Prima Pars
18. Summa Theologiae I, Q.3, Articles 5–6: God is in no genus and has no accidents
Class of 2006-02-16
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/018-summa-theologiae-i-q-3-articles-5-6-god-is-in-no-genus-and/

[0:00] So let's start for a moment here before we begin the fifth article here. And if you, I may not recall, but we said something about before in the fifth book of wisdom, right? where Aristotle distinguishes the meanings of the words used, especially in wisdom, right? And in the axioms, right? But to some extent, what everywhere, right? He distinguishes four senses of whole and part.

[0:40] But as you know, distinction of four is hard to grasp. And perhaps you could see a distinction there as he begins between the composed whole and universal whole, right?

[0:57] Now the composed whole, as the name indicates, is put together from its parts, but is not set of its parts. So the chair is put together from the legs and the seat and the back, but the back is not a chair, the seat is not a chair, the leg is not a chair. So it's put together from its parts, but not set of them, right?

[1:29] A statement is put together from a noun and a verb, right? But a noun is not a statement, verb is not a statement. Now the universal whole is just the reverse. It's set of its parts, but not put together from them. So animal is set of dog and cat and horse and elephant, but animal is not put together from dog, cat, horse and elephant. Otherwise, when you say a dog is an animal, you'd be saying a dog is composed of a cat, a horse and elephant, and so on.

[2:01] Which would be like John Locke speaking, you know, the universal idea of triangles being, you know, all none of these particular kinds of triangles.

[2:12] Now I've asked myself sometimes, why doesn't Thomas have a question? where the question is, where the God is parts, right? And where you eliminate that God is composed whole, and also that God is a what universal? whole. Well, I found in sentences one of the questions you have two articles right next to each other. Oh, at those two, right? Okay. But how about the Summa? Well, in a way, in this question on the simplicity of God, you're showing that there's no composition God, and therefore eliminating any kind of composed whole, right?

[2:56] But when you show that God is one. There's only one God. Then you show that God is not a universal whole, instead of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, or you know many gods, right? So in a way, that God is not a universal whole

[3:17] is shown, and show that God is one, right? Okay. But here you show that God is not a composed whole. Now, in the fifth book of wisdom, Aristotle distinguishes three composed wholes, and the first one he talks about is the quantitative whole, the whole we usually have in mind when we say a whole is more than one of its parts, right? And of course, in a quantitative whole, it's most known, I suppose, as the continuous quantitative whole, the parts being at a common boundary and so on, right?

[3:55] Okay. Now the other kind he distinguishes are is this essential whole, right? And in reality, it's matter and what form, okay? That's quite different from the quantitative whole. Okay. In the quantitative whole, all the parts are to the whole as ability is to act, right? But in the essential whole, one part is to the other its ability to act. Now the definition is more on the side of the mind, right?

[4:27] But the genus is taken of what is material, and the difference of what is what form, right? Okay. Now what has Thomas done in these articles leading up to just the first five articles, right? Well, in the first article he's eliminated the quantitative whole, right? Because God is not a what? Body. A body, right? Okay. Then the second thing he did in the second article was to eliminate what?

[4:56] Matter and form, Matter and form, right? Okay. But you could say, like the distinction between matter and form, is what he does in the third article and the fourth article. In the third article, you have the essence or nature and God are the same, right? But if they were distinct as they are in you and me, our nature is to its individual in us something like form is to matter, but it's not exactly the same thing that you could attach here, right?

[5:29] It's related, huh? And then existence, right? In the nature, you deny that composition that you have in creatures, or the existence of the creature, right? The existence of a cat and what a cat is are not the same thing, but in God they're the same. What God is and his existence are the same, but that's a little bit like matter and form too, insofar as existence is to the what nature, where they're distinct as that to ability, right?

[6:02] And I was mentioning how in the Summa Contra Gentiles after he shows that that in the angels there is a composition of nature and existence. He wants you to see that that's not the same thing as matter and form, and he has a chapter devoted to showing that difference, right? But people might confuse those two because both we have actability, huh?

[6:27] We see how he's ordered those three articles: the second, third, and fourth, right? And the third is more like the second, right? Because the nature is more like the form than existence is, right? But still, there is a likeness between those three. Now we get the fifth article where he's going to eliminate, but that God is in a genus and so on, and the definition is composed of genius and difference, huh?

[6:54] And there's several chapters you know, go into this in Summa Contra Gentiles, right? So you can see, he's following the order, here, right? Okay. Now the sixth article you'll see is something different because in denying the composition between of substance and accident that you have in creatures of God, even in creatures, strictly speaking, substance and accident don't form a whole. Okay, so I might be, for example, a man, and let's say I'm healthy.

[7:29] I suppose that's doubtful, but let's say I'm healthy. But as healthy man, a whole, you see, strictly speaking, no. But there's a kind of composition there, right? Okay. Or I'm a logical man, right? I'm known for my some understanding of logic, anyway, right? Okay. I don't want to say I'm a wise man, but. a geometrical man, maybe. Do you see that, right? Or a white man, right?

[8:00] But that's not strictly speaking a whole, right? It's an unum per accidens, we'd say, huh? Okay. So that's put after the first five. You can say the first five articles are. And this is around these two kinds of wholes, right? But the third and the fourth articles ones that are like the second one, right? Okay. You see a little bit the order that Thomas has here.

[8:29] To the fifth, he proceeds. One proceeds. Thus, it seems that God is not that God is in some genus, huh? Now, remember the definition of genus from logic, huh? You might

[8:46] be sensible and take genus as as a name, right? Is that what we call a genus? Yeah. Differing in kind, right, or in species, but in answer to the question, what is it, huh? Okay. So it's a name said with one meaning of many things other than kind. Signifying what it is, right? Okay. So

[9:10] it seems that God is in some genus, for substance is a being what existing, subsisting by itself, right? As opposed to an accident, which is a thing that exists in another and can't exist apart from it, right? Okay. So this belongs most of all to God, right? That He be ends per se, Therefore, God is in the genus of what substance, huh? Okay. Now Thomas will point out, I assume here, like he does in the Summa Contra Gentiles that ends the genus per se is not a fully adequate understanding of what Aristotle means by the genus substance.

[9:52] Okay, and if he doesn't give the real definition of the of substance. I here will bring it in from the other summa. Okay. Moreover, each thing is measured by something of its own kind, of its own genus.

[10:16] Now, as in English, we sometimes use the word "kind" for genus, huh? And etymologically, you know, if you say something is sui generis, huh? What's the what would be idiomatic way of saying that in English? One of a kind of its own kind? Yeah, one of a kind. Yeah, one of a kind, sui generis, of its own genus. Yes, but we'd say idiomatic in English "one of a kind."

[10:42] But "kind" can be used sometimes for for species as well as genus, huh? So a general kind of thing, a particular kind of thing, right? But "kind" is is is somewhat similar etymologically, maybe to genus too. If "kin" is in their like generation.

[11:02] Moreover, each thing is measured by something of its own kind, of its own genus, as links by links, huh? And number by number, but God is the measure of all substances, as is clear through the commentator. And who's called the commentator? It's Averroes,

[11:26] because he commented on on all the major works of Aristotle, right? So he was known as the commentator by Averroes. Although I think Thomas deserves the title more than Averroes, but Thomas will follow the tradition, right, the custom, and refer to Averroes sometimes by the name of Averroes, but sometimes he refers to him as the commentator of the capital C, just like he refers to Aristotle by Aristotle as the philosopher or Saint Paul as the what the apostle.

[11:55] Yeah. Now notice it's in in the commentator's comments on the tenth book of wisdom, right? Tenth book of the metaphysics, and that's the book on the one and the many, right? And of course, one we first see as the beginning of number, and then later on we realized that the one convertible with being is not the same as that. We'll see that when we get to the question on on one, where Thomas would explain that again.

[12:22] But it's a kind of a property of the one, especially that it's the beginning of number, to be the measure, right? So every number is measured by one, and then you kind of carry that idea over that the one is the measure of the many to what other genera and so on. So I've often thought, Thomas, why doesn't he have another question after the question that God is one, that God is the measure of all things, huh?

[12:49] Because that is an attribute of God too, huh? But didn't do that, okay? But he would admit, you know, the commentator's saying here. And other places, Thomas will talk about God being the measure of all things, but he doesn't have to one here.

[13:14] But against this is the genus is before, according to understanding, what is contained in genus. But nothing is before God, neither secundum rem nor what, even understanding. Therefore, God is not in some genus, huh? Okay. So Thomas begins by bringing out a distinction. I answer: It should be said that something is in a genus in two ways. In one way, simply and what properly, huh? As a species which is contained under the genus, huh?

[13:56] In another way, by being led back to it, huh? As principles and privations, right? Okay. So where would you put the soul? or genus. In substance. Okay, but is the soul a substance or part of a substance? It's more part. Yeah, or a principle of a substance, right? Okay. But you would nevertheless bring it back to a genus, right? Mm. And what genus would you put for privation, like, say, blindness, right?

[14:27] Quality. Yeah, you'd bring it back to quality, right? Okay. But strictly speaking, simply and properly, a quality, right? The lack of a quality. Yeah, yeah.

[14:41] But you can distinguish and order things by the categories, which are not species. Yeah. Okay. But because of the beginning of some species, or because of the lack of some species, or privation of some species, just as point and unity are reduced to the genus of what quantity, as beginnings, right? That's especially clear about the point. The point is the beginning of a line, right? A line is a what species of continuous quantity, so it's in the genus of quantity.

[15:18] But is point a what quantity? No. So it's not simpliciter et proprie, simply and properly, in the category of quantity, right? Mm. But it's. The reduction. Yeah. Led back again there, right? Because it is the beginning of a what quantity, right? The continuous, huh? And strictly speaking, is the one a what? Quantity. Yeah. Is it a number? No. You know, it's one of these mixed up moderns, you know.

[15:49] Okay. And I think I mentioned how Shakespeare, you know, in the is it the Turtle and the Phoenix there, the love poem there, you know, love has made the lover and the loved one, right? And therefore, it's murdered number, right? So Shakespeare understands that one is not a number, right? Okay. And where is that? Where is that setting? Phoenix, and the Turtle, yeah. Okay. Yeah. And as I say I don't have a number of wives, as I tell my students.

[16:24] Yeah, or a number of heads. I have a number of arms, a number of legs. because two is the first number, right? Okay. But notice one is closer to being a number than point is to being a what? A quantity, or yeah, yeah. And and one sign of that is that, an analogy, that a number is composed of ones, right? By a line is not composed of points, but also the fact that one can have to a number the same ratio that number has to a number.

[17:02] So one is to two as what? Two, four. Two is to four, three is to six, right? But a point is not to a line as a line is to a line, right? Yeah. Okay.

[17:16] Now a couple footnotes to that. There's a theorem in the science of numbers there, where you have to see to maintain the truth of the theorem that Euclid is calling one a number there, right? See. And it's an equivocal use of the word number, but it's not purely equivocal by chance. It's it's a theorem where he says that

[17:47] numbers in the least ratio, right? The least of numbers in the same ratio measure all other numbers in the same ratio. Oh. Okay. Well, if you take let's say the ratio three to six, two to four, right? Well, two to four would be the the smallest ones in that ratio, right? They're still numbers in the original sentence, but two doesn't measure three and four six. So you got to go all the way down to one and two because one measures two and two measures four.

[18:22] One measures three, two measures six, right? So he's extending the word what? Yeah. To include one, right? Okay. But that's an analogous use of the word, right? Yeah, but the difference of a point to the point

[18:42] cannot have to a line the ratio that number has. I mean, the line has to a line, right? Okay. Okay. Chris Thomas makes use of that fact, right? When he's talking about

[18:56] is God and creatures better than God alone? And Thomas says no. He says, well, it's the man now. I say, and Thomas gives a little likeness there, that there's an infinite distance between God's goodness and the goodness of the creature. So the goodness of the creature is not to God like a shorter line is to a longer line, but like a point is to a line. And a point added to a line makes the line no what A little longer.

[19:29] A little longer. Yeah. Okay. That's a beautiful way of doing it right. Or the other way he shows it, of course, is that the creature partakes of the goodness of God, right? And Dwayne Berquist, and a part of Dwayne Berquist, and the arm of Dwayne Berquist is no more than Dwayne Berquist alone. So God, what partakes of God divine goodness is no better than God alone, you know.

[19:52] And to me, that helps me understand how gratuitous is God's making us, right? Yeah. Because it adds nothing. To his goodness, huh? You know. So, point and one are reduced to the genus of quantity as beginnings, right? Mm-hmm. Blindness and all privations reduced to the genus of its habit, right? Mm-hmm. So ignorance we might put in the category of quality, not in genere proprie, but what by reduction, right?

[20:28] Mm-hmm. Because it's a lack of of the quality you have. But now he says in neither way is God in a genus, right? Mm-hmm. Neither as a species, a particular kind of that general kind of thing, right? Nor even as a what principle that is limited, huh? Now he's going to spend most of the arguments. He's going to give three arguments here that he's not in there as a species, right?

[21:02] And then later on that he's not in there as what? Principle. Yeah, yeah, yeah, and these separate reasons, right? That he is not able to be the species of some genus is able to be shown in three ways, huh? You see how important is the what for this is Porphyry's work, the Isagoge, right? Mm-hmm. You know, most philosophers I run into now have not read the Isagoge, and some of them have not even heard of it.

[21:39] You know what's that passage in the Acts of the Apostles? You know, and the Holy Spirit. Have you seen the Holy Spirit? We've not even heard of him yet, have we?

[21:50] Yeah. And the the Isagoge gets its name because Isagoge is the Greek word for what introduction. Logically it's the same thing, and this is like an introduction to the categories of Aristotle, but it's useful for other things too. But it just got called from after some time just the Isagoge, and then they understood the name by Antonio Messiah You know, this is the introduction to logic, and logic is the you know is before all the other sciences, so you got to know this thing, you know, and they haven't even heard of it, the Isagogi.

[22:30] how could you understand this if you didn't know what a species was and a genus is, huh? The species now is the name of a particular kind of thing placed under a genus, right? And of which the genus is said and answered the question, what is it? So dog is placed under animal, right? Or virtue is placed under habit, or justice is placed under virtue, and so on.

[22:54] Okay. Now that it is not able to be the species of some genus is shown three ways. First, because the species is constituted from the genus and the what Differences. differences, huh? Okay.

[23:15] But always that from which is taken the difference constituting the species has itself to that whence the genus is taken as act is to potency. And even Porphyry points it out, right? That the genus, in a way, is to what the differences, right? As as matter is to form, its ability is to act, huh? Okay. And so when we're talking about the difficulties, say that Anaxagoras has in understanding matter, right?

[23:50] And the difficulty he has is that he's putting everything matter is able to be actually in matter, and he's got a he has problems putting it all in there and so on. But in a way, John Locke has the same difficulty, right? About the genus, right? Because when he's talking about triangle in general, he wants to what say it's equilateral, scalene, isosceles. It's all none of these, right?

[24:22] And it's a little bit like Anaxagoras saying that everything's inside of everything, and infinitely small pieces, and all these other problems he gets into. And then you see the lightness there, right? Okay. So just as matter can be what

[24:40] formed in different ways, right? So the genus can be determined by various differences, huh? Okay. So if you're going to ask, you know, what is the

[24:54] what is triangle in general? Are the three sides equal, or just two of them, and none of them? It's open to all of them, but it's none in itself. Yeah, it's not actually any of these, but it's able to be all of them, right? Okay. That's something like wood is able to be a chair, a table, a door, and so on. But as wood, it's not actually any one of these until it gets its form.

[25:16] Okay. So always that from which is taken the difference constituting the species has itself to that whence is taken the genus as act is to what potency. That's where Aristotle talks about these, and Thomas will see definition as being more like a composition of matter and form than like the quantity, the one, right? Okay.

[25:50] For animal is taken from the what sensitive nature by way of concretion. For that is said to be an animal that has. A sensing nature, but rational is taken from the intellectual nature because rational is what has intellectual nature. But the intellectual is compared to the sensitive as act is to what ability, and similarity is manifest in any case of genus and difference. Hence, since in God, potency is not what joined to act; it's pure act.

[26:34] ion It is impossible that he be a species in some what Genus. Genus, huh? Can be a composition again of potency and act. Secondly, because since the being of God is his essence or nature, as has been shown, if God were in some genus, it would be necessary that his genus be being.

[27:06] For genus signifies the essence of a thing, since it is predicated in as regards what the thing is, right? But the philosopher in the third book of wisdom

[27:21] shows that being is not able to be the genus of something, for every genus has differences which are outside the nature of the genus. But no difference can be found which is outside being, because non-being is not able to be a difference. Hence, it remains that God is not in a genus. Sometimes, in English, you can see that more easily with something invertible with being there, namely something, right?

[27:52] Okay, can something be a genus? No, no, because it was a genus; it had to have differences. The difference would have to be something, right? So, you'd be dividing something by something, right? Okay, so

[28:14] no, that's an argument based on what the previous what. We have some previous articles. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Was the fourth article, isn't it? Okay, okay, but the first one is going back to something more general that God is what pure act, right, which was shown at the beginning of the the question, right? That's

[28:42] the very first article, right, about the God is pure act, huh? And the Summa Contra Gentiles is an old chapter just for that purpose, right? You know, it's more specifically laid out, right? This whole chapter It's the foundation for the whole consideration of the substance of God, right?

[29:04] Third, because all things which are in one genus come together in the what it is, or the nature or the essence of that genus, which is predicated of them as regards what they are, but they differ by their what being, right? Huh? For there is not the same being of man and of horse, nor of this man or of what that man. And thus it is necessary that whatever things are in a genus, that they differ in them their being and what they are, essence.

[29:41] In God, however, they don't differ, right? Once is manifest that God is not in a genus as a what species, huh? Okay. For the second and third arguments are both from God being what being itself, right? And being can't be a genus, right? That's a genus it had to be. in Because genus signifies a substance, right? And then, because when you have, you know, any universe or for that matter, the many that are beneath it differ in their existence, huh?

[30:13] But they have a common nature, huh? And therefore, God would have to differ his nature, his existence, if he could be in a genus.

[30:23] And from this, it is clear that he does not have a genus, right? Nor does he have differences. Nor is there a definition of him that came before, right? Okay. Because a kind of whole right Huh Okay

[30:36] Because the definition is from genus and difference, right? Nor is there any demonstration of him, right? Because the middle term in a definition or demonstration, rather, is definition. Going back to the posterior analytics. Okay. So by those three arguments, now he eliminates that God is what. In the genus. Yeah, Yeah. The first one is taken from God being pure act, and the other two from God being I am who am, right?

[31:10] That's just being the same. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. The two separate arguments, right? Now he wants to eliminate the other way of being in a genus by reduction, huh? Okay. Don't fence me in, huh?

[31:31] We're always amused as philosophers. Now the the Latin word for the categories of Aristotle, the ten highest genera, is predicamentum. This has come in English now to mean a predicament. Is it? What's kind of funny now, because the the more abstract word you might say, you know, has become now, you know, kind of concrete in our human situation, right? I'm in a real predicament, you know. I'm in.

[31:56] And I guess the the likeness is that when you're in predicament, there seems to be no way out, right? You know, no matter what you do, I mean, I'm in a predicament. And if you're in a genus, strictly speaking, you can't get out. Oh. I mean, man can't go over to, you know, quality be a quality to a substance, right? And and geometry can't get out of quality to become a substance, you know.

[32:18] Oh. Once you're in a predicament, predicament, you're you're fixed, right? You know. So God is not in a predicament. There's, but Aristotle had his predicaments. Yeah. Now that God is not in a genus by reduction as a beginning is manifest from this that the beginning that is led back to some genus does not extend itself beyond that genus, huh? As the point is a beginning of nothing except what continuous quantity.

[33:01] And the unit of discrete quantity, number. But God is the beginning of the whole being, right? As will be shown below. Hence, He's not contained in some genus as a what? Yeah, or beginning. Speak English, okay? Okay.

[33:23] So I'm convinced now that God is not right. So there's no composition of this kind, right? Thomas does it by showing that God doesn't have a genus, right? No differences, therefore no definition.

[33:47] So, eliminating these three kinds of composed whole, right? But founding upon the second kind, two things are somewhat similar to that, right? Okay. And now he's talking about something a little bit different here in the sixth article, right?

[34:07] Because I don't think Aristotle would consider healthy man or white man or wise man as a whole, strictly speaking, huh? It's a little less unity than that. Okay. It's unum per accidens, because one thing happens to another. But he's going to be complete in eliminate that kind of composition too, huh? Okay. So in me, there's a composition between me and my knowledge, or me and my health.

[34:39] But in God, there's not going to be any composition of that sort either. To the sixth, he proceeds. One proceeds thus. It seems that in God there are some accidents, huh? Okay.

[34:58] For substance is not a what? Accident to anything, as is said in the first book of Physics, in natural hearing. But therefore, is an accident in one thing cannot be a substance in another, right?

[35:15] Think of his predicament, right? Just as it's proven that heat is not the substantial form of fire, because in other things it is a what? Accident, right? Third species of quality. But wisdom and virtue and other things of this sort, which in us are accidents, right? These are attributed to God, right? And therefore, they must be in God accidents, huh? It's pretty convincing, right?

[35:50] Oh, excuse me. We didn't do the reply to the objection, did we? in the previous article? Yeah, yeah, okay, okay. Let's go back and do that first, huh? Okay.

[36:05] Now the first objection, if you remember, was saying that substance means ends per se, right? Being by itself or being through itself. This most of all belongs to God.

[36:18] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the name of substance not only signifies this which is to be what by itself, because this that is to be is not able to be by itself. A genus as has been shown, Aristotle in the third book of metaphysics, but signifies an essence to which it belongs to be. That is to be by itself, which nevertheless being is not its very essence, and thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of substance.

[36:57] Now in the Summa Contra Gentiles, it's a little more clear. And then he's showing that God is not in the genus of substance. He says what is meant by the genus of substance there is a res. He says, "Quid conveniat esse non in alio a thing right now. Thing is taken from what having a nature right. Okay, so a thing whose nature it is right, a thing to which belongs right to be not in another, isn't a subject right?

[37:48] Okay, so there's in the notion of what substance is a distinction between the what the nature the thing and the being that it has right, and the thing that has a nature such that it has this kind of being rather than being another right. Or naturally it would be a res cui conveniat esse in alio right? Okay, so in this understanding of substance, there's a distinction between the the thing and its nature and the existence of the thing of nature, and in that sense God could not be substance right.

[38:28] Now if by substance you meant simply something that exists by itself, then you could say God's a substance, and sometimes we speak of the substance of God, right? And sometimes Aristotle will call God a substance in that way, right? But not the substance which is the first of the ten categories, the first of the ten highest genera, right? And in any genus, you've got to have a distinction between the nature of the thing, which is common to all the things, and the existence of each one of them, which will be distinct.

[38:59] So the existence of the thing in its nature will not be the same. And therefore, something like God, for whom existence and the nature the same, cannot be in that kind of genus. huh Or any genus Because in genus, there's a distinction between the nature and the existence. Okay. I guess it's a little nicer said than here, but same idea is expressing here, right? Okay. Significat essentiam cui competit sic esse.

[39:32] id est per se esse, right? Okay. It signifies a nature to which it belongs to exist in this way, right? When you say cui conveniat, you're indicating that the existence is not the what nature, right? Okay. As they say, accident would be the other, a thing whose nature is such that it belongs to it to be in another. Okay. But it signifies in essence to which belongs to be thus, that is to be by itself, not another.

[40:10] Which nevertheless, which being nevertheless, is not as very what essence, right? And thus it is clear that God is not in the genus of what substance, huh?

[40:24] The second objection was taken from God being the measure of things, and the measure being in the same genus, right? And Thomas says, well, that's good about a measure that is proportion, right? Okay. For this is homogeneous with the measured, right? But God is not a measure proportioned to anything, huh? He is said nevertheless to be the measure of all things. From this, that each thing so much has a being as it what approaches him, huh?

[40:58] That reminds me of the the disagreement between Plato and Aristotle, right? Plato has the idea that the perfect is the measure of the imperfect, huh? And

[41:16] therefore, you need something perfect as a measure of our own goodness, right? Okay. And Aristotle says, well, that's fine, you know, but the measure has to be known. So Aristotle says the virtuous man is the measure. Plato's saying no, the good itself is the measure, right? There's a kind of tension there between Plato and Aristotle because Aristotle sees truth in what Plato says, right? That the perfect is the measure of the imperfect.

[41:52] But he also sees that the measure has to be known, so you can use it, right? So there's no way to really resolve that, right? Now, when Thomas gives the reasons for the incarnation, and following the great Augustine, Augustine says, you know, God should be followed, right?

[42:18] Be perfect, even as your Heavenly Father is perfect. God should be followed, but He's not seen. Man is seen, but He's not a perfect model to follow.

[42:31] You have a predicament here, right? How's it solved? By God becoming man, right? Then you're a perfect model to follow, and yet it can be what no, right? See. But these poor chief philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, didn't know nothing about the incarnation, right? Okay.

[42:55] So. Aristotle or Plato was saying, you know, the perfect is a measure of the imperfect, huh? And Aristotle's insisting the measure has to be known to be used, but there's no adequate way of resolving that except the incarnation.

[43:14] That way of thinking of the two chief philosophers helps us to understand better how the incarnation is a solution of their problem, right? As well, as a solution of many other problems too. but. I mean, that problem in particular, right?

[43:34] When Christ says that's kind of, he says a similar tangent in the Sermon on the Mount, right? Be perfect, even as your Heavenly Father is perfect, and

[43:44] well, he's taking what what is the one who's altogether perfect, right? You know, the perfect, the sense of perfect is lacking in nothing, right? That he Aristotle himself distinguishes in the fifth book of Wisdom, the same book he talks about perfect, but that perfect thing called the Father is not very well known to us, right? Yes, sir. So we got a problem, right? Okay.

[44:14] So if we take the virtuous man, we take someone who's known to us, right? And therefore, we have a known measure, but usually find some defects in these men. That's the old thing. No man is a hero to his valet. That was the old saying. My politician friends always quote that, you know, and you get to know some of these people, you know, you realize that they're not so not so perfect, you know, and not so worthy of imitating, you know, and so on.

[44:52] So. Okay, so let's go back now to whether God is whether in God there are some accidents, right? So the first objection is saying, hey, if something is in the the categories of accidents, like a quality, it's stuck there, right? Huh? So things like wisdom, he says, and virtue, right, which are in the category of quality, they're said of God, then there must still be accidents, right?

[45:26] They can't get out of their predicament, so. Moreover, in each genus there is one thing that is first, huh? But many are the genre of accidents. If therefore the first of those genera are not in God, there will be many things first outside of God. Which is inconvenient to say the least.

[45:58] Not fitting. But against this, every accident is in a what subject? God, however, is not able to be a subject because a simple form is not able to be a subject, as Boethius says in the book about the Trinity. Huh? That's really a magnificent book. Have you ever read that? And it's interesting. Monsignor Dionne said, you know, they say this is by Boethius, you know, but so even more perfect in his other works, you know, doesn't seem to be by the same man, you know.

[46:34] But somehow the occasion here made him rise up. To me, to me, Boethius is the greatest mind there between Augustine and Thomas, huh? In the church, huh? To be, be somebody. When when did when did he he was that was he he wasn't after Augustine was he? Yeah, after Augustine, but something like like four eighty five twenty five something like that. For something a little before, yeah.

[47:00] Augustine's a little earlier, right? Yeah, yeah. And and he he you know followed Augustine and and studied the Trinity right and seeing that the relation multiplies eternity and so on huh? Yeah. Thomas has a great deal of respect for Boethius.

[47:21] Of course, the definition of person comes from Boethius. The definition of eternity, many definitions come from Boethius. So. Of course, the Consolation of Philosophy is so famous that Chaucer made a translation of English. Elizabeth the first was working on translation though. Yeah, yeah, and yeah. Washington Irving talks about it too in his sketches. Huh? Boethius, something. You can see in you can see in the Consolation of Philosophy how he kind of you know sometimes he speaks more like a Platonist, sometimes more like Aristotle, right?

[48:08] You see his balancing, huh? He sings. Ah. Therefore, in God, there is not able to be an accident, because God is a simple form, right? Divina substantia forma est says Boethius. I answer. It should be said that according to the things that have been gone before, it manifestly appears that in God there is no accident. Now the first argument is going to be from pure act again, right?

[48:51] To hold on to that pure act, to hold on to the. thing you learned in the ninth book of wisdom, right? Aristotle showed that what the order of act and ability, right? And that act is simply speaking before ability, even in time. That although the thing that goes from ability to act is an ability before it's an act, it does so because of something already an act.

[49:17] So simply, act is before ability, and therefore, what is before all other things, the first being, the first cause, must be pure act. First, because the subject is compared to the accident in some way as ability to act. For the subject is by the accident in some way an act. So I am healthy by my health, right? I am a geometer by my science of geometry, right?

[49:50] I am a logician by my science of logic, right? I am just by my virtue of justice, right? Okay. But to be in potency is altogether removed from God, as is clear from the fourth Metaphysics. So let's figure the syllogism again, the second figure, right?

[50:20] So what has an accident is an ability. God is not an ability, right? In the passive sense. Secondly, because God is His own what? Existence, right? And as Boethius says in the book de Hebdomadibus, although that which is can have something other adjoined to it, huh? To ipsum esse nothing other can be adjoined to it, huh? Just as what is hot is able to have something extraneous than hot, as whiteness, but heat itself, nothing besides heat.

[51:03] Okay. Nice idea there, right? Um. In trying to take the abstract here, um, can the healthy, for example, let's take one's example here. Can the healthy be something besides healthy? Yeah, here's here's one who's healthy. Let's assume, and this healthy is white. This healthy is a magician, right? So the healthy can be something other than healthy, right?

[51:56] But now, what is the difference in meaning between healthy and health itself? And abstract and concrete. Well, health itself is that by which the healthy is healthy, right? Now, can there be any geometry or any whiteness in health itself? No, because then geometry would be that by which the healthy is healthy, which is laughable, right? Okay. So in health itself, there's nothing beyond that by which the healthy is healthy, right?

[52:37] Okay. So it can't have anything extraneous in it, right? Now, same with existence, then, right? That which exists can be something besides existing, right?

[52:57] But existence is that by what exists exists, right? And could existence itself have anything in addition? That's what God is. Existence itself, so you can't have anything else, right? That's a very subtle argument, right? But but the great greatest develops that, and that they have the body goes up.

[53:37] So if you understand the difference there between healthy and health, right? Or between wise and wisdom, right? Okay, the wise could be something besides wise, right?

[53:55] But wisdom is signifying that by which the wise are wise, right? So can there be any whiteness in wisdom itself? Any health in wisdom itself? No, no.

[54:13] Okay. So if God is what not only exists but his existence itself, can he have anything extraneous? What accident would be, huh? But then you're piping sh* t. Third, because everything that is through itself is before that which is through what happening, right? When, since God is simply the first being, right? In Him, is not possible that there be anything accidental. But neither accidents per se in Him are able to be, as the laughable, I mean the ability to laugh, is a per se accident or property of man, because accidents of this sort are caused from the principles of the subject, huh?

[55:24] But in God, nothing is able to be caused, since He is the first cause. Whence, it remains that in God there is what no accident, right? Okay. Nothing ever happens to God.

[55:41] Either from something outside of him, right? Or even from his very nature, anything happened to him, right? Okay. Very dull life, the old guys.

[55:53] It's interesting. Somebody told me that when you're reading Scripture, the Old Testament says the word of the Lord came to the prophet. Yeah. In Hebrew, it really means the word happened to the prophet. Yeah. Yeah.

[56:13] Okay. Now, to the first objection, Thomas is saying, "Well, you think that virtue and wisdom, instead of God, have the same meaning as when they said of us, right? But that ain't so. Okay. And this will be more manifested in the twelfth and thirteenth ones. The twelfth reading or a twelfth question will be about our knowledge of God, and the thirteenth, our naming of him, right? And of course, we name him as we know him.

[56:40] That's why the order, twelve and thirteen. Now, we have to talk about how we know God before we can understand fully how we name him, right? Because that principle, nothing is said univocally of God and us. That'll be brought out fully at that time, as we says infra below. Right? Will become clear.

[57:03] But going back to the Isagoge, the distinction of the five names in the Isagoge genus, difference species, property and accident, is a complete distinction of names said univocally of many things. And one of the arguments in the Summa Contra Gentiles shows that there's no name of those five kinds. Therefore, nothing is said univocally of God and creatures. But this will be taken up later on more explicitly.

[57:42] So it's especially the genus of these things that is dropped when you carry the name over to God. Okay. Now, the second objection was saying, "What about something being first and besides God? " To the second, it should be said that since substance is before accidents, the beginnings of accidents are reduced to the beginnings of what substance, as to something before.

[58:15] So, although God is not what is the first thing contained in the genus of substance, but He's the first thing outside every genus with respect to the whole of being. Okay. Now, I'm going to be looking at Article Seven next time. But notice what Thomas has been doing up to this point in the first six articles. He's been eliminating different kinds of composition that you find in creature, right?

[58:46] The composition of legs and arms and liver and heart and other parts in me, huh? The composition of body and soul in me, right? Huh? The composition of What I am and myself, right? The composition of what I am in my existence, right? The composition of being my accidents, right? He's eliminated all of them, right?

[59:11] So, in the seventh article, inductively, you can say, well, we've eliminated all the kinds of composition that there are. Therefore, there's no composition of God, right? But then you give other arguments, you know, to show universally there's no composition of God, right? And

[59:33] I think I mentioned before; I would mention again here: the order is just to reverse the summa contra gentiles. In summa contra gentiles, he shows in general that there's no composition of God, and then he descends to some to different particular kinds. Right here, he does just to reverse order, right? So this is more proportion to the student, right? Because you're being led from the less universal to the more universal, and this is, what. He says about manuductio here in question what one seventeen article one right you know proposiciones minus universales right you're being led by the hand right through these six articles and then you're going to get a thing about the simplicity of God omnino, altogether universal here right in the seventh one right

[1:00:25] huh okay so we're leading you up gradually right huh okay see that but in a sense you can see that the Summa Theologiae is a more proportion to a student than the Summa Contra Gentiles huh I was reading a question this morning there in the a chapter in this Summa Contra Gentiles this morning and let's see thirteen arguments I'm trying to remember all of them, you know at least for the time being yeah I'll forget them tomorrow but you know just for for today remember the thirteen arguments you know and don't ask me to give them all right now but it's not as proportion to a beginner you know you don't need thirteen arguments you know three good arguments is more than enough huh huh

[1:01:10] for people you know so you chew on these things huh but it's it's kind of fun to to read the Summa Contra Gentiles and then go to these other works and see you know oh yeah well we got fifteen arguments here and here's three of them are right here again you know but you know and then go to the question disputati and they got three there too you know but occasionally you get an argument here that's that's not in the Summa Contra Gentiles you know but

[1:01:43] but also in the two Summas there's a difference in the order of the of the things huh okay but as a natural philosopher here

[1:01:57] that you show that God is simple before you show He's unchanging right well I've always teaching the first book you know of natural hearing, the first book of the physics and there Aristotle shows very clearly that whatever changes is composed okay and when you go through that first book of the physics you come away knowing that everything that changes is composed and then you come here and you learn that God is not composed put two and two together and he's what can't change right so it fits in beautifully but in the Summa Contra Gentiles and and he shows that God is unchanging before he shows that God is simple so you lose something right There's something beautiful here right you know and so when I'm

[1:02:50] teaching the first book of the physics I always stop and have a theological footnote and I say now But you've learned here that what changes is composed In theology, when you learn that God is not composed, you can put the two together, and you realize God is what unchanging, beautiful, beautiful. You know, so there's something really beautiful about the order of the Summa Theologiae. But there are things you'll find out about the the order of the Summa Theologiae that the Summa Theologiae doesn't have, right?

[1:03:19] You know. And then, then, as I mentioned in the compendium of theology, there's yet again a different order of these five, right? But you always have these five in those three central central works, huh?

[1:03:36] So next time we'll see the complete reality that God is omnino altogether holy, simple, right?