Prima Pars
26. Summa I, Q.5, AA.5–6: Mode, Species and Order; the Noble, the Useful and the Pleasant
Class of 2006-03-23
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/026-summa-i-q-5-aa-5-6-mode-species-and-order-the-noble-the-useful/

[0:00] Okay, now in the fifth and the sixth articles, we're going to what get into kind of divisions, but five is more like the intrinsic divisions, as we said, right? And the six is more like the what subject parts, huh?

[0:21] Okay. To the fifth, one proceeds thus: It seems that the notion of the good does not consist in mode, species, and what order, huh?

[0:39] For the good and being differ in what definition, as has been said above. But mode, species, and order pertain to the definition of what, or to the notion of of what being, right? Because, as is said in the eleventh chapter of the book of wisdom, you have disposed all things in number, weight, and what measure, right? To which three are reduced: species, mode, and order. Now, how are they reduced to that, huh?

[1:24] Which one goes with which? Is is it species and number, modus and mensura, and order? Uh huh. Okay. Of course, you know Plato had spoken of species of things being numbers, right? Oh. Aristotle in the eighth book of wisdom doesn't say they're the same, but the what species of things are like numbers, right? Just remember that. You know how he points out a number of likenesses of them.

[2:05] For example, that definitions are not divisible forever. And number is not divisible forever. And you add or subtract one, you have another number. And so, when Shakespeare says in the exhortation to use reason, "What is a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed? A beast, no more." Okay. So, if you take away reason from man, right, he's no more than a what, a beast.

[2:44] If you take away sensation from an animal, it's no more than a plant. You take away life from a plant; it's no more than a stone. Really, huh? So

[2:57] it's like what numbers, right? Like adding, subtracting. So man is more than we say, huh? A beast, just like four is more than three, and a beast is more than a plant, like three is more than two, and a plant is more than a stone. So a body plus life equals a plant. A body plus life plus sensation is a beast, and a body plus life plus sensation plus reason, number four—that's man.

[3:33] Okay. And of course, ponder I suppose means like wait. So you're inclined to certain direction, right? So this idea of order, right? And measure there is explained by Augustine here in the fourth book on Genesis to the letter. For the measure, what fixes a mode for everything? Okay.

[3:57] And number gives species to everything, and weight down draws everything to rest in what stability, right? Therefore, the ratio of good does not consist in mode, species, and order. Right, this part pertains to what is, right? Okay. But of course, good includes the idea of being plus something else, right? I mean, good is like what a desirable being or a desirable thing, right? So includes the idea of being or thing.

[4:29] So maybe Thomas will like to see how he solves it, but he'll bring that in. Moreover, mode, species, and order themselves are good things, right? If, therefore, the notion of good consists in mode, species, and order, it would be necessary that mode have also a mode, a species, and order, and likewise species would have to have a mode, a species, and order, and so on, and then these would also have to have each of them a mode, a species, and order, and so on forever, right?

[5:01] Okay. That's a nice inter nice objection, right? Moreover. The bad is the privation of the lack of mode and species and order, right? But the bad does not entirely take away the good, because the subject of the bad is something what good, right?

[5:28] And therefore, the notion of good does not consist in mode, species, and what order, right? Because you got to realize that there's more than one sense of what good, right? The good of the nature and the good that is added to that, and so on.

[5:53] Moreover, that in which consists the ratio of good cannot be said to be bad, but is said to be a malus modus, a malus species, malus ordo, right? Therefore, the ratio of good does not consist in mode. Species and order. Okay.

[6:20] Sometimes we say, you know, you're doing that in the wrong order. How are you speaking when you say that? Because you're really being, disorder. Yeah. Talking about right. The disorder is called the wrong order. Then the bad seems to have order, right? Hmm. Okay.

[6:45] Hmm. Moreover, most species, in order are caused from weight, number, and measure, as is clear from the authority induced from Augustine. But not all goods have what? Weight, number, measure. For Ambrose says in the work on the six days, the six days of creation, right? But the nature of light is not in number, not in weight, and and and not in measure. It's not created in these things, right?

[7:20] What's created? Not in number. Not in weight. Not in what? Measure, right? So we got to deal now with the authority of Ambrose, right? And

[7:32] therefore, the ratio of good does not consist in mode, species, and order. Huh? This is unusual to have five objections, right? He's really getting carried away.

[7:45] But against this is what Augustine says in the book on the nature of the good. Huh? These three, these three things—mode, species, and order—are general goods, right? In the things made by God, and where these three are great, there's great goodness, huh? Where they're little, you have little good. Where none, there's no good at all. Which would not be unless the ratio of good consisted in these, right?

[8:19] Therefore, the ratio of good consists in mode, species, and order. Now, this question ever come up? There hadn't been a guy called Augustine. I wonder. Huh? Who else speaks this way? Except for the text from Ambrose, they're denying it. But it's in Scripture, right? About making things in mode, in number, weight, and measure, anyway.

[8:45] I answer: It should be said that each thing is said to be good in so far as it is what perfect. For thus it is what. Yeah. So he goes back to the idea of being desirable, right? But now he brings in and recalls the idea that what is desirable is the perfect, right?

[9:10] So again, if it goes to be a syllogism there, the good is desirable, and what is desirable is the perfect, right? That shows the connection between them. But that is said to be perfect to which nothing is lacking, according to the what? Its own perfection. The way of its own perfection, yeah. For since each thing is what it is through its form,

[9:35] the form, however, presupposes some things, and some things what? Of necessity follow upon it, right? Thus, that something be perfect and good is necessary both that it have a form, right, and also those things which are what presupposed to it, and those things which what follow upon it, yeah, yeah.

[10:07] Could there be a middle without something before and after it? Okay, it's easy to see if there is. But he's saying if if good consists essentially in some form,

[10:26] and there's something that we can show that's presupposed to form, right, and something that follows upon it, right, then good is going to consist in these what three things, right? Okay. And he's got to

[10:42] show those things. Now, what is presupposed to any what form? Huh? To a form is he says the determination or the what? How would you translate "commensuratio

[11:03] Commensuration Yeah, But measured with, right? Other principles either of the material ones or of the what efficient ones? And this is signified by what mode? Once, it is said that measure fixes ahead a mode, huh? Okay. Now it's kind of interesting, you know, when you read Aby sometimes

[11:33] Aristotle in Greek, and then Thomas in Latin, and then in English, right? And sometimes the word used to translate has more or less the same meaning, but a little different etymology, right?

[11:59] I noticed with the word "modus" when it first came up in in the in. Talking about the the way of proceeding in a science, Aristotle speaks in what we call in English the way of going forward,

[12:20] and the Greek word he'll use is tropos for tropos yeah, and they didn't have the word for going forward, pro again or something like that. In Latin, I'll translate that the modus procedendi, the mode, way of going forward, and then in English would tend to translate the way of going forward.

[12:57] Now, is the etymology of those three words exactly the same? But tropos in Greek, tropos in Greek has somewhat the sense of turn, okay,

[13:21] and it's kind of a little bit strange to say, right? But one of my favorite authors there, Washington Irving, in Montjoy, right? Montjoy is a guy with kind of a poetic turn of mind,

[13:44] okay, and so Aristotle will be talking about you have to have a different turn of mind to go into a different science, okay. You have to turn your mind a little bit different direction. That's kind of interesting. The etymology there, um,

[14:12] you change your point of view. It's the English, right? But your angle's a little different, huh? Turn a little different, right? In the Republic, Plato has a kind of interesting way of speaking of the soul. It's as if the soul is turned towards material things, towards sensible things? Huh? If you're going to know the immaterial things, you got to turn your soul away from material things, huh?

[14:48] And of course, Plato also was aware of the mathematical sciences, and the mathematical sciences are sort of in between natural science and and wisdom. It's in between a knowledge of material things and a knowledge of what immaterial things. Because in geometry, you're studying things that are found in the material world, but you're defining them without matter, right? Okay. So it's like I'm looking towards material things. You want to turn me all around, to look towards the immaterial things, which it turned me as we were 90 degrees to look at the mathematical things, right?

[15:38] And then finally turn all the way around, and now you see the immaterial things. Wow, you know, I never looked that way before. Okay, interesting. Now this can be the sensible image, right? Um,

[15:55] we're kind of aware of that sort of thing in Christian teaching sometimes, right? We have to turn people away from material things a bit, right? Okay. And I suppose part of Lent is to turn away. Somewhat from material things, right? And turn you towards the material world a bit, huh?

[16:23] Now, in English, we use the word "way," right? Way doesn't have the sense of turn, does it? No, I suppose "way" is almost closer to what to to road, huh? The road, the way, the path.

[16:43] I notice how how we translate the the words in in of our Lord. We say, "I am usually here quoted." I am the way, the truth, and the life. Okay, but the Greek word is "hodos." I am the road. It is very concrete, right? In Latin, they'll say what not "modus" but "via," which is the Latin word for road, and they'll translate "hodos" in Greek a lot, like in Aristotle, but translated by "via."

[17:18] Like in the beginning of the Physics, Aristotle speaks of the hodos, the inborn road, and they use the word "via" in Latin, okay? So, way can be it's not quite as concrete as road, but it can have that sense, right? To put into that, and and what does modus have? Does the word modus have?

[17:44] Well, I guess the idea of modus is almost that of size, okay? So you talk about getting the way of proceeding that fits the subject matter, right? It's like getting a pair of shoes that fits your foot. This pair of shoes doesn't fit my foot. I get a pinched foot, right?

[18:15] You get the wrong way of proceeding, you're going to get a pinched view of the subject, right? Or a loose view of the subject, or something, right? You know, so

[18:33] you may have seen Thomas asks in the beginning of the country in the Psalms, was it where he uses the word "modi Huh? Modi Different modi in Scripture, right? Huh? Okay, so that in the historical books of Scripture, you might use the modus narrativus, you know, and but there's a little difference in them, right? So modus

[19:02] keeps that connection with the word measure. You kind of measured by the subject, huh? Yeah. My way, he suggests, more that the road to this subject is not the road to that subject, right? Taking a different road when you go in this science thing on that road, right? But the Greek word has a sense of kind of turning the mind, right, in a certain direction, huh?

[19:37] Okay. So what is presupposed to the form, the determination or the what? Commensuration, right? Of the principles, either material ones or efficient ones, and this is signified by mode. Hence, it is said that measure fixes ahead of time mode. But the form is signified by what? Species, huh?

[20:13] Now in Greek, that word would be eidos, huh? Idea, form. Because through its form, each thing is constituted in species. And on account of this, it is said that number gives what? Species. Yeah. Because definitions signifying the species are as numbers, according to the philosopher, that Aristotle, in the eighth book of the what metaphysics.

[20:44] For just this is well like this as Aristotle sees. For just as a unit added or subtracted changes the species of number, so likewise in definition, a difference added or subtracted, right? Okay. So it's like it's like almost to say that the stone is one, and the what? Plant is two, because it's body plus life, right? And the animal, the beast, as say, is three. A body plus life plus sensation, and the man is four, right?

[21:24] And if you take away from man reason, you have nothing but a beast. You take away from a beast sensation, anything but a plant. anything but life, you've got just a body, right? Okay. So there are numbers, right? And what like this Aristotle sees is that you know you add or subtract the one, you add or subtract the difference, you seem to have a different thing, huh?

[21:44] Okay. Another like this he sees that is that they're not divisible forever, right? Okay. Another like this he sees that they're not more or less, you know. Oh yeah. You see. So what? So this four is not more or less four than another four. Yeah. Okay, so you may like to say Aristotle sees, but to form or upon form, there follows inclination to the end, right? It is some action or to something of this sort, because each thing, in so far as it is an act, acts, right?

[22:23] And tends in that which is what suitable to it according to its form, and to this pertains what weight in the text of the scripture, right? Or order in Augustine's text, right?

[22:37] Whence the ratio good, according as it consists in perfection, consists in mode, species, and what order, right? Okay. Now the first objection said that these three things do not follow upon being except in so far as it is what perfect, right? And according to this, it is what good, right? Okay. The first objection was saying that hey, God made all things in what

[23:19] number, order, and measure, right? And Thomas says, okay, that's true, but it's following upon being in so far as it's perfect, and in so far as it's perfect, it's good, right? Okay. But you have to remember that being is in the idea of the good, huh? Okay.

[23:42] Now the second objection is saying you're going to go on forever. Okay. To the second, it should be said that mode, species, and order, in that way, are called good as they are called beings, right? Not because they themselves are subsisting, right? But they are said to be because by them other things are beings and good.

[24:16] Whence is not necessary that they have some other things by which they are good, for they are not thus said to be good as if they are good formally by other things, but because by them formally other things are good, just as whiteness is not said to be being because by it something is, but because by it something is in some way, namely what white, huh? And you see a little bit the idea there, right?

[24:55] I mean, suppose I said, take a simple example here. you say the body is healthy. Okay. Now the body is healthy by what? Health. Yeah. So by health, the body is healthy.

[25:31] Yeah. Now, would you say that the that health itself is healthy? No. No. Because if you said that health itself is healthy, you have to have another health by which health itself is healthy, right? Mm-hmm. And then we ask the same question about that health: Is it healthy? And if it's, it's just as much reason to say it's healthy too. Mm-hmm. It's healthy, another healthy, right? You know.

[25:59] Okay. Now, good is not exactly like that because there's a way that you could say that the the goodness of the thing, right, is good, right? Mm-hmm. Because you know it's healthy. the idea of good, but it's not good in the way that the good is said to be good, right? Goodness is good because by something is good, not because it itself is good, but because by something is good, right?

[26:26] Okay. So I might be just by my virtue of justice, right? If I have that virtue, right? But is my virtue of justice just?

[26:38] No. Is my virtue of justice good? Yeah, yeah. Am I good by? Yeah. Yeah. But notice, justice is that by which I am good, right? Hmm. But justice is not good in that sense; that it's good by some goodness itself. Yeah. But is what that by which something else is good? Okay. So it's good in a different sense, and so the man who wants to have mode, species, in order to be good in the same way that which is good by them is misunderstanding the way in which they would be said to be good.

[27:24] That clears mud. Well, they're they're good because something else is good, than I am. Yeah. they're said to be good there in a different way, right? Okay. So, it would be like you know, if you say that the creature is not his own existence, right? Okay. So the creature is what is, and the existence of the creature is that by which he is. Now, some might say, "But does his existence exist?

[27:56] " Right. And want to deduce, you know, that it exists by another existence, right? But does the existence of the creature exist in the way the creature does?

[28:08] No, because the creature is what exists, and the existence of the creature is not what exists, but that by which what exists does exist, right? Yeah. And so you're trying to, in a sense, make the existence of the creature a subsisting, existing thing, just like the creature is, and then you've got this infinite regress, right? Then okay. So that might catch a lot, but you ain't going to catch St Thomas.

[28:39] Okay. So the second it should be said that mode, species, in order, in that way, are called good, just as they are called beings, right? Not because they themselves are, as it were, subsisting, right? Hmm. But because by them other things are both good and beings, right? Hmm. Whence it is not necessary that they have some other things by which they are good, for they are not thus said to be good as if what.

[29:14] They were good formally by something else, right? But because by them formally, other things are good. Just as whiteness is not said to be being because it is by something, but because something else by it in some way, namely the what the white, huh? Okay.

[29:44] Now the third objection. Moreover, the bad is a lack of mode and species and order, but the bad does not entirely take away the good. Therefore, the notion of good does not consist in mode, species, and what order, right?

[30:05] He says to the third, it should be said that every existence, every being, is according to some what form. Whence, according to every being a thing, there follows upon it mode, species, and order, right? Just as man has species, mode, and order in so far as he's a man, but likewise in so far as he's white, he has likewise a mode, a species, and an order, right?

[30:37] And in so far as he's all the things which are what said of him, right? But the bad deprives us of a certain being, right? As blindness deprives us of the being of sight, whence it does not take away every mode, species, and order, but only the mode, species, and order which follow upon what the being of sight, okay?

[31:08] So I'm said to be good in some way by my in my substance, right? I'm said to be good simply by reason of certain accidents added to me, right? But both in my substance and in my accidents, each of them have their own what mode, species, and order.

[31:34] So just as the evil takes away one good, but leaves another good, so it takes away one mode, species, and orders, but leaves another one and the other good that it leaves behind, right? Okay. Even the devils are the nature of the devils is good and has mode, species, and order, but they're lacking some other mode, species, and order, right? On the fourth one, that in which consists the notion of good cannot be called bad, but there's said to be a bad mode, a bad species, a bad what.

[32:11] Order, right? Okay. To the fourth, it should be said that as Augustine says in the book on the nature of the good, every mode, in so far as it is a mode, is good, and the same is able to be said of species and order. But a bad mode or a bad species or a bad order they are said because they are less than they ought to be, right?

[32:40] Or because they are not accommodated or suitable to the things to which they are accommodated, right? And thus they are called bad because they are alien and in what? Congruous, not fitting, huh?

[32:57] Okay. Now the last objection was the one from Ambrose, right? About the nature of light. It gave the modern physicists a lot of problems, too, the nature of light, waves or particles. The nature of light is said to be without number and weight and measure, not simply, but in comparison to the what? To bodily things, right? Okay. Now it's interesting, even you know the famous book by Louis de Broglie, the collection of his papers, father of wave mechanics.

[33:36] But the name of the book is Matter and Light by Matière et Lumière Lumière. So you kind of contrast light with matter, even though light, in the understanding, physicists is still something kind of material, right? Photons and particles, but it's not as gross as most matter, right? So you make a contrast between matter and and light, and until the twentieth century they were very much distinct, huh?

[34:01] Because light seemed to be traveling in waves and matter in little particles, right? Then it got more complicated because they discovered a particle aspect to light and the wave aspect to matter, but

[34:16] because the power of light extends to all what bodily things, and so as far as it is the active quality of the first body, that alters other bodies, namely the what Heaven, right? That's kind of a relative comparison. Take a little break here now. Sure. If I do the other last article and this one next after a little break, okay? Okay, now the second division here is going to be more a what division of universal into less universal, right?

[34:55] Okay, okay, more so, but not entirely. To six, one proceeds thus. It seems that the good is not suitably divided into the honestum. Now, it's hard to know how to exactly translate the honestum. Can translate as the honorable, right, or the noble, or something. They do both those translations, but the useful and the what pleasant.

[35:25] For the good, as the philosopher says in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics, is divided by the ten what predicaments, the ten categories, huh?

[35:40] But the honestum, the honorable, the noble, the useful, and the pleasant are able to be found in one category. Therefore, they are not what suitably divided to these. Son.

[35:58] Moreover, every division is by opposites, but these three do not seem to be opposed. For the honorable are delightful, and nothing dishonorable is useful, which would nevertheless be so

[36:21] if the division were what two opposites, opposites. So that the honest and the or the honorable and the useful were opposed, as Tullius or Cicero, right, says in his book about duties,

[36:39] Therefore, the foresaid division is not suitable. Moreover, where one is an account of another, there there is one only. But the useful is not good except an account of the pleasant or the honorable. Therefore, it ought not to be divided against the what pleasant and the honorable. But against this is Ambrose in the book about what duties, right? Uses this division of the good, huh? So he's influenced here by Augustine and now by this guy what Ambrose, right?

[37:20] Who are the great doctors of the Western Church? Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory the Great, Jerome. Okay. Right. Yeah, so it's certainly ideal. So it's ideal, but okay, but so Ambrose is somebody else. Yeah. I answer. It should be said that this division properly seems to be a division of human good, right? Okay, but maybe can be understood more broadly too. He's going to go on to say, "If, however, we consider in a higher way and more general way the notion of good, this division properly belongs to good, as it is what good, right?

[38:08] Okay. For the good is something in so far as it is what desirable, right? And in so far as it is the desirable. end or the term, the limit of the motion of what appetite, a desire. Which termination of motion can be considered from the consideration of the what natural motion of a body, or the motion of a natural body. Let's put that way. Um,

[38:47] for the motion of a natural body is what terminated or ended simply to the last, in some way, however, to the what middle, middle, to which one goes to the last, which terminates the motion and is said to be the what limit or the end of the motion, right? In so far as it terminates or or ends some part of the motion, but that which is the ultimate term of the motion can be taken in what two ways: either the thing itself to which one tends, as for example, the place or the form, or the rest in that thing, right?

[39:37] Thus, therefore, in the motion of desire, that which is desirable as limiting the motion of desire in some way, as the middle to which one tends to another, is called the what useful. But that which is desired as last, terminating the whole motion of the desire, as a thing towards which desirous such tends, is called the what. Honorable honestum, right? Yeah, the end, yeah. Because the utilay is more like a means, right?

[40:15] Because the good is said what is desired to itself or by itself, right? But the utilay is desired for the sake of getting to the end, right? Yeah.

[40:28] So my goal is to get into this, to be here in this room, right? But to some extent, my goal was what to come through the door. But I came through the door, in order to be fully within here eventually, huh? Okay. And then I just sit here and rest and do nothing. Okay.

[40:51] Okay. But that which limits or or ends the motion appetite as rest in the thing desired is called what? Pleasure. Yeah, the kind of rest of the of the heart. Yeah. So desire is like what motion, and pleasure is like more like what rest. Yeah. Reminds me a little bit of Thomas's explanation of the metaphor there, in the commentary on the Psalms. Have you seen that? Sweet.

[41:21] Yeah, yeah. And he says sweet can mean what? There's three likenesses there. It's pleasant, right? And then it's what restful, right? And then it's what refreshing, right? Okay. So restful is what is being hit upon here, right? It's being characteristic a little bit of pleasure, right? And you know sometimes people say that when you have a beautiful scene in somebody's house, right? Oh, how restful we say, right?

[41:53] Well, speaking of beautiful, it's being restful, right? Or you speak, you know, of a girl, sight for sore eyes, right? Something refreshing about the beautiful, right? When I was in college, I used to go to this little reading room there, which is, I guess, we didn't manage into the library, but it's kind of separate from it. But it has kind of interesting, you know, famous painting there on the wall, right?

[42:15] So you could sit reading your your Latin text there, you know, and look up and you kind of look at that painting as kind of what refreshing to look at, right? Okay. So,

[42:29] but you know, when the kids are upset there and they can't find the parents and they give the kid an ice cream cone to quiet him down, right? So the pleasant is the work, which is which is the rest, yeah, yeah.

[42:43] And I just got to you know going across country to get the few little kids in the back seat there and they're driving me crazy once in a while. So what I did was I before we took off I got like three candies, right? You know, and I put them in a little bag and still zipped it up, and then I put in a bigger bag and I made several of those, right?

[43:02] So when you couldn't stand the noise in the back seat anymore, time for daddy treat. You pull out one of these things and you pass it back and each get one of these things and they share and so on. They talk and they're very contenting over half an hour or an hour and you know, then you go on until the next next breakdown.

[43:22] Hope you're getting to the motel and you're popping the pool, y'all. Get there, yeah. Okay. Now the first one is about this strange distinction Aristotle makes of good according to the what categories. Okay. So you can speak of good in all ten categories. He says to the first, therefore it should be said. That the good, insofar as it is the same and subject with being, is divided by the ten what categories, right?

[43:57] But according to its own definition, right? This division fits it, right? Okay. And that's something I think it's not too hard to see, right?

[44:23] The division of one is much closer to to the division of categories, because Aristotle, you know, in one place he divides particular meanings of one, like same, equal, like, well, same one in substance, equal one in quantity. Like one in what quality, right? See, but one is very close to being, right? And that's why in the in the fourth book of wisdom, Aristotle says the subject of wisdom is being and the one.

[44:57] And that's the way the books on the subject are divided, right? Books seven and and eight and nine are on being, and book ten on the one. See, and consideration of good and true and so on follows from that, but the fundamental consideration is being and the one, and their divisions are much more similar. When he first divides the meanings of of one. It's being per se, being per accidens, being per se, being per accidens and then it goes on from there.

[45:28] But the good, if you take the definition of the good as desirable, right, being, then this division fits a division of the desirable, right? It's it's either desirable as an end or as the means to an end, right? Or as the rest resting in the end, yeah, yeah.

[45:56] Same, same, equal, like, yeah, yeah. They related to substance, quantity, quality, yeah, substance, yeah. That's the distinction of meanings of one, and corresponds more really to distinctions of being there in the categories. But substance, quantity, and quality are different meanings of good as such. Don't seem to be a division or distinction of the desirable as such, right? See, what is primarily desirable is the end, right? But then to rest in the end, right,

[46:41] is desirable, right? And in essence, the desirable is what it means to the end. So you know, sometimes you know, I see a great Augustine. He'll say the end. He says, "The vision is the whole reward." Okay, and there he's talking about the end, the anastasis, right? Other times he'll say, "Beatitude is gaudium de veritate." Well, then he's talking more of the what? The pleasure, the delectatio, the resting in it.

[47:17] I say, you know, Thomas's prayer to the communion now looks vera. But he says satietas plena gaudium sempiternum jucunditas consummata et felicitas perfecta. So he's talking about the anastasis and the delectabile, right? Okay, or it says you know, enter into the joy of your master, right?

[47:43] So those two kind of pertain to the end, and the useful more to the what the means, right? Okay. But you know, if I'm studying, let's, say geometry, right? You know, what's my goal to to know the Pythagorean theorem, or to enjoy the Pythagorean theorem? Knowledge of it. Yeah, but they both in a way pertain to the end, right? Because if I know and understand that is to say the Pythagorean theorem, I have this charm.

[48:18] Like I'll say, my brother Marx, I just like to solve so still delectable, you know. Some of these things really are. You get to know them, and you know that that theorem I like so much. You know, where it says that my, you know, in the second book, theorem five, right? Theorem five says that if a straight line be divided into what

[48:45] equal and unequal segments, right? The rectangle contained by the what unequal segments plus the square on the line between the points of sections, right, would be equal to the square on the half. Okay. So when I was kind of you know speaking with the sort of tragedy, as Aristotle says about Zeno, I said, "Well, from this theorem, you can realize that a square will always have more area than a rectangle for the same what for perimeter, right?

[49:27] That's interesting in itself, right? Because a square is the simplest of these things. But then, what is the difference in area, right? Well, that's equal to a square too. The difference, the square of the difference between the side of the square and either one of these. So with the square just to exemplify, if it's five by five, and this is say four by six, and this is let's say three by seven, well, the area direct, I mean, the perimeter is the same in every case, right?

[50:03] Namely twenty, right? But the difference in area between five and six, or five and four, either one you can take is one, and one squared is one, and that's exactly the difference in area between three or seven. Either one and five, the difference is two, and two squared is four, and that's exactly the difference, right? That's really really delightful to see that, right? Okay. So

[50:34] that delight in reaching the end pertains to the end too, but it's more something what following upon the end, right? Aristotle says in the tenth book of the ethic Ethics that pleasure perfects operation, right? Like beauty perfects youth. Is that the definition of youth, right? But something you know, expected that the youth would be more beautiful, right, than the old. And so the perfection of operation is is followed by pleasure, right?

[51:08] Okay. But my end is more to know this than to delight in knowing it. But to delight in knowing it is not a means, right? It's a kind of resting contented in what I discovered, right?

[51:25] Now Thomas says there in the reading prayer, dulce sapere, right? Sweetly to savor Christ in the Eucharist, right? But then other things are merely what means, huh? They're useful to get to the end, huh? Okay. What's kind of interesting that division, huh? He said this is a division of the good as good, of the of the desirable in a sense as desirable. Okay.

[51:58] But but but pleasure and and the anastasis there seem to be both on the side of the end in a way, right? But the anastasis is more the the end essentially, and and the pleasure more the resting in it, right? But then there is also the the useful, the means that that leads to the end, huh?

[52:30] I think that's very interesting that that that first objection, you know, because it's possible to divide the same thing maybe in in in more than one way, but there is one way that's really dividing it as such, right? More properly that, huh? And this is what you are doing now.

[52:52] The second objection: every division is by opposites, huh? And he says this division is not by opposite things, but by opposite definitions, huh? For those things are said to be properly delightful, which have no other what reason for being desired except pleasure, right, huh? Since sometimes they are what noxious, right? And dishonorable, right? Mm-hmm. Okay, Like adultery, or something like that sort, right. Okay, or fornication, huh?

[53:42] Useful things are said which, do not have in themselves once they should be desired. But are desired only as leading to what? Something further. Yeah, as the taking of a what? Medicine. Bitter medicine. Yeah. Yeah. See, if the medicine was delicious, then we'd have more than one reason to take, right? When I was little boy, I had some medicine for something, and and was kind of coated.

[54:09] Looked like one of these red cinnamon things, you know. Oh, little things. Candy or something. Yeah, yeah, yeah, and it actually tasted good. I remember holding in my mouth and found like like a piece of candy, and all of a sudden I I got through this. Oh no! It was you know. Get it down, Was the you know I can it now enjoy the pleasure of of sucking that thing like a piece of candy.

[54:35] It sounds as though it was a bitter medicine. in itself, wasn't it? Yeah, yeah, yeah. yeah That That's what he says. A bitter medicine, right? You know. we don't no no But you know, I used to be worried about these things, you know, because a little charity would would consume these things, you know.

[54:58] But Anesta, I said, the things which have in themselves, whence they are what? desired, right? Okay. So there, there you're taking pleasure as something what other than honestum right? Huh? I know. Rather than the one falling upon it, so there is a lot of subtlety there. You can see why, in Aristotle, when he gets to the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, he takes up pleasure before he takes up his final consideration of happiness.

[55:28] Of course, if you read the utilitarians, right, which are mainly the English empiricists and so on, and you know, going back to Hobbes and Locke and so on, up to John Stuart Mill, they identify the good with what pleasure, pleasure, basically, right? That's the only criterion of the good pleasure, right? Because that's where you get all this confusion about animal rights and so on, right? Because they feel pain and pleasure too, right?

[56:01] So what right do we have to inflict all these pain upon the animals, right? Well, if you are only standard of good and bad is pleasure and pain, right? Why should you know ten thousand chickens die to feed one man or something, right?

[56:15] Well, the only criterion is pleasure and pain, they they can't really see their way out of this, right? Okay. A lot of pain, I'm causing there. See, get my get my steak dinner and chicken dinner and pork dinner and so on, right?

[56:46] I see. What's the argument to use sometimes here? You know, some people want to maintain. You said all pleasure as such was good, right? Okay.

[57:02] Well, now some people try to say, you know, well, suppose I get pleasure from torturing people, right? Is that pleasure good? And some people try to maintain, well, as pleasure, it's good, right? You see, is that true? You see,

[57:24] and they try to say, well, you shouldn't want to torture people, but if you enjoy torturing people, that enjoying torturing people is good. How would you think about that? Yeah, separated from

[57:45] from man. Yeah, yeah. But you see, if it's wrong or if it's bad to want to torture people, right? That's because the object of your wanting there is something bad, okay? Which joins you more to torturing people, wanting to torture them, or enjoying torturing them? Yeah, because you can want to torture people without having them in your power to torture them, right? Okay, but if you're enjoying torturing people, then it's the torturing itself that you're enjoying, right?

[58:25] So you're more joined to the bad, right? Than you are by by enjoying it, than you are by wanting to do it. So if the wanting is bad before, it's already enjoying is bad. So, but you know, people have a hard time, you know, rising above this, huh? And of course, you know, they attack John Stuart Mill saying, "Well, your philosophy is a philosophy for beasts, right?

[58:52] " Because the beast just lives by pleasure and pain, right? And well, John Stuart Mill tries to make as good a defense against that objection as he can, right? He says, "You're the beast," he says, because you assume that man has only the pleasures that the beast has, right? Okay. And then he says, "Well, but man has some pleasures in common with the beast, like like eating or something, right?

[59:23] Sleeping and so on, and other pleasures that are the beast doesn't share in at all, right? Okay. Now, are these pleasures that the beast doesn't share? Are they better than the pleasures that the beast does share? It now, I see. They could well. They could well be worse. Well, you see, Mill, given his philosophy, cannot give any reason for saying that they are better, right? But as an empiricist philosopher, right, he says those who have tasted both pleasures, right, okay, say that the pleasures of the mind and so on, right, are greater than those pleasures of the body that we share with the beast, right.

[1:00:11] See, so he can only apply. I mean, only try to answer the question, right, by an appeal, right, to the experience of those who have tasted both pleasures.

[1:00:28] Empirically, I think you could say that makes some sense, right, by itself. I don't say that this is a thing because if someone says to you. You know,

[1:00:41] which pain is greater, right? Huh? You know, pain of a broken leg or pain of an ulcer. You know, well, the only the person who's experienced these two pains can say which is worse, right? And and so you know, in your own life, I'm sure you you've compared some pains you've had, right? And and and and you've considered some pains worse, but it's something based on experience, right?

[1:01:08] Okay. So, there's only criterion for saying that the pleasures of the soul or the pleasures of the mind are greater than the pleasures of the body is that those people like Aristotle or Plato who tasted both, right? See that these pleasures the philosopher has are much greater than these other ones, right? You know, but it's kind of a narrow view, right? Huh? You can see you can see you can't see anything beyond pleasure as a criterion, right?

[1:01:40] And the experience level of pleasure, huh? You can see why Aristotle, you know, does devote a consideration in the tenth book to pleasure, right? That men can, you know, confuse that with the what the end itself, right? Okay. Um, because because

[1:02:03] basically our goal is to see God as He is, huh? Okay, I'm sure we see God as He is, but I enjoy that. But but is the end, you know, substantially to enjoy seeing God, or is it the seeing of God itself, which is the end? Seeing God himself. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But but but no one will be able to understand that, right? You know,

[1:02:31] we have to wait and see if that pleasure is greater, and then we'll know that's the greatest good, right? Yeah, yeah. But you know, it's the the direct utile is much closer to the what anestum, right? Mm-hmm. Than you today, right? Or are able to be confused with it? Okay. Just like in the division of the predicaments, huh? which is the closest to substance, quantity or quality?

[1:03:02] Quantity. Yeah, yeah. And you you go to Descartes and Descartes confuses what? The extension, the quantity of material things, with their what? Substance. Yeah. You hear a little joke about Descartes? Huh? He never grew up. Because your quantity was your substance, right? Oh yeah. Then you'd be a different substance when you grew. up. So you never grew, up, you know. See. So if you actually grew up, then you, the individual.

[1:03:34] Man are not the same as your size, right? But you've actually had different sizes in your life. You were knee-high to a grasshopper, and now you're somewhat taller, right?

[1:03:48] So just as as Descartes and and to some extent the Pythagoreans, you know, even the Platonists confuse quantity with the substance of things, huh?

[1:04:01] But not quality with the substance of things, huh? They may not consume, you know, shape or color or something like that with substance, right? But extension, yeah. In fact, you have the two words body. Body is used as what the name of one kind of substance, material substance, and body is used as a species of what continuous quantity, right? But doesn't exactly same thing. But people confuse the two, right?

[1:04:34] So there's a proximity. Well, they confuse, then, pleasure with the what? anestu the honorable, the noble. end itself, right? But they don't confuse so much the useful. But that's a little a little more different, huh?

[1:05:00] Okay. Now the theory thing was, where one is an account of another, there there is one only. But the useful is not good except on account of the what, either the pleasurable or the what? The next one, third objection. Therefore, one ought not to divide the useful against the pleasurable, and the honorable. To third, it should be said that the good is not divided into these three as something what Univocal, having exactly the same meaning.

[1:05:36] Equally said of them, right? That's often said when you speak of the univocal, right, in the strict sense, under it said equally of these, huh? So even by talking about the oblong and the square, it is the square more equilateral than the oblong. No. No. They're equally what Quadrilateral. Yeah, yeah. And and and that's very difficult, then, right? You know, when something is said ex equo, they'll say hey, Latin, right, equally of the many, right?

[1:06:13] Then it's very much being said univocal Clearly huh? But is good being said ex equo equally of the honestum the delectabile, and the utile? Clearly not, huh? Okay, but this shouldn't surprise us, right? Is being said ex equo of substance and quantity and quality? No. No. Is being said ex equo of act and ability? No.

[1:06:45] But it's said secundum prius at what posterius, right? And so a lot of times they they call this analogum, huh? They'll call it equivocal, right? By reason, right? But reason is characterized by orders. We were saying earlier today, right? And prius and posterius is what the matter ordering. So it's equivocal by reason, right? There's some order among the meanings. And per prius it's said of what the honestum, the honorable, and secondarily of the delightful, and third about the what.

[1:07:24] Useful. Yeah. Yeah. So now you understand the good a little bit. But Thomas has given us a kind of a lesson in these six articles of really what consideration of the good that you might make and even what wisdom, right? But it's kind of for the goodness of teaching now, so we can speak more clearly about the goodness of what Of God, right? Ah-ha! Prodigal son has returned.

[1:08:21] And we're—I think we should stop here now because we're just beginning to the sixth. yeah, yeah. We just finished the fifth question, and we're going to, you know, start the sixth question and just, you know, take a bite out of the sandwich and then eat it.