Prima Pars
28. Summa I, Q.6 a.4 and Q.7 a.1: All Things Good by the Divine Goodness; the Infinity of God
Class of 2006-03-30
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/028-summa-i-q-6-a-4-and-q-7-a-1-all-things-good-by-the-divine/

[0:00] So let's look at the fourth article here. Whether all things are good by the divine goodness, huh? Now you might think he's going to say yes, but he's going to say no. Sounds pious to say that all things are good. To the fourth, thus one proceeds. It seems that all things are good by the divine goodness. For Augustine says in the eighth book of the Trinity, you see this good and that good, huh?

[0:35] Take away this and that, and see good itself, if you're able. Thus, you will see God, huh? Who is not by another good, good, but he's the good of what? Every good, huh? Hence, I mentioned that you know in the Summa Contra Gentiles, the first capitulum is God is good. The second one I think is God is goodness itself. Third one is that there's can't be anything bad in God.

[1:02] that there can't be anything bad in God, the third; the third one is that he's said to be good as itself be good as itself, and the fourth one is that he's the good of every good. And then the fifth one is that he's the summum bonum, huh? But each thing is good by its good. Therefore, each thing is good by that good itself, which is what God, huh?

[1:24] Now again, Augustine, you know, sometimes needs to be read with care, and and Thomas, in some sense, is a more proportionate student who can easily misunderstand some of these texts of Augustine.

[1:43] Moreover, as Boethius says in the book De Hebdomadibus, all things are said to be good in so far as they are to God, and this by reason of the divine goodness. Therefore, all things are good by the divine goodness. Oh, that sounds pretty good.

[2:03] But against this is that all things are good in so far as they are, which Augustine said in another passage. Remember. But all things are not said to be being through what divine being, but through their own being, huh? Remember that passage used to have from Dionysius. Now he says that God is the esse omnium. Thomas said, "Well, he doesn't mean the formal being by which each thing is, but the esse effectivum or something of all things."

[2:36] Huh? I got an email from from somebody the other day and and said, "Do I exist by the divine esse? Something like that." Right away, I decided to answer these things right away. But right away, I sat back and I and and I took the chapter from the Summa Contra Gentiles you know, and started saying God is not the esse formale omnium. You know, right away, but I can't wait a second.

[2:58] with this guy, Why do you even ask the question? But. it kind of gets in a kind of pantheism, right? You know, if you say that the existence by which I am is God, right? Then he's all, you know, down in us things. here.

[3:20] I answer it should be said that nothing prevents in those things which imply relation for something to be what denominated from something extrinsic, just as something is denominated, placed from place and measured from what a measure, huh? But about those things which are said absolutely, so again, absolutely, there is opposed to what relative, right? Okay, there is a diverse opinion. For Plato laid down that the what species separated of all things on the world of what forms, right?

[4:04] And that from these individuals denominated as were partaking of these separated species, as for example, that Socrates is said to be a man according to the separated form of man. Don't translate that idea. Okay,

[4:22] and just as he laid down a separated form of man and horse and dog and so on, okay, which he called what man himself through himself, right, and horse itself through itself, right? I think we mentioned how two ways that Plato maybe came to this idea. One was that he thought the way we know must be the way things are if we know truly, and so corresponding to the truly knowing through definitions, as Socrates showed that we couldn't know the definitions had to be these universals existing by themselves, right?

[5:01] Because in a definition, you know the universal in separation from the what singulars, yeah. Um, but maybe the other thing was that he realized in some way that in material things like man and horse, what a thing is is not identical to the thing, and so it seems in some way that Socrates is not a man through being Socrates, and therefore he's only a man by partaking, and if therefore there must be before him something that is man itself through itself, okay?

[5:37] But the problem that man himself through himself would just be form and no way matter, and then you don't have any of the nature of man. So likewise, as he posited man himself and horse himself through himself, so likewise he laid down a what form of being and a form of one separated, which he called being per se and one per se, and by its partaking, each thing is said to be being or one, right?

[6:08] And this, that is per se being, and per se one, he laid down to be the what highest good, right? And because good is convertible with being, just as one is, this good itself he said to be God, right? From which all things are said to be what good by way of participation.

[6:35] And although this opinion seems to be unreasonable in this regard, that it laid down that the species of natural things are separated, existing by themselves, right? As Aristotle proves in many ways, is not reasonable. Nevertheless, this absolutely is true that there is something first, which through its very what essence or nature or substance is both being and good, right? Which we call God, as is clear from what is said before.

[7:15] And to this position, Aristotle was in agreement. From the first, therefore, through its own what essence or nature, something being and being good through its own nature, right? Each thing is said to be good and being in so far as it partakes of it by way of a certain what a simulation, a similitude, although remotely and deficiently, right? Who is like God, right?

[7:55] Thus, each thing is said to be good by the divine goodness as by a first exemplar. Now exemplar is a what exterior form, right? Remember that when Aristotle explained the four causes, I guess the second kind of cause. He says the form and the exemplar, but form means intrinsic more, and exemplar extrinsic, right? Okay.

[8:19] So, so each thing is said to be good by the divine goodness as by a first beginning that is an exemplar, right? And is also what an efficient cause maker, and also an end or purpose of all goodness, right? Nevertheless, each thing is said to be good by a what likeness of the divine goodness inherent in it. That's true. Which is, as it were, formally,

[8:55] yeah, denominating it right, and thus there is both one goodness of all things and also what many goods. You're talking about the the goodness by which. I'm intrinsically formally said to be good. That's something in me, right? And the same with each other. Each thing has its own goodness, right? But they're all a certain likeness of divine goodness, which is therefore the exemplar of all the goodness in these things and the efficient cause of all that and the end of all this, right?

[9:25] But, but not the form, right? You've heard me say it before. When you get to the four kinds of causes—matter, form, mover, and end—I try to show that this is universal distinction of what kinds of causes there are, and you can, you know, in science or art, you get into you can say which of these causes we should use, right? And so he said, "God is a cause."

[9:49] I said, "How many senses is God a cause?" And I always answer, "What? Two and a half senses." He's in No way, a cause in the sense of." matter. Right, he's very much a cause in the sense of mover or maker and end. When he says, "I'm the alpha and the omega, the beginning, the end," he's also a cause in the sense of exemplar. Let us make man to our image and likeness.

[10:13] Right, that's what you mean when you speak of exemplar cause. But the intrinsic form is not the intrinsic form of things, huh? So that's why I say that cause in two and a half senses. Right, you see what I mean? But in the sense Thomas is saying here, right, he's the first beginning, exemplar, effective, and final of all goodness, but he's not the intrinsic goodness by which a thing is denominated good.

[10:42] But that intrinsic goodness is is likeness goodness, right? And is an effect of his goodness and is ordered to his goodness, right? Is an end. Is still something different. Okay.

[10:58] You say something like that about the divine, you know, our existence, right? God is existence itself, and he's not the existence for which I exist formally. But the existence of which I exist is like his existence in some remote way, right? And is an effect of his efficient causality, right? And it's ordered to God as an end too. Okay.

[11:24] And so Thomas says, from this it's clearly implied to the objections, right? Because Boethius there is talking about the order to God as an end, right? But also we have other ways of doing it. Just a little more ambiguous there, we right, son. Okay. So

[11:52] now we've considered two attributes of divine substance, huh? In question three, that he's altogether simple, not composed in any way, right? And for good measure, that he's not entered into composition of anything else, right? Which you which you wouldn't in this case if he was, what? A formal being. And now he's going to take up what the infinity of God next, huh? To which will be attached his being everywhere.

[12:26] I. Can't confine this infinite being. It's going to be infinite and everywhere in a different way than a body would be infinite. You know, in extent and everywhere in place, huh?

[12:46] I had students at my house there last night. There, and we're doing the the natural hearing there, and we'd come to Anaximander He says the infinite is the beginning of all things, right? I don't think he he makes his comparisons in my chair, but he does in the Summa Contra Gentiles that he says, quoting Aristotle when he talks about the infinite, that almost all the Greek philosophers had in mind that the beginning of all things is infinite.

[13:13] But they're thinking infinite in kind of a quantitative sense, huh? Either infinite multitude of things or infinite in extension, right? But then when they began to see that there couldn't be such a thing, then they realized it had to infinite some other way. But he speaks uses the famous phrase of Aristotle, where he's talking in another context, but he's talking about how they're all saying something without giving a reason for it, as if coerced by the truth.

[13:45] And so our mind is naturally moving towards the beginning that it's infinite, huh? Even without, or even before it has a reason to say the beginning is what infinite, huh? And so I was talking about how how four of the things that Thales and Anaximander say about the first matter, right, are the same in name, not necessarily in meaning, but the same in name is four of the five attributes of divine substance.

[14:16] That's that's worth noting, right? And as I say, Thomas in particular, regard to infinite, there he takes some time to show the comparison. It's not purely unrelated those two, even though different senses of infinite, huh? And that really kind of presses when you first see that, huh? You know, but you realize that the mind is moving in that direction, even before it has the the the reasons why it must be so, right?

[14:52] That's part of the mind being convinced now. But this is not something you know unheard of, you know, or ah, you know, I was talking about how in mathematical physics they're always looking for something one equation will explain everything, and they say you know if you ask them, I think you ever get that? They say probably not. But when you're working, you know, we're always looking for something one, right?

[15:19] And something simple, right? And Max Planck says, you know, the more universal a theory is, the simpler it should be. And well, there's something infinite about the equation, huh? Force equals mass times acceleration. You can deduce an infinity of masses or accelerations, their forces by plugging in numbers, right? So there's something kind of infinite about it, and something unchanging about it too. You know, Heisenberg and Heisenberg and Rutherford, the physicists say that conservation laws are the most basic laws: conservation of energy and momentum and angular momentum.

[15:55] So the mind seems to be moving to something one simple, unchanging. Infinite, right? You know, perfect doesn't come up because they're making more material terms, but, four of the five, right? So you see, even before I see all the reasons or understand all the reasons, I can see that the mind is working that way. It's not like this is coming out of nowhere, you know. We're naturally inclined in that in that way.

[16:22] So we just have to begin a little bit. So after the consideration of divine perfection, we're not to consider about his infinity, right? And about his existence in things, right? Okay. And also Thomas refers to what four, five, and six is about the divine perfection, because the goodness was attached, you might say, to consideration of divine perfection. And now to the infinity of God will be attached his existence in all things, everywhere, right?

[17:01] Okay. And just like thereon to his unchangeableness would be attached the consideration of his eternity. Okay. So he said there's five attributes. Yeah, but we have certain things attached or followed upon one or another attribute, right? I don't know why he talks about God being one. He doesn't bring in that he's the measure of all things. You know, that's that add in there, right?

[17:29] Yeah, yeah, yeah. But when Thomas and when Thomas comments in Aristotle in metaphysics, and Aristotle talks about the one, he says it's a property of the one to be the beginning of things and to be the measure. Yeah. He first said that the one is the beginning of number, you know, but then it's carried over. Metaphysicians to every genus is something one is the measure of all.

[17:53] And so we find out, as you will, in the eleventh thing is his question, right? That God is altogether one. There could have been another question there that God is the measure of all things. It's you know, but these lacuna, you know, these great minds.

[18:16] He only had so much time. Yeah, yeah. He didn't finish the book as it was, so. Yeah. Nice interruption, though. So after the consideration of divine perfection, we're not to consider about his infinity and about his existence in things. For there is attributed to God that he be ubique, everywhere.

[18:52] Kind of interesting, ubique. Yeah. Because ubi by itself means what? Where. Yeah, we say everywhere. But I don't know. Quay doesn't say the sense of everything, but I guess what he translates it. I don't know. Got the Latin. And in all things, how those two kind of going together. Insofar as he is in circumscriptibilis, you cannot draw a line around God. It's a beautiful way of speaking.

[19:22] And he's what, infinitus, huh? I think he's taking those almost as synonymously there in circumscriptibilis, right? Can't draw a line around God. Aristotle uses that phrase in Greek sometimes, you know, perigrafia, to draw a line around. When he first defines happiness in Book 1 of *Ethics*, he says, he calls it perigraphia, right? And then he's going to go into all the virtues in detail, and then he's going to come back and fill in more exactly what human happiness is.

[19:53] But very concrete way of speaking, of it perigrafi huh God. is not that way, but just as his infinitus seems to be opposed to his being what defined, which make him infinitus, and so likewise you couldn't draw a line around him. You couldn't have a periphery of him either.

[20:22] So about the first four things are sought. First, whether God is what infinita. Notice the other articles are not really about God so much as the fact that this is unique to God, right? Secondly, whether anything besides him is infinite in its very what substance, yeah. Second, whether anything is able to be infinite in magnitude, right? And third, whether he's able to be what infinite in things according to what?

[21:01] With the infinite, it can be in things according to multitude, right? Now, especially three and four go back to the first meaning of finite and infinite, which is certain quantity, right? Okay, and discrete quantity and continuous quantity.

[21:20] To the first one proceeds thus: it seems that God is not infinite, for everything infinite is imperfect because it has the notion of a part and matter. That's the kind of infinity that Aristotle is talking about in the third book of the Natural Hearing. But God is most perfect; therefore, he is not what infinita.

[21:48] So it's kind of interesting that word "infinite." Originally, it has a sense of something what unformed. However, according to the philosopher in the first book of the Physics, finite and infinite belong to quantity, right? That's what he's arguing against Melissus and Parmenides, who say that

[22:15] everything is one. There's no multiplicity at all in the world. But one guy says that the what the one thing is infinite. The other guy says it's finite. Aristotle says, "Well, infinite and finite refer to quantity. So you got substance and quantity. You got the multiplicity. That's one of the arguments against them, right? So that's how he points out these things. But in God there is no quantity, since he is not a what body.

[22:43] Therefore, there's not belonging to him to be infinite. Huh? That's what I always puzzle about my separated soul. You know, I can't. I want to imagine it, and I can't imagine it. But the soul separated from the body does it have length and width and depth? No, no, and it seems seems be nothing, you know, because every time we think we we imagine something, right? Huh? You know, and so we tend to think that everything has got length and width and depth, but the soul doesn't, huh?

[23:15] So it's very hard to transcend your imagination that you have to do when you think about immaterial things, huh? And and Socrates can't even transcend, but you know, his imagination he's thinking about the universal. He sees the universal as a sail that covers things, you know. and gets into all kinds of troubles. in a dialogue called the Parmenides

[23:40] So, Moreover, what is here that is not there is finite according to place. Therefore, what is this that is not that is finite in its substance, but God is this and not that and not other, for he's not a stone, he's not a piece of wood. Therefore, God is not infinite according to his substance, huh? He's this and not that, so he's limited to being this and not that.

[24:19] That's pretty pretty definitive as far as I can see, huh? You know, when you teach these things, what's nice to do is to give them a page just as objections to it, you know, and they said contra, let them stew on that for a while, and then you know you drop in the second part, you know, and let them absorb that, and then finally you know say now reply the objections, and then you know then after a while drop in the reply to the objections.

[24:48] That's the way you should do this, you know. I know when I get through with the the and of course love and friendship, right? So at the end I do a little bit about charity and the article in the Summa where charity is what friendship, right? But I put the objections against his being friendship

[25:15] on a separate piece of paper, right, and give that to them, let them stew at that, and the objections come in a way right out of the treatise on friendship.

[25:25] So Aristotle, you know, will say that friendship is is mutual love, right? And but you're supposed to love your enemies, no love those who hate you, and by by charity, so it's obviously not friendship, right? Not mutual love, or if it's friendship, it's got to be the highest friendship, right? And the highest friendship is is between the virtuous, which is supposed to love sinners, huh? So this is obviously not the highest kind of, yeah.

[26:01] So it's beautiful objections, you know, and then and then interesting to see how Thomas will eventually untie those objections, huh But you better give them the whole article once, you know. See, you got to discipline yourself. You read these things on your own, and you know you get to the objection, you kind of stop and think about it, you know. So, how would I handle these things?

[26:26] Maybe you can't handle it, but at least it's good to know that you need someone to help. But okay, but against this is what Damascene says. huh I don't know you heard of St John Damascene, the the Philia Orthodoxa that's the reference down there. Okay, that God is what infinite and eternal and in circumscriptibilis That's where we get that word circumscription huh Interesting, But uh why does he stick eternus in there, right.

[27:10] Yeah, but I mean, I suppose because you think eternity is having no beginning, no end, right, and therefore as being what infinite, huh? Eternal. Yeah, Wojty's definition we'll meet later on is you know tota simul et perfecta possessio vitae interminabilis like saying unending life, but interminabilis is almost like infinite, right? That's what he thinks of that right in context. But Thomas would take up eternity

[27:47] attached to what unchangeable, right? Okay, he doesn't take up eternity as attached to infinite, right? He'll take up ubiqui in all things. I. Answer: It should be said, aha! You say this that all the ancient philosophers, right,

[28:07] attributed infinite to the first what beginning. As is said in the third book of the Physics, where Aristotle takes up the infinite. Okay, that's interesting. Did that right? And this reasonably considering that things flow from the first beginning without what end. Okay, that's kind of one of the reasons I give. You know, why should Max a man to think that the beginning of all things is infinite in some way, right?

[28:38] Well, because one reason would be because things keep on coming to be. Every spring, things spring up, right? We see them from God So the the origin of things must be infinite in some way. Things keep on coming to be from it forever, right? Was kind of coerced by the truth itself, right, to think that in some way the beginning of things is infinite, but. Maybe they are mistaken as to exactly in what way it is infinite.

[29:08] But some erred about the nature of the first beginning, right? Consequently, it was that they erred about the infinity of it, huh? Can we mention how the word error comes from the Latin word to wander, which suggests that error is result of a disordered movement of reason? Okay. And when our Lord speaks to the Sadducees, you know, they're trying to give him a rough time. The Sadducees didn't believe in the resurrection, son, and so they had the impossible situation of a woman marrying one man and he died without any heir, and the second brother marrying her and So on and seven brothers; they all had no heirs.

[30:03] So whose wife will she be in the next world? They're like you know, you've got a false situation. And Christ says, "You eplanēthēte," right? In Greek, yeah. Now the Greek word "plane" right comes from the Greek word to wander, and it's where we get the word "planet," huh? Because the planets seem to wander around the sky in comparison to the other ones, as opposed to the fixed stars as they call it, right?

[30:29] And so the word "error" in Latin, which is a very common word, and "plane" in Greek, there both come from the word to wander, right? And so

[30:47] this suggests that we wander into errors, right? Like Shakespeare says in the Comedy of Errors, we wander in illusions. Why the other word for error, which is mistake, right, seems to hit more upon what? Stone, defective of stone. Well, mistake is probably closer to what we call being mixed up, right? And so that's not seeing some distinction, or not understanding some distinction, or misunderstanding some distinction, right?

[31:28] And so sometimes I tied up with you know Shakespeare's definition of reason as the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, right, looking for order. But as Thomas points out, before you can see a before and after, you've got to see a distinction. So error is named from what? I mean, both mistake or error is a defective reason, but mistake or mixed up is more a defect in regard to distinction, and error more from wandering a defective order, right?

[32:06] So it's kind of interesting to see those those two words, huh? But some he said erred; they wandered, right? I remember one time you know, I kind of liked the wander, you know, the newspaper, you know, but the liberals were attacking it, and you know, for being mistaken. So it said the wanderer wanders, right? And it's kind of a nasty thing, you know, especially to somebody like me who who knows the origin of the word, right?

[32:38] I'm surprised that they do that. Okay, but because some erred about the nature of the first beginning, consequently they erred about its infinity, right? Because they laid down the first beginning to be matter. Consequently, they attributed to the first beginning a material infinity, which would be the quantitative, right? Saying that some infinite body was the first beginning of things. That's the way we get mixed up in the various senses of infinite too.

[33:16] Now it should be considered that something is said to be infinite from this that it is not what limited, right? Okay, negative. But in one way, matter is limited by form, and in another way, form is limited by what matter.

[33:43] For matter through form, insofar as matter before it receives a form is in potency or inability too many forms. So the wood could be a chair or a table or a door. What limits it to one of these or the other? It's the form it receives, the act, right? But when it receives one form, then it's limited to what that

[34:11] form, however, is limited by matter. In so far as form, considered by itself or in itself, is common to many, but through this that is received in matter, it becomes a form in a determinate way of this thing. Matter, however, is perfected by form through which it is what limited, and therefore the infinite, according as is attributed to matter, has the notion of something imperfect, for it is as it were matter not having a form.

[34:50] Form, however, is not perfected by matter, but rather through it, its what amplitude, its extent, is what contracted or limited. Hence, the infinite, according as it has itself in a part of form, not determined through matter, has the notion of something what perfect. He's

[35:19] asking somebody what it's like for a man to get married, and he said, "This philosopher, it's like form being contracted by matter." Marriage is a contract. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. It ties a man down and limits him in the. It can be more perfect without that limitation.

[35:47] Okay. Now, that which is most formal of all things. what is most the act of every act you might say, huh? Is existence itself right? As is clear from the things said above. Since, therefore, the divine being, the divine existence, is not being received in something, but it is being subsisting itself, right? It is manifest that God Himself is both infinite and what perfect. Now, perhaps this is one reason for taking up the infinity of God right after his perfection, right?

[36:31] They seem to be very what, yeah, very close, yeah. It almost seems like infinity is saying, you know, speaking about God is infinitely perfect, right? His perfection is not limited to to any what genus, right? But the perfections of every genus are found in God in a simple way, okay? Universally, perfectly, say sometimes, right? So Thomas often quotes there God saying, "do I think Maybe Abraham and Moses, but one of them, if not both, I will show you every good.

[37:14] You know, follow me, and I'll show every good." Thomas says, "That is myself." I just love the way he does that. It's so what a great mind he has. Okay, so that's the reply to the first objection, whereas I was thinking of the infinite that is tied to matter, right?

[37:35] For everything infinite is imperfect because the notion of part in matter. Okay, but that's not the kind of infinity we're going to attribute to God.

[37:51] The second objection is saying that finite infinite belong to quantity, but in God there's no quantity. To the second, it should be said that the term or limit of quantity is as its what form, right? In fact, that's probably where we get the word "form" first, right? From the limit of quantity. A sign of which is that figure which consists in the termination of quantity, is a certain form about quantity, like a what triangle or a circle or a square, right?

[38:26] So when when Euclid talks about a square or a circle or a triangle, he's not just talking about the the four lines; he's talking about the what the surface that is bound by four lines, right? Okay.

[38:43] So you speak of the diameter as bisecting a circle. The circle is all this; it's not just that line itself. Some some people you know tend to think of just the line as being a circle, right? Okay.

[39:00] Whence the infinite that belongs to quantity is an infinite which has itself from the side of matter, and such an infinite is not attributed to God, as has been said. Right? You may recall during Aristotle's distinguishing the categories, right? And he says some things are said of individual substances by reason of what they are, like man is said of you and me, and more generally animal and all we have to substance.

[39:29] Other things are said of us not by reason of what we are, but something existing in us, either absolutely, he says, or towards another, right? And towards another, the category of towards another relation. Said absolutely, and then he distinguishes quantity and quality, but one is on the side of matter, and the other on the side of what form? Yeah. Yeah. So we're more apt to carry words over from quality. To God, like He's wise or He's just, right?

[40:05] Then things from what quantity? Huh? Because that follows upon matter, right? Okay. And such an infinite is not attributed to God on the side of of matter.

[40:24] Now the third one. What about his being here and not there, or being this and not that, right? To the third, it should be said. From this very fact that the being of God is subsisting by itself, not received in another, insofar as it is said to be infinite, is distinguished from what All other things, right? And other things are removed from it, just as if there was some subsisting whiteness.

[40:59] From this fact that is not in another, it would differ from what all whiteness existing in the subject, huh? So it's not that God has something in common with other things, and and by this he's separated from that and those, but because he's not what received in any way, right? He's simply what

[41:31] unlimited. Okay. It's interesting when Aristotle talks about the various senses of being in metaphysics, right? And there's accidental being, huh? Like white geometers and so on. And then there's being as such, right? And the two main kinds of being as such are act and ability. That's one division. The other one is being according to the figures of predication, right? And

[42:06] it's interesting the word he uses there, figures of predication. But figure comes up here, right? It's not really same thing as quantity, but it's it's it's talking about genus and species and so on, huh? And why does he use the word figure there? I mean, you can talk about that for a while, you see. But God is not under any one of those figures of predication. He's not in any genus.

[42:33] So he's not limited in that sense, right? So he's not like something one of those genus that has to be distinguished from other things in that genus, but something outside all those genera, right? And not limited to any one of those genera. He's unlimited, and that's why he's distinct from all these other things, right? But if he was in some genus and he was this and not that, he would be limited, right?

[43:04] Now, Thomas could be confused a little bit more, right? But I think he's thinking in part partly of that. Aristotle uses the word figures there. I think you know he's talking about the syllogism too, huh? And you know, we we tend to borrow the Latin, words. We speak of the major term, the middle term, the minor term. But the Greek word is limit, right? What term means limit, really?

[43:31] The major limit, the middle limit, the minor limit, right? I suppose it's borrowed from quantity originally, right? But it's it's a little different meaning. But still, it's unlimited in the way that God would not be limited, right? Then you find the word limit also in the in the word definition, right?

[43:55] So God, strictly speaking, cannot be defined. Sometimes you know we say you know what can motion be defined because that's kind of unlimited too, but but but it's a different kind of being unlimited, right?

[44:15] That's why I thought it was funny when you read that objection. Your reaction was very definitive. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But we're thinking usually a thing to end the same same kind of thing, right? And then you know, this is a dog and not a cat. You know, this is wine and not beer or something. You know, but they have some kind of common. Should we stop right now?

[44:42] It's about four fifteen Yeah No let's see. Oh let's see.