Prima Pars
12. Summa Theologiae I, Q.2 aa.1–2: Is God's Existence Self-Evident, and Can It Be Demonstrated?
Class of 2006-01-19
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/012-summa-theologiae-i-q-2-aa-1-2-is-gods-existence-self-evident/

[0:00] So we see the division now here. Thomas will mention now the fundamental division into God and Himself, right? God is the what? Principium, the beginning, the maker, the creator, and then God is the end, and so on. But then, unlike the Summa Contra Gentiles, where you have the three books corresponding to that, he does, you might say, the first two are included in the first what? Part of the Summa, right?

[0:36] And both the second part, which is dealing with the return of the rational creature in particular to God, right? And then the help you get to Christ, who as man is the road to God, right? In the third part, they all pertain in some sense to what? Coming back to

[0:59] God, huh? We saw those words of Benedict XVI. They're talking about baptismal there in Rome, you know. And why baptism? You know, well, eternal eternal life. He says is the answer. So I mean, you know, even the sacraments, which you take up in the third part, you're looking for is the what? The end, the goal, which is eternal life, huh?

[1:28] Okay. So we saw then the next division there: the first part, where he considers the divine essence, and then those things which pertain to distinction of the person, and then those things which pertain to the procession of creatures from Him, right? Notice the first two of those three things pertain to God and Himself.

[1:55] But because the distinction of persons is such a what above reason thing, right? Kind of singles it out, right? Now about the divine essence, first we ought to consider whether God is, right? Okay. Secondly, in what way He is, or more in what way He is not, and that's what He calls later on with the consideration of the substance of God, huh? Okay.

[2:32] And third, we ought to consider about those things which pertain to His what operation or doing, right? Namely, about His knowledge and His will and power, and so on. So that's how I was going on the board with the circle, right now. These three things, these three parts. Why are those two parts if they turn out to be the same thing in God? Well, that's the way we have to know God through creatures.

[2:59] huh? There's a, multiplicity in our thinking about God, because we're not able to in this life see Him as He is, right? When we see God as He is, the no multiplicity in the vision. itself.

[3:15] No change, which won't be hard. Okay. Now, about the first three things are sought. Now, about the existence of God. First, whether God to be is per se known, but it's obvious. Secondly, whether it's demonstrable, able to be demonstrated, right? Of course, the answer to the first question will be no. Okay. And to the second one will be yes, and then finally the third article, whether God is right.

[3:59] Okay. Right, it goes about proving that God is. Now, in a way, you know how truth is between two mistakes. And you know one mistake about this would be to say that the existence of God is obvious, right? Okay. The other extreme would be to say it's not obvious and it can't be proven either. Not accessible. Okay. Now we saw in Vatican I, right, that your anathema if you don't accept that it can be known or through reason, it can be proven, right?

[4:48] Okay. It can be known to creatures, and that's the middle ground, right? Okay. So the one makes it too well known, and the other extreme, not knowable at all, right? No. Okay. And this is a common thing that truth is between what Two extremes. two extremes, huh? Okay.

[5:18] So, like with the Trinity, you know, you have those who say that as there are three persons, there must be three natures here. That's saying too much. And then those who say, and as there is one nature, there can only be one person, and therefore these just different names of the same person according to different things he does. Um. The truth is in between there. There's one nature, but three persons, huh?

[5:49] Now, the incarnation you have the reverse. You have the multiplicity of the natures. And the unity of person. Then you have the same two extremes: those who say, you know, that because there is two natures, it must be two persons, like Nestorius says, he shouldn't be called the Mother of God, just the Mother of Christ, and so on. And then you have the other extreme, right? Where all of this two.

[6:11] what? If there's one person. There must be one one nature. Okay. So is Christ a king as man or as God? Both, because he's as a person. Yeah, I would say both. Both as God and as man, right? There is one psalm I know: "The Lord is King and Splendor Obed." So in the divine nature, He is.

[6:53] Who's also king as man? Priest the king. What about priests, though? They would only be as man, though. Yeah, yeah. So it's interesting, huh? You know, I was talking about how sometimes they say king, prophet, priest, right? But sometimes just say king and priest, right? What's interesting about king is that both as God and as man, he can be called a king, and both as God and as man, he could be called a what teacher.

[7:23] Yes. Okay, but not a priest. Both as God and man, right? And this is certainly, you know, seen most clearly as most priestly act. You might say, dying on the cross, huh? Because that obviously belongs to only according to his human nature, right? His divine nature cannot die, suffer. Okay, I find it strange, isn't it? Impossible, but. Can't talk

[7:53] about the expression you've heard. Priests of God, priests of the Most High God, like Melchizedek, speak Mm hmm When we speak of priests of Christ, because our conformity as priests to his priesthood. It's peculiar because we sometimes hear the expression "priests of the Holy Spirit," and I don't think that that's a. Wouldn't seem to be a proper use of it. He's called priest alter Christus. It either refers to Christ in humanity or refers to the divinity, but it doesn't refer to the priesthood of the Son of the Trinity.

[8:26] Even act like praying. I don't think God should be speaking praise, right? And you know, you know, you know, when they when they're attacking the Holy Spirit, they call God is because he, you know, he's supposed to groan in us, you know, and then Tom has to explain why that's the way speaking is, but he makes us pray, really, huh? But you know, really to pray would be to make him an inferior, and and therefore he'd have to be something less than God.

[8:55] Christ can pray because he is man. So, in that sense, Christ's priesthood is very much science humanity, right? Okay. So let's look at the first article here. Whether for God to be is known to itself.

[9:21] Now something must be known to itself, right? Can everything be known to another? No. That through another always presupposes the through itself, right? So the coffee is not sweet to itself, unless it's something like sugar, right? It's sweet to itself, right? He says those things are said by us or for us to be known to themselves, the knowledge of which is naturally what in us, okay?

[10:09] As is clear about the first beginnings, meaning like the what whole is greater than the part and can't both be and not be at the same time.

[10:19] I know it's a connection there between natural and per se, right? Per se, this is translated as what Literally through itself, right? But also has you could say as such, right? So what belongs to you by nature belongs to you as such or through yourself. But as Damascene, Saint John Damascene says in the beginning of his book,

[10:50] the knowledge of God existing, right, is naturally inserted in all of us. Therefore, God to be is known to itself. Well, there is some way maybe in which God is what naturally known, huh? And people, you know, most people believe that there's a God, right? Okay.

[11:24] That's a very confused view, huh? Moreover, those are said to be known to themselves which at once, when their parts are known, right, are known, huh? Which the philosopher, and that is the Aristotle, of course, attributes to the first beginning to demonstration in the first book of the Posterior Analytics, in the old stock example. You know what a whole is. You know what a part is. Right away, you know that every whole is more than one of its what parts, huh?

[12:06] Okay. What's interesting? Nobody tries to enumerate all the axioms, huh? There's an axiom, for example, that nothing is the beginning of itself, and nothing is before or after itself, right?

[12:28] This is a very even a more clear example of that. But understanding what this name God signifies, right? At once you know that God is. Once it is had that God is, for one signifies by this name that. Then, which nothing greater can be what signified or thought,

[12:58] but what exists in thing in reality, right? And in understanding is greater than what is in the understanding only. Whence, when what is understood, this name God. Right away in the understanding, it follows that it is in what reality. And notice our word reality is taken from Res huh? Okay.

[13:29] The. Greeks would say what Anthos From being. On We say really, Okay Okay At least in. Things, therefore, for God to be is known to itself.

[13:51] Moreover, truth that truth is is per se known. Because the one who negates truth to be, concedes truth to be. For if truth is not, it is true that truth is not. So truth must be. Okay.

[14:17] But if something is true, it is necessary that there be truth. But God is truth itself. I am the way, the truth, and the life. Therefore, for God to be is known to itself, huh? Okay.

[14:40] Like the fun I have with a statement there, right? Statements exist. If a man denies it, right? It's making a statement, huh? Yes. You can't deny. What statements are? Without making a statement, so it's obvious the statements are right. Something like that with truth, right?

[15:07] You can't say it's true that there is nothing true without admitting it. There's something true. Okay. But against this, no one can think the opposite of what is known to itself, as is clear through the philosopher or by the philosopher in the fourth book of wisdom, and the first book of the Posterior Analytics about the first beginnings of demonstration. But it is possible to think the opposite of this that God is, as is said in the Psalm fifty-two.

[15:44] The fool said in his heart, "There is no what God." Therefore, God is not per se no. Notice the word there insipiens huh? Insipiens one, okay. Thomas explains the word sapientia, as I've mentioned before It's sapida sciencia, which means what in English? Savory knowledge, huh? Okay, wisdom is something to be savored, right? Okay. And Thomas's other word, devotio, right? Dulce sapere. Remember the words there? To sweetly savor, right?

[16:29] Huh? Christ there in the Eucharist. Um. I mentioned how Shakespeare, you know, when he has Romeo running the ship on the rocks. You know, he's a metaphorical way of speaking. He's going to take his life, right? The apothecary has given him the poison, and he compares himself to a foolish, right, ship captain who's running his ship right in the rocks, huh? And and he says, "Come, bitter conduct," but conduct means conduct, war.

[16:59] come, bitter conduct, come unsavory guide, and he talks about crashing on the thing. What does unsavory mean? Insipiens same word, huh? Shows you how how Shakespeare is very close to that way of speaking in Latin, huh? I think I said before. I think that the Latin word sapientia is more interesting than the Greek word sophia, Or even the English word wisdom, right? Savory knowledge, huh? You don't savor these things; you don't really appreciate them, huh?

[17:40] Just like when you drink a good wine, you got to savor it. You drink a soda; you don't have to savor it. You know, to really appreciate it, right? Okay, follow up now. Okay.

[18:03] Thomas says, "I answer it ought to be said that something is able to be known to itself in two ways. In one way, in itself or by itself, and not towards us, right? In another way, in itself and also towards us.

[18:28] Now, from this, some statement is known to itself that the predicate is included in the ratio of the subject. As man is a what animal, right? For animals of the definition, you might say, of man. If there are therefore it be known to all. What it is about the predicate and the subject, that statement will be known to itself by all, just as is clear in the first beginnings of demonstrations, whose terms,

[19:12] whose limits, are what some common things which no one is ignorant of, as being and non-being, whole and part, and things of this sort. So I say to the students, no one can live without experiencing whole and part. Unless you take your steak and one bite and your beer in one sip, you know, and one swallow, you're going to experience whole and part. Everybody's going to come to know those.

[19:38] And if everybody knows what a whole and a part is, then they'll see that a whole is more than a part. And if they say they don't know it, will what? Give them part of their salary this week because they don't know the difference. And they'll reveal that they do know the difference. You're part of the thing you bought, you know. Part of a book is a whole book, right?

[20:00] No more. A few pages, this thing. So what? Want your money back? If, however, among some, it is not known about the predicate and the subject, what it is, the statement in itself is evident, right? But not among those who ignore the what subject or ignorant of the subject and the predicate of the statement, right?

[20:33] So I say to my students, I know they don't know what a perfect number is. So, say it's obvious to me, I said that a a perfect number is a composite number. But isn't to you? It's Obvious to me. What's wrong with you guys? Well, if you know what a perfect number is, it's a number what equal to the sum of everything that measures it, measures in the strict sense, evenly.

[21:05] So four is not a perfect number. It's measured by one and two, but not by three, and one and two don't add to four. But six is the first perfect number. It's measured by one and by two and by three, but not by four or by five. And one plus two plus three adds up to six, right? Okay. Well, now a prime number is measured only by one.

[21:31] So obviously, no prime number could be a what a perfect number. So it's obvious to me that perfect number is a composite number, but not to my students, because they have the slightest notion what a perfect number is. You see? Okay, so that's that's some of the distinction that the great Boethius gives, right? That there are some statements that are known to themselves by all men because all men know their parts, their subject and predicate, like whole and part.

[22:00] Others are known only to the what the wise, not necessarily wise in the fullest sense, but those who have some education, right? That's the softness.

[22:15] That some common thoughts of the soul, that there are some thoughts they call the common thoughts of the soul, per se known. apud sapientes only, among the wise only, as bodyless things are not in place, right?

[22:37] So there's to be one of those greats, where's God? you know? So where's heaven? Well, the answer is wherever God is. Boy, they're thinking, you know, spatially of these things, It's like you know, when the. Communists, you know, were still in full power there in Russia, you know, and they said that's not there, and he's reading back. You know, there is no God up here, you know.

[23:04] Time to eat it sometimes. Sometimes of the totalitarians. It's not funny. I say therefore that this statement, God is, in itself, is what per se known, right? Because the predicate is the same with the subject. He is I am who am, right? God is his own existence, his own to be, as will be clear later on in the question on the simplicity of God. But because we do not know about God what he is, right?

[23:55] He is not known to us per se, but needs to be demonstrated to those things which are more known towards us, right, and less known towards nature, namely through what facts, huh? That goes back to the thing that Aristotle taught in the second book of Wisdom, right? What's more known to us is less known by nature. Less known simply.

[24:29] Okay. No, it goes back to reply to the first objection here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that to know God to be in something common under a certain infusion is naturally inserted in us, huh? In so far as God is the beatitude of what man, huh? For man naturally desires beatitude, and what is naturally desired by man is naturally known by him.

[25:14] But this is not to know simply and without qualification that God is right. Just as to know the one coming is not to know Peter, although Peter is what coming. For many,

[25:35] think that the perfect good of man, which is beatitude, they estimate to be what wealth, right? Others, what pleasures, right? Another is something else like power, right? I just got through a little. Few weeks ago, reading a biography of Mao, the new biography of Chairman Mao, the real monster, you know. But he was so taken up with power, right? And it's kind of amazing, you know, his pursuit of power, huh?

[26:05] And when he was trying to get power, huh? He would not cooperate with other communists for fear that they would have more control over things. He would sacrifice armies and so on just to make sure that the armies remained under his control. And and larger armies, you know, of fellow communists, you know, were destroyed, so that he could emerge superior. It's kind of amazing, but towards the end of his life, though, he's kind of losing power, and people were starting to you know, it's just ridiculous, the things he was doing.

[26:40] I mean, it was just he, he was taking food from China and exporting it to get what technology and so on, and build up his war machine and so on. And he was actually killing millions who were starving because of this. And and some of his, you know, close associates were revolting against this, right? And and finally, at the end, he just couldn't control anymore. They were going to stop this nonsense.

[27:09] And so he was having this self pity, you know, for his losing some power, you know, and and and associating his mind. Everybody fell from power, right? Invited Nixon, and Nixon, you know, lost power after the the Watergate business. He had Nixon come back to see him, you know. But it was really all these characters in history, you know, who had fallen from power, and you know, crying about Napoleon and so on.

[27:34] And I can't help but think of you know because you know likeness is the cause of love, right? You know, can't be if things redeeming in him, nothing. Nothing redeeming really, but but anything redeeming there is a little bit of attachment to these other great men who have fallen and lost their power, you know, after his the end, and it was kind of funny. So you know they described Khrushchev after he fell from power, you know, just moping around the house, you know, like a kid to live for, you know, and

[28:10] it's kind of frightening. So it's interesting, you know, when Socrates argues that man is born knowing some things he didn't acquire in his life. It's kind of an exaggeration a little bit of this, but you know, certainly takes as clear examples uh mathematical things, right? Like he'll take, for example, you know, we get the idea of a flat surface. You say, "Well, this the table

[28:56] is not flat, right? But this table is flat, okay?" You say, "Well, I see the little dent here, you know, you know, okay." So when you examine these so-called flat surfaces in the world around us, we see that they're not really flat. So how do we get the idea of what is really flat, truly flat, the flat itself, from something that is not really flat, right? See, and how can we make this judgment that this approaches much more to being flat than this does, right?

[29:32] But still falls short of it if we didn't have a knowledge of flatness, not derived from what these things around us. And he uses a very interesting comparison. He says, "If we brought in a painting or a statue of somebody, right, and you made the judgment."Well, that's a painting of so and so, but then you made the judgment that it's not exactly like he is. Must you not have any knowledge of this man who is represented in the painting or the statue, not derived from the painting of the statue?

[30:10] Okay. So if I go down to the Worcester Art Museum and look at at some earlier character, I can't say what he was. That's Lord Salisbury, right? And but his nose is a little bit shorter, a little bit longer than that, you know. I can't make the judgment. I have no knowledge of Lord Salisbury except the painting I see there. Um. But when, say, Lafayette came back to the United States after Washington had died, right?

[30:39] And he saw the country filled with paintings and statues that were of Washington, he said, "Hey, that's not really who he was, but that's pretty good, you know, the statue I guess of Washington and in the Virginia State House. So that's really, you know, pretty close, right? " But he couldn't make those judgments unless he had a knowledge of Washington, not derived from that statue. That's why Socrates tries to argue that we must have gotten this in a previous life.

[31:10] Okay. But he also touches upon this idea of happiness, huh? Say. And I often take to the end of Vanity Fair. I don't know if you know that novel by Thackeray. That's his greatest novel, I guess. But ends up, you know, with vanity of vanities, and but it says,

[31:32] "For who in this life, " he says, "ever gets what he wants? " Or he does to satisfy that. You know. We always seem to be pursuing something that either we don't get, or if we do get it, it doesn't turn out to be the satisfying thing we thought it would be, and so on. And so we seem to be pursuing a perfect happiness, right? But at the same time, we judge that this is not something possible in this life, huh?

[32:03] And common people would say that, right? And and people in general, you know, nobody's going to be perfectly happy in this world. You know, it's impossible, right? Okay. So any happiness that we do have in this life, and sometimes you hear people saying, you know, that was the happiest year of my life, or that was the happiest part of my life, and so on, right? And so some parts of our lives certainly are much more happy than other parts, that's for sure.

[32:30] But even those parts that we say were the happiest parts of our life, we realize there's something imperfect about them, right? Well, what is this happiness that we are judging to have been what approximated a bit by this part of my life, but have fallen what? Shorter. Say. Well, that shows in a kind of confused way that you're knowing about what God, huh? The idea of a perfect good in some way, right?

[33:00] Huh? Okay. But it's kind of what confused, right? Romeo thinks it's Juliet, right? Isn't so, right? Huh? Okay. When I was a little boy, I thought my father a very foolish man. He didn't fill the refrigerator with soda pop, huh? Because with his money, he could have orange soda, grape soda, root beer soda, all the wonderful sodas. You drink soda all day long and be a happy man, right?

[33:28] Didn't know how to be happy. So even if I had gotten that. I would not have been happy, but I thought I would be happy, right? So? So you're always pursuing happiness in some what false happiness, in a way, huh? But that has some resemblance to it, huh? In the great consolation of philosophy, huh? Boethius distinguishes between true happiness, which is really God, ultimately, huh? And false happiness, huh?

[34:01] He says, "We'll take up false happiness first because it's more known to us." It's kind of interesting, you know, when Thomas is showing that God is completely happy at the end of the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, and even that false happiness, right? And he goes through all the parts of false happiness and shows that even if that was happiness, God would still be supremely happy, right?

[34:25] You know, I wouldn't. either false happiness is fame, right? Huh? And Thomas ends up, you know, well, God has has the admiration of any mind that understands Him at all. You know, it's marvelous.

[34:47] And actually, Thomas, you know, when he's talking about the end of man in the Summa Contra Gentiles and he's first kind of reaching reaches a conclusion that the end of man is to know God, right? Huh? But then he goes into know God how, you see, and then he he talks about this kind of of confused knowledge that everybody seems to have in some way of God, right?

[35:14] And how that is not very satisfactory, right? And then he shows that the knowledge that the philosopher has by demonstration, which we'll be getting here as we go along, doesn't completely satisfy us. Why that way? It's imperfect, right? And then why even the knowledge we have of God by faith is not sufficient to satisfy us, right? And then eventually he's going to talk about seeing God face to face.

[35:37] This is the knowledge of God that will finally satisfy us, and that's really what the end is, huh? But he seems to be more explicit about there being a kind of a confused, right? Knowledge of God, and therefore, it's an explicit question: Is that satisfactory knowledge of God? Right? Is that really the end of man? Just to have that kind of confused here. It's a little more explicit.

[36:02] Interesting. Here he's a little more reticent about that. Reading that. Okay. Now the second objection is saying, "Well, if you understand what the word God means, you'll see it has to exist, right? Okay. " Now Thomas says, "to the second, it should be said, And, this is not the strongest objection. First, first that that one who hears the name God

[36:37] may not understand, right, that it signifies something than which nothing greater can be thought, right? Since some believe God to be a body, right? Okay. But even given that someone understands by this name God that it signifies this, which is said to be that, than which nothing greater can be thought, not nevertheless, on account of this, does it follow that he understands that which is signified by the name to be in what reality?

[37:13] Right? That's kind of the phrase used in Latin. Thomas does in rerum natura in, the nature of things, literally, but he would say in reality. But only that exists in our apprehension, right? Okay. So you're kind of assuming that there is something existing, right? Then which nothing greater can be thought. How do you know there is such a thing? Now, if it does exist, something than which nothing greater can be thought, that must exist, It doesn't necessarily exist.

[37:46] But how do you know there is such a thing? You're kind of assuming that, right? You can't just assume that because that's what you mean by the word.

[37:55] See that? You see that? He's basically saying just because it's in your mind doesn't necessarily mean it's outside your mind. It's in reality. That's all. The guy is trying to say that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought, right? And that which exists outside the mind and not just in the mind is greater than that which exists only in the mind. Therefore, God must exist, right?

[38:28] And Thomas is saying, "Well, but you're assuming that what the word means, even it does mean that, right? Which may not mean for everybody, but even that's the meaning you have in mind. " Um, you're assuming that there exists such a thing, right? Than which nothing greater can be thought. How do you know that? Say. Okay. Say. You can't assume that there is something in which nothing greater can be thought; therefore, it must what be?

[38:57] Yeah, yeah. It would essentially come down to this: that you know, obviously, we can understand God the way He in Himself; we can only know Him negatively, etc. But I can't understand immediately that there's not an opposition between something existing by His essence. For maybe maybe there's a contradiction implied here, maybe there's not. But in a way, I have to. In a way, I'm assuming that there's not a contradiction between something existing by his essence.

[39:34] that's that's that's a proper interpretation of this, isn't it? Well, in a sense, he's saying you're confusing the meaning of the word, right? Mm-hmm.

[39:45] And assuming that what the word means is something that exists, right? That's exactly what you have to prove, right? Mm-hmm. Yeah. Yeah You might say, "By God, I mean that that which nothing greater can be thought, but

[40:04] that doesn't tell you there is such a thing." And I have to prove that there is something than which nothing greater can be thought. Okay, and you could say this other way: you could say, "Oh, by God, I mean something that necessarily exists to itself." What necessarily exists to itself must exist, right? Therefore, God must be right. Okay, now even assuming that's what I mean by God, right?

[40:30] Um, how do you know what I mean by God exists? I have to take things I know exist, right, and show from them that there exists something necessarily through itself, which is the way you do in the third argument for existence of God.

[40:50] So, is assuming what you is already assuming what you are trying to prove? Then, that's a problem yeah, yeah. Okay, so he says, even given that someone understands by this name God that signifies what is consider namely that that which nothing greater can be thought. Not on account of this does it follow that he understands that which is signified by the name to be in reality, right?

[41:26] But only in the what grasping of his understanding. Nor can one argue that it is in reality unless it be given that in reality there is something than which nothing greater can be thought, which is not given by those positing God not to be. To the

[41:55] third, it should be said that truth to be in general is known to itself, but for the first truth to be in God, this is not known to itself towards us. The

[42:13] sense that truth that you know must be—it's obvious—is that truth that is said of all truths. That's not God, right? Okay, that's kind of confusing. What is said of all? What is the cause of all? Right.

[42:35] As I said, I am glad that some people think it is obvious, right? Because then you have another extreme, right? It's interesting when Thomas talks about the immortality of the soul in the second book of the Summa Contra Gentiles He goes a lot also into. The opinions of those who say that no soul is immortal, right? And then the opinion of Platonists who say that the souls of the animals are also immortal.

[43:07] So the position of Aristotle that just the human soul is immortal, is in between two extremes: those who say that every soul is immortal, and those who say that no soul is immortal.

[43:23] Of course, what's what's what's interesting when you have the two extremes is that extremes can't what explain each other, right? If no soul is immortal, why should anybody think that every soul is immortal? And if every soul is immortal, why should anybody think that no soul is immortal, right? So it's just like you know what the Trinity was saying before, you know that if there really are three persons and three natures, right?

[43:50] Why should anybody think there was what one person and one nature? And if just one person, one nature, why should anybody think there is three of both? But if there is one nature and three persons, then there is an element of truth in both the extremes. So the middle can explain the extremes. At least it can show that there is some part of the truth there, but the extremes can't explain each other.

[44:19] The guy says there is three persons and three natures. Says well, there is no truth. The guy says one person, one nature, and vice versa. There is no truth there, right? So they can't explain each other, right? So it's kind of Aristotle says a sign that you found the truth that you can not only defend it and answer the arguments for the other things, but see why they thought that they did that way, right?

[44:45] But the extremes can't explain. They can't explain how the subject. The other contrary. This is interesting too because this is Saint Anselm's thing, right? But he doesn't even mention it. Is it? It's a sign of his respect. Sometimes

[45:06] when he disagrees with Albert, Albert, you know, some say, you know, because another question: there is a lot of controversy as to whether Anselm understood the way some people think he understood it too

[45:25] Because as I understand too St Bonaventure takes that up, but he agrees with. He falls into the obvious side of the issue. The thing with Anselm, of course, Anselm doesn't have the authority that Augustine has. Even Augustine, there are things in Augustine that can be misunderstood, and Thomas a lot of times will spell out what Augustine really means, huh? And he doesn't, you know, the Anselm, you know, but.

[45:52] Anselm's way of speaking might have led some people, at least, to this idea that since the God is per se known, right? And maybe Anselm meant that, maybe didn't, because maybe needed Thomas to tell you what Anselm really meant. That

[46:10] something like that, you know, when Aristotle critiques Plato, right? And Thomas, you know, sometimes following some of the Greek commentators and so on, sometimes he'll distinguish, you know, Plato really meant this, and Thomas, Aristotle, is refuting what Plato really meant. Plato said this, but didn't really mean it. But Aristotle is refuting what he said because some people are being deceived by it, right? And but some cases it might not be altogether what clear, yeah, yeah, okay, and

[46:49] and something you say to students, you know, student will say, "I didn't mean what I didn't mean that." I said, "I said that's what you said on your paper, and and I correct what you say. I don't correct what you what you mean. We didn't say, 'Why I didn't mean that. ' I'm sorry. Right? Some you know advantage, you know, to to correcting the words of somebody, right?

[47:16] And sometimes people will say things in a way that it's not correct, right? Even though the understanding is not incorrect, and so if you attack the words, it's kind of way of clarifying it. Sometimes in the liturgy of the church, I know that's one of the things that some theologians will explain differences of Eastern liturgy and Western liturgy. Yeah, things in Eastern liturgy sound like they're not right, but then the church will say, "But what we mean is when we select that one.

[47:50] " East the baptism doesn't say I baptize you, but so and so is baptized, and they say what they mean is, and that explains, yeah, different forms of sacraments, different things like that. Explain that.

[48:12] I was looking at the little biography they have of Benedict the Sixteenth there in the on the Vatican website, huh? Oh, and some of the things he wrote, you know, for some of his degrees, you know, ones on Augustine, the ones on on Bonaventure, on history, is theology, history, and what? Yeah, yeah, be interesting to see some of those he said about those things, you know.

[48:38] Okay, Article Two: Whether God to be is demonstrable. The second one precedes us. It seems for God to be is not demonstrable. For God to be is an article of faith, but those things which are faith are not demonstrable, because demonstration makes us to know,

[49:06] but faith is about things that do not appear. The substance of things hoped for, right? The conviction of things not seen. They translate it. They say kind of weirdly, "Evidence of what is not seen,"

[49:25] as is clear through the apostle. Therefore, God is not demonstrable, right? No, so you're trying to defend somebody saying that the evidence of what is not seen, you know, which might seem to be a clear contradiction. and someone would say that, you know, what he means, you know, you see that it should be believed, right? You know, that's what he means.

[49:48] You don't see it in itself, right? You know, You're still believing it, right? But you see that it should be believed, and that we kind of interpret it, you know, in a way that would, would, you know, that's what it means, and we hope.

[50:07] Okay. Moreover, the middle term in demonstration is what it is, but about God, we're not able to know the what it is, but only what it is not, as Damascene said, huh? Oh, so Damascene is saying the same thing.

[50:28] Therefore, we're not able to demonstrate God to be. Moreover, if it were demonstrated for God to be, this would not be except from His effects. But His effects are not what proportioned, to Him, since He is infinite, and His effects are what finite. Though the finite to the infinite, there is no proportion.

[51:01] Therefore, since a cause is not able to be demonstrated through an effect that is not proportioned to it, it seems that God is not to it Yeah He's supposed to have come to the Summa and taken the objections so he could embarrass his Catholic associates, but didn't bother to get the answers. I don't know if that's true, but I wouldn't put it put it Voltaire below him.

[51:29] You see, you know, the difficulty he gives someone who who had have seen objections, right? He gives him a rough time, right? You know, you know, gets the ammunition against the against the the faith from from Saint Thomas. That's why I got the ammunition against. But you have all these wonderful objections, right?

[51:55] But those who weaken the faith, you don't give these objections, you know, because to confuse them, right? But if you're persistent, you want to see the objections and see how they're answered and so on, Strengthen these things. But against this is what the apostle says. That's Saint Paul again, Epistle to the Romans, chapter one, verse twenty. Invisible things of God to the things which have been made are understood, looked upon.

[52:26] So that's the same text that the Vatican One used, right? He says, "Anathema to say you can't know God through things that have been made, huh?

[52:37] But this would not be unless through those things which are made, one could demonstrate God to be. For the first thing that is necessary to understand about something is whether it is. Okay, As Aristotle said before, right? First question is whether it is, and second question is what is it. So the reason he wants to know what is, what it is. Okay, but if you're interested you ought to know about what it is, then you know later on it is.

[53:07] That's where we'll follow it. So he says, "I answer that to be said, the demonstration is of two kinds, and this is where Aristotle taught in the first book of the posterior Analytics. One demonstration is through the cause, and this is called procterquit, which simply means on account of what, right? So they call that a lot of times in Latin or in English, even demonstration propter quid, demonstration by the cause, and this is through things that are before simply, right?

[53:45] Because the cause is simply speaking for the effect. The other is the demonstration through the effect, and this is called demonstration quia, meaning demonstration that it is so, right? Okay, and this is to those things which are before towards us, huh?

[54:08] Because usually for us the effect is more known than the what, the cause, huh? And this is through those things which are before towards us. For since, for when some effect is known to us more manifested than its cause, through the effect we proceed to a knowledge of the cause. So in natural philosophy and ethics, we proceed to the effect of the cause, huh? And it's only in mathematics, right?

[54:41] that? We tend to begin at the cause. But from any effect, one is able to demonstrate its cause to be. If nevertheless the effects are more known to us, because since the effect effects depend upon the cause, when the effect is posited, is necessary for the what cause to for exist.

[55:16] Whence God to be, since it is not known to itself towards us, is demonstrable through effects what known to us, huh? Okay, now the first objection was saying, "Isn't this an article of faith? " Well, strictly speaking, no, but it might be for some people who can't understand the arguments and don't have the time to or the willingness to go through them. To the first, therefore, it ought to be said that for God to be and other things of this sort, which through natural reason.

[55:53] Are able to be known about God, as is said again in Romans one nineteen. They are not articles of faith, but what praeambula, which means literally what walks before. Yeah. Okay. For thus faith presupposes what natural knowledge, just as grace presupposes nature, right? And perfection the perfectible. But nothing prevents that which, by itself or in itself, is demonstrable and knowable, from somebody, right, to be taken as believable, who does not what grasp the demonstration.

[56:37] I mean, most of us, right? Okay. But Descartes said he believed that God existed more from what his mother had taught him than from his study of the five ways, huh? Okay.

[57:00] And the second objection, just saying that the middle term is not what it is. To the second, it ought to be said that when the cause is demonstrated through the effect, it is necessary to use the effect in the place of the definition of the cause to proving the cause to be. And this most of all happens in regard to God, because to proving something to be is necessary to take for a middle term what the name signifies, not the what it is in its very nature.

[57:37] Because the question about what it is, meaning its very nature, follows upon the question whether it is. When you ask us this or that exists, you have to have some meaning to this or that, right? But you don't have to know its nature really fully, and you wouldn't try to know its nature fully until you know that it is, huh? Okay.

[58:04] But the names of God in this life are placed upon them from His effects, right? As later on will be taken up in the what twelfth and thirteenth, right? Questions. Whence, in demonstrating God to be through His effect, we are able to take for a middle term what this name, what God signifies, like unmoved mover, right? First cause, huh?

[58:40] The third objection was saying, "Well, the effects are not proportioned to God. " Well, that doesn't show you can't know God at all from them, but you can't know Him what adequately or perfectly, huh? To the third, it should be said that the effects. That are not proportioned to God, one is not able to have a perfect knowledge of the cause. But nevertheless, from any effect, one is able to be manifestly demonstrated for us that the cause is, as has been said.

[59:14] And thus, from the effects of God, one can demonstrate God to be. Although through them we are not able perfectly to know Him according to His very what essence. Now I say the angels through their what natural knowledge, right? Since they are much closer to God, much more like Him, they have a much more perfect knowledge of what God, naturally than we do, right? But even they are not effects that are what proportioned to God, huh?

[59:46] That unfold His whole power, right? I'm all he can do. The angel doesn't say. But in seeing what he's done for the angels, right, they know much more what he can do than we do.

[1:00:06] My teacher Kasurik used to say, When you die and you see your guardian angel, and you say, Oh God! Your guardian angel says, 'No, no, no, no, he's higher up. ' But it's a marvelous thing. I didn't realize how marvelous is this, you know. So they have much, you know, higher effects of God, right? They know much much more closer to God. They know him much better, actually, huh?

[1:00:33] Doesn't Thomas say that in was it in the Catena or is it in his commentary how God, how the angels, in the Old Testament didn't stop men from worshiping them because the incarnation hadn't happened yet, so they were much higher. But after the incarnation, in the Apocalypse, the angels, said, no, no, don't worship. Well, not as much, but they treated us more as equals, you see. After incarnation, after incarnation, yeah, yeah.

[1:01:00] So they appear as men, right? No, I'm not saying they accepted the worship, but they didn't. They they wouldn't, they wouldn't ask to worship them, no. but... Yeah, But I mean, they didn't object so much to our inferior position. Yeah, the incarnation kind of changed

[1:01:17] things. So with that, ontological argument, with that ontological argument, if somebody has knowledge, I guess I'm probably wrong in what I was thinking. If somebody has knowledge, you don't have this knowledge

[1:01:36] necessarily. But if somebody did have knowledge that there wasn't an opposition between something existing by its very essence, of being in its essence, not being, there not being an interest in its life.