Prima Pars
30. Summa I, Q7, Article 4 and Q8, Article 1: No actual infinite multitude, Weizsäcker on a finite universe, and how God is in all things
Class of 2006-04-06
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/030-summa-i-q7-article-4-and-q8-article-1-no-actual-infinite/

[0:00] Okay. Whether there be an infinite in things according to multitude? Huh. The fourth one proceeds thus. It seems possible for there to be an infinite multitude in act, for it is not impossible that what is in ability be reduced to act. But number is multipliable forever, and therefore it is not impossible for there to be an infinite multitude in act. For Aristotle in the ninth book of wisdom there says that some abilities are what it's a nature never to be fully actualized.

[0:50] Moreover, of any species, it is possible for there to be some individual in act. But the species of figure are infinite. Huh. Hexagon, seven figure, eight figure, nine figure. Therefore, it is possible for there to be infinite figures in act.

[1:07] Moreover, those things which are not opposed to each other do not impede each other. But having posited some multitude of things, one is able there is able to come about another multitude, right, which is not opposed to them. Therefore, it is not impossible again for another one to be together with them and so on forever. Therefore, it is possible for there to be an infinite act. Now nice sickanta huh?

[1:40] But again, this is what is said in the book of wisdom, 11 verse 21. All things in weight, number, and measure you have disposed. Okay. I

[1:54] answer. It should be said that about this there was a twofold opinion. For some, as Avicenna and Algazel said it was impossible for there to be a infinite multitude in act per se, right? But an infinite multitude per accidens was not impossible.

[2:24] Now that is said to be an infinite multitude per se when it's required that for something to be that there be an infinite multitude, huh? And this is impossible to be because thus it is necessary that something would depend upon an infinity of things. whence, its generation would never be completed, since you can't go through an infinite number of things, multitude of things. Per accident, however, a multitude is said to be infinite when it is not required.

[3:02] For something an infinity multitude, but it happens thus to be, and this can be manifested thus in the work of the metalworker, I guess, to whom a certain multitude is required per se, to wit, that there be an art in his soul and a moving hand and a hammer. But if these are multiplied forever, never would the work of the fabricator be completed, because they depend upon infinity of causes.

[3:36] But the multitude of hammers, which happens from this that one is broken, another is taken, is a multitude per accidens, for it happens that he operates by many hammers, and doesn't differ at all whether by one or by two or by many or by infinity of them, if he operates in an infinite time. So in this way they laid down that it is possible for there to be an act an infinite multitude per accidens, but this is impossible, he says, Thomas, because every multitude necessarily is in some what species of multitude.

[4:17] This sounds like they're meant to be used in the previous article, doesn't it? But the species of multitude are according to the species of numbers, but no species of number is infinite, huh? Because each number is a multitude measured by one.

[4:37] I remember reading the text of the Oxford translation of Aristotle, right? The class and the English text says an infinite number. My teacher, the circuit says Aristotle didn't talk about infinite number. That's like a contradiction in terms, right? Dwayne, look it up in the Greek. Sure enough, the word number was not in there, right? Okay. So it was infinite multitude that Aristotle used. Well, yeah, yeah, but not not just a number, you say.

[5:06] Yeah. Okay. Hence, it is impossible for there to be an infinite multitude an act, either per se or per accidens, right? Because it could be some what particular kind of multitude, particular kinds of multitude being distinguished by numbers, huh?

[5:29] Moreover, the multitude existing in verum natura, right, in reality, in the real world, is created, and everything created is comprehended or included under some certain intention of the creator, for he does not what do something in vain, eh? Whence, it is necessary that under a certain number all created things are comprehended. Is impossible, therefore, for there to be multitude that's infinite in act, even per accidens.

[6:07] So God's not going to what aim at an infinite multitude of of blessed right? There's some number, and the number is completed. That's it. And the ball game's over.

[6:24] But for there to be an infinite multitude in in potency, in ability, right, is possible, right? Why? Because the increase of multitude follows the division of magnitude.

[6:39] The more something is divided, the more what according to number result. Of course, you kind of saw that in Anaxagoras, right? He said there's no smallest of the small, which is only true of mathematical quantity. And then he goes on to say there's no larger of the large, right? I say, what's the connection between saying there's no smaller than small, and therefore no largest of the large?

[7:04] What's always getting larger as you divide the line and subdivide, subdivide? Well, sometimes you get a student who will say the number of lines is always getting larger, right? So if you can always divide a line and divide forever, then the number of lines can always increase without any limit, huh? So there's no largest number, just like there's no shortest what line, yeah, yeah. Hence, since the infinite is found in potency in the division of continuous, because it proceeds to matter, the same reason the infinite is found only in potency in the addition of the multitude.

[7:45] So Aristotle talks about or defines even the line of the continuous as that which is able to be divided forever. Is that an ability that can ever be what fully actualized? No, no, no.

[8:03] And in a way, my ability to walk home is a little bit like that too, right? Because when is my ability to walk home completed? When you finally get home. Yeah, when I have walked home, but then I'm not walking home. So as long as I'm walking home, it's the very nature of walking home to not have walked home. And to have walked home is not to be walking home.

[8:31] So it's a little bit like the division of continuous, right? Kind of a strange ability, Not like the ability to be a chair. Say that Wood has one that can be fully realized. That ability to be a chair.

[8:52] And when you try to show the infinity of the mind, I think I'm interesting because one way we show the way the mind is infinite is by it's not universal. It's kind of a common way. But if you realize that you can know one thing to knowing another thing, then the more you know, there's always something more you can know through what you just learned, right? And then you know something more as well as that, then you can know something else through that, and so on, kind of another way, right?

[9:22] But it's never completely actualized, huh? When you study geometry, you realize that you're going to be no end to this discovery of simple numerical relations among these things,

[9:43] so of course, go back now to the first objection. Says it is not impossible that what is in potency be reduced to act, but number is multipliable forever, right? Therefore. To the first, therefore, it should be said that each thing is reduced that is in potency is reduced to act according to the way of its own being. For a day is not reduced to act that it be all at once all at once, but successively.

[10:18] And likewise, the infinite multitude is not reduced to an act that it be altogether at once, but successively, because after each multitude, one is able to take another multitude, and so on forever.

[10:36] Now, the second objection is taken from: Well, can't you have one of each kind? And this is an infinity of kinds, right? Says to the second, it should be said that the species of figures have infinity from the infinity of number. For the species are figures are trilateral, quadrilateral, and thus. As soon as you see the word trilateral instead of what triangle, it's kind of funny, anyway.

[11:02] We tend to call triangle from three angles rather than three sides. Probably make more sense to call it what trilateral, right? Whence, just as the infinite multitude numberable is not reduced in act that it be all at once, so nor so also neither is the multitude of what figures.

[11:31] I heard Thomas say elsewhere. You know that when we see God as He is, we know all figures. That's kind of strange, right? Because there's no limit to that, right? It's kind of

[11:49] hard to understand how, in understanding one thing, we can understand many things. It kind of gets a famous thing on on the idea of limits, right? Where you're trying to know distinct at the same time the circle, let's say, and the what

[12:07] polygon, right? Where you know in the circle as the limit of these polygons, as you divide the sides all the time, you know. So it's like you're trying to know two things distinctly at once. Trying to be like an angel, not quite getting there, perhaps, but a little bit, huh? Now,

[12:27] the third objection can always add something. To the third, it should be said that though some things being laid down to lay down other things is not opposed to them, nevertheless,

[12:44] to lay down infinite multitudes is opposed to each what species of multitude, huh? Whence it is not possible for there to be some what multitude in act infinite, huh? Okay.

[13:06] No, a little time left, I guess. Question eight is the one attached to God being infinite, right? And this is God's being what? God sitting sitting all around us. Yeah, God is infinite. Is everywhere, right? Okay. Because to the infinite, it seems to belong that it be everywhere, right? But as you suspect, it's not going to be everywhere in the way that a body is everywhere, right?

[13:34] So in a sense, he's excluded that. He's excluded the infinite body beyond the third article, right? Then God is not everywhere in the way that a body is that fills everything, huh? Whatever. whatever Newton meant by the Newton meant by the sensorium, right? He's not there in the way that space was thought to be everywhere, you know, going on and on and on forever, right? Did I ever tell you about Heisenberg's student there, Weizsäcker you know who's a physicist.

[14:13] But his book, The World View of Physics, he has an interesting thing about the infinite. Well, he, he was working with Heisenberg in the modern physics, and what characterizes modern physics, as I say, the physics of the twentieth century, as opposed to Newtonian physics of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth century, is the discovery of limits. Okay. Now the beginning of the physics of the twentieth century, modern physics as they call it, was the quantum hypothesis in December of 1900, proposed by Max Planck.

[14:50] And this says there's a limit as to the smallest amount of energy you can give or receive. That there's an amount of energy below which you cannot give or receive, and you give either this amount or some multiple of this amount, huh? And Planck came to this, you know, in his study of black body radiation. And so he proposed in December of 1900, and then five years later Einstein showed you can't understand light without this quantum.

[15:22] And then 13 years later, Niels Bohr showed you can't understand the atom without this, right? So nothing in the physical world, matter or light, is without the quantum, right? But this is a limit now, right? Okay. And sometimes, you know, popularly I compare it to the monetary system, right? There's a smallest amount of money you can give or receive, which is a penny, right? And you either give or receive a penny or some multiple of penny, but nothing less than a penny, and nothing between one penny and two pennies.

[15:51] You see they had just so-called quantum jumps in the atom, right? And that's why it was introduced by the great Niels Bohr. But then in 1905, Einstein proposed the what? Special theory of relativity, and that's there's a limit as to how fast the body can go, you see, which is the speed of light, right? So this is a limit now in the direction of the large. Now neither these limits existed in Newtonian physics, and you could always give less and less energy, you could go faster and faster in principle, right?

[16:26] So these are the foundations of modern physics, huh? Well, then ten years later Einstein proposed the general theory of relativity, huh? And well, then tested until after this, first world war that kind of, broke up.

[16:45] But the general theory of relativity gave a great impetus to cosmology, the study of the universe as a whole, and so they started to to think about the universe in the light of the general theory of relativity. It seemed to make sense that the world is finite, and ever since the Renaissance, they had been maintaining that the universe was infinite, huh? You know, everybody talks about that famous work of Koyré, you know, from the closed universe to the infinite universe, right?

[17:22] This is the modern thing, right? So from from the Renaissance until you know the general theory of relativity, they just assumed that the universe was infinite, right? In opposition to you know Aristotle thought the universe was finite, but now it seemed that the universe was was was finite, and I guess Einstein was a little bit surprised at coming out his own theory. And if that guy's mathematics, you know, that guy's mathematics was wrong, and Einstein actually was making some miscalculations himself, and finally had to admit that he did.

[17:57] Oh. You know, okay. And then with with the big bang and so on, right, huh? There seemed to be some reason to say that the universe might be not only limited or finite in space, but even in time, okay? It's a great shock, right? Well, then the quantum physicists they went in the opposite direction. Now they started to go down to the study of the elementary particles, huh?

[18:23] And at least two of the Nobel laureates in in quantum physics who went into elementary particles, they were working with the idea that there's going to be a minimum length, a smallest length, which is something like ten to the minus thirteen centimeters, huh? Below which there is nothing, right? You see, That's a shock. A minimum length. It's a contrast to what you have in math, right? It's a minimum, but in the natural world, there's a limit, right?

[18:51] So anyway, that's kind of background. But Weizsäcker was giving a what a lecture, right, on the new physics, you know, and kind of emphasizing the fact that what. Characterize it as limits, limits, limits, limits, right? You know, and there was an older physicist there, you know, who got very indignant about this whole thing, right? And angry and really upset about this, you know. So, Weizsäcker, being a young physicist, decided to go see this older physicist and see what his objections really were to new theories, right?

[19:25] And you know, see them privately, we can, you know, talk a little more calmly about things. And it seems that that the old physicist he didn't see any objections to new theories. I mean, any defects in the thinking, but just couldn't stand the idea that we had a finite universe, right?

[19:44] And you know, the evidence is pointing that way, right? And so Weizsäcker began to think, you know, well, why was he so upset about this, right? And then he went back to thinking about. When they started to think the universe was infinite, and it wasn't maybe a coincidence that they had turned away, he said, from the study of God, who's infinite, right, to the study of the material world, and universe was now becoming a substitute for the study of God.

[20:19] But a finite thing can't satisfy our mind, so they had to what make the universe infinite to make it a substitute for thinking about God, which was out to be finite. What do you do? You know, dead end. You know, the universe is a dead end. It's all a dead end. It points you back to God. It's

[20:45] like my wife and I have a joke, you know, between us, you know, and we we said such a thing, you know, that we consider marriage to be a dead end. And people kind of, you know, you know, what's wrong with marriage? And the joke, the reason why we call it dead end, there's no way out. What do you say? It's just like Sartre no exit, no exit.

[21:04] Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's what I meant. Yeah, I mean, it's horrible. It's kind of nice, but it's a dead end, you know. So the universe ought to be a dead end, you know, to be limited, right? And but that's kind of significant, though, right? It's an interesting point he's making, yeah. Yeah. I don't think he's a believer, right? But he sees that an infinite God that you're thinking about is something very satisfying to the mind, right?

[21:33] And when you give up that, like they did, you know, the Reformation and so on, and the Renaissance, and and then devote yourself to study the natural world, natural world has to become now a substitute for what for God, and therefore if it's not infinite, it can't be a substitute for God. But then, with modern science itself, you know, using its own methods, runs into conclusion that everything's limited out there.

[22:04] It seems to be. Well, then what can we do? You see, I think it's interesting, huh? It reminds me, you know, of what you see in the modern philosophers too. Myself, I'm both a philosopher and a theologian, right? And incidentally, your latest little newsletter, right? You said in our philosophical class, yeah, I thought that too yeah, yeah, you've got to be. Careful about that, right? Because as a philosopher, I don't know that there's a Trinity.

[22:34] I don't know that God became man, right? I don't know that as a philosopher, right? So, although some of these things, you know, could be understood by the philosopher, the order is really imitating God's, because we're imitating God's knowledge. So it's not really philosophy class. That's a little mistake there. First. What I think, Dr Berquist, I think you should sue them. This,

[23:03] yeah, but the the point is, you take a taxi man coming to that. It's a long walk out of town. No, I bought some philosophy theology. See, what happened in modern philosophy was they give up theology, right? You see, but they're living in a society where there's still remnants of Christianity around and so on, right? So they're not back in the position the Greeks are. The Greeks are philosophizing without theology, right?

[23:39] But they're never exposed to it, right? See, but the modern philosophers have given up theology, having been exposed to it to some extent, right? And so they seek in philosophy a substitute for theology, and and so they seek in philosophy things the Greeks didn't seek in philosophy or try to get in philosophy, right? Because they weren't trying to get a substitute for theology. So I mean, I always say Hegel's Hegel's philosophy of history, you know, is more like the City of God of Augustine, the secularized version of it, and and Hegel's system is like the Trinity, you know.

[24:18] I mean, a perverse imitation of the Trinity, and then at the end there, you know, the the thought becomes flesh, you know, and so so it's a perverse imitation of the Trinity and the the incarnation and so on. And it doesn't make sense really philosophically, but it's it's you can see the guy is trying to get a substitute for theology. But I said this thing, Feitich is is something like that, right?

[24:45] In a sense, the natural world is becoming a substitute for God, and it can't be unless it's in some way what infinite, right? See, and you know, you know, communism appealed to some people too. You know, Marxism. You know, this is kind of a salvation. You know, you know, like like Whitaker Chambers. I don't know if you read his book Witness and so on. But he graduated from Columbia University, right?

[25:10] He had two alternatives: He was: either to become a communist or commit suicide. Like there's no salvation, you know. I guess I guess his brother committed suicide and he became a communist, right? But this is like you know, we get your salvation, you know. And and it's kind of funny you read you know about L J Hiss and these other people you know who you know how could they have done this you know but it was like a kind of a it's interesting how communism really it's a deep imitation of Christianity in many ways because but it's peculiar because many of the like Lenin and many of them they actually would take a new name when they became yeah communists and so forth it was

[25:48] really kind of peculiar you know how yeah preserving the body you know yeah it's really bizarre yeah yeah it was interesting that reaction of whoever that older physicist was yeah. Because just reading this morning, and when, as you know from St. Thomas's commentary on Job, basically proceed by disputation. Yeah. And one of the comments he makes at the end of chapter six is he's commenting on Job is trying to refute the arguments of his first Eliphaz Yeah, his dear friend.

[26:18] And he gives he gives four reasons at the end that put an end to all kind of disputation. And one of them is when somebody doesn't have a reason against your argument, but he just doesn't want to hear it. Yeah. So it's an end of disputation. Yeah. Yeah. Because they don't have a reason to dispute anymore. Yeah. And that's kind of this reaction, this kind of visceral reaction.

[26:38] Yeah. But again, say in seeking the natural world as a substitute for God, right? And therefore, having to make the natural world in some way infinite, right? It doesn't mean that you attribute to the natural world in this substitute the kind of infinity that God has, right? But I mean, the average mind doesn't see that, right? You see. And and as they say, looking at from the other point of view, from the point of the Greeks, um, they were thinking at the beginning of all things as being infinite in a kind of quantitative sense, and Thomas says they were coerced by the truth to think that the beginning of things infinite, but they misunderstood the kind of infinity it had, and so Thomas has to

[27:25] kind of contrast that infinity with the infinity that God does have, huh? And the consequence of that is that this God being ubique and some what does that mean? But not understanding that in a quantitative being everywhere, you know, spread out like like space, huh? Or like the Manichaeans that God is like a light extended through space.

[27:52] So just maybe we should begin just a little bit of this here. Because truly, to the infinite, it seems to belong that it be everywhere, and be in all things, right? Okay.

[28:13] It should be considered whether this belongs to God. Okay. And of course, when Melissus or somebody like that said that the being is infinite, and he thought of it infinite in this quantitative sense, he thought it was everywhere, right? You can see how close this is to the way the mind works there right now. You think of something as being infinite, you think of it as being everywhere in some sense, right?

[28:42] And as you understand infinity, you understand you're everywhere. So about this, four things are sought. First, whether God be in all things, huh? Secondly, whether God is what everywhere. So Thomas doesn't understand exactly the same thing by saying God is in omnibus rebus in all things and he's ubique, right? Doesn't say exactly the same thing, huh? So when he sets it up above there in the premium, because to the infinite it seems to belong to be everywhere in all things, there's a little, seems to be a little distinction between those two.

[29:25] At least there's a separate article for each, right? And then the third article is kind of a breakdown of the second, right? Whether God is everywhere through essence and power and presence, huh? So it's kind of a funny way of saying it, but we'll see what it means, huh? And then whether to be everywhere is proper to God, huh?

[29:51] He's got nowhere to go, huh? So, to the first one proceeds thus: it seems that God is not in all things. Of course, to be in is said in many ways, as you know, and should that come up a little bit somewhere, earlier. For what is above all things is not in all things, right? But God is above all things, according to that of Psalm 120: "The Lord is raised above all what nations, right?

[30:34] Above the heavens is the Lord above nature. Therefore, God is not in all things, huh? Moreover, what is in something is contained by it. That's only the first sense of being in. We're contained by the four walls of this room, right? We're in this room, right? But God is not contained by things, but more, He contains them, right? We're in God's hand. God's on us. Therefore, God is not in things, but more, things are in Him.

[31:15] Whence Augustine says in the book of the eighty-three questions that in Him more are all things than He Himself. What? Moreover As an agent is more powerful, right? So its action proceeds more to what is distant. But God is the most powerful of agents.

[31:49] Therefore, His action is able to what? Reach those things which are distant from Him. Therefore, He doesn't have to be in all things. Moreover, the demons, the devils, are some things, right? But God is not in the demons. For there is no coming together of light with darkness, as is said in the second epistle of the Corinthians, chapter 6, verse fourteen. Therefore, God is not in all things.

[32:34] But against this, wherever something operates or acts, there it is. But God acts in all things according to that of Isaiah 26, chapter 12, verse. All our doings you do in us. Glory. Pretty interesting thing, huh? Don't do anything except in what. Power of God, huh?

[33:05] Therefore, God is in all things. Always come up in discussions, you know. Does, I mean, does it cooperate with the sinner? The defect doesn't come from what God does, right? Whatever there is of goodness, what the sinner does is due to God. Defect is due to the sinner. I answer: It should be said that God is in all things, not as a part of what their nature, right?

[33:44] Or as an accident, right? But as an agent is present to that in which it what acts. For it is necessary that every agent be joined to that in which it immediately acts, right? And that by its power it what touches it, right?

[34:12] Once in the seventh book of the physics is proved that motion and the the moved, I should say, and the mover are necessarily what together, right?

[34:27] Since therefore God is to be itself, who is very nature, right, is necessary that created existence be his proper effect, huh? Just as to be ignited, to be fired up, is the proper effect of fire, huh?

[34:53] But this effect God causes in things, not only when at first they begin to be, but so long as they are conserved in being,

[35:07] Now, like this here, just as light is caused in the air by the sun, so long as the air remains what illuminated, right? So long, therefore, as things have existence or being, so is necessary that God be present to them, right? In the way in which they have being, but to be is that which is most intimate to each thing, huh? And what more profoundly is inside of all things, huh?

[35:42] Since it is formally, it's formal with respect to all things, which are in the thing, huh? The actuality of everything, as is clear from what has been said above. Once it is necessary that God be in all things and being what.

[36:00] So sometimes the saints say he's closer to you than you are to yourself. I'm kind of spread out in my arms and legs, and you know when when who is it Saint Teresa of Avila talks about the interior castles of the expression Jesus, you know, it's like going in to God, right? Who's more within you than you are within yourself, right? But

[36:27] why is that? Because he's the cause of being. Knowing when a thing first begins to be, but but always right, and he can't make something to be without him. That would be a contradiction, right? Doesn't have being except to what is essentially being, namely God. So God is in all things in the sense in which the what agent is present to all things, right? Just not the most obvious sense of being in, right?

[37:00] And we we tend to fall back upon the interior senses to be in, right? And therefrom misunderstand the sense in which God is in all things.

[37:12] So the first objection was that God is above all things, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that God is above all things by the excellence of his own nature, and nevertheless he is in all things as causing the being of all things.

[37:34] So he's not what above all things in the same way that he is in all things. Right? That's the distinction he's making here. You know, the second one is going back to the first meaning of being in that Thomas does in the order of the senses of being in in the fourth book to be in in the room being contained. The first sense of to be in is to be in place, right?

[38:01] To be in the room here. Second one is to be in something as a part in the whole, right? And Thomas is showing how that's the second sense. He says that if you loosen the part from the rest of the whole, then it's in there like in a place, right? So if you knock my tooth out, and I can take it down and put it back in again, like it was a false tooth.

[38:24] False teeth are really in the mouth. In the mouth is in a what place? They're not really a part of your mouth. You know, I guess they have something to hold them in there. I guess, and I got to that, but but so a part is is is not straight to go like this. You see how close the meanings are, right? Then the third meaning is what the genus and the species.

[38:55] Oh yeah. Yeah. Um. So he says the second it should be said that although bodily things are said to be in something as in what what is containing them, nevertheless spiritual things contain those things in which they are, just as the soul contains the body, right? And so, the soul leaves the body, the body falls apart, right? So the whole is what the soul is what holds it together.

[39:29] So if it holds it together, it's it's contained the body more than the body containing it. There might be another sense that you would say that maybe the body contains a soul, right? The form is in matter. Whence God is in things as containing things.

[39:52] Nevertheless, through a certain likeness of bodily things, all things are said to be in God. insofar as they are contained by him, and that can be said, you know, also in the sense of what when you get to the seventh sense of in there and the physics, I've got you in my power, right? See, that means you're what

[40:17] I control you, right? Okay. And we see sometimes, you know, and something's not in our power; it's out of my hands, right? Okay. Have no control over it; it's out of my hands.

[40:44] Okay. Now the idea about acting at a distance. To the third, it should be said that if no agent, no matter how powerful it is, does an action proceed to something distant, except in so far as it acts through the what intermediaries. But this pertains to the the maximum, the maximum power of God that he immediately acts in all things. Whence nothing is distant from him, right?

[41:25] As if God, what? Didn't happen to himself. Yeah. Things near us are said to be distant from God through the what unlikeness of nature, right, or through the unlikeness of grace. Just as he is above all things, so the essence of his nature, going back to the distinction he made in the first reply to the first objection, right? Okay. Now, what about the demons? To the fourth, it should be said that in the demons is understood both the nature which is from God and the deformity of fault or guilt, right, which is not from him.

[42:05] And therefore, it ought not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, right? In so far as they are demons, right? But with this addition, in so far as they are certain things, and they're very so their staying in existence depends upon God, right? Okay. But in things which name a nature that is not deformed,

[42:32] absolutely one might say that God is, God is, shouldn't I? And I always say, "Hail Mary, full of grace. The Lord is with thee. " I can't say with thee I guess say, in you. We say with you.

[42:53] So. Should we stop or? time to be done? No, no, no.