Prima Pars
32. God Present by Essence, Presence and Power; God Alone Everywhere; the Unchangeable God (q.8 a.3–4, q.9 a.1)
Class of 2006-04-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/032-god-present-by-essence-presence-and-power-god-alone-everywhere/

[0:00] Now the third article: Whether God is everywhere by essence, presence, and what power. And this now is a more what particular knowledge, right? God's being everywhere. To the third, one proceeds thus: It seems that badly are assigned the ways of being, or God being in things, when it is said that God is in all things through essence, power, and presence.

[0:34] For that, through essence, is in something that is essentially in it. But God is not essentially in things, for He is not of the essence of something, right? Saw that before, right? God is not in things as part of their nature, right? He's not the soul of things or the body and so on.

[0:57] Therefore, it should not be said that God is in things through essence, presence, and power. So that's that's an objection to His being in all things per essentiam, right? Okay, because that seems to imply the essence of a thing, the nature of a thing, right? And God, therefore, you seem to be saying, it would be in the very nature of things, right? He's the soul of the world or something like that, right?

[1:27] Moreover, that is present to some things. That is not what lacking. Yeah, or absent from it. Yeah. But this is it for God to be by essence in things that He is not what lacking to them or absent from them. Therefore, it is the same thing for God to be in all things by essence and by presence. Therefore, it is superfluous to say that God is in things through essence, presence, and what power, right?

[2:07] Huh? So, what is the difference there between God being in all things through essence and presence, huh? Moreover, God, just as God is the beginning of all things through His power, so also through His knowledge and His will. But God is not said to be in things through knowledge and will. Therefore, neither through what power.

[2:43] Moreover, as grace is a certain perfection added over and above to the substance of a thing, so there are many other perfections added over and above. If therefore God is said to be in a special way in some things to grace, grace, it seems that according to any perfection we're not to give or take or get a special way of God being in things.

[3:15] Okay, now that gets stuck in there, and all huh grace. But against this is what Gregory says. Now I assume this is Gregory the Great, right? What else did he mean?

[3:29] In his commentary upon the Song of what? Songs, Canticle, of Canticles, right? That God in a common way is in all things by presence, power, and what? Substance. No, no, substantia. There is like the word essentia in the other text, right?

[3:52] So those three ways, and then nevertheless in a familiar way he's,Said to be in some things, right? Through grace, right? Maybe that's the reason why that fourth what objection came up, right?

[4:09] Because of this text of Gregory the Great. Now, I answer: It should be said that God is said to be in some things in two ways. It's a kind of interesting distinction. Now, in one way,

[4:32] through the manner of a agent cause, and thus He is in all things created by Him, because the agent is what together, right, with the thing it's acting.

[4:48] How can you act upon something without being in contact with that thing there? In another way, as the object of operation is in the one what operating, which is what

[5:07] proper or prior. Prior, yes, huh? It's just in the operations of the soul, right? According as the known is in the knower, right, and the desired in the one desiring.

[5:25] So, in this, therefore, in this second way, God especially is in the rational creature, right? That is to say, in the rational creature which knows and loves Him, right, either actually or habitually, right.

[5:41] And because the rational creature has this through grace, as will be clear below, He is said to be in this way in the saints through what grace, huh?

[5:57] So, you're the temple of the Holy Spirit. That means the Holy Spirit is in you, right? But it is in you what through grace, right? Okay. Now he says, in things and other things created by Him, in what way He is should be considered from those things which are said to be in human things. For the King is said to be. Now, here you're starting to go to the other three, right?

[6:36] The key there, there was singled out in the statement of the tension of the article, right, where God is in all things through essence, power, and what presence, right? Okay, and He's going to lead us by the hand here from human things.

[6:58] So, in other things created by him, in what way he is, should be considered from those things which are said to be in human affairs. For the king is said to be in his whole kingdom through his what power, even though he is not everywhere what present, right? The king's power extends everywhere

[7:24] through his presence. However, he is said to be in all things which are in what his prospect in his sight, right? Just as all those things which are in some house are said to be present to someone, who nevertheless is not according to his very substance in each part of the house,

[7:50] but according to substance or essence. Now, see there, he's taking what the words of Gregory, right? That we had substantia, right? And the words in this what article where he said God is said to be everywhere through essence through what what everywhere through essence through what

[8:11] presence, yeah. They say in the text from Gregory, you had substantia, and well, yeah, but leave you the left side now. Yeah, presentia, potentia, substantia, But in the original text of the article, you had presentia, potentia, and essentia, right? But essentia and substantia mean somewhat the same thing, okay? But substantia is a different word than essentia, obviously, huh? Okay.

[8:48] Um. Now, according to substance or essence, I'm understanding it's kind of being the same. Something is said to be in place in which its what substance is had, right? Okay.

[9:08] For there were some, to wit, the Manichaeans, who said that to the divine power are subject spiritual and incorporeal things, right? But that the visible things and the bodily things are subject to the what power of a contrary principle, right? Because matter is evil, right? For the Manichaeans, huh? So God's power doesn't extend down here, this sublunar world with all its misery, right? Um. So against these heretics, these Manichaeans, therefore, it is necessary to say that God is in all things through his what.

[9:52] Power, right? Okay. There were some who, although they believed all things to be subject to divine power, nevertheless they did not extend divine providence all the way down to these what lower bodies. Yeah. From the person of whom is said Job twenty two, he what walks around the cardinal points of the heavens, right? Nor does he consider our things down here, right? He doesn't bother about us down here.

[10:34] And against these, it is necessary to say that he is in all things through his what presence, huh? There are also those who, although they said that all things pertain to divine providence, nevertheless they laid down that all things were not immediately created by God, right? But that he immediately created the first creatures, and these created others, right? And against these, it is necessary to say that he is in all things through his what?

[11:10] Yeah, a little fun of use of words here, but. Thus, therefore, he is in all things through his power, in so far as all things are what subject to his power, right? He is by presence in all things, and this refers now, I guess, to his knowing, in so far as all things are naked and open to his eyes, right? Nothing, no closed doors to God, right?

[11:44] Now he is in all things through essence, insofar as he is in all things as the cause of their what being, right? Huh? It seems to be a little overlap there between what potentiam and essentiam right a little overlap there between what potentium and essentium, right? Huh? Okay. But essentium is is referring very much so to his what being everywhere as giving existence to these things, right?

[12:14] Now Deconic you know, the teacher didn't like the word essence, right? I guess in French, you know, because he's teaching in French essence, you know, meaning gasoline, I guess. So he's always you know bringing up that meaning of essence, and then apparently turned him off the word somewhat, right? But if you look at the word essentia, it's obviously related to the word esse, isn't it? Yeah, You see?

[12:36] And so, he said to be in all things through his essence, in so far as he is what. To all things as the cause of their ascendancy, to the cause of their being, right?

[12:56] But all these things that he's the cause of being, his power is there able to act upon all of them, right, or transform them, or to them to do something, right? Okay.

[13:09] So, but you know, in some contexts, you might say it's it's through the power of God that things are created, right, and held in existence, right? So he seems to be almost what using the word essence there for the giving of these things their existence, right? And then subsequent to that, they're subject to his power, right, to move them to do something or not, and to change them any way he wants to, and so on, right?

[13:41] But then the presence is something quite different. That's his his knowledge, right? Okay. So you know those words, I don't think are really Thomas's choice, but they're the Words that were famous, right? And he's kind of explaining how to understand them.

[14:08] A lot of times, Thomas will use the words that are common at the time, you know. I know when I teach the love and friendship there, and you have the distinction between the Latin, the amor concupiscentiae and the amor amicitiae. And perhaps you could translate them more accurately, I mean, the meaning, by saying the love of wanting and the love of wishing well, right? Because friendship implies, you know, not only you wish well to somebody, but there's a mutual wishing well, right?

[14:41] So when you say the love of friendship. Is that the best way to name this? Say. Then you see later on, you get to the treatise on friendship. The highest kind of friendship, Aristotle talks about there, is the friendship where the friends wish well to each other, right?

[15:10] But the lesser kinds of friendship, the friendship of pleasure, right, and the useful friendship, there we don't really wish well to each other, right? But I want something from you, pleasure, or some useful way that you're useful to me, right? And you want something pleasant or useful from me, not really wishing me well, right? You want me because I tell a lot of good jokes or something, right?

[15:37] Or I cook a real good meal or something, right? You know, so you have the love of wanting from me, right? Or I'm useful to you in your dealings and so on. Okay. And of course, but if you're talking the two kinds of love involved in the highest kind of friendship and in the lower kinds, well, you don't want to call one of them the love of friendship and the other the love of of concupiscence, right?

[16:05] The love of wanting. It'd make better to say the love of wanting than the love of wishing well, right? But likewise, you can have the love of wishing well for someone who doesn't wish you well.

[16:19] But that's not friendship. because friendship involves mutual wishing well. Take a little break right now. To the first, therefore, it should be said that God is said to be in all things through essence, not because He is what

[16:42] of things as being of their very essence, but because through His essence, right, His substance is present to all things as the cause of their being, right. So the way of speaking is a little bit it seems to be awkward, you know, to say that in all things through what essence, right? Huh? It's has some ambiguity to it, right? So it needs to be explained how it's to be understood, right?

[17:11] But it seems to have something to do with the fact that the word essence is related to the word essay, huh? And so God is through His essence present to all things as giving them what their being, right? Huh? Because God's essence is is being, right? God is being essentially, so all other things are partaking of the divine being. So there's some appropriateness to it, but still it could be easily misunderstood.

[17:43] Now the second objection that what is present to things is not what lacking to them, right? Not absent from them, and so on. And it's superfluous, therefore, to say that He's in all things both through essence and presence.

[18:03] To the second, it should be said that something is able to be said to be present to something in so far as it is subject to its what sight, right? Okay. Which nevertheless is distant from it according to its substance, as has been said, and therefore it's necessary that there be two ways laid down, namely through essence and through presence. So God is what

[18:33] everywhere in a way through His what knowledge, right? Huh? And He's everywhere through giving what existence to things, right? Okay. Those are two different ways of being everywhere.

[18:49] Now the third one says, "Why do you say power and not through science and will?" He says to the third, it should be said that, "of the notion of science and the will that the thing known be in the knower, right, and the thing willed in the one willing, whence according to knowledge and will things are more in God than God in things, but it's of the notion of power that it be a beginning of acting in another, whence according to power the agent is compared and applied to an exterior thing."

[19:29] And thus, through power, the agent can be said to be in what? Another, right? Okay. Now, sometimes Thomas will point out, you know, if you use the word power with respect to knowing and willing in God,

[19:51] you can't really say there's a real distinction between the two, right? Because there's no what difference in act and ability in God, huh? But if you take power in comparison to exterior things, then those exterior things in God's power are really what distinct, right? And that's why I use the word power more than the word will or reason.

[20:22] Now, the fourth objection, and this goes now to the other way of God being in things as their what object, right? Huh? To the fourth, it should be said that no other perfection added to substance makes God to be in something as the object known and loved, except grace. Grace, And therefore, grace alone makes a singular way for being of God in things.

[20:54] There's, however, another singular mode of being for God and man through union. I'm always referring to the what incarnation, I think, right? Okay. About which, in its place, will be treated, huh? Okay. That's a special one that doesn't take up here, right? It takes up the incarnation in the third part, right? Summa, just not so appropriate here. That's called Emmanuel in the Gospel of Matthew, right? And in the Isaiah, I think it is.

[21:33] That's the only place where it's called Emmanuel. It means God be with us, right? But it's referring in a way to the incarnation. That's a special way that he wants to take up in that third book. Let me just hint briefly. Okay, now the fourth article: Whether to be everywhere is proper to God.

[21:56] It seems that to be everywhere is not private to God. I'm saying, huh? For the universal, according to the philosopher, is everywhere and always. And the first matter, since it is in all bodies, is everywhere. But neither of these is God. huh.

[22:22] Therefore, to be everywhere is not, but private to God, right? Moreover, number is in the numbered, huh? But the whole universe is constituted a number, as is clear in Wisdom chapter 11. Therefore, there is some number which is in the whole universe, and thus is everywhere. I'll even tell him to think of all these objections. you wonder, huh?

[22:57] Moreover, the whole universe is a certain what? Whole body is perfect, as is said in the first book of the heaven earth, Aristotle's book on the universe. But the whole universe is everywhere, because outside of it there is no place. Therefore, not only not God alone is what everywhere, right?

[23:24] Moreover, if some body were infinite, no place would be outside of it. Therefore, to be everywhere, and thus to be everywhere would not seem to be what private to God, right?

[23:41] Moreover, the soul, as Augustine says in the sixth book of the Trinity, is a whole in the whole body and a whole in each part, right? Thomas will often take off from Augustine there when he accepts that article, right? You see that in the Summa and other places. Because Aristotle doesn't talk too explicitly about it. If, therefore, there was not in the world except one animal alone, its soul would be what?

[24:09] Everywhere, right? And thus, to be everywhere is not private to God. Moreover, as Augustine says in the Epistle to Volusianum, the soul is where it sees; the soul where it sees, there it senses, and where it senses, there it lives, and where it lives, there it is.

[24:33] But the soul sees, as it were, everywhere, because successively it sees the whole heavens. Therefore, the soul is everywhere, right? I mean get your soul in the heavenly things, right? But against this is what Ambrose says in the book about the Holy Spirit. Who would dare to say that the Holy Spirit is a creature? The Holy Spirit, who is in all things, and everywhere, and always, which surely is what private to the divinity, right?

[25:15] I answer: It should be said that to be everywhere, first and through itself, is private to God. For that is, I say, that is everywhere first. That by itself, as a whole, is everywhere. If something were everywhere by diverse parts in diverse places, right? It would not first be everywhere, but to those parts, because what belongs to something by reason of its parts does not belong to it first.

[25:52] Just as if man is white by his teeth, whiteness does not belong first to man first, but to the teeth first, right? But to be everywhere per se, I call that to which it does not belong to be everywhere by happening on account of some supposition being made.

[26:19] For thus, a grain of what? It's some size there. Would be everywhere if one supposes that no other body were right. So, a an apple would be everywhere, right? Whatever the fruit is, if it's the only body.

[26:43] But through itself, it belongs to something to be everywhere, when it is such that whatever position being granted, it follows that would be everywhere. And this properly belongs, or privately belongs, to God, because whatever places there are laid down to be, even if one were laid down infinity of places, right? Besides the ones which are. It would be necessary that in all of these is God. Why?

[27:14] Because nothing is able to be except through Him, right? Thus, therefore, to be everywhere, first and through itself, belongs to God, and is what? His property, I'd say say, right? Huh? It's private to Him.

[27:32] Because no matter how many places are laid down, it would be necessary, as necessary, that each of them be God, not by some part of God, but by Himself, huh? Okay. So through Himself He's everywhere, right?

[27:53] Now to the first objection that the universe and the first matter are everywhere, he says, "Well, the first, therefore, it should be said that the universal and first matter are everywhere, but not according to the same what?

[28:15] Being, huh? Not according the same existence, huh? Because matter is under different forms, and therefore has what? A different existence, right? Under each of these forms. And the universal exists in the mind apart from the singulars, but man out here exists in you and me and the next guy by a different what? Existence, right? So existence of Socrates and existence of Plato is not the same. Are both of them are existence of the universal in some way?

[28:51] So the universal set of many, each one of which has its own distinct what? Existence, huh? So it's not to itself first everywhere, is it?

[29:02] But to the existence of each of the singulars of which it is said, right? To the second, the one about number. To second, it should be said that number, since it is an accident, is not through itself, but through action or through happening in place. Nor is the whole and each one of those numbered, but according to part, huh? So it's four in all of us.

[29:37] It's four in me and four in you and four in. you, Okay. And thus it does not follow that it be first and through itself what everywhere, huh?

[29:53] The same thing for the universe, huh? To the third, it should be said that the whole body of the universe is everywhere, but not first, because the whole. Is not in each place, right? But one part of it is here, and one part of it is there, right? So it's not first and through itself everywhere, but it's everywhere through its parts, one of which is here and one of which is there.

[30:22] Okay. Nor again is it everywhere through itself, because if one were to lay down there to be other places, it would not be what in them, right?

[30:38] But God would still be in these other places because they couldn't be without Him, right? To the fourth, it should be said about the infinite body that if there were infinite body, it would be everywhere, but by its what parts, right? One part here, one part there. So the infinite body, first and through itself, couldn't be everywhere, could it? No. But it couldn't be everywhere because this part is here and that part is there, right? To the fifth, it should be said that if there were one animal alone, its soul would be everywhere first.

[31:25] But what? Pragadians, huh? There we're kind of supposing that there's only this one animal, right? So if the dog, this one dog, is the only thing that was, the soul of this one dog would be everywhere.

[31:44] But it happens, right, that this one dog is the only thing there is, right? But God doesn't by happening be everywhere, because that, without which other things cannot be, is not by happening everywhere where it's giving existence.

[32:13] And the sixth one is about the eyes looking around the universe and so on. To the sixth, it should be said that when it is said that the soul sees somewhere, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, according as this adverb somewhere determines the act of seeing on the side of the object, and thus it is true that when it sees the heavens, it sees in the heavens, and the same reason it senses in the heavens.

[32:45] But it does not follow that it lives in the heavens or that it is in the heavens, right? Because to live and to be do not imply an act going over to an exterior object. In another way, it can be understood according as the adverb determines the act of seeing, according as it goes forth from one seeing. And thus it is true that the soul, where it senses and sees, there it is and lives, according to this way of speaking.

[33:20] And thus it does not follow that it is everywhere. Kind of strange objection, huh? Okay. Now we're up to the immutability of God. Let's start this one.

[33:41] Now this is going to be the what? Fourth attribute of God, right? We know so far that he's altogether simple, right? We know that he's perfect, right, and therefore good. And third, we know he's what? Infinite. That's the main thing. He's infinite, right? And consequently, everywhere, right? Mm-hmm. So just as as good was attached to the consideration of divine perfection, right? So God, being everywhere, was attached to the consideration of his infinity, right?

[34:14] And likewise, we'll see that the Consideration of the divine eternity right follows upon his being what? Unchangeable. Yeah, yeah. Just as time follows upon something being changeable. Okay.

[34:32] So sometimes at the end of the philosophy of nature course, when I take up motion and time a bit, then I'll make kind of a side to God's being unchangeable and God being eternal, right? Because they involve the negation of motion and time.

[34:51] So consequently, we're not to consider about the immutability, the unchangeableness, and the divine eternity, which what follows the unchangeableness of it. Now, concerning the unchangeableness of God, two things are sought. First, whether God is altogether what unchangeable.

[35:18] Secondly, whether to be unchangeable is what private to God, right? Huh? God alone is unchangeable. And what do you do with someone who's unchangeable.

[35:38] Now, Julius Caesar there in the play, he compares himself to the North Star. You know, everything else revolves around. He doesn't move at all, right? Everything revolves around him.

[35:50] Marvelous the way Shakespeare represents him. To the first one proceeds thus: it seems that God is not altogether unchangeable, for whatever moves itself is in some way changeable. But as Augustine says in the eighth book on Genesis to the letter, I guess Saint Jerome is what complaining about is not sticking to the text close enough, huh? So it's on Genesis ad litteram to the letter to the word.

[36:23] The Creator Spiritus moves right itself, neither through what time nor through place. Therefore, God is in some way mutable. The Holy Spirit is said to what move Himself, right?

[36:45] Moreover, in the Book of Wisdom, chapter seven, it is said about wisdom that it's more mobile than all mobile things. But God is what Wisdom. itself. Therefore, God is mobile. Reminds me of that fragment of Heraclitus, right? We speak to this wisdom moving you know through all things, huh?

[37:08] Moreover, to approach or to. Get further away signify motion, but these things are said about God in Scripture. Approach God, and He will what? Approach you, right? You go to God, and He'll come to you. Therefore, God is changeable. But against this is what is said in the prophet Malachi, chapter three, verse six: "I am God, and I do not what change." Yeah,

[37:47] the other text is in what? Is it James, the Epistle James? One of the epistles there, canonical epistles. Yeah, not the shadow of change, you know.

[38:01] I mentioned it here. Yeah, let me let me quote it later on. Yeah, yeah. I don't know. That was from the drawing here. Okay. I answer. It should be said that from the four

[38:18] sent, it can be shown that God is altogether unchangeable. First, because above it has been shown that there is some first being, right, which we call God, and that this first being is what pure act, right, without any admixture of any potency or ability.

[38:50] In that potency is simply after act. That's what Aristotle shows in the ninth book of what wisdom, book of the metaphysics, that potency simply is after act.

[39:10] But everything that in any way changes is in some way in ability or in potency, from which it is clear that it is impossible for God in some way to what change.

[39:25] Okay, is that clear enough? God is pure act, right? What changes is able to be something other than it is, right? So no ability in God in this passive sense, right? Therefore, he can't change, right? Okay.

[39:53] Or the idea that what you know the definition of motion, if you recall, is the act of what is able to be, right? Insofar as it's able to be, so what is moved or changed is in ability, right?

[40:08] God is not in ability, but is pure act. Okay. So this idea that God is pure act is a middle term for almost all these attributes, if not all of them.

[40:24] Secondly, because everything that moves, as regards something, remains; as regards something, that, what passes away, right? Just as what is moved from whiteness to blackness remains in its substance, and thus in everything that is moved, there is to be noted some composition. But it has been shown above that in God there is no what composition; He is altogether simple. Whence it is manifest that God is not able to be moved.

[41:02] If you go back to the philosophy of nature, we see that very clearly: that a thing that changes must be composed. Remember how the thing went there in the philosophy. of nature? No we say the hard becomes soft, right?

[41:19] And there's a apparent contradiction there, right? Because if the hard becomes soft, and becomes means comes to be, well, if the hard comes to be soft, then the hard would be soft, and then the same thing would be hard and not hard, soft and not hard. So, how is it possible if the hard becomes soft?

[41:51] Yeah, it's not the hard as such that becomes soft. It's not hardness as such that becomes soft. It's what the hardness is in, like the butter, right? That becomes softer. So the butter as such becomes soft, not the hard as such becoming softer. So there must be a real distinction between the butter and its hardness before the butter can become softer. If the butter and its hardness were the same thing, then could the butter ever be soft?

[42:24] No. So you begin to see that the thing that changes must be what composed, right? And so when I teach that, you know, in philosophy of nature, I'll say, now we can use this premise but the premise in theology that God is not composed, right? And so we syllogize in the second figure, of the syllogism, where you affirm something of one thing and deny it of another, right?

[42:51] So if what changes is composed, as we were showing there, and God is not composed, then God cannot change. Um. Sometimes I was pushing it this year a little bit. Did you becoming? And I say,

[43:12] and something becomes something, right? There must be something in what becomes something that's able to become that, right? But there must also be something that distinguishes it, right, from what comes to be, right? So if this becomes that, whatever this is, if this becomes that, there must be something in this that's able to be that, right? Okay. Okay. So this becomes that, right? There must be something in this that can be that, right?

[43:54] But there must also be something in this whereby this is not that, right? Okay. So if this really becomes that, there will be coming, and this is not that to begin with, right?

[44:11] And but there must be something also in this that becomes that, right? So there must be some composition in the this that becomes that, right? Composition of what is able to be that, and what distinguishes it from that, right? There's another way of looking at it, but I mean, it's just same idea, right? So what changes is always composed. God is not composed, therefore God does not what change, right?

[44:41] That's a very common way of reasoning, huh? When Socrates reasons against Simmias there in the dialogue, huh? When he reasons that the soul is not the harmony of the body, and he finds three things instead of the soul that are denied of the harmony of the body, like the soul resists the body's inclinations sometimes, right? But the harmony of the body would not be such the inclinations, so the soul can't be the harmony, right?

[45:06] That's a very common thing. If you affirm something of one thing and deny it of another, can those two be the same? If you affirm woman, let's say, a mother, and deny a woman of Socrates, can Socrates be a mother? No, no. That's what they call the second figure of syllogism, huh? So what's the third argument here, huh? Third, because everything that moves by its motion acquires something, right?

[45:43] And comes to that to which before it had not attained, right? But God, since he is infinite, comprehending in himself all the what fullness or the perfection of the whole being, he's not able to acquire something, right? Nor to extend himself to something to which before he had not arrived, huh? Whence in no way does motion belong to him, right? I'll stop there for a moment. You say

[46:22] at Christmas time, you know, what do you give the guy who has everything? Well, if he really did have everything, there'd be nothing you could give him, right? Yeah. So God contains everything in a simple way, right? Like he says to Abraham or Moses, "I will show you every good," right? And Thomas says that is myself. So because God is infinite, he can't what change, right? Now that kind of gives a little reason for taking up the infinity of God before his what

[46:55] unchangeableness, right? Because you reason from his being infinite now to his being what. Yeah. And also taking up his simplicity, right? You realize from his simplicity to his not being changeable, right? And then more generally from his being pure act, huh? So you get three. Three arguments and three is enough, as Aristotle says, right? He comes to do that a lot of times in the disputed questions too.

[47:25] You'll get three arguments and then you'll stop, you know. And the Summa, Contra Gentiles doesn't stop at three. Sometimes he has ten, twelve, thirteen. Okay. That's why the Summa is more for beginners, right? You don't need that many. Three arguments is is enough for the beginner, right? In the first objection, there, this is a kind of a common thing he said about Plato, right? Plato will say that he'll call any operation a

[48:00] motion, right? Okay. You may recall the ninth book of wisdom, where Aristotle begins to consider act and ability, and he begins less universally, right? He begins with act and abilities are found in motion, right? And he sees act as first of all being the same thing as what motion, huh? That's where it begins. And I often quote Shakespeare there, where he says, "Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs," huh?

[48:40] So motion is the act that seems to be most known to us, huh? Now later on, in the ninth book of wisdom, in the middle part and so on, he makes a what extension of the word act, so that form is called act too, right? Okay. Now

[49:11] the way he sees it is by a kind of proportion, right? And along with motion, he'll take other activity, right? And notice if we use the word act in English by itself, we're going to think of something more like motion than something like form, right? And these words that derive from act, like activity, actions, right? You never call form an activity, would you? You never call it action, right?

[49:48] Okay. But this word act is carried over from motion to form, and you say, well, just as the body is able to move before it actually moves, right? So the matter is able to be formed before it's actually formed, right? And so the form is to matter something like motion is to the ability to move, right? Okay. And and you can apply it to things like seeing, right?

[50:18] Okay. So I don't see people now, but I'm not blind. I have the ability to see, right? And now I open my eyes, I go from the ability to see to actually seeing, right? And something like that takes place when you have the wood there before it's been shaped by the carpenter, and then the wood goes from being this shapeless object to being a chair or a table or something else.

[50:47] And the ability is actualized, right? So form is act two, right? Okay. But now Aristotle will eventually distinguish between motion and what we don't really have a good name for in English. Thomas will call motion and operation, right? And there's various ways of distinguishing them. But you begin by seeing that motion is an imperfect act,

[51:19] and operation is a perfect act. And Aristotle brings it out kind of simply by saying, when you're walking home, have you walked home yet? No. See, when you're building a house, have you built the house yet? See. But when I'm seeing you, have I seen you yet? Yeah. Yeah. See. And when understanding what a triangle is, have I understood what a triangle is yet? Yeah. So when I'm understanding what a triangle is, I have understood what a triangle is.

[51:55] He calls that a perfect act, right? While motion is something imperfect. So long as I'm walking home, I haven't walked home yet. It's incomplete, isn't it? And when the activity is complete, and you can say, I have walked home, right? I'm not walking home anymore. Okay. And when you can say, I have built the house, I'm not building the house. So so long as I'm building the house or walking home, my walking home is not complete.

[52:26] My building is not complete. And when it is complete, that activity doesn't exist anymore. So it's essentially an imperfect act. But seeing and understanding and loving and so on, these are perfect acts. Because when I love somebody, I have loved them now, right? See. When I understand something, I've understood it. When I see something, I have seen it.

[52:52] So we'll distinguish between these two, right? Okay. But you know, we might say in English, words are not altogether clear here, but we might say, when I'm walking home, am I doing something?

[53:11] Yeah. And when I'm seeing something or understanding something, am I doing something? Am I doing something when I'm understanding? You might call me up and say, "What are you doing?" And, I say, "Well, I'm listening to Mozart, right? Or I'm looking at a painting or something, right? Or I'm understanding something. I'm doing something."

[53:45] Huh? What do you say? They keep on asking, "What are you going to do when you retire?" And sometimes I'll say, "You know, I'm going to listen, going to think about think about God, you know, you know." So, am I doing something when I'm thinking about God? Yes. Yeah, but you see, so but you have a hesitation there, right? Because doing you think of motion first. Well, we might say that understanding what a triangle is is doing something, right?

[54:24] But a little bit hesitation there, right? Well, sometimes Plato likes to call what we call operation there motion right Okay so if God understands Himself, right, he is said to be moving Himself, right? And if God is loving Himself, right, he's moving Himself, calling any kind of doing or operation a what? A motion, right? And occasionally, even in the third book on the soul, that Aristotle will call understanding a kind of what motion, right?

[55:02] Huh? Okay, but then you're kind of extending the word motion to this perfect operation, this perfect doing, huh? Okay, so this first objection here is taken from what Augustine, right?

[55:18] In his commentary on Genesis, to the letter, and Augustine, right, likes to speak in the Platonic fashion sometimes, huh? Okay. So the first, therefore, it should be said that Augustine speaks there according to the way in which Plato spoke, right? Saying that the first mover, the unmoved mover, moves itself, right? Calling every operation or every doing what motion, right? According as even what to understand itself and to will and to love are said to be certain what motions, right?

[56:01] But then using the word motion to cover a perfect act and not just the imperfect act of motion. Okay, Aristotle doesn't usually do that, but occasionally he does, right? But it's very common for Plato, right?

[56:17] Because therefore God understands and loves Himself. According to this, they say that God what moves Himself, right? But not, however, as motion and change is of something existing in ability, as we are now speaking more strictly about what change and motion.

[56:44] So you can say Plato is using the word motion more loosely than Aristotle will usually do, right? He's using the word motion to cover any doing, right? Even the doing that is complete or perfect, like understanding or sensing, for that matter, and and willing, right? And so, in that sense, you can say God does something, right? Right? But if you want to call His doing something motion, right?

[57:17] You got to be careful, right? That's kind of the Platonic way of speaking, that can be misunderstood, huh? Okay. Now, wisdom is said to be the most mobile thing, huh?

[57:37] But wisdom is said to be mobile, but kind of likeness. According as it diffuses its likeness to the what last of things, right? To the least of things. For nothing is able to be that does not go forward from the divine wisdom by certain what imitation of it, huh? Just as from the first effective and formal beginning of things. In so far as also artificial things go forward from the wisdom of the what artist, right?

[58:19] Thus, therefore, in so far as the likeness of the divine wisdom, step by step, goes forward from the highest things which partake more of his likeness, down to the lowest things which partake less, there is said to be a certain what

[58:41] going forward and a certain motion of divine wisdom in things. Just as if we were said that the sun proceeds as far as the earth, in so far as the ray of its light extends or reaches down to the earth, right?

[59:01] And in this way, Dionysius expounds in the first chapter of the Celestial Hierarchy, saying that every going forward of the divine manifestation comes to us from the Father, right? From the Father of lights, from his what being moved, right, huh? Okay. Now it's a little bit like we speak of a a wave spreading out. Now, if you drop a rock in the water, does the wave move across the whole lake or the whole surface of the water?

[59:44] No, but kind of the similitude of that, right? The likeness of that, huh? Okay. So we speak of the descension of what the perfection of God to creatures, right? And the higher creatures partake more, in the lower and finally gives out down there, get down to prime matter, right? There's no actuality down there. So,

[1:00:11] is the divine wisdom itself moving down? No, but it's kind of like the effect of it is moving down, right? It's a likeness there.

[1:00:32] Okay. Now, God approaching us. To the third, it should be said that these things of this sort are said of God in scriptures metaphorically. Just as the sun is said to enter a house or to go out of the house, in so far as its ray arises at the house, and thus God is said to approach us or to what, go away from us, in so far as we perceive the influence of His goodness, or we what, fall away from it.

[1:01:09] What did I say in the beginning? Sometimes with the office, the Lord may please to help me get here quickly. But you know, this is kind of a metaphorical way of saying, right, to help us right away, right? And then He said to be coming.

[1:01:45] What's this prayer we have? Come, Holy Spirit, fill the hearts of Thy faithful. and kindle in them the fire of Thy love. Does the Holy Spirit come to us? See, Is there a motion of his coming to us, right?

[1:02:09] Or did they speak of the mission of the Son and the Holy Spirit? Right, He sent to us, right? You know, but so does He come to us, or what?

[1:02:35] Are we beginning to experience the effect of His causality? You know, and that's the He's coming to us, right? Now a lot of students have a hard time, you know. People in general, you know, think God must be awfully bored if he can't change.

[1:03:00] And He's often confined, you know, like he's tied up or something. And and it's probably, I suppose, why why the metaphors are good in a sense, right? Huh? Because

[1:03:18] you know, and what's good to see, you know, God is in some sense everywhere too, right? That He needs nothing, right? Let's say in Scripture there will be in the temple there. We won't go out anymore. Oh no, cabin. Cabin. What do you call it? Yeah, yeah.

[1:03:43] It's hard to understand, right? And now people can't even understand, you know, how we won't eat in the next world, right? It's it's kind of strange, huh? We won't sleep, I guess, either, huh? You neither eat or sleep, huh?

[1:04:07] Of course, was was it origin, right? We thought that sometime, you know, we'd get tired if you do vision, right? And then we'd want to go down, be reincarnated or something. And

[1:04:25] it's hard hard to for us to understand the unchangeable, right? Motion motion seems more real than what is not moving, right? And yet, you know, you understand what motion really is. It's hardly there at all.

[1:04:52] If I walk out the door here, my motion is what mostly gone and to come. And how much motion is there ever actually here?

[1:05:08] Well, in the now, I can't be in two places, right? Is any motion in the now? No motion in the now. So so my motion, one sense, is hardly even present, huh? Very very very very very fugitive kind of existence, huh?

[1:05:37] Very strange, very strange. And more, more you think about it, the more unreal motion seems to be. And yet, to us, it seems to be the most real thing. Aristotle says we'll say anything about the now existence except that it moves, because then it would seem real to us, right? Whatever moves is real,

[1:06:02] but it's barely real. And God seems kind of unreal because, what is He doing all day long? Just thinking about Himself doesn't He yet? It's you know, I'm trying to introduce you know some some reaction in God to what we do and don't do.

[1:06:30] And you know, scripture will speak, you know, metaphorically of God getting angry and so on. To react to our being good or our being bad down here. That doesn't.

[1:06:59] What? The human soul. But in the beatific vision there you are partaking vision there, you are partaking. This is called eternal life, right? Because you are partaking of eternity there. There's no before and after in that vision. It's going to be very, very unique.

[1:07:18] You wonder whether you will recognize your your friends up there. I'm sure you will, right? But it's going to be a very, it's going to be a very different life. Very different. I've got a couple of platonic things here, and the last dregs for my thing.