced that he should honor his father and mother. He needs to be punished.

[45:46] A Man should know this, you know. So that's something you know that. Because God gave it to Moses on the mountain, yeah, he did, right? And that confirms this, but it's not as if. This could be known only through God speaking to Moses on the mountain, right? How did Aristotle? To the best of my knowledge, God didn't speak to God. Aristotle, on Olympus or someplace you know

[46:13] There's no evidence that he did, but you could know this by natural reason, okay? He says, so I think the second thing he's talking about now is necessary for the well-being. To those things which can be investigated by human reason about God, is necessary for man to be instructed by divine revelation, because the truth about God investigated by reason, approaches right by few, right? In other places, Thomas develops.

[46:51] this why it would be by few, right? First of all, there are few men who have the mental ability to do this, right? And even those who might have mental ability are often what distracted by the what necessities of life and so on, right? And even those who might have the ability and the leisure, oh, I got to go through all these things to get there. Like when Euclid was instructing the king, you know, isn't there a sort of way to these things, you know?

[47:21] So, because few men are capable of this, and they would have to have the leisure to do it, right? And and the desire to go through all the things we suppose, right? Very few men would attain to this, right? So wouldn't that that's not good, okay? And even those who could, it'd be a long and tempest for a long time, right?

[47:53] And with the admixture of many errors, right? And this is shown by the the disagreement among men, right? Okay. Often, reason is deceived, but the knowledge of this truth, on the knowledge of this truth, depends the whole what salvation of man, right? Which is in God, right? And therefore, that the salvation man might what convenientius right, more suitably, and certius, more certainly, right, arrive, it was necessary to be instructed about divine things, the divine revelation.

[48:36] So that's that second sense of necessary for the well-being, right? Okay. I think when if anyone is touching upon these two things, to use the term absolutely necessary, right? But that it could not be without that first sense of necessary for the very being. right? So we conclude, therefore, it's necessary besides the philosophical disciplines which are investigated by reason to have some teaching by what revelation. Are you convinced?

[49:08] Okay. So notice in my examples there, logic is necessary, right? In one of these senses, necessary, right? This foretaste of first philosophy is necessary for the philosopher in this other sense, right? But sacred doctrine is necessary in what? Both of these senses of what necessary, right?

[49:35] But not necessary in the intrinsic sense, right? Okay. Because I'm a man, I don't necessarily believe, right? And God didn't do us by violence, like in the movie sense, right? Okay. But. He's pretty strong like Saint Paul. like Bernicade But. He's pretty strong like Saint Paul, right? Mocks him off his horse, right?

[50:00] Yeah. Didn't move him to faith, moved him to the ground. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Are the adjuncts objecting to Revelation itself, or just to theology? or are they not making it? Well, they kind of go together because this is a now is based on revelation, right? So if you object to revelation, then you're going to do away with this knowledge too, right? Okay. Well, Thomas, notice replies to the first objection, right?

[50:36] To the first, therefore, it should be said that although those things which are above the knowledge of man should not be sought by man to what reason, right?

[50:49] They are nevertheless to be received by faith when God what reveals them, and then he points out that later on in that same book of Ecclesiastes, there in the twenty-fifth verse, once it is joined under that, many things are shown you, right? Above the what sense or judgment of man, right? And in things of this sort, sacred teaching consists, right?

[51:21] Now the second objection, huh? A little different. Second objection is saying, well, the philosophers have talked about everything there is to talk about, right?

[51:32] Okay. But remember what I was putting out before. It's possible, right, that what the same things could be known in different ways, right? Okay.

[51:48] Plus, you would probably add that there's some things about these things that the philosopher would not know. So he might know some things about God, among other things, but he might not know everything that we know about God. So he says a diverse way of knowing leads us into a diversity of sciences, right? He takes a famous example there from Aristotle. For the same conclusion is demonstrated by the astronomer we call him today, right?

[52:20] And the what natural scientists, for example, that the Earth is round, right? Then, so Aristotle saw that the Earth cast a round what shadow on the Moon, right? Okay, what kind of shows that the Earth is round, right? But then you might say, yeah, but look, the Earth is made out of Earth, right? And Earth tends to what go towards the center, right? So it's going to end up in a round formation, okay?

[52:47] So one thing is taken from the nature, the natural, um, the nature of Earth, right? And the other is taking a more mathematical thing from the shape, of the shadow. Yeah, yeah.

[53:06] So one is through a mathematical middle term that is abstracted from matter. The naturalist through a middle term that is concerned with the kind of matter that Earth is.

[53:23] Now, taking even more known example, there of the what eye and the what touch knowing, say the shape of this thing. I can know that this thing is round on top here, right? Just feeling it, you know. If you brought it near with my eyes closed, it allowed me to feel it. I can also see with my eyes that it's round, not square. Let's take an example that's closer.

[53:47] because He's talking about sciences now, right? My example is example of the fact that there can be what two different kinds of knowledge, two different ways of knowing, but knowing the same thing sometimes, huh?

[54:04] Whence nothing prevents about the same things about which the philosophical disciplines treat, according as they are knowable by the light of natural reason, for another science to treat of these same things, according as they are what known by the light of divine revelation, huh?

[54:27] Whence the theology which pertains to sacred doctrine, revealed theology, might say, differs in genus, right, from that theology which is laid down as a part of philosophy, right? So the theology that we call natural theology, first philosophy, that's a what species of the genus looking philosophy, right? Well, this theology is the species of looking philosophy. No, this theology differs in genus then from it, right? Okay. So now we know the thing exists, right?

[55:03] Now we got to find out what it is. And he's asking, reading about the genus here. Now, how do you translate "scientia" into English, right? Because if you translate it by science today, you know, you usually think of experimental science, and maybe that's not the best likeness here. "Scientia" is used to translate the Greek word what episteme, right? Now, sometimes I translate it by what reasoned out knowledge, yeah.

[55:46] You can't do that here on opinion Well, you could take maybe knowledge as opposed to opinion, right? The knowledge in the strict sense, huh? Where you have certain, Scientia has the idea of being certain, right? Okay. But

[56:05] perhaps there's this, as you see later on, this is argumentative, right? Insofar as argumentative, there's a kind of reasoning out, right? Okay. So maybe you could translate it as reasoned out knowledge, right? But you got to be kind of careful about that, huh? Okay. And he's going to go back to a distinction that Aristotle uses in the Posterior Analytics, right? Between a science whose principles are obvious in that science, right?

[56:34] And a science who borrows principles from other science and takes them on faith from the other science. He's going to assimilate this knowledge being a science to that, because it's based upon the knowledge which God has of Himself, and perhaps the saints who see Him as He is, right? Which they have, right? And this science is subordinate to that science in the same way that maybe astronomy is subordinate to geometry, right?

[57:01] So the astronomer will take from the geometer certain truths of geometry that he doesn't see himself as being what true, but he believes them on the word of the geometer, right? And then he proceeds using those, right? Okay. It's like the biologist might use what the chemist has concluded, right? And just take on human belief, huh? Okay.

[57:32] So the first objection, it seems that sacred doctrine is not a science, huh? For every science proceeds from beginnings known to themselves, right? Okay. Now those beginnings or principles known to themselves, are divided into those known to themselves by all men, and known to themselves by those who are wise in some science, right? So the wise men like me who know what a perfect number is, it's per se known that every perfect number is a composite number.

[58:19] Does Magnus see that as being obvious? No, because he doesn't know what a perfect number is, right? But a perfect number is a number equal to the sum, right? Of everything that measures it, in the strict sense, measures it evenly, right? So six is the first perfect number, right? It's measured by one, by two, and by three, and add up to six, right? Well, could a number be a perfect number and be a prime number?

[58:49] Well, a prime number is measured only by one, and one, of course doesn't add up to any numbers, so it's impossible for a composite number to be prime, right? See, it's kind of obvious to me because I'm pretty wise about these things, and I know what a perfect number is. But see, like the whole is more than a part, but everybody knows what a whole is, what a part is.

[59:11] They can't eat their meal without knowing what a whole and a part is, right? So everybody knows that the whole is more than a part, right?

[59:27] But sacred teaching, sacred doctrine, proceeds from articles of the what faith, right? There are, three persons in God, right? God became man, which are not what known to themselves, since they are not conceded by what all, right? For St. Paul right For St. Paul says in the Epistle to Thessalonians, second one, faith is not everyone; not everyone has faith. Therefore, sacred doctrine is not a science, right?

[1:00:04] Okay. Now, Thomas, to reply to the objections, we'll see, is going to use the distinction that Aristotle has, even in what the human sciences, right? Okay. And show what senses is a science. It's not a science like geometry, but more like what astronomy. Yes, when astronomy takes principles from geometry, and in astronomy doesn't see them to be true, but takes them on the word of the geometry, and this is a science in that sense, right?

[1:00:44] Because it proceeds from things that are seen by God in His knowledge of Himself, and by the blessed who see God as He is, right? Okay. We take it from what they say, and we proceed. right

[1:00:58] Second objection: More of a science is not about what singulars, individuals, huh? But sacred doctrine treats about singulars, about the doings of Abraham and Isaac and Jacob, huh? And likewise, ones like that. Therefore, sacred doctrine is not a science, huh? That's history. That's biography, right? You distinguish between history and biography and and science, right? Aristotle, you know, in when he's in the book on the poetic art, he says that fiction is more philosophic than history, right?

[1:01:40] The reason he gives is that philosophy is about the universal, history is about the what singular, right? And fiction is more about the universal than about the singular. So my stock example is that you see Romeo and Juliet, right? And you say, well, that's the way this, I don't know, 14th century Verona couple were, you know. You say, no, that's the way young lovers are, right? huh?

[1:02:06] Okay. And Oedipus the king, there, you know, someone said, pointed out the when the critics there, when Oedipus's downfall comes, you know, the chorus comes in like kind of the commentary almost. It doesn't say, "Oh, Oedipus," but says, "Oh, you generations of men, right? How miserable man is, right? How pathetic, how tragic man is, right? You see something universal in the downfall, right? And a man who's hesitant, they call even today a hamlet, right?

[1:02:41] Okay. So, although you could say, in a sense, fiction is in between, right? It's kind of the universal singularized a bit, and the singular universalized, right? But there's something it's closer to the universal, right? So when I taught the love and friendship course, you know, I say, well, you all have an experience of love, and that's individual to you, right? That's the starting point for our thinking about love, right?

[1:03:07] We're going to go from that individual knowledge we have of love, your own experience of love, to a very universal consideration of love by Thomas, right? We're going to go from one to the other through Shakespeare, because Shakespeare, right, is closer to your experience of love than Thomas, right? But he's closer to Thomas than your experience of love, because he's dealing more with the universal, than in the love of men And so.

[1:03:35] on Okay,