Prima Pars
31. Is God in All Things and Everywhere? (Summa I, q.8, a.1–2)
Class of 2006-04-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/031-is-god-in-all-things-and-everywhere-summa-i-q-8-a-1-2/

[0:01] In The name of the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlightener guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us and help us to understand all that you are within. The Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen. Kind of funny. I was reading Thomas on the incarnation, right?

[0:33] Of course, what he does in the Summa Contra Gentiles is will have a refutation of the heresies about the incarnation, right? And bringing out scriptural texts, you know, to bring out gradually what the incarnation is. And then you'll have a chapter where he gives arguments from reason against the article faith. Of course, one of the objections is that the human nature of Christ is not everywhere, right?

[0:59] So if God takes on the human nature of Christ, He's not ubique, right? And of course, Thomas is saying, Well, He's still God, though, so He still is ubique. He still is everywhere, right? You know, even though His human nature is not everywhere. That's kind of interesting, though. It's kind of funny that this was happened to be one objections I was reading this morning when I was going to go in and talk here about whether God is ubique everywhere.

[1:29] We say where in the second part of everywhere, and they say in the first part, ubi is where, right? Ubi ubique. Okay. So let's look at the premium again here.

[1:42] Because it seems to belong to the infinite that it be everywhere, right? And even the infinite, in the sense of a what body, the infinite would be everywhere, huh? Okay.

[1:57] And of course, the ancient Greeks who thought that there was some body that was infinite, that body would be everywhere, right? In length and width and depth, and therefore there wouldn't be any motion anymore, right? If it's everywhere, can't move from one place to another. And but it kind of struck me here, you know, the way Thomas has arranged these consideration of the attributes, because he has the infinity of God in between his what perfection, right, and his what being unchangeable, right.

[2:32] Of course, the Greeks would see, you know, even in that way they understood the infinite a connection between being infinite and being unchangeable. If you're infinite in extension, there's no place for you to go. You're everywhere. And if you're infinite, of course, in in perfection, there's nothing you lack. So nothing you could change around or move to try to get. But on the other hand, the infinity of God.

[2:59] Is related to his what perfection right? Because God is universally perfect, and that means his perfection is not limited to any one kind of thing, but he contains perfections of every kind of thing, in a what superior way and in a simple way. So it's kind of appropriate that he has infinity in between the perfection of God and his being what unchangeable. In other words, is infinity of God more closely related to his perfection and to his being unchangeable, right?

[3:34] And then the perfection and God being unchangeable are to what each other, right? You know, I just throw that out as a hint, right?

[3:47] Of course, Thomas is always talking about how the circle is perfect because the beginning is the end. Okay, and it's kind of interesting the way these five are related because God being simple and God being one are very close together. And I think I mentioned how in the compendium of theology he considers the unity of God among the little chapters dealing with the simplicity of God. So show how close they are, but in a way he begins with the simplicity of God and then with the unity of God.

[4:19] It's like what he ends where he began. Kind of interesting, huh? So, without being so presumptuous as to say why he's got them in this order exactly right, it makes me stop and think about the order. At least remember the order, you know, and I try to see some reasons for it.

[4:42] Now about this, he says four things are sought: whether God is in all things; secondly, whether God is everywhere; and the third, in particular, whether He's everywhere by essence and power and presence.

[5:00] And Thomas will make that distinction of what those three mean. But essence might refer to His being everywhere as what giving things existence, right? And power maybe is being everywhere as moving things to do what they they do, right? And maybe presence is that He He sees all, hears all, knows all, right? All things are open to Him, as Scripture says.

[5:31] And then the fourth article is whether to be everywhere is private, huh, to God, huh? You know that word "proprium." Sometimes people translate it "proper," and "proper" is opposed to what improper. Say, but sometimes you know "proprium" has a sense of private as opposed to what common, right? So you speak of the bonum commune, the common good, and the bonum proprium, the private good, huh? And I don't think it should be called the bonum proprium, the the proper good, because then the common good would be the the improper good or something, right?

[6:10] And so, but a lot of times people will translate it that way, right? And of course, when you study logic, there you have the so-called property, right? While property, in the strict sense, belongs to only one species to every member of it and always. so it's kind of unique to that one thing. So, and since what you are asking here is whether to be everywhere is something that belongs to God alone, right?

[6:36] The only God is everywhere, right? That's a separate thing, right? It's one thing to see that God is everywhere. It's another thing to see that maybe this is something that He alone and no one else has, huh? Okay.

[6:54] So, if the Greeks would say God is wise, and sometimes they say God alone is wise, right? That's adding something to it, right? You said alone, huh? But it's kind of appropriate that you take that up last, huh? Because you want to see, obviously, that to be everywhere belongs to God, as presupposed to seeing that belongs only to God. If that's what he's going to conclude in the fourth article.

[7:26] Now, to the first one proceeds. Thus, it seems that God is not in all things, for what is above all things is not in all things, huh? But God is above all things, according to those words of Psalm one twelve. The Lord is what raised up above all the nations, huh? Okay. Therefore, God is not in all things.

[8:00] That's a good objection, right? That's the That's the objection Protestants use for denying the real presence. In other words, how could Jesus be up there and over here at the same time? Yeah,

[8:16] yeah. More, what is in something is contained by it. And that's when it goes back to the first sense of being, huh? We are in this room; we're contained by the four walls of this room. But God is not contained by things, but He more contains things. Therefore, God is not in things, but more things are in Him. Hence, Augustine in the book of the eighty-three questions says that in Him rather are all things than He what somewhere right.

[8:58] Now, of course, the words "to be in" have many senses, right? Aristotle, in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, the physics, as the multitude call it, distinguishes eight senses of being in, right? Which Thomas, in his commentary, orders on. But those even are not all the senses, but the central senses. Moreover, the more powerful an agent is, the more to a greater distance does his action proceed.

[9:33] But God is the most what? Powerful agent, huh? A lot of times, you know, virtue is more translated by power than by by virtue, right? In English, therefore, his action is able to what? Arrive even at those things which are distant from him. Therefore, it is not necessary that he be in all things, huh? Fourth objection: Moreover, the demons are some things, but God is not in the demons, for there is no coming together of light to darkness, as is said in the second epistle to the Corinthians.

[10:19] Therefore, God is not in all things. things. But against this, wherever something operates or does something, there it is. But God operates, acts in all things, according to that of Isaiah twenty-six twelve. All are what doings God has done in us. That's that's a very important text that Thomas is always quoting. You know that we don't do anything without what

[10:54] God, in some way, doing in us. You know, it raises all kinds of difficulties about understanding free will, right? But even free will, and of course, it's interesting that Aristotle in the I think it's maybe De Mota, the Eudemian Ethics there, where he talks about the beginning of our deliberation and so on, and willing comes from outside, comes from God. So even Aristotle, the pagan if if you want to call him that,

[11:25] sees that God is the beginning of our doings. So he says, "I answer: It should be said that God is in all things, and he starts to first negate the ways in which he is what not in things, right? Before he arrives at the way in which he is in all things. So he's not in all things as a part of their what? Essence. Yeah. So God is not the soul of the world or something like that.

[12:01] Okay. Nor is he in all things as an accident, right? So he's not in me like my quantity is in me, my knowledge is in me, my shape is in me, my health is in me, right? And all the other accidents not in us the other accidents, not in us and those that way either.

[12:22] Neither my soul nor my body nor my accidents, right? Yeah. Okay. But as an agent is present to that in which it what acts, right? Okay.

[12:36] For it is necessary that every agent be joined to that in which it immediately acts. Unless it's acting through an intermediary, and by its power it necessarily what touches that thing, right? Okay. Now sometimes Thomas will explain this word "touch" a bit, right? Because when a body acts upon another body. It physically touches it, right? Huh? Okay. But then we keep the idea of touch for acting upon something, even if you don't bodily touch it, huh?

[13:14] And so, you know, Thomas always points to our way of speaking there when we say, "I was touched by his situation or whatever it was," right? You feel sorry for somebody, right? Say, well, it's not touching in the sense that bodies are touching, right? But that they're acting upon your what? Your heart was acted upon by their misery or whatever it was, right? You felt pity or something for them, right?

[13:37] Okay. So, you could say there is a contact of power, but not necessarily of surfaces. In fact, God doesn't have surfaces; they can't be that kind of contact, right? But there can be the contact of power. Once in the seventh book of Natural Hearing, which the multitude call the physics, he proves that the moved and the mover are necessarily what together, right? Now, Einstein's talking about wonder, right?

[14:11] He talks about how his wonder was aroused as a little boy when his father brought home a magnet, and the magnet seemed to be moving the metal filings without being in contact with them, and that seemed to him strange, right? And of course, maybe there are things that we don't know about, right? What they call fields and so on, right? In physics, so you don't really have action without contact, but it appears to be that when you see this, and so, or like with the magnet, you know, you bring a magnet up and the other one turns around or something, runs away, right?

[14:49] But the surfaces of the two magnets haven't come in contact, but there is what electromagnetic fields in there, right? Huh? And so, but Einstein is wondering because it seems you know strange what's going on here.

[15:04] So the mover and the mover must be together. If you are talking about what is immediately, you know, working through a medium, right? Huh? Okay. But if I use this if I use this law for radio, whatever it is to move that cup, right? Then I don't have to be in contact with the cup because I am working through an intermediary, right? Okay.

[15:29] Now that immediate idea has got to be kept there, since God is what to be itself, right? to his very nature, to his very essence, it is necessary that created being be his proper effect, just as to be ignited is the proper effect of what fire, huh? To be fired up is something that fire does. Okay.

[16:01] But this effect God causes in things. Not only when they first what begin to be, but as long as they are conserved in being. And then the little comparison there: just as light is caused in the air by the sun,

[16:22] and what? As long as the air is what illuminated, it remains. When therefore things have being, is necessary that God be what present to it, according to the way in which it has being. So he's saying that that that to be of things is an immediate effect of God, right? Therefore, God, as the cause, has to be present to all things, and in a most intimate way, because he says to be is that which is most intimate to each thing, huh?

[17:00] And which is more profound in all things. And the reason for that is that it be formal with respect to all the things which are in the thing. It's the actuality of them all.

[17:13] Once it is necessary that God be in all things and most what intimately, or you could say most what, maybe in English most inwardly, right? Okay. Um.

[17:28] In the Boethius' De Trinitate, right? In the beginning of Boethius' De Trinitate, he's talking about how he's drawn his teaching ex intimis disciplinis philosophiae and I think the proper way to translate is from the inward disciplines of philosophy. It's a very interesting way of speaking of him. And Thomas Aquinas says when he says the inward disciplines of philosophy, he means logic and wisdom. Say, why natural philosophy and geometry you can you have, something more sensible, right, or imaginable, and I suppose you know ethics and politics where you're dealing with human experience and so on.

[18:13] That's more outward philosophy, right? But logic, which is dealing with things inside the mind, right, and wisdom, which is dealing with immaterial things and things you can't sense. Therefore, right, but you have to attain and know through your mind that you can't sense the way they are, imagine the way they are. That's inward philosophy. That was Boethius. Yeah, yeah, the De Trinitate. The De Trinitate. Yeah. So I think intimis You can translate intimate, but it could translate inwardly, you know.

[18:46] Sure. Yeah. And you kind of see this in in Saint Teresa of Avila, you know, the what do they call it, the interior castles, in the name of one of the books, and so like you're kind of going inside yourself, right, to what's most inward in you. Yeah. And if you get altogether into what's most inward in you, then you might find God, right? Okay, but there might be a lot of monsters on the way in, this.

[19:08] Yeah. as she says, right? Dragons and all those things on the way in, all your your defects and sins, I suppose. Okay, so God is said to be in all things and most inwardly, right? Because He's the source of their being, and their being is most intimate and inward in them, right? And the cause must be, you know, together, right, with its effect. So God is in all things.

[19:45] Now, the first objection was saying, "Hey, but Scripture tells us that God is above all things, huh? Yeah. So how can He be in all things, right? He says God is above all things through the excellence of His what nature. And nevertheless, he is in all things as what, causing the being of all things. So it's not the same way you have this in mind. Okay.

[20:16] It's interesting how we use the where we borrow these prepositions from space, right, to talk about things. But we tend to say that what is better, we put above, right? Oh, yeah. You know, I put this student above that student, or I put this thing above that, meaning it's better than that, okay? And what we tend to think of the agent as what acting upon the patient, right?

[20:46] So acting upon it's above, and the patient is under, right? And since the effect of the agent acting upon, say, the matter is that the matter be formed, right? Then we we imagine the form to be above the what? Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[21:07] Let me tell you a little story about my nephew there when he was a little small kid there, and I was kind of babysitting him, and I was kind of building things for him to amuse him. And I built a little tower or something of blocks, and he liked to knock it off and laugh at it, right? But he was distracted, and I could build a tower that was actually taller than him.

[21:28] And he go, oh, oh, little finger pointing, put it like this, kind of R wonder, you know, oh, oh, oh. And he didn't, you know, have that laughter and knock it down. But because it's above him, and maybe it would come down upon him. You see, it might act upon him, and he's in a position to act upon it. But you kind of see how those words begin.

[21:51] Do you know is there any special reason I've always wondered is why Saint Thomas uses the infinitive "esse instead of like maybe "ens" or something? Is there any significance? Well it's more that's more precise because "ens" would mean sometimes what is right. Oh, okay. That makes sense. Now, English is an equivocation there, I suppose. When you say "being," right? By "being," do you mean what is, okay, or do you mean the existence of what is, right?

[22:20] Okay. He uses both ways in English, I suppose. But when we say that wisdom is about being as being, we mean it's about what is, right? As it is. Okay.

[22:42] Okay. Now the second thing about the what is in something is contained by it, right? So since the second, it should be said that although bodily things are said to be in something as in a container, right? Nevertheless, spiritual things contain those things in which they are. As the soul contains the body, so when the soul leaves the body, when you die, the body starts to fall apart, right?

[23:13] Oh man! So what's holding together the body is the soul, really? And so though the soul is said to be in the body, right? Huh? It's not in the body; it's in a place, right? It's in it as the form, and the form is really, you might say, holding together the body, huh? Okay.

[23:35] Hence, also God is in things as containing things, huh? Nevertheless, through a certain likeness of bodily things, all things are also said to be in God, in so far as they are what contained by Him, right?

[23:56] I've gotten a lot of mileage out of knowing that text in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, the eight senses of in and out, right? And because I'll notice that people who may are deceived by the equivocation of in and out, they'll tend to fall back upon an earlier sense, which is not correct, huh? So you know the first three senses of in that you have in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, what is in something is actually there.

[24:26] So you and I are actually in this room. That's the first sense of in, and the second sense of in is part in a whole, like my teeth in my mouth. They're actually in there, right? And the third sense is the way the genus is said to be in the species. It's actually in there, but then you get to the fourth sense, where the species is said to be in the genus.

[24:50] See, is man in animal? Well, an animal is able to be a man, but is man actually in animal? Well, if it was, then when I said the dog is an animal, I'd be saying the dog is a man, right? Say, so dog is not in animal,

[25:11] actually, but only in ability. And then he comes to form in what matter and so on, right? Okay. Now you'll find people fall back upon an earlier sense, like people sometimes say.

[25:33] Suppose you have a piece of clay in the shape of a sphere, and you molded it into a cube. What has changed? The clay or its shape? What do people say?

[25:46] Shape. Yeah, yeah. Now, has its shape changed? Is the shape the subject undergoing this change from sphere to cube? No, no. It's the clay that's changed, right? But shape is actually the genus of spherical and cube, right? So you're falsely imagining. The genus of the two species to be the subject of the change from one to the other, rather than the what clay. So you are falling back from the fifth sense to the fourth sense.

[26:23] And likewise, when Anaxagoras is trying to understand how you can't get something out of nothing, right? And we have the old saying, you can't get blood out of a turnip Why not? Because there is no blood in there. And so he falsely imagines that what you can get out of something must be actually in there. And it may actually be in there in some cases, but in other cases, there's only an ability, right?

[26:47] He wants to put everything that's in the ability of matter actually in there, and then he gets into all kinds of problems that Aristotle points out because of this. So people will often be falling back upon an earlier sense.

[27:02] So let's see here some of the senses of in as you apply here. Now the sense in which things are said to be in God,

[27:20] this could be taken to be the what seventh sense in the in the fourth book of Natural Ray. I've got you in my power. You know, and the opposite of that is it's out of my hands. We say right, I don't have any control over it. Right. So when I get you in my power, that's the in the agent, right? Okay. So in that sense, all things are in God in the sense that they're in God's hands.

[27:54] We say right, it's not mine; it's in His power, right? But in another sense, God is said to be in things as containing them, right, Holding them into existence.

[28:07] Now the third thing is about acting at a distance. And the more powerful an agent, the more distance its action goes. To the third, it should be said that if no agent, no matter how virtuous or powerful it is, does its action proceed to something at a distance, except in so far as it acts upon that thing through what? What is in between? Through the middle. But this pertains to the what?

[28:38] The greatest or the fullest or the maximum power of God that He acts immediately in all things. Whence nothing is distant from Him, as if it in itself does not have God, right? But things are said to be distant from God through the unlikeness of their nature or through their lack of grace, huh? Just as He is said to be above all things by the excellence of His what nature, right?

[29:12] So God could be said to be very close to me. In fact, closer to me than I am to myself. But another way, being that I'm a sinner or something, then we might say that there's a great unlikeness between me and God, right? Huh? And and the more distance between me and God than there is between the saint, let's say, and God, right? Huh? Okay.

[29:39] Now, what about the demons? Huh? What Thomas says to the fourth, it should be said that in the demons there's understood both the nature which is from God, right? And the deformity of what guilt, huh? Which is not from him, right? And therefore. it ought to be. Not to be absolutely conceded that God is in the demons, but with this addition, in so far as there are certain things, but in things which name a nature not deforms, absolutely one ought to say that God is right.

[30:17] So maybe the word demon already includes in its meaning this deformity of will and so on that's in these demons, and therefore we don't say that God is there causing that deformity of will, right? But is responsible for the existence of the nature.

[30:41] So now we know that God is in all things. Now, what about God being everywhere? To the second, thus one proceeds. It seems that God is not everywhere,

[31:00] for to be everywhere signifies to be in every place. But to be in every place does not belong to God, to whom it does not belong to be in place. For bodyless things, as Boethius says in the book De Hebdomadibus, are not in place. Therefore, God is not what everywhere, right? Only bodies are in place, right? I think I quoted that famous opinion of the early Greeks, before Aristotle.

[31:28] Aristotle, and when Aristotle takes up place in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, he says it's a common opinion of the early philosophers that whatever is must be somewhere, and it isn't somewhere, it doesn't exist. But to be somewhere, to be contained in some place, is a property of the natural body, right? So the thinking that everything must be a body or in a body, and if it isn't in a body, right, it is it isn't, and bodies are in place, right?

[32:01] So whatever it is must be somewhere, and in somewhere it doesn't exist, right? It's like when they shot the cosmonauts up in the Russian, you know, and they had them called back to the Earth. There is no God up here. I see a lot of some attacks upon God, but this kind of takes a kick, you know, a kick, kick, I should say, you know, this occasion to say, how would be surprising is

[32:27] up there in the sense in which the the asteroids or the the comets and so on up there. Moreover, as time has itself to successive things, so has itself place to things that what persist or remain. But one indivisible of action or motion is not able to be in diverse times. So one now, right? So on can't be in diverse times, and one indivisible. The action, the motion, can't be.

[33:12] Therefore, neither can one indivisible in the genus of primitive things be able to be in all places. But the divine being to be is not successive but permanent. Therefore, God is not in many places, and thus He is not everywhere. A lot of times, people you know mix up the what indivisible that has a position in the continuous, right? With the indivisible that has no position in the continuous, huh?

[33:46] And if you're talking about the indivisible in the sense of a point, that's either here or there, right? But is God indivisible in the way that a point is? No, no. He's entirely outside the genus, you might say, of the continuous. Huh? So it belongs to geometry to talk about the point as well as the continuous because it's something in the continuous, right? But God is not something in the continuous like the point is.

[34:13] Entirely outside the genus. And that that problem comes up, you know, before when we talk about the soul. The whole soul is in every part of the body, right? And they say, well, but the soul is indivisible. How can it be? But the thinking of the soul as being indivisible in the way that a point is, right? But the soul is indivisible in the genus of substance, not in the genus of quantity.

[34:36] Huh? The point is indivisible in the genus of quantity and the genus of continuous quantity in particular, right? But there you see the necessity of what of transcending the imagination, right? You're trying to imagine the way in which God is indivisible in the way that the indivisible is imagined. So you might imagine, you know, a line, and you co- imagine you might see the endpoints of the line, right?

[35:10] And so one's here and one's there. But God is not indivisible in that way. He's not in the genus of continuous quantity. Is something of it, something outside of all the genera.

[35:25] Moreover, what as a whole is somewhere, nothing of it is outside that place. But God, if He's in some place, the whole of God would be there. It could be part of Him here and part of Him there. He doesn't have any parts? Right. For He has no parts. Therefore, nothing of Him is outside that place. Therefore, God is not what everywhere, right? I can see, you know, what Thomas means when he speaks of the false imagination being the beginning, you know, of mistake and error.

[36:00] And false imagination can be imagining something other than it is, right? Which is a very common thing we do, right? You know, C. S. Lewis starts one of those stories where he goes to some part of England to visit, and he's picked up by an uncle or somebody, you know, and they're driving along, and the car has been picked up at the train station or where it is.

[36:25] And you mark, you know, C. S. Lewis to his uncle, that this part of England looks much different than he thought it was, right? And but we the way he imagined it to be, right? And you probably had this experience going to some place and that you heard about all your life or something, and to get there, it's not the way you imagined it to be, right?

[36:47] And of course, the father or the uncle or where it is is saying, "Well, what right did you have to imagine to be that way, right? " But your imagination does these things, right? You know, if going to meet a famous person, you imagine the way they're going to look, right? And they don't look the way you imagine them to be, huh? And so, but if for it's your, if you try to imagine something you can't imagine, right?

[37:15] Then necessarily you have false imagination, and of course we never think without imagining, huh? And so we have to negate what we imagine when we talk about that which cannot be imagined. So we say God is not a body, right? Okay, but God is not in the continuous, huh? Even though we're imagining something continuous when we say this.

[37:42] Of course, you have that problem in logic too, right? When they try to understand the universal, and Socrates is trying to understand the universal in the Parmenides, the dialogue, and you imagine the universal to be like a big sail covering things, right? But you'd have only part of the universal. You'd be part of man. I'd be another part of man. Another part of man. The whole what a man is would not be found in each one of us.

[38:02] So you're trying to to imagine the way the universal is, and then you get false, right? So that's why logic kind of disposes for wisdom, because to really do logic, you have to transcend imagination to understand universal. But then you get to these modern magicians, and they'll want to substitute class for universal, right? But the class is like a collection you can kind of imagine like a crowd, right?

[38:34] So instead of understanding what man means, something one common to all men, right, set of all men, you imagine a multitude of men, right, if that's what man means. But it doesn't mean that To resolve into something imaginable, right?

[38:55] But against this is what is said in Jeremiah, huh? Thomas has a commentary in Jeremiah, chapter twenty-three, verse twenty-four. I mean God, fill what. Heaven and earth

[39:13] can't escape from this guy. Huh. So I answer: It should be said that since place is a certain thing, for something to be in place can be understood in two ways.

[39:38] Either in the way of other things, that is, just as something is said to be in other things in some way, as accidents of place are said to be in place, or in the way that is private to place, as things what placed are in place, right? Okay, lokata would be things, placed right. Um. Now, in both ways, in some way, secundum modum quid, God is in every place, which is to be everywhere.

[40:17] First, because He is in all things, as giving them what existence, right, and power, right, and what operation. Thus, for thus He is in every place as giving to it its existence and its power to what locate things, huh, to place them. Also, things placed are in place in so far as they fill the place, and God fills every place, but not as a body does, huh?

[40:55] For a body is said to fill a place in so far as it does not what suffer another body to be there, right? But through this fact that God is in some place, one does not exclude, but that other things can be there, because through this He fills all places that He gives existence to all things that are located or placed in place, right? Which fill all places, huh?

[41:30] Okay, so everything that's in place is held in existence by God, right? So God is present to every place, right? Now, first objection here:

[41:54] Incorporeal things like God are not in place, right? To the first, therefore, it, should be said that bodyless things are not in place through the contact of what? Dimensive quantity, right? Thomas uses that sometimes as a synonym for continuous quantity, right? Okay, so you could say the water is contained inside this cup here, is in a place, right? And the outer surface of the water is in contact with the inner surface of the cup, right?

[42:28] That's what he calls contact of quantitatis dimensivae, huh? Okay, now we speak of dimensions, right? Huh? So it's tied up with continuous quantity as opposed to discrete quantity. So you have the line, which is one dimension, and the surface is two dimensions, right? And the body, three. So the contact of part to part, there, right? So the outer surface of the water here and inner surface. Of the containing are together, right?

[43:01] But that's not the way God is in contact with all things, but through the contact of what? Yeah, contact of power, right? Huh? Okay.

[43:19] So what do you mean when we say to somebody keep in touch? We use that word touch to talk about what? Power, right? Yeah.

[43:37] Okay. Now, second thing, talking about the indivisible there, and that can't be what everywhere. To the second, it should be said that indivisible is twofold: one, which is the what limit of the continuous, as the point in permanent things, and the momentum in successive things, huh?

[44:10] And this kind of indivisible in permanent things, because it has a determined site or location, is not able to be in many parts of the place or in many places. And likewise, the indivisible of what action or motion, because it has a determined order in the motion of the action, it cannot be in many parts of time. Okay. But In general, that's the what indivisible that is a limit of the continuous, right?

[44:47] Okay. And therefore, it has a definite position or place, you might say, in the continuous, right? And therefore, it can't be in two places at the same time, right? Okay. Now the other indivisible, which is what outside the whole genus of the continuous, and in this way, the bodyless substances, the incorporeal—that means bodyless in English—as God, the angel, and also the soul are said to be what indivisible, right?

[45:26] Such an indivisible is not applied to continuous as something of it. That would be the point, right, which is in the line of which it is the what limit, right? But in so far as they touch it by their what power, right, or by its power, whence, according as its power can extend to one thing or to many, or to the small or to the large, then according to that.

[45:56] It is in one or many places, or in a large place, or a what great one, right? But God's power being infinite, right? It's going to be in every place, huh? Okay. But sometimes they speak of the angels being in place and they're acting upon something, right? Here or there, right? And they can't act everywhere at once, right? So they can be one place and not another place in the sense that their power is being exerted here and not somewhere else, right?

[46:26] But God is not limited, given His infinite power, to be acting here and not there, right? They can act at once everywhere. Okay, His power has no limit.

[46:44] Okay, the third one is talking about whole. And how can the whole of God be in one place, and then some of them being somewhere else? To the third, it should be said that whole is said with respect to the parts.

[47:04] But there is a twofold part, huh? To wit, the part of the essence or nature, as form and matter are said to be parts of the composite, composed, And also genus and difference are parts of the what species, huh? And

[47:31] that's why he puts there are two different senses of whole and part. There, genus and difference are parts of the species and form and matter, that are composite. But he puts those two together as having something in common, right? That they're parts of the what the nature, right? Huh? Okay. You kind of see the reason for this, huh? What about parts? Why am a creature composed of body and soul, right?

[47:54] That's my nature, being composed of body and soul, and that's form and matter, right? You also say I'm a rational animal, and that's what I am too. That's my nature, okay, being expressed by rational animal. But animal is the genus, and rational is the difference, huh? So he puts those two different ones, the two different ones, the two different senses Aristotle distinguishes in the fifth book of wisdom, but they're put together as both giving you parts of the nature, right?

[48:26] But the one is more the parts as they are in reason, genus and difference, right? And the others are parts as they are in the thing apart from from reason, okay?

[48:38] So there is a distinction in me, the walking, talking man here, between my soul and my body, right? Huh? And someday they're going to part, I guess. But genus and difference are more parts in reason's understanding, right, of my nature. An animal might be taken more from my bodily aspect, right? And rational, more from my what

[49:05] soul, right? Huh. But nevertheless, you can't say that animal is the body and rational is the soul, right? Okay, but there's something proportional about those, huh? And

[49:20] but then the other kind of whole would be the quantitative whole, right? That's another sense Aristotle distinguishes there. The first one, in fact, in the fifth book, um,

[49:33] and also the part of quantity, right, in which is to it divided some quantity, huh? When I was reading Thomas in English, they always translate scilicet to wit to wit Yeah. That's a translation so I never got to calm that myself.

[49:56] Now, what therefore, as a whole, is in some what place? By the whole of its quantity, is not able to be outside that place, right? Because the quantity of the placed is measured together with the quantity of the place. Just like I was saying, the surface of the the outer surface of the water, right, corresponds to the inner surface of the cup, right? They're equal, right? Huh? Okay.

[50:29] Because the quantity of the placed is measured with the quantity of the place. Whence there is not the totality of the quantity if it not be the totality totality of the place. But now the totality of the nature, the essence, is not measured with the totality of the place.

[50:51] Whence it is not necessary that that which is a whole by the wholeness of its nature in something, in no way be what outside of it, just as it appears in accidental forms. Because when they have accidentally quantity, huh? For whiteness, for example, is a whole in each as a as a whole in each part of the surface, right? If one takes the what wholeness of its nature, right?

[51:26] If you have this white paper here, right? You know, this is fully white here, the nature white, and this is fully nature white here, and white here, and so on, right? Okay. Um.

[51:43] So whiteness is is a whole in each part of the surface. If one takes the whole of what the nature, right? Huh? The whole nature of whiteness is found in each part. Because according to this perfect the perfect definition of the species is found in each part of the surface. If, however, you take the totality according to quantity, which it has by accident, thus the whole is not in each part of the surface, huh?

[52:10] But it's spread out over the whole surface, huh? In bodyless substances there is no totality, neither per se nor per accidens, except according to the perfect definition of the nature. And thus, just as the soul as a whole is in each part of the body, so God as a whole is in all things and each one of them, right?

[52:39] I remember that that article we had on the soul, right? That the the whole soul is in each part of the body, right? Okay. So, it's a little bit like on the whole, what whiteness is is in each part of the what surface here, right? Okay. Even though the the the extent of it, you know, over the surface is not everywhere, right? Okay, the quantitative aspect. Okay.

[53:16] So, what are the two senses in which God is everywhere? Then. In this article. Yeah, but he's everywhere because he's what giving existence to everything that's in place, right? Yes. Yeah, but he's also giving existence to what the place itself, right? Oh.

[53:46] He says, first, as he is in all things, going back to the body article. Yeah. As giving them existence and power and operation, thus for thus he is in every place. As giving to it being right, and his power of what, creating things. Also, things placed are in place insofar as they fill the place, and God fills every place, not as a body, right? Okay. But it's giving what he says eventually existence to all things placed, which fill all places, right?

[54:35] So God is in every place because he's in everything that's in place, right? But he's also in place itself as giving place its what existence, right? Kind of interesting when Aristotle, you know, begins the consideration of place, and he quotes the early Greeks that whatever is must be somewhere, if it isn't somewhere doesn't exist. And then he quotes Hesiod and so on. That you first of all have to have a place for things, right?

[55:03] So you can have things. So place seems to be the first of all things he says, right? Place can be without the things that are in place, but the things that are in place can't be without being somewhere. So you got to have a place before you can have anything else.

[55:25] Then people come along and they say, you know, yeah, what about place? If whatever is must be somewhere, where's place? And you have to have a place to place place, right? Right. And that seems to be a little difficulty, right? Because then you have the same question about that place, right? Yeah. Where's that? Sure, sure.

[55:47] But if you say the place doesn't have to be anywhere, but yet it is, then you're saying something is without what having to be in place.