Prima Pars
14. Summa I, q.2, a.3: The Third, Fourth and Fifth Ways, the Most Universals, and Replies on Evil and Enough Causes
Class of 2006-01-26
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/014-summa-i-q-2-a-3-the-third-fourth-and-fifth-ways-the-most/

[0:00] Okay. And the third way is taken from the possible and the necessary, right? Now the possible here is used in the sense of what is able to be and not be, right? Okay. There's another sense of possible or able besides that.

[0:22] Now, if someone asks you this question, he say, "Is what is necessary to be able to be? Well, if you say what is necessary to be is not able to be, right? Then it would be impossible for what is necessary to be, right? And therefore, what is necessary to be wouldn't be. You get those kind of contradictions. But if you say that what is necessary to be is able to be,Is able to be is able not to be, then what is necessary to be is not is able not to be.

[0:55] That gets into a problem, right? So you have to realize that there's two different meanings of the word able. Okay. Now, in the fifth book of wisdom, Aristotle distinguishes

[1:10] two basic groups of meanings, right? The kind of ability that you have in geometry or in logic, and the kind of ability we talk about in natural philosophy, especially. And the ninth book of wisdom was mainly about that second kind, huh? Where ability is the beginning of some kind of motion or change, or at least of some kind of of operation or doing, huh? And can be an active one, right?

[1:44] Like fire is able to burn the paper, right? Or it can be a passive one, like the fire is. I mean, the paper is burnable, right? So it's able to be burnt, huh? Okay. But then there's another sense of able, right? And sometimes we use the word. It makes more sense with the word power, but in mathematics we speak of to this third power or the second power as something.

[2:11] But also in logic, you know, we can speak of a able in terms of the statement which is studied in logic. And if the subject and predicate can go together, are compatible, then we speak of ability there, right? For example, we could say that

[2:33] a triangle is able to be what green, right? There's no contradiction saying that triangle is green, right? But you'd also say that a triangle is able to be a figure, right?

[2:54] There's no incompatibility between the two, but in this example, it's what necessary, right? Okay. And so there is a able that includes the necessary and the contingent, right? So in my examples, if I say

[3:18] two is able to be a number, and a triangle is able to be green, right? Both can be said to be able, right? But the triangle was able to be green. This is something kind of contingent, may or may not be green, right? But it's able to be green, right? No contradiction in saying that. Nothing impossible, right? And there's nothing impossible with two being a number, but it's in fact what necessary, right?

[3:46] So able there is being said. In terms of the subject and predicate, are compatible? With the compatibility is between things that necessarily belong together, or just could belong together. But that's what "able" means. There, it doesn't mean an ability to to act upon something, or an ability to be acted upon in a certain way, right? But here he's using the word "possible," which you could translate by "possible," but since in English we use the word "able," right?

[4:20] He's using the word "possible" there, and "able" for what is able to be and what not be, right? Okay. So he begins the argument: for we find in things some things which are able to be and not be, right? So this table is able to be and not be, right? You and I are able to be and not be, right? And the trees out there, okay? And this is what's, in a sense, most known to us: these things around us which are able to be and not be, right?

[4:59] Okay. And and unfolding this a bit more, since some things are found to be what generated, they come to be, and they are what corrupted, right? And consequently, they are able to be and what not be. Yeah, it seems more colloquial meaning is to say able to be and not be than possible to be and not be. Like say that, you know.

[5:35] Now he says it is impossible, however, that all things which are such, right? It's impossible for them to be what always, right? Because what is possible not to be at some time is not.

[6:02] Now that's something that Aristotle talks about in the first book on the universe, right? Okay. And in the last six lectios, let's say, of Thomas' commentary in the first book, he goes into this much more than he does here, right? Okay. And I think for a full understanding, we'd have to go through, you know, the first book on the universe, which I don't think we're going to do right now.

[6:29] But I'm just trying to give you a little caution here about seeing this, right? And part of the reason is that if it was able,

[6:42] if it had the ability to be for if it was if it was forever, let's say, right? If it never didn't exist, right? Is able to be forever, it would have the ability to be forever, right? And something that is able to be forever will be forever, because things naturally want to be as long as they can, right? Okay. So something that is able to be and not be doesn't have the ability to be forever.

[7:10] So at some time it is what not, right? Okay. If therefore all things are able not to be, if they're all things that are able to be and not be, right? Every one of them is able not to be, and at some time was not. Then at some time there was what nothing, right? Sometimes people have difficulty in seeing that. They say, "Well, can't you go on like this?

[7:37] " Yeah, I don't last forever, but but I had a father before me, and he had a father before him, and couldn't this go on forever, right? And Aristotle also talks about that in the

[7:51] the book of the universe, but and also in the book on generation and corruption. But what you're saying now is that the generation of one from another goes on forever, right? Okay. But why is this? Well, as they'll point out, the cause can't be one of these members of the series because that member is not forever, right? And can't be all of them are the cause of it because they're only just together.

[8:22] So outside that series of generations, there must be something else that is the cause of the perpetuity of this. It reminds me of the argument that they give. You know, when you're talking about grace, huh? And whether you need? You know, special guidance from God to persevere, right? This is a very important thing because, as Augustine and Thomas say, you know, only perseverance is crowned, right? Okay.

[8:50] So what is the cause of you or me or any other human being persisting to their death, right? In good acts and so on, right?

[9:07] Can I will now? I at this moment, right, choose to be good the rest of my life and never sin again. None of your own. Say. Can I choice today be the cause of my persisting the rest of my life? I can say I want to be good the rest of my life, right, till my death, right. But can my wanting today be the cause of my continuing good deeds and so on, and avoiding bad things the rest of my life?

[9:41] Not sufficient cause. Well, my wanting today, that wanting is going to. Come to an end when I fall asleep or something, right? And my wanting today is not going to continue, right? Rest of my life, so that can't be the cause of my persevering to the end, right? And then they say, well, I can renew this each. They say,

[10:07] but then can the act renewed, you know, the succession of acts be the cause of my remaining good to the end of my life? Well, that succession of acts don't exist together, do they? So they can't cause anything, right? So it has to be something outside of me, namely God, right? Who is what watching over me, right? And if I continue in in good acts of will and deed and so on till death do me part of this world, God will be the cause of that, right?

[10:47] And so you have to pray. For what perseverance, among other things, right? You know, it's so beautiful that that prayer, Anima Christi, right? And you know, the way it kind of imitates the Our Father, right? It's almost the same petitions, huh? You go through the first five petitions, you know, and you say, "Passio Christi, conforta me," right? Okay. Now I am strong, right? Now I can what persevere?

[11:17] No. No matter how strong I am from receiving Eucharist, right? Does that give me the strength to persevere? Well, then the next part is about perseverance, right? You know, hide me in your wounds, it says, right? Ne permittas me separari a te, but you're asking God to not permit that you be separated from Him, right? And no matter how strong you are, as you all the first five petitions, you know, you are still not what capable of those of persevering and being the cause of your perseverance, right?

[11:54] You know, so you have to always ask God for perseverance, huh? Thomas often, you know, asks about what about the Our Father, right? Why he says, "That kingdom come," you're asking in part there for perseverance, huh? Because His kingdom doesn't come really unless you persevere. So when you say that kingdom come, you're asking for perseverance, huh? But seems to be even more explicit in the in the Anima Christi, you know, which is kind of one of one of the most revered you know prayers in the tradition of the Church.

[12:29] It doesn't go back to Ignatius, It goes back to, although he made it very popular, I guess, it goes back to to John the twenty second. Yeah, They're not sure whether he approved it, you know, or whether he wrote it himself, right? I don't. That's you know, at least the article I read in the Catholic Encyclopedia, but it's it's a prayer that's always been you know held up to me as you know as excellent prayer.

[12:51] I think it is. It's kind of like the Our Father in a way, a lot. You know, it almost follows the word in the petitions and so on. Makes you think of St. Peter too, because that line, "You've been made, separari," exactly. St. Peter said to our Lord when He's walking on water, "If it's you commanding to come to you, yeah, That's a line written out of Scripture.

[13:12] You command me to come to you, but He didn't persevere. He said, 'Save me, yeah. ' But it's a good example of need of special help. So if you read the treatise on grace there in Thomas in the Summa later on in the prima secundae right? And they don't talk about you know the perseverance, huh? So it's something special, right? Huh? In addition to all the theological virtues and all the other things, you need the special divine providence, huh?

[13:49] Okay, so it's something like what we're saying here, right? That these things that are able to be and not be, right? No one of them could be the cause of their always being these sort of things, right? Because it doesn't exist forever, right? Nor can all of them together be the cause of their always being, because they don't exist together. Therefore, can't be a cause, and so you have to go outside of them, right?

[14:15] To something that guarantees their perpetuity, if they are perpetual, right? Just like with the acts of the will, you have to go outside. Okay.

[14:31] So there's nothing outside of them. Then eventually, what nothing would have been, the past, and then even now nothing would be, right? Because what is not could not begin to be except through something that is, right?

[14:50] Can't get something from what nothing. If therefore there was no being, it would be impossible for something begin to be, and thus now nothing would be, which is clearly false, right? Okay.

[15:08] Therefore, that first conclusion: all beings are not what possible, meaning able to be and not be, right? But is necessary that there be something necessary in things, right? Okay. Now, in the Summa Contra Gentiles, he gives this argument. If I remember correctly, now it's a little bit different. The reason he gives, right, he's saying these things are able to be and not be, right? So why are they one rather than the other, right?

[15:41] And then you have to bring in something that makes them be rather than not be, and then that's something else. And then you get to the necessary, right? So there may be one way to reason, right, to the existence of something necessary.

[15:56] And then, you know, Aristotle, you know, so the great Socrates, the great Aristotle, because it was the Democritus who said, "If something is necessary, don't ask any reason for it." Aristotle, who's known as the father of logic, this is a kind of way of showing it. We know in demonstrations of geometry that the conclusions are necessarily true, right? But they're true because of the premises. So they're necessary things that can have a cause of their necessity, huh?

[16:26] And that's what the angels are, right? They necessarily are, but they have a cause of necessity. Okay. But everything that is necessary either has a cause of its necessary necessity, or it does not have it. It's got to be one of the two, right? But it's not possible to let them go on forever in necessary things, which have a cause of necessity. Just as neither is it in what, yeah, or in movers that matter, right?

[16:58] Okay. They have one grand necessary to another, with no other. Therefore, it's necessary to lay down that there is something that is necessary to itself, not having a cause of its necessity otherwise, somewhere else, but which is the cause of necessity of others, and this all call what God. Now, Thomas, you know, in Summa Contra Gentiles, so use this as a middle term to show that God is His own existence, right?

[17:41] He says something exists to existence, right? So, what exists to itself necessarily must be existence itself. Very simple, eh? To think it that way, you know, you say he's so simple, you know, in a good sense, huh? You know the famous words of Saint Teresa of Avila. You know, God is altogether simple, and the closer one gets to God, she says, the simpler one becomes. Right? Okay.

[18:14] remember De Koninck also saying, "We have to get back to the simple understanding of Thomas, and even something profound, but not naive understanding." Or, you know, I mean, De Koninck had a great appreciation of difficulty of these things that I was trying to explain. You know, in the way he gave that great seminar for us, right? But

[18:34] most of what I hear, you know, we're interviewing people at the college now, and so on. All this language, you know, they can't say simply and clearly what the way Thomas would say it, huh? And so, you know, I got through with the senses of before. I was talking about how it's commonplace now to talk about priorities, you know, and you know, they talk about individuals get their priorities straight, and the government get their priorities, and everything.

[19:01] But the word "priority" is like an abstraction from prior, and the word "prior" itself is what It is is the Latin word, and therefore not as familiar as before, right? And so, it's really a question of getting your before straight huh? And then, when you realize that there are many senses of before, you realize that there is a difference in some. Sometimes you have to do this before that, not because this is better than that, but you can't do that unless you've done this first.

[19:28] Other times, you do this before that because this is better to do than that, right? And and they don't realize when they say your priorities that they're different senses of before, right? You know how Shakespeare makes fun of people using the word "prior and posterior" instead of "before and after." Huh? I borrowed part of three before, but. But he has these guys in *Love's Labour's Lost*, right?

[19:54] Or kind of you know pseudo intellectuals and so on. And they say, one of the guys says to the guy, "Let us meet in the posteriors of the day." Puts the rude multitude. Call the afternoon. Well, it's always obscene to say the posteriors of the afternoon, you know. Let's say that's clear. Let's say that's in the afternoon, you know. Remember, kid, you know that came to me.

[20:21] when I was in college Now, since college, you know, it's a pretty you know good philosophy major and so on. What do you mean by first principles? Beginnings. Oh, oh, what do you mean?

[20:31] So you got to. But it shows you the bad effect of custom, right? People are accustomed to use the big words, and they're not really as clear, huh And uh it impedes their understanding and it impedes the understanding of. those they explain these things to huh?

[20:56] Okay. Now we come to the fourth way, right? Now Thomas seems to be, you know, as he goes on here, being more brief, you know, and maybe taking things it doesn't unfold as much as he might unfold elsewhere. The fourth way is taken from the grades which are found in things, for there is found in things something more and less good, something more and less true, right?

[21:36] Something more and less noble or excellent, and so on, and and thus about other things of this what sort, huh? Okay. Now these those first two bonum and verum are what we call transcendentals right? Which you could also call the what you know the most universal, right? Okay. Now maybe, huh? Maybe he means to emphasize those ones, huh? Okay. What is he going to say about them?

[22:13] But more and less are said of diverse things, according as they approach in diverse ways to something that is what most of all so. Just as that is more hot, which more approaches what is most of all hot, then okay. Now let's just kind of stop on that for a minute before we go on here.

[22:44] Suppose you're in the the room with the fireplace there, and logs and something on that fireplace, right? And as you approach the fireplace, right, things get warmer and warmer, right? And what would you say about the fire there, right? That's the warmest in the room, right? Huh? Okay.

[23:09] But there's another aspect about this thing, huh? And that is that what is the warmest here is also the cause of the others being warm, right?

[23:28] So there's an aspect of cause and effect here as well, right? Although Thomas is not so much emphasizing that, huh? But there's a a he's going to state it later on here that what is most of all In some genus, right, is the cause of all the rest, huh? Okay, There is that aspect of it. There is, therefore, he says, something most true, an optimum. Now that's the superlative of bonum, right?

[24:04] Something most noble, right? He was no democrat, there. Tell me, son. And consequently, what most being, right? Now, I was talking before about the definition of what reason, right?

[24:35] And how reason is defined by Shakespeare as the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, right? And so it completes the definition of reason by its looking before and after, right? But as I was explaining earlier today, before reason can see it before and after, it's got to see some distinction, huh? Okay. Now,

[25:03] what are the first distinctions? Would you say that the distinction between a dog and a cat, and the distinction between an animal and a plant, is there some order between those two distinctions?

[25:27] Okay, what is the order? Because order means before and after. What's the order between those two distinctions? One more channel. Yeah, but I mean, order means before and after. So, what's the the order between those two distinctions? Does one of them come before the other, and so which one? Animal plant. What? Animal plant first. Yeah, yeah, it might make sense to distinguish between animal and plant, and then distinguish between these two animals.

[26:06] These two, right? Huh? Makes sense. Okay. Um, distinction between moral virtue and intellectual virtue, and distinction between justice and courage. Makes sense that Aristotle distinguishes between moral virtue and intellectual virtue at the end of

[26:31] one of the Nicomachean Ethics, right? But it's not until the next book that he distinguishes between justice and fortitude and temperance and so on, right? And then, likewise, you know, he distinguishes. Between art and foresight, reasoned out knowledge and wisdom, and so on, right? And then In the sixth book, which distinction of what? The virtues of reason, right? Okay.

[27:00] Um. So the distinction of the general is before the distinction of the particular, right? Hmm. So according to that, then the distinction of the most universals would come first, right? Okay. And

[27:22] Thomas, say one very famous text there, often referred to, in question one, article one, of the disputed questions on truth and goodness, as I add, um, Thomas following Avicenna, right, distinguishes the most universals,

[27:45] and he distinguishes six of them. Following our friend Avicenna, although we find out later on that Avicenna doesn't fully understand all of them, but anyway, he is following Avicenna in his metaphysics, right?

[28:08] And many places Thomas will come back. We'll see some of them here when he talks about God being good, right? Because that's going to be one of the most universals. He talks about God being one, right? He'll stop and say some things about those. I don't want to get too much into it right now.

[28:28] But he distinguishes six, and they all follow upon one, the first one, which is being, right? Okay. And some of them follow upon being in itself, and some of being in comparison to something else. Okay, that's kind of the fundamental distinction that Thomas gives, following following the great Avicenna. So

[29:01] following upon being in itself, he distinguishes affirmative and negative. Now, the only thing affirmative that every being has is what it is. Okay, and so the word res in Latin, or the word thing, or even maybe the word something to some extent, signifies what.

[29:31] Yeah. Okay. Now it's kind of interesting because if you ask the average person, and maybe ask you too, this is the existence of a cat. And what a cat is the same thing.

[29:55] And is the question, "Does a cat exist?" And what a cat is the same question. So, to some extent, even in in daily life, right, we make some distinction between the existence of a cat and what a cat is, huh? Okay.

[30:16] Um, but in a way, we could say for a cat to be is to be a cat, right? Very close, right? So these are the first two most universals: being and thing, right?

[30:32] Now, let me ask the next question: What's the opposite of being? None being, right? Okay. What's the opposite of? Thing or something, yeah. And nothing and non-being seem to be the same thing, right? Okay.

[31:02] And so, being and thing seem to be almost the same thing. I notice, you know, idiomatically, what we would say in English, "Is that really so?" Which comes from the word for res thing, right? In Greek, the the adverb would be ontos from on from being. You wouldn't say it in English is that beingly or something? So, so definitely, right? But you say, "Is that really so?"

[31:35] You know, okay. So you see how close they are, right? Being and non-being, something, nothing, right? And you kind of see in the first book of Natural Hearing, can't get something from nothing, and you can't get being from non-being. That was the same thing, huh? And then the third most universal

[32:10] is one. Okay, and this is where the problem is, you know, where Plato and Avicenna, these two great minds, are both get into problems because they confuse the one that is the beginning of number, and which is therefore limited to the genus quantity and even to one part of that, with the one that's convertible with, being, yeah. And but what one adds to the idea of being or thing is indivision, okay, undivided, huh?

[32:52] And that's only a being a reason. But anyway, Plato and Avicenna, in different ways, mix up that one with the one the beginning of number. Okay. And that's behind the thinking of Avicenna that one adds something real to being, huh? And behind Plato's thinking that the substances of things are numbers, huh? Okay, that's a very important distinction, huh? Okay.

[33:26] And then Thomas says there are three most universals outside. I mean, from falling behind being in comparison to something else, and there's a little problem as to how to translate the next one here because.

[33:48] Thomas says, one thing is not another. Okay, and so the word he uses in Latin is aliquid Okay. Now, some people might translate aliquid as by something. I think that's not the best way to do it. When Thomas explains it, he takes aliquid to mean aliquid. Mm-hmm. And I like to translate myself as another thing. Everything is another thing. But that said, in reference to what, it's distinction from other things.

[34:29] Okay, back to my big word there: distinction. Right. Okay, and so that's adding again a negation, which is a being a reason and therefore nothing real. Now, sometimes Thomas will will take one to include both of these. Huh? To say that one is what is undivided in itself and divided from or distinct from other things. Huh? Okay. So one chair is what undivided; its parts are united, and it's distinct from all other chairs.

[35:06] One chair, right? So anyway, I put a looking like that on the internet. There you are. Look at it. So anyway, and then the other two are something involving a what relation of reason, huh? And it must be something that, in some way, is all things. And then Thomas quotes Aristotle in the De Anima that the soul is, in some way, all things. And this is because of the universality of the mind and of the will, right?

[35:40] And so the universality in comparison to the mind is true, and to the will, it's the good, right? That's kind of a beautiful thing, right?

[35:51] After that superficial introduction, but these are the most universals, right? And there'd be various articles for Thomas to talk about these things as being what convertible, right? In universal and so on, and

[36:08] so he seems to be talking about those kind of things here when he speaks of what verissimum, right, and optimum, right. Okay, now exactly what means verissimum is not clear, but that one says it's right. And then he says, and per consequence, maxime ens huh. Well, if good and being are really what the same thing, right? Then what is most good might be also most being.

[36:42] Then he refers to what Aristotle brought out in the second book of wisdom, that the things which are most true are most beings. And we saw that before when he looked at the second book, but let's recall just a bit here. And Aristotle used there the famous what statement, which in Thomas liked to state in abbreviated form, right? And in Latin, say "propter quod unum quodque tale et illud magis," right?

[37:17] On account of which each is more so. But I, in my concern for the student, try to unfold a little bit more, right? You may recall my unfolding of that a bit, and I say when the same belongs to two things, right? But to one of them because of the other, it belongs more to the cause than to, yeah, belongs more to the cause. And then you know how I try to take these very sensible examples and say if hot is said of the fire and the air around the fire, but of the air around the fire because of the fire, which is hotter, or sweet is said of sugar and coffee, but of the coffee because of the sugar, which is sweeter, right?

[38:15] And I use that when I talk about the end and the means, and I say, well, if the end and the means are both good or desirable, but the means are good or desirable because of the end, right? Then which is gooder, more desirable, right? Which is better, the end? Yeah, yeah.

[38:38] So Aristotle applies that principle here, right? And he says if the effect is what is, and if the effect is true, right? It is and is true because the cause is true and is right, and therefore the cause is more true and more is than the what effect, right? Okay, and therefore what is what

[39:14] the very first cause you could say is most right, true and most being right. And that's what I was saying that if Aristotle could have been introduced to the Bible, right, he would have been interested in "I am who am" being truth itself, right? He would have seen the connection between that and seen would have been a a mode of credibility for him as a philosopher, huh?

[39:39] See the profundity of that. Okay. So he has in mind all those things that Aristotle said, right? Now he states his famous principle that what is said most of all to be such in some genus is the cause of all those things which are that genus, just as and takes a kind of sensible example in the old science, just as fire, which is most hot, is the cause of all what hot things.

[40:17] Aristotle gave a sensible example, right? The science people, you know, belabor too much that sensible example, right? Okay, that's just kind of a crutch to help you understand this a bit, huh? See, because some of you might say, well, is sugar really sweet to itself? See, or is sugar a compound or something? Some part of it makes it. Well, you don't have to go into those details to see the point we're trying to do. what. illustrate by this kind of sensible thing, right?

[40:55] Now, again, Thomas is brief here, and this is a very common thing they talk about. But let's just take a little less sensible example, Not a nonsensical example. Like that.

[41:18] Like the kind of pun on that, you know. I always remember this statement of Albert the Great, where he says that the first thing to be considered in logic is universal. And I say, well, that's that's good, but it's a little more sensible to say name said of many things.

[41:43] And leave it for the student to decide whether I'm not more sensible and just closer to the senses, or whether they're therefore more proportioned to us, right? Or whether I meant to consult the master of over there. Okay.

[42:06] Let's take the science of geometry, right? Okay. They have all these theorems in geometry, right? And some of the later ones, I think I kind of forgot the sum of the way to get there. And I like to grab, you know, innocent TAC graduate, you know, who hasn't studied Euclid for a while, you know, and ask him about all of these things, see, and show my superiority.

[42:34] But anyway, so as these theorems go on, they're getting what less and less known, right? Okay. And would the premises of a syllogism be more or less known than the conclusion? More. Yeah. Yeah. Because if they were just equally known, why would you use them to prove the conclusion?

[43:11] Okay. So you see the connection there between being more known and being a cause. On the premises are a cause of your knowing the conclusion, right? Okay. Now, sometimes I apply that principle we were talking about a minute ago, right? And I say, if known is said of the premises and the conclusion, but it's said of the conclusion because of the premises, then which is more known?

[43:45] And the students were as expected to the premises, right? Okay. But then I'll kind of, you know, yeah, it was kind of additional confirmation what I said before. And if they weren't more known, right, you wouldn't use them to prove the conclusion, right? Okay. So you see, right, you work your way back. Now, eventually, you work your way back from the earlier theorems all the way back to the what axioms and the postulates, right?

[44:16] And they would be what most known, and the cause of all the rest, right? Okay. That's the sort of thing that he has in mind. This is a very common thing for him, right? Okay.

[44:36] You see the same thing in regard to the what? That's close to what he said. This is a true, because it's more known. You see the same thing in regard to the what? Good, right? Okay. And and without being too extensive, there, you go back to the example we had before, where we say that good is said of the end and of the means to the end, right?

[45:02] Like good is said of health, and good is said sometimes of that's a good medicine, right? Okay. But it's said of the means because of the end, right? Medicine is good and desirable sometimes because it leads to health, right? Or restores health, or conserves health, or something, right? So, which then, according to that principle,

[45:34] which is more is gooder, which is better, which is more good, huh? The end. the end, yeah, yeah. But it's also the cause of the good, right? Okay. Of the of the means, huh? So

[45:53] now sometimes you have what a means to a means to an end, right? And so you get something less good as you go along, right? But you

[46:07] get something that's further away from the cause, but still depends upon the cause, the end, in this case, for its being good at all, right? Okay. So. So

[46:29] it's kind of a background to see that there is a connection between the more and less that you see in things, right? And the less depending upon the more, and therefore ultimately upon the what most, right?

[46:48] But now sometimes you know you say well yeah maybe there's a little more that has to be unfolded here right I say but you kind of see it doesn't seem that that strange to begin with right once you consider these these examples okay

[47:15] what's moving the train most of all the caboose no the cars in between well they're pulling something right but it's really most of all what the engine right huh okay okay

[47:35] now sometimes you go back to the idea of through itself again right is something belongs to a thing through itself right is it going to belong to it in a diminished way

[47:54] so if it does belong to in a diminished way maybe it's not what through itself right okay is some statements are really less known than others and everybody knows that right

[48:14] that to be known belongs to them in a diminished way that's a sure sign that they are not what known to themselves right okay

[48:30] but they're known to something more known right but if that is still not completely known right still diminishedly something's known you go back to what is most known right and that must be the what cause of all the others being known okay

[48:53] so therefore there's something in all beings that is the cause of their being and their goodness and of every what Perfection right In other words, if perfection

[49:07] belongs to you through yourself then you're really the what the cause of such of that right so why should the cause as such of that

[49:21] make you have it in a diminished way that makes sense Sure. No Uh I I puzzle a lot you know I find Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles you know saying that God is the the first cause And the first being, right? And does he mean the same thing by saying it's the first cause and the first being?

[50:05] And now man has got before in his mind, and realizes the word "first" means before all the rest, right? Well, in what sense of before is God the first cause, and what sense of before is He the first being, right?

[50:28] And well, obviously, the first cause would be before in the crowning sense, which is the cause is before the effect, right? But is that what the first being means? And that's where it means exactly that.

[50:46] It's the same thing. That's the first being, but is it simply synonymous? No, because God would always be the first being, whereas He wouldn't necessarily be the first cause that He ever created. Yeah, would you call the first God, first being, the first being? So, well, in a way, absolutely, couldn't you still? You couldn't, but okay.

[51:13] Well, sometimes I play with the the second central sense, right? And I say, there's something interesting here, right? The second sense of before was before in being, right? And we say this can be without that, but not vice versa. Well, it's rather nice to be able to say that God is not only before the things as a cause before an effect, right? But He's before all the things in other sense.

[51:41] He can be without them, but not vice versa. Now Thomas, in the second book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, he'll spend a lot of time showing that does God doesn't produce the universe by natural necessity. So God could be without having created anything at all. That's entirely a free act on the part of God that He created us or anything else at all.

[52:06] And then you realize that God can be without what other things, but they can't be without Him. Right? That's something different than saying He's a cause in them. We've got a very important truth about that. Um, but um, that's that that way of understanding first is suggested by saying He's the first being. You think of before in being, and and you think of that second sense. But in the context here, in the context I see in Sumas, isn't He saying is better than all the other things?

[52:49] It's more perfect, right? Okay. Notice that last sentence there. Therefore, there's something before all things, right? That is a cause there, being and goodness and a very perfection, right? He's thinking of God as as what the most perfect, the most good, the best, right? And therefore, being before all the them in the fourth sense. Usually, I get to you know those five senses of before. I say clearly, God is before all other things as a cause before an effect.

[53:26] But He's also before other things in the second sense. He can be without other things, but they can't be without Him. He's also before all the things in the fourth sense of being better than all things. But in the third sense, in the discourse of reason, He's not before all the things, because we know God from His effects, huh? So the effects, huh? And you got to care about the first sense because that's in time.

[53:52] God's not in time, although. There's some sense in which you could say God is before other things in duration, but not so in time. So you have to, you know, qualify that a lot. But clearly, in the second, the fourth, and the crowning sense, God is before other things, right? But Thomas seems to use it. Every time he uses the word, I try to get a little sense of what he's, how he's using it.

[54:14] But he seems to, you know, associate the idea of primum ens with with the perfection of God. Okay, I'm not altogether sure of that, but but I think there's a little part of the difference here. Ends closer to this fourth argument than the earlier ones, huh? Especially the first two, right? You think very much the first mover, first maker, first cause, right? But in the third one, a bit, because you don't use so much the word cause there as much, although you do speak of having a causal necessity, right?

[54:50] But the emphasis is upon being the necessary being to itself. That's kind of you. That you're the first being, right? And in here, I had some of the sense of the first being, right? So I would tend to conclude more from the first two that God is the first cause. And

[55:09] from the third and fourth, I'd be closer to saying he's the first being, although you could say he's the first cause in those two because he does bring in cause. And of course, the word necessary is taken up with the words for cause in the fifth book of wisdom, huh? But I'm kind of rambling now, but you see that that I think about his words, you know.

[55:32] Around his words, a couple of words in my mind to render down exactly why Thomas says that, huh? He does use the word cause here in the third and fourth too. So I mean, I don't exaggerate that, huh? But

[55:53] closer. Now the fifth way is taken from the governance of things, huh? For we see that some things which lack knowledge, right, to its natural bodies, act for an end, right? Which appears from this that always, or for the most part, in the same way they act, huh? That what

[56:20] they might achieve that which is best, right? Okay, this is going back to the first argument that Aristotle gives for nature acting for an end. Once it is clear that not by chance but by intention they arrive at an end. But those things which do not have knowledge cannot tend towards an end except as directed by someone knowing and understanding. Thomas's example of the arrow. Tend towards a target because the archer.

[56:54] I mean the the coil. Archer, yeah, archer. Very interesting, archer. I know that to be king of archery. Probably archer. Archery, okay. Therefore, there is someone understanding from whom all natural things are what, or by whom all natural things are to an end, and this we call what God. Sometimes Thomas refers back to John Damascene in this argument, right? You say it goes all the way back in some way to Anaxagoras, huh?

[57:31] Okay. Arcas, Arcas, bow, rainbow. Okay. Now let's go to the objections. The first objection was about the good and the bad. He's very brief about this, but he'll be talking about the bad more at length later on. He gets into talking about God's goodness, right? You talk about goodness in general and so on. But in in the third book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, he goes a lot into the bad, right?

[58:04] And then the question is disputatae de malo. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion, that God, since He is what most good, in no way would allow anything of bad in His works, unless He was so omnipotent and good that He might well make things what. Well, well, even for evil. Yeah. For this pertains to the infinite goodness of God that He allows evils to be, so that He might what, present from them goods.

[58:42] And there's some goods that couldn't be without what. Evil. Evil. So the good of the martyr, right, couldn't be without the good of the persecutor. And Augustine says we need heretics for theology to develop. Two things good out of that, right? Okay. And this person who annoys you, you know, helps you to gain patience. Huh? He was right there. But they say they say the good man, you know, uses even bad things well, right?

[59:12] Or the bad man uses even good things bad. Okay. This is not the time for Thomas to go into a great defense of you know divine providence and so on. But he will in other places go much more into this, right? So you shouldn't think this. You know, sometimes they quote the great Boethius, huh? And he says the man should argue not that if there's evil, then God doesn't exist.

[59:43] He should argue if there's evil, God does exist, huh? Because there couldn't be evil without the what transcending the. Good order, right? And therefore, there must be a cause of that good order, that leads you back to God. So they should argue: if there's even a world, there must be good. If there's good, there must be the cause of the good. Therefore, there must be a God.

[1:00:07] So he kind of turns the tables on them, you know. But he's he's a quite a mind, Boethius. I think you could say that these three great thinkers there—Boethius, Albert the Great, and Thomas Aquinas—they they all think that Plato and Aristotle are the chief philosophers. Augustine, you know, talks about the Platonists, but I don't think he knows, you know, Aristotle that much. But by the time of of Boethius, who could go studying in Alexandria there, you know, and so on, it's very clear from his works that he's what he's influenced by by Plato and Aristotle, right?

[1:00:46] Gratian is the chief philosophers, and Albert the Great says you can't. Be a philosopher without knowing Plato and Aristotle, right? So even though Thomas and Thomas himself says they're the principes philosophi, the chief philosophers, so even though he calls Aristotle the philosopher, right, puts him above Plato when they disagree, he nevertheless calls them together the chief philosophers.

[1:01:12] Now to the second one who's saying, "Hey, we got enough causes, why are you bringing more superfluous causes in?" It says that, and nature is one of those causes. But since nature acts were determined in, huh, from the direction of some superior agent, is necessary that those things which come to be from nature are also led back to God as to the first cause. That goes back to the fifth argument for the existence of God.

[1:01:41] Similarly, those things which happen from what, choice, intention, what's proposed, is necessary to reduce them to some higher cause, which is not the reason and will of man, because these are what mutable and defectible. But it's necessary that all things changeable and all things able to fail to be reduced to some beginning that is unchangeable and to itself necessary. It has been shown in the arguments for God.

[1:02:18] Now sometimes Thomas, you know, when he's talking about this, he'll go back to what Aristotle did, right? Aristotle in the Ethics explicitly says that that the beginning of our thinking and ruling is from God, not from us. And he's a very good reason for saying it, right? There's kind of an argument for the unmoved mover, like he's teaching here, not only from motion in the natural world, right, but from what our our understanding.

[1:02:49] Yeah, no, yeah. I mean, I can will to understand, right? And I can understand to will, but is that the way? Before every understanding, there's a willing, and every willing an understanding. And the same infinite regress problem. So the beginning of us comes from the outside. of our style. What's common argument for the existence of God from our very understanding will.

[1:03:20] Wake up in the morning, right, with a good thought to start the day, you know. Do I will to have that good thought, or even to think that thought? Maybe you did in your sleep, and you just

[1:03:34] didn't. I think I had something frustrating in my sleep last night. I thought some stupid form for the government, and something was wrong, and you know, some stupid problem to think of. So it's time to stop and. Next time we can start to study the substance of God, right?