Prima Pars
16. Is God a body, or made of matter and form? Aquinas's arguments, second-figure syllogisms, scriptural metaphors, and 'divina substantia forma est'
Class of 2006-02-01
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/016-is-god-a-body-or-made-of-matter-and-form-aquinass-arguments/

[0:00] So we're up to Article One here now. It seems that God is not a body, or is a body rather. For a body is that which has three dimensions, but sacred Scripture attributes to God three dimensions. It is said in the Book of Job, He is higher than the heaven, right? What are you going to do? He's deeper than the infernal regions, And whence? you know, He's longer than the earth is measured, and wider than the sea.

[0:34] Therefore, God is a body, right? No, it's there. You are thinking of God as being infinite in the what? Material, yeah, quantitative sense, yeah. A body would be.

[0:48] Moreover, everything that has a figure is a body, since figure is a quality about quantity. It's the fourth species of quality, right? But God is seen to have a figure, since it's written in Genesis one twenty six. Let us make man to our image and likeness, huh? But figure is said to be an image, according to Hebrews, since he is the splendor of what glory in the figure of his what substance, huh?

[1:18] That is the image. Therefore, God is a body. Moreover, everything that has bodily parts is a body, but Scripture attributes to God bodily parts. It is said in the Book of Job, if you have a what arm as God, or the eyes of the Lord in the Psalm there are upon the just, and the right hand of the Lord makes power and so on. Therefore, God is a body, right?

[1:48] Huh? You can see why you had the article on where the scripture uses metaphors, right? Even though they don't argue metaphors, somebody might argue for metaphors.

[2:01] Moreover, sight or location does not belong to, except to a body, but those things which pertain to sight are said in scriptures about God, for it, or position maybe. huh? Yeah. For it is said in Isaiah, "I saw the Lord sitting, right, and then He stood up the Lord to judge him, right." Moreover, nothing is able to be a what?

[2:35] A local term, a local limit, from which or to which something goes. Yeah, except a body, something bodily, but God is said in Scripture to be the. A local term. Local term. To which, according to that of Psalm, approach him and be illuminated, right? And also that from which something recedes. Receding from him, those receding from him are written on in the earth. Okay. Therefore, God is what a body, right?

[3:13] So you're all convinced? Okay. totally. But the sent contra in John four twenty four is that God is a what spirit. You see, the word spirit sounds like the word air, right? Huh. And so it's placed first upon air, and then what carried over and applied to a immaterial substance. So it's an equivocal word, right? It's not a metaphor though when it's carried over. It takes on new meaning.

[3:53] I answer: It should be said, absolutely, without question, that God is not a body, right? Huh. Which is able to be shown in three ways.

[4:09] First, because no body moves not being moved itself, as is clear inductively going through the various kinds of motion. But it has been shown, however, above that God is the first immobile mover, right? Whence is manifest that God is not a what body, right? Huh. Okay, that's clear enough, huh? No body moves without being moved itself, right? God moves without being moved, right? Therefore, he's not a body.

[4:51] Now, second, because it is necessary that that which is the first being. Hear that expression, of Thomas? huh. They. Sometimes call God the prima causa, right? Mm-hmm. And sometimes you'll call him the primum what? ens. Yeah. And the first being and the first cause are the same thing, but are the two expressions synonymous? Huh. Mm.

[5:24] And when he develops that God is the first being here, but he's going back to the before and after of act and ability, right? Mm. hmm. And act and ability don't name cause, but they name two ways of being, right? Mm-hmm. So it's kind of natural to see that what's first is the primum ens here, right? But it'll also be the first cause. It's kind of interesting to see that little that little

[5:56] difference in those two phrases. Okay, let's see how he develops this here. Secondly, because it is necessary that that which is the first being be an act and in no way in ability, Potency has been used in the passive sense.

[6:18] And then the thing we were talking about earlier. For though in one and the same thing that goes forward from ability to act, it is what in ability before in time, then it's an act, or it's its ability before it is act in time.

[6:38] Nevertheless, simply speaking, act is what. Yeah, to potency, and then the reason for that, because what is in potency or in ability in the passive sense is not reduced to act except through a being in act.

[6:59] But it has been shown above that God is the first being, right? Now, I mean, you might stop upon that and say, "Hey, I thought you were showing that God was the first cause. How can you say that God is the first what being, right? " Although maybe in the third and the fourth arguments, You're getting more of the what first being. The third argument was the one from the set from, you know, what is able to be or not to be depends upon what is necessary to be, and what is necessary to be through another depends upon what is necessary to be through itself.

[7:35] So that said, more explicitly with reference to being than to what cause and effect. I mean, we're talking about that cause and effect a bit there, and then he talks about it's the same belongs to some things more or less. It's because it belongs to them because something that belongs to most of all, and that's said about truth and being, right? So the third and fourth argument is closer to showing the existence of a first being.

[8:05] You want to see a little difference there? That's what he says here. So it's impossible, therefore, if God is the first being, that means the being before others, right? It's the first means, right, before all the rest. Therefore, it can't be in potency at all, right? If there's any potency in God that had been actualized, there would have been something before. Yeah.

[8:39] So in a way, here he's showing that God is pure act at this point, isn't he? That's kind of funny because in the Summa Contra Gentiles after he shows that God is unchangeable, then he shows there's no potency in God and he's pure act. And in that same chapter, you develop the argument from act and ability from the ninth book of Wisdom, right? Without you know making it more concrete in motion or something like that, they just argue that you know simply speaking, act is before ability.

[9:11] Therefore, the beginning of all things must be pure act. Okay. Here he develops in the middle of the what second argument to show that God's not a body, right? Okay.

[9:27] In some way, the Summa Contra Gentiles is better in one sense because he's going to be arguing from God being pure act through all of these articles, right? So it's not just to develop that God's not a body, right? So it makes some sense that Summa Contra Gentiles does to put that by itself in its own chapter, right? To some extent, the argument from five attributes of divine substance was being pure act, but Thomas doesn't develop that till he gets here to the second article. Or second argument rather against God being a what body,

[10:13] but every body is in what potency in ability because it's continuous and continuous as such is divisible forever. That's what you mean the famous sixth book of the physics, right? Continuous is divisible forever.

[10:34] Is impossible therefore for God to be a what body, right? When he when he when he makes that point, what that's looking that's looking at quantity in itself because according to Aristotle, say the the heavenly bodies were indivisible even though they're yeah they did that quantity yeah so aren't you taking away that potency the potency of divisibility from given the nature of the heavenly body? Well, I see.

[11:05] In the sixth book, you consider they're considering matter. It is well, in the sixth book of physics, you consider the continuous kind of by itself. Yeah, it was an abstraction. There might be something else that prevents you from dividing a body, right? Because Aristotle himself said you can't divide matter infinitely. Yeah, that's because that's because of nature, right? Yeah, but in the more general consideration, there's nothing in the continuous that prevents you from dividing it forever, right?

[11:35] Yeah, I was just thinking that given given what its nature may be, you may end up taking away that potency from it, not because of quantity, But even if it has the continuous has part outside of part is going to have some kind of potency there, right? Because no part by itself will be actually the whole. I guess I guess yeah yeah. So parts are always to the whole like matter to form, yeah, ability to act, and you can still make a yeah an intellectual division, as it were, yeah.

[12:06] Um. Third, because God is that which is most what noble in beings, huh? It goes back again to the maybe the fourth argument, right?

[12:25] But it's impossible for some body to be the most noble thing in beings because the body is either alive or it's not alive. A body that is alive

[12:38] is more noble, obviously, manifestly, than a body that's not alive. But a body that is alive does not live in so far as a body, because thus every body would be alive.

[12:51] It's necessary, therefore, that it lives through something other, just as our body lives through the soul. That therefore, to which the body lives, is more noble than the body. It's impossible, therefore, that God be a what? Body, right? Huh? So three arguments are enough, huh? Famous statement, first book of the physics, right? Three is enough.

[13:18] Okay. That shows up enough, huh? Three arguments to show God's not a body. Hmm. And yet, to me, he's kind of back and saying, "Can I remember those three arguments? Huh?

[13:34] Can I? What argument is that? What? God is the unmoved mover, right? And a body is only a moved mover, right? So it can't be the same thing, right? Unmoved mover can't be moved mover, can it? Okay. And we just saw the third argument, right? That every body is what? In. What's what? The noble. Yeah. Yeah. What's the second argument?

[14:12] Bodies in places. No, no potency, so you can't have quantity in it. Yeah. Invisible in it. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So, what kind of syllogisms are these, huh?

[14:29] The main syllogisms in each of these three arguments, huh? If you argue like this, you said God. Um. Let's say every body is a moved mover.

[14:59] God is not a moved mover. Therefore, God is not a what? Body, huh? What kind of syllogism is that? Second. Second figure, yeah, yeah. In the second figure of the syllogism, the middle term is the what? Predicatum in both. And when you start the second figure, you see the only way that you have a syllogism in the second figure is going to involve one of them being affirmative and one of them being what?

[15:39] Negative, right? Okay. So, just kind of the basic syllogism, right? And and this this premise here showed more natural philosophy. This one here we showed in the. Previous question, right? Now, what's what's the second main syllogism here? And

[16:07] if you say every body, wait, everybody, everybody is in potency, and you mean potency in the passive sense, right? Yeah, you know, if you remember back in the ninth book of wisdom, we distinguished the active and the passive, and this is passive. God is not in potency.

[16:40] Same form, again, right? Okay. Reminds me of Socrates when he's showing in the Phaedo that the soul is not the harmony of the body, right? And he argues, well,

[16:56] the soul resists the body's inclination sometimes. The harmony of the body does not. Yeah. Okay. So he affirms one thing of the soul and denies it of the harmony, or vice versa. Okay. It doesn't seem kind of right at times, right? Okay.

[17:19] The soul has a harmony, but the harmony doesn't have a harmony. So you can affirm of one, but you deny of the other, right? Now, what's the third argument here?

[17:34] God is most mobile. Yeah. Yeah. God is most mobile. Body is not most mobile. Yeah. Body is not most mobile. Maybe by the way you can state these arguments, but that's one way, right? Okay.

[17:57] But now, if someone says to, "Why does he say that God is pure act? " Is that one of the premises here? Through the inverse of this, of the second. Yeah. But it would be kind of a beginning to see the truth of the second premise here, right? If God is pure act, then God is not in potency, right? So, when you analyze these things, you try to find the main syllogism, and the main syllogism is syllogisms whose conclusion is the main conclusion.

[18:38] The main conclusion in this article is that God is not a body, right? So, what are the two premises? You just two premises in the syllogism. What are the two premises which are immediate next to that conclusion, right?

[18:57] Okay, and then there's something else in there. It must be in there to illustrate or support or back up in some way one of the premises or other. Okay, sometimes they call the backup syllogism if there's one a prosyllogism, right, Something like that. huh? But or you can call it the backup syllogism. It's, secondary. So in a way, when we analyze these things, you proceed in the opposite direction, right?

[19:28] You start with the final conclusion, then you see what leads immediately to that, and then what leads to what leads to it, and sometimes it goes back several steps, right? Um, can we look at the third one again? It's a little bit different. Um, how do we go through that again? Where it says God is most noble. Yeah. A body is not most noble, right? Mm-hmm. But see how we're different from the other ones because we we switched around.

[19:58] Yeah, yeah. Well, actually, you see. You can, in the second figure, you can argue in three different ways, or two different ways, I should say. Just put down the formula

[20:18] here. You can say no A is B and every C is B, right? And then every A is B, no C is B. Okay.

[20:57] Now, in both of these forms, you can draw the conclusion that no C is A, right? Right. Okay. But Aristotle calls these syllogisms of the second figure and the third figure, for that matter. But the second figure is more important than the third. He calls them imperfect syllogisms, right? Mm-hmm. Because they're not altogether clear as it's stated, huh? Mm-hmm. And if you want to show that it's altogether clear, you will convert the premise.

[21:45] So in this case, you convert no A is B to no B is A, and you have to show, which he does, that a universal negative always converts. Okay. And then bring this over, like it is, every C is B, and now it's obvious, right? Mm-hmm. That no C is A, right? Okay.

[22:15] Now here it's a little more complicated. If you want to show that no C is A, right? You convert this and you get no B is C. Bring this down, right? And you've got every A is B. Now you're back, lo and behold, in the first figure again. So the conclusion here now is going to be no A is C. You can convert that, right? So I would put this one, on the final exam rather than, this one.

[22:51] Because now that converts, you have to convert twice, you see, and then you have to show the conversion, right? You see? So it makes no difference, right? You know the way it's simplest three arguments, not necessarily but whether necessarily, but whether God is a affirmative or a negative one, right? Kind of the same, right? Now it's kind of interesting, of course you're dealing with universal terms at this, but if you have a singular, right, you can invert that too.

[23:25] So if we say no woman is Socrates, you know, then Socrates is not a woman, either, right? You say it can turn around, the singular, right? Um, Socrates is not a woman, Okay? And so God is a singular, right? You can still turn it around just like the way universal.

[23:51] But you know how we show the universal negative can be turned around. It's kind of an amazing thing too. It shows about the human mind, huh? Because what Aristotle does with the universal negative, he'll say,

[24:13] you know, means you've got a little mind that's, right? If no dog is a cat, and you turn it around, it would be true that no cat is a dog. Okay, and say okay.

[24:33] In this example, you can turn it around, and both are are one is true, the other is true, right? But now, is that going to be true about any universal negative statement? Well, there's an infinity of universal negative statements that are true, and any way of knowing that in that infinity of universal negative statements that are true, that every one of them can be turned around and still true.

[25:05] At first sight, say that's an impossible task, right? We can't possibly look at an infinity of universal negatives. No squares are circle. No circles are square. Yeah, okay. No elephant is a tiger. Yeah, no tiger is an elephant. Yeah, you see.

[25:25] But how do you know there isn't some, you know, example where this isn't the case? Right? You assume that there is an example where there is a case of maybe some no A is B. No, Aristotle's a very good way of showing it, right? Oh, yeah. And presupposes that you understand, you know, what statements are posed contradictorily. So he'll say here, no matter, let me get some more room here, No matter what A is and what B is, right?

[25:57] If it is true that no A is B, right? No matter what A is, what B is, you can always turn this around. It would be true. Also, there's no b is a. Okay. If you admit that, you know, then you're admitting what I'm saying. But if you say no, it could possibly happen that this is true, right? No a is b, and this is what false.

[26:24] I say that can never happen. But if it did happen, you say it may happen. If no b is a is false, then by the square of opposition, some b is a is what true in that case, right? Okay. Because no b is a would not be false unless there's at least some b is a. Now, some b is an a is true. Let's give a name to that one b that is an a.

[26:58] Here B. And let us call the b which is an a. Whatever you want to call this called an x, right? Okay. Therefore, x is both a b and an a. Right. Therefore, there's some a,

[27:29] which a the one we called x, right? Some a, namely x, is b. Now, can that be true when this is true? No, no. So something impossible follows if you don't admit this is is true.

[27:53] So this is the way Aristotle shows. It's kind of marvelous, isn't it? The way he shows that no matter what, and there's an infinity of examples, right? For a and b, where it's true that no a is b, right? And then he's shown that for every one of those, the reverse no b is a is true. And he had to do that to show those syllogisms in the second figure that we're using here and now are valid.

[28:22] huh? They're valid? anywhere you use them. Where is it that he, that he developed the square of opposition? Wasn't it before? That's in the Peri Hermeneias, yeah. Yeah, yeah. That's yeah. That was when he was just dealing with yeah. Yeah. But he teaches conversion in the Prior Analytics, right? Because it's necessary to reduce imperfect syllogisms to perfect ones. Yeah. that's how he proves them. But you see,

[28:47] you can't do that with every a is b. The reverse might not be true. Every dog is an animal. Every animal is a dog. No, see, All you need is one example to show it isn't necessarily so, right? But you can say if every A is B is true, at least some B is an A. Because if some B were not an A, then no B would be an A, and obviously that can't be the case.

[29:18] Because no A would be a B, whatever A is a B. Um, And that's the reason why in the second figure you can only get these negative conclusions, because you can turn it around universal negative and keep the result. You can't do that with universal affirmative. You can't do it with particular affirmative, where you get the same thing. So when you go through all the cases of the syllogism of the three figures, that is to say, there's only one case where you can prove the universal affirmative.

[29:50] That's Barbara, yeah. In the first figure, yeah. But there's one way in the first figure you can prove universal negative, and two ways in the second figure. You. know Those those four are the most important, right? Of all the cases. So it's easier to prove a universal negative, universal affirmative. At least there's more ways to do it anyway. And so you you know, Socrates and Thomas using the same form here.

[30:20] You know, Aristotle teaches us in the Prior Analytics. Now sometimes, of course, we use the if then syllogism, right? And sometimes we use the either or, right? As example later on, when Thomas is is showing and say that there's no composition at all in God, right? We've gone through all the particular kinds of composition, right? So he can reason, you know, that every composition is this and this is and this this and he eliminates all of them.

[31:02] Therefore, there's no composition in God. That's a different kind of of argument, huh? And now we got all these objections to answer. The first one says, "Well, God's got what? Length and width and depth and so on." The first, therefore, it should be said that has been said above in the first question, right? That sacred scripture treats for us spiritual and divine things under the likenesses of what?

[31:38] On bodily things, huh? Whence, since it attributes three dimensions to God under the likeness of what bodily quantity, it designates his what? Virtual quantity, huh?

[32:03] So that through what depth, huh? His power to knowing hidden things, right? Of course, we speak sometimes of the deep mind, right? Not as deep as God, but some depth, right? As opposed to a shallow mind, huh? There are a lot of shallow minds and news these days.

[32:27] Through altitude, right, the excellence of his power above all, right? Through longitude, the duration of his what? Being, right? Through latitude, the affection of his love for all things, huh? You often do that for Christ in the cross too, right? as an example, embracing the world, right? Okay.

[32:55] That's one way of understanding it, but another way is given by Dionysius in the chapter nine of the Divine Names. Now notice. What is the sense of the letter when you have these metaphors in Scripture? The sense of the letter would be false. Well, no, no, no. What? Wait. The sense of this is what I was worrying about. The sense of the letter, in the case of metaphor, is what the speaker intends, not what the words signify, right?

[33:30] Yes. Yes. So you say God, the Lord is a rock. The sense of that is not that God is a rock. Yeah. But you are speaking what metaphorically, and the meaning is He's my support, or He supports me, or something of this sort, huh? Yeah. Okay. I think I mentioned how Thomas there in the commentary in the Epistles of Paul, when Paul uses figure of speech, irony instead of metaphor, but it's also figure of speech, and Thomas says that when you speak figuratively, the meaning of the speaker is not the meaning of the words, right?

[34:05] And it's the meaning of the speaker that is the sense of the what letter, right? Okay. Now he's giving another one from Dionysius, right? And this goes back to what we said before, these two great minds, there Augustine and Thomas, that even in the sense of the letter, there can be more than one, right? Okay. Or as Dionysius says in the chapter nine, of the Divine names.

[34:36] Through the profundity of God is understood the incomprehensibility of His essence. Okay. Through the what length, the procession of His power, right, penetrating all things, huh? The long arm of the law, right?

[34:59] Something like this, right? Penetrate all things. Through latitude, huh? His what? Being extended, so to speak, over all things, right? In so far as all things are contained under his what? Perfection. Yeah. Yeah. So, then what Dionysius is doing, talking about this in the divine names? Because it should be the symbolic theology is talking about this, right? But maybe came up in some way there in the text, right?

[35:36] When Thomas divides the works of Dionysius, and there are some books about names that are said properly of God, and some books about names said metaphorically of God, and then some ones where you another problem of Trinity names there. Okay.

[35:58] Now to the second one about man being said to be the image and likeness of God, that man is said to be to the image or likeness of God, not by his body, right, but by that by which man excels the other animals. Whence in Genesis chapter one verse twenty six, after it is said, "Let us make man to our image and our likeness," there is subjoined, "So that he may what rule over the fish of the sea and so on."

[36:38] For the man excels all other animals as regards his what reason and understanding. Whence, according to his understanding and reason, which incorporeal man is to the image of God, right? Might include the will there too, the intellectual part.

[37:03] Okay. Now to the third objection, huh? And although there's something the same in these objections in a way, right, because they're all kind of using the metaphors, right? But there's something kind of unique about Thomas's answer to these things, because there's something different about the metaphors. To the third, it should be said that the parts of the body, right, are attributed to God in Scripture by reason of their acts, right?

[37:30] It's a little different now, right? But according to a certain likeness, huh? For just as the act of the eye is to see, huh? Whence the eye said of God signifies his power to seeing in understandable way, not in a sensible way, right?

[37:49] That reminds me what Gregory the Great says, huh? In the Moralia that anger, anger disturbs the eye of the soul. What does he mean by the eye of the soul? Reason. Yeah, saying anger disturbs your reason. You don't think too clearly when you're angry, huh? That's kind of a metaphor to call reason the eye of the soul.

[38:21] But if our reason can be called the eye of the soul, right, huh? Then God's understanding might be called metaphorically an eye too, right? It's an eye too right Sin and likeness there, so we carry the word "see" actually over to understanding, right? See. But I don't think "eye" really becomes a meaning of reason, right? It remains a metaphor, huh?

[38:48] Okay. Now, what about the fourth one, huh? I hear talking about God taking up a certain position, I guess, huh? To the fourth, it should be said that also those things which pertain to how how you translate situm" is that position or what posture? What posture? Posture, yeah, yeah, yeah. They're not attributed to God except by a certain likeness. as he is said to be sitting on account of his what immobility and what authority, and standing on account of his what?

[39:25] Helping. Yeah, to fighting against right, opposing him. Yeah, that makes sense, right? We stand up, you know. You're going to get a fight there in the bar. You stand up, right?

[39:44] But the you have the kind of the chair there, the chair of the bishop and so on, right? And then the chair of the judge and so on, right? His authority and immobility. huh He sits in the chair. gonna put down a judgment, on you sentence, you right?

[40:10] My old teacher Kasurik, he had this quote from Thomas: "Homo sedens fit sapiens." And his Latin was worse than mine, so he says. Translates that the man sitting makes wisdom, huh? Okay. I think it means the man sitting becomes wise, right? Homo sedens fit sapiens. And the fifth objection, huh? About his being the one who needs to go, right? To the fifth, it should be said that to God, one does not what approach by bodily steps, right?

[40:54] Since he's everywhere, he's right here inside us, but by the affections of your mind. In the same way, by the affections of your mind, you recede from him, right? And thus, excess and recess under the likeness of locomotion designate our what spiritual affection. Okay. What about? Let's think of this with the creed. When we hear "light from light, " that's um. It's obviously metaphor, huh? But why?

[41:36] Well, you got to be careful with it because sometimes it's hard to to tell, you know. Um. Because sometimes light has a sense of, like Saint Paul says, "everything that manifests something is light. " Oh, I see. So there's some places you know where Thomas would take some of these things like light, and maybe for one church father this is kind of metaphor, right? Another man sees the idea of light as manifesting things, and then it's no longer a metaphor for him, right?

[42:07] Uh huh. Okay. See, it's just one thing when a word takes on a new meaning, right? And when a word doesn't take on new meaning, but there's a likeness between what it means and what you want to say, right? Then it could be made a metaphor, right? So, as you see, you know, in the newspaper or something like that, you know, representing a guy with a bright idea, shows the guy's head there and a little light bulb going on, right?

[42:44] That's metaphorical, right? You know. But I think light can become, you know, properly carried over, right? Just like the word "to see, right? Hmm. When I say to students, "Do you see what I mean?" I don't think I am speaking metaphorically, but when I speak of the eye of the soul, I think I am right. So, I am just one meaning of the eye, the mind, right?

[43:12] But one meaning of the word "to see" is to understand. So, the word's been carried over in a new meaning, given, huh? Sometimes it's hard to tell the difference between the two, and some some person might, you know, use a word metaphorically, another person see a new meaning. Seems like the context of the creed has to do with the substance, right? It's gone from God, life, from light.

[43:36] That's what I was thinking. It was maybe the similarity or something, and the sense of light is sort of like spirit. That it's the least immaterial. but the other thing that's different from that thing that we saw, where I was talking about, is better to use like grosser things for theology than like rock. Yeah, so you won't be deceived. But. But light is on the opposite extreme.

[44:05] There, it's more immaterial. But you are trying to explain that God understands, right? If you go, if you go to the metaphor of a fire for God, right, huh? Oh, and as I think I explained before, fire is sometimes a metaphor for the divine substance,

[44:27] and then the light represents the divine understanding, right? Yeah, and the warmth of the fire, the divine love. Yeah. But sometimes, as fire is taken as a metaphor for the Trinity, and then the substance of the fire represents the Father, and from the Father proceeds light, which is the Son, and then the warmth, which is the Holy Spirit, huh? So it's a beautiful metaphor for those, right?

[44:56] So, since the second person proceeds by way of God's understanding Himself, right? We attribute to the second person, you know, the life by whom, like every man, comes into this world.

[45:20] I was thinking of how how the rule of two and three comes up. You know, in the in the creeds again, because in the Apostles' Creed and in the Nicene Constantinople Creed, the articles of faith are divided into what three, according to the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, and something because they're proper to that person, or because they are accommodated to that person, or appropriated to that person, are taken up with that person, huh?

[45:57] But then in the. Athanasian creed, which they think goes back about to the fourth century, and if not by Athanasius, as in people who know his work, and in the Fourth Lateran Council, the creed in there, twelve fifteen there. Then you divide the articles of faith into two: those concerning the divinity of Christ, and then with the humanity of Christ.

[46:32] Now both of these divisions are good, but one is into three, and one is into two. What's interesting, you know, you go to the Mass and and the the two parts of praise that are sung, right? One is the Gloria, and the other is the Sanctus and the Benedictus, huh? In the Gloria, you use the same division that you use in the Nicene Creed. According to the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, that's the way you praise God there.

[47:05] But in the Sanctus and the Benedictus, you praise the divinity and then the humanity, huh? So there, that praise is divided in a way like the Athanasian Creed and here. Now, with the two prayers of mercy, you divide. You ask mercy of the Trinity: Kyrie eleison Christe eleison Kyrie eleison. That's the Trinity, and then the incarnate word, Agnus Nei. So there, are the divinities here, and the humanity is there, right?

[47:40] But in the creeds, you have both, okay. Now, in the in the the famous praise of God, the Te Deum, right? That has the same order as the Sanctus and the

[47:57] Benedictus, huh? It praises the divinity and then puts the humanity, and that's the distinction that is used in the in theology, right? Okay, because in the prima pars you have all about the divinity, and in the tertia pars you have all about the humanity. So you don't divide according to the Trinity, divide according to the divinity, and the humanity. So the Athanasian Creed and the Creed of the Fourth Lateran Council, that order is followed more in theology, right?

[48:38] That that division, right? You know, you take up God the Son here; you don't take up, you know, his humanity and everything that he underwent and so on when he was a man.

[48:54] Now, in the Hail Mary. You know the Hail Mary's got two parts, right? And the first part is really a praise of Maria after you read her Hail Mary. And you divide the praise of Mary something like you do in the Sanctus and the Benedictus, right? Because you first praise Mary in comparison to God, say Hail Mary, full of grace, which is partaking grace of the divine nature.

[49:25] The Lord is with thee, so you're looking towards God, right? And you're not talking about the Lord is with you in terms of the incarnation, because this is said before the incarnation by the angel, right? Hail Mary, full of grace. But then you say, Blessed art thou amongst women, and blessed is the fruit of thy womb. which. I think Elizabeth says really. Then you're praising Mary with respect to her role in regard to the humanity of Christ, and then when you get to the second part of the Hail Mary, we're going to be asking, you know, for things. But you address her as Holy Mary, right?

[50:03] Mother of God, right? Well, holy is always said respect to God, so Holy Mary is, saying she should be devoted to God. When you say Mother of God, essentially going back to the incarnation, because she's not the Mother of God according to the divine nature, according to the human nature, right? So the praise of Mary in the Hail Mary is divided like the praise in the Sanctus and the Benedictus.

[50:32] When you get a CD, you know, with Mozart's Mass or something like that, you know, the Sanctus and the Benedictus they're always in a separate slot, right? And of course, the music changes. when he goes to the Sanctus and the, Benedictus, huh? Because he does have someone in the creed too. He goes from the divinity to the incarnation. The music always gets you know more gentle, more tender, and kind of you know, it just changes, you know.

[51:02] And I don't know what he's doing there, but so there you find that the rule of two or three is being used, huh? In both the creeds and in the praise of God, right? But sometimes it's the three, and sometimes it's the two. You have to see which one is more appropriate, huh? Let's look at the second article here. He proceeds thus to the second. It seems that in God there is a composition of form and matter.

[51:33] For everything that has a soul is composed of matter and form, because the soul is the form of a body. But Scripture attributes the soul to God. For it is

[51:47] introduced in Hebrews ten thirty eight for the person of God. My just one lives from faith, right? Which would be taken away, I guess, This will not please my soul, right? So God is said to have a soul, right? He must have a body, then. He must be composed of matter and form, right? That's kind of unusual. It's not very often that God is called soul, but there's something.

[52:15] Therefore, God is composed of matter and form. More, moreover, anger, joy, and things of this sort are passions of the what? The body and soul that could be conjunction, as is said in the first book about the soul. So you know, they say anger is a desire for revenge, but with a curdling of blood around the heart and so on, right? So, body and soul. But these passions are attributed to God in Scripture, for it is said he was angry with you, the Lord, over his people.

[52:51] Therefore, God is composed of matter and form. Moreover, matter is the principle of individuation. This is true of material things, right? But God seems to be an individual, for He is not set of many; He is not universal. Oh, therefore, He is composed from matter and form. But against this is that everything composed from matter and form is a body, for dimensive quantity is what first inheres in matter.

[53:23] But God is not a body; therefore, God is not composed from matter and form. I answer: It should be said that it is impossible, what, God to be matter, right? First, because matter is that which is in what ability or potency, right? And in the passive sense, it has been shown, however, that God is what pure act, not having something of potentiality. I know it's God being pure act is meaning backing up that He is non habens aliquid de potentia.

[53:59] So you're in the second figure of the main syllogism, right? Okay. So you know, someone says matter has ability. God is pure act. Can you syllogize on those two.

[54:16] No, you've got to say matter has or isn't ability, right? And God is not an ability. Then you syllogize: God is not matter, right? But you can reason from God being pure act to us not having any ability or not being ability. Yeah, yeah. So that's really kind of a backup thing, right? Yeah. You

[54:43] can see how important that thing was that Aristotle did in the ninth book of Wisdom, though, right? That act is simply before ability, and therefore the first being or the first cause must be pure act. Sure. He's going to use it a lot in there.

[54:59] The second, because everything composed from matter and form is perfect and good through its what form, whence is necessary that it be good by what partaking, right? According as matter partakes of form, but the very first

[55:23] good and the best thing, which is God, is not good through what participation, yeah, or partaking, because what is good per se, ens essentially good, is before what is good by partaking. Once it is impossible that God be composed from matter and form, that's kind of like an axiom that what is what

[55:50] soul essentially is the cause of what is soul by what participation. Is love reasonable? I mean, Shakespeare says love and reason keep a little company nowadays, It could be but

[56:14] is is love essentially reasonable? It doesn't have to. No, no. But it can partake of reason, right? Okay. What about anger? Is anger reasonable? It can be. I mean, when Christ is angry with the Pharisees for their hard heartedness, or when he chases them out of the temple, he has anger, right? But this is a reasonable anger, right? Yes.

[56:43] Is it reasonable essentially? Anger. No, it's reasonable by partaking of reason in some way. Yeah. And when you talk about the moral virtues. It's something of reason impressed upon the emotions and so on. So they're partaking of reason. Now, could if anger is reasonable only by participation, must there not be before it something that is reasonable? What? Essentially, right. That's reason itself, huh? So when Aristotle distinguishes the human virtues, he does so bearing in mind that man is the animal that has reason, right?

[57:30] And then you have two kinds of virtues: the virtues of reason itself, foresight, and art, and wisdom, and reason out knowledge, and so on, natural understanding. And then the virtues of what is not reason but can partake of reason, huh? And both the will and to some extent the emotions can partake of what reason, huh? And so the four cardinal virtues, right? One is in reason itself, and justice is in the will, and fortitude is in the irascible appetite, and temperance in the concupiscible appetite, huh?

[58:10] So if God is the first good, is He a good by participation, by partaking of the good? Okay. So you say God is not good by partaking of the good, huh? But what is composed of matter and form is good by partaking of the good. Therefore, God is not what composed of matter and form, huh?

[58:40] My old teacher, Kasurik, said, "You know, the problem is not really in formal logic, because the forms are, you know, fairly easy to see, and and they're used again and again and again, right? It's the question of the material, you know, that that's in the in that form that." Gives you difficulty, huh? People think that logic's going to solve their problems, right? Is it the main problem in thinking?

[59:03] Is what is the form of the argument, huh? Well, not really, huh? You can know something about the form, but there's just a few forms being being used again and again, and once gotten down, you know, you're set for life, huh? There's infinity of arguments, but the matter can give you trouble again and again, right?

[59:30] Um, okay, that's a nice argument, huh? Third, because each agent acts through its own form, right? Once, as something has itself to its form, so it has itself to this that it be what acting. huh? Now, notice, the reason why an agent is said to act to its form rather than its matter, is that every agent is going to give what. Actuality to something else, right? And through its form, it's an act, and therefore has something to give.

[1:00:08] But through its matter, it's more of what it sees rather than it is. Okay, then he's got a reason: since God is what is the first and through itself an agent, he's the first mover, the first maker, right? It's necessary that he be what first and through himself a form?

[1:00:31] But God is the first agent since he is the first efficient cause or maker. as has been shown. Therefore, he is through his what form and not composed of matter and form. So there is reasoning from God being the first mover or maker. he can be. he must be form alone, right?

[1:00:56] It's a little bit like the second argument in a sense. uh. If, if he was composed of matter and form, he would not be a mover or maker through himself, but through his form, right? And therefore, he wouldn't be a mover or maker to himself first, right? Because he wouldn't be the very first what mover or maker. Okay.

[1:01:26] So, as Boethius say, divina substantia forma est. It's interesting, even the first book of natural hearing, the first book, with the rude multitude called physics, right?

[1:01:43] Aristotle when he reasons against Plato, he takes a common thought that he and Plato have that form is something what godlike, right? Okay. And sometimes we explain that in terms of God is pure act, right? Form is act, so you're like God, huh? It's opposed to matter, which is ability to see, huh? So divina substantia forma est. It makes form very godlike, huh? Okay.

[1:02:18] So you don't want to have an unformed mind, do you? That would not be a godlike mind. Of course, charity is the form of the virtues, right? Interesting. So now you stand back and you kind of sit back in your chair and think. Now, let's see here. How many arguments? Three, right? Thomas seems to think three is enough. I noticed he does a lot in the in the questions disputatae too.

[1:02:46] he'll say, "hoc sufficit you know. These are enough, you know. And the Summa Contra Gentiles sometimes, you know, you have you know more than three, you know, it's kind of but maybe that is appropriate for a beginner, right? Huh. I have to see which one of those arguments, you know, that's just a tidbit for the mind. huh? Now, So, how does he prove that God is not matter and form?

[1:03:14] He's not looking at the text anymore. He's kind of going back and trying to try to remember what he says, you know. And sometimes you remember some of the arguments, not the other ones. Just say, oh, we need to go back. Oh, that's when I forgot. Okay, so how does he argue that God is not composed of form and matter? Does he argue from his being pure act?

[1:03:40] Do you argue from his being pure act? Doesn't that come? Doesn't that come in, but not not? I don't know. What is composed of matter and form has some ability in it, right? God has no ability Did he argue that way. I thought he did. Yeah. Huh? And then that his pure act would kind of back up that he has no ability, in the passive sense, right?

[1:04:06] I think that was one of the arguments, wasn't it? It might have even been the first first one, right? Okay. And then how else does he argue? Whatever.

[1:04:20] Participation. I'm trying to remember what? it was now. There he's talking about from goodness, right? That something is good to its form, right? This is brought out in the first book of Natural Hearing again, too, that form is something good, right? And lack of form is something bad, right? That's part of the common understanding that Aristotle has that form is something godlike and good and desirable,

[1:04:47] and matter is good only insofar as it desires the form. So if God was composed of matter and form, he'd be good by partaking of goodness, huh? And therefore, he'd be the first good. huh He wouldn't no he wouldn't No, no, I see that was like the second argument, wasn't it something like that. It was one of them Yeah, And and and what is so essentially must be before what is through by partaking, right?

[1:05:17] Just like I was saying with reasonable anger and reasonable love, if they're not reasonable essentially, they're you know they must be partaking of something that's reasonable essentially. And then what's the third way That third way of reasoning too if I remember. The third way of reasoning. So that's the first mover. Yeah. Yeah. That's something is a mover or a maker through its form and not all its matter, right?

[1:05:44] And so something that's composed of matter and form is a little like the second argument I was saying. He's partaking of what of the ability to be a mover or a maker, right? But God is the very first one.

[1:06:01] So if he's first and through himself. the mover or maker he must be just form and therefore I was quoting Boethius God divina substantia forma est. No matter there.

[1:06:16] Okay, reply to the objections here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the soul is attributed to God by likeness of act.

[1:06:28] For when we wish something for us, it is from our soul. Whence what is pleasing to the soul, of, God is what is pleasing to His what will. But I think I think God is rarely called a soul, isn't he? Right. In scripture, and I think that kind of confirms what Thomas is saying: that the exception proves the rule. You don't find this around very much because you might make the mistake of thinking God is a soul, right?

[1:06:55] Right. Where God is the soul of the world or something, right? Huh. You know, people thought that. We're not supposed to make the mistake of thinking God is a stone, right? I'm not going to worship a stone myself. But I might worship the soul of the world if that's what he is. Right. You know, and they they they sacrifice to the various parts of the world because he's the soul of the world.

[1:07:18] Okay. Anger and other passions of this sort are according to a likeness of the effect, because it is proper to the one angry to punish, right? And therefore,

[1:07:37] his his actually his justice is usually said to be what. Anger. Anger, metaphorically signifies God's what? Justice, Justice, right? Okay. So these are, something like the other objections. Now the third objection is a little bit different, there, right? Because the guy was thinking about in material things, individuation is due to your your matter, right? But that's not true. Even the angels, huh? No matter. To the third, therefore, it should be said that forms which are receptible in matter are individuated through matter, right?

[1:08:20] So the shape of the top of your mug there in mind, right? Are individually not the same circle, are they? Because they're in different parts of matter.

[1:08:33] Um. So they are individuated through matter, which is not able to be another, since it is the first subject standing under them. A form, however, as far as itself is concerned, unless something prevents it, is able to be received by many, like this circular shape. But that form which is not receptible in matter, but is subsisting through itself, by itself. From this very fact is what Individuated.

[1:09:05] that it cannot be received in another right and such a form is what God right, Whence it does not follow that he what Has matter. Has matter right Now it's interesting sometimes there's a famous passage there in Saint Paul there where he says when he was in the form of God he did not yeah and he took on the form of man right well form of God means the the divine substance divine nature so that's that's one place where it's called form right okay now form is used sometimes you know

[1:09:47] for what we call species in logic and then form could involve matter but that's a different sense of the word right you know sometimes like we might speak of the forms of Government, right? That means the species, the particular kind of government, and then species could imply what? Matter and form, right? And that's a different use of the word form.

[1:10:16] But that's one place at least where form is applied to the very divine nature huh Divina substantia forma est.