Prima Pars
35. Summa I q.10 a.3-5: Is Only God Eternal? How Eternity Differs from Time, and the Aevum Introduced
Class of 2006-05-18
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/035-summa-i-q-10-a-3-5-is-only-god-eternal-how-eternity-differs/

[0:02] So in the name of the Father and of the Son and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightener, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, pray for us, and help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit,

[0:29] Amen. So we start with Article Three here in Question 10. Whether to be eternal is what private to God, huh? For it is said in the Book of Daniel, Chapter Twelve, that those who instruct many in justice will be like stars in perpetual eternities. But there would not be many eternities if only God was eternal. Therefore, not only God is eternal. Moreover, it is said in Matthew twenty-five, "Go, accursed,

[1:25] into eternal fire." Therefore, not only God is eternal. Moreover, everything necessary is eternal. This is in the Posterior Analytics. But many things are necessary, like all the principles or beginnings of demonstrations and all demonstrative propositions. Therefore, not only God is eternal.

[1:56] But again, this is what Jerome says to Marcellus, that God alone is the one who does have no beginning. But whatever has a beginning is not eternal. Therefore, God is eternal. This wasn't the definition of eternity. That's the what all at once and perfect possession, right? Of unending life that has no beginning. no end.

[2:26] The answer it should be said that eternity, properly speaking, is found in God alone. Because eternity follows upon immutability or unchangeableness, just like time follows upon what motion, right? So the negation of change or motion negates what time, right? We saw it in the definition of eternity. But God alone is altogether unchangeable. As has been shown above.

[3:06] Nevertheless, in so far as some things receive unchangeableness from Him, by that they partake of His what eternity. Now, some things there are that, in this respect, receive unchangeableness from God; that they will never what cease to be. According to this, is said in Ecclesiastes about the earth that it stands in aeternum forever. Some things are said to be eternal in scriptures on account of the what length of their duration,

[3:55] even though they are what corruptible, as is said in the Psalms, the eternal what mountains. And in Deuteronomy, one speaks also of the what fruit, fruits of the eternal hills,

[4:18] Bacchus amat colles, Bacchus amat colles. He likes hills, right? I forgot that word there, that particular phrase colles. But some things receive more of the notion of eternity in so far as they have what unchangeability, either according to their being, right, or further according to their what doing the operation. As the angels and the blessed who enjoy the Word, because as regards that vision of the Word, we're seeing the Word face to face as as He is.

[5:10] There are not in the saints changing thoughts, as Augustine says in the fifteenth book on the Trinity. Whence also those seeing God are said to have eternal life, according to that of John seventeen three. This is eternal life that they might know You and Him whom You have sent. So that's like the definition of eternal life.

[5:42] Thomas gives that definition of eternal life there when he talks about the division of the articles of faith, because the faith is kind of a what foretaste of the vision. And of course, the way that text says, "This is eternal life; they might know You and Him whom You have sent. " So he divides according to the divinity and the humanity of Christ, and but it's because it's a foretaste of eternal life.

[6:11] So to the first, therefore, it should be said: this is the one that had the objection from Daniel, right? Speaking about the stars, right, and their perpetual eternities, and there's said to be many eternities, according as there are many partaking of eternity from the very contemplation of eternity. God.

[6:36] So there's no before and after when you see God face to face. I just read the last chapter of the Summa Contra Gentiles this morning. Thomas was quoting the Apocalypse there, and time will not be anymore. So it's kind of hard to think of yourself as not living in time, not having your life measured by time.

[7:00] It's quite an adjustment. It will take you a long time to adjust. To second, it should be said that the fire of hell, right, is said to be eternal on account of its what? end. Yeah. But nevertheless, there is in their pains a what? change. huh. According to that of Job, chapter twenty-four, that they would ah transit, huh?

[7:39] From the waters of snows, right, to exceeding what heat, huh? So you have both the complaints of winter and summer. And this, whence in hell there is not true eternity. Huh? Because the definition of eternity was what? totum simul, all at once. There's no before and after, right? Okay. So there's more time there, right? Huh? So far as there's this change from the hot to the cold.

[8:15] According to that of Psalm eighty, that there will be their time in what ages, right? Huh? I know. Nothing prevents one from using a word like eternity in more than one sense, right? So God's life is essentially eternal, right? Huh? And then we have life because we partake of eternity, and we have a activity of seeing God face to face, in which there's no before and after at all, right?

[8:47] Okay. And we'll have no end that. Okay. Might have a beginning, but no end of seeing God, right? So you're keeping. More of the meaning of eternity, right, in the beatific vision, than you are in the second objection here, referring to hell, right, because there you have a transmutation, a change from one state to another state, and it has only the idea of not having an end in common with what eternity, right?

[9:20] Okay. So the word becomes equivocal by dropping something of the full meaning of eternity and keeping what. Yeah, less than much. Yeah. In the souls in purgatory, there's no no sense of the word eternity for them, right? Because there'll be an end, and there's still. There's a beginning and an end. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. So it's kind of there's something. They're not eternal. That. Yeah, you punish them, right?

[9:57] Yeah. Yeah. Even more time more time. than hell Yeah. More time. than hell More time I I think I think in purgatory, in purgatory, there's there's no body there to to distract you, right? Huh? And so your desire to see God is really causing the pain, right? Because you realize you're impure, not ready to see Him yet, and you want to have this burned away, right?

[10:29] Huh? I know. Um. Just like you're getting married to something, you want to break off of the rash or something. or. You want to get married when when you're cleared up with all these pimples and gargoyles and everything. But I mean, the separate soul is more aware of its its defects, right? Than than it is in this life, and you have no nothing the bodily to distract you or to console.

[10:59] So it must be very intense, you know. What does Saint John of the Cross says? You know, says his friends, pray that I might have my purgatory on earth. Most people aren't willing to pray for that, but but they say that purgatory is more painful than having a purgatory on earth, huh?

[11:23] But that's the thing; it's neglected a lot in funerals now, too. You know, people speak as if you know the everybody's there. They arrived, you know. And they, I know when my my father died, the priest, a very good priest, had in the parish there. But you know, the same thing. You know, never stop praying for him because we never know how long. You know, nobody says anymore.

[11:46] You know, I always remember him saying that to my mother, and she told me that. So she always, you know, pray for him, and if he's if he's he's got over already, I mean, then then these prayers aren't going to be wasted. It's not going to be like, oh, I'm praying to somebody who already made it, but if they hadn't made it, and they'll be very thankful when you get there, and they'll remember you too.

[12:11] So, and just like we learned in logic, when you define a property, a property is defined by porphyry in a strict sense. It's what belongs to only one species, to every member of it, and always, huh? So it's a property of two, say, to be half of four. Because only two is half of four. Two is always half of four, and every two is half of four, right?

[12:44] But then, if you say, "Well, isn't it a property of two to be less than ten? " Well, now you've got every two is less than ten. Two is always less than ten, but not only, right? And then you you drop one meaning, right? And then maybe you can say, is it a property of man to be a logician? Well, every man is not a logician, and

[13:11] well, what sense is a property? Well, only maybe man is a logician, right? But not every man is a logician, and not always, right? Even those who are logicians, okay? You saw something of the idea of property, right? Yeah. So you have something like this in eternity, which is you know, you're dropping maybe the idea of before and after, right? The negation of before and after. I think when people think of eternity, they usually think of endless time, right?

[13:38] Yeah. And so if you you call that eternity, I suppose you could say that's one way of using the word eternal, right? But it's falling off from the the full sense, huh? Yeah. Okay. And you can drop out one or maybe more than one being, right? You drop the idea of not having a beginning, but keep the idea of not having an end, right? Okay.

[14:05] Now the third objection was talking about the necessary being what eternal. The third, it should be said, that necessary signifies a certain mode or way of truth. But truth, according to the philosopher in the sixth book of wisdom, the sixth book after the books of natural philosophy, is in the understanding, right? According, therefore, true and necessary things are eternal because they are in a what eternal mind, which is the divine mind alone, right?

[14:44] Once it does not follow that something outside God is eternal, right? Okay. But no, in some sense we would say that, but it's always true that two is half of four, right? Mm-hmm. Always true. Sit down.

[15:06] So you're convinced now that God alone. So you ought to answer the objections, huh? Okay. Now the fourth article, where eternity differs from what time.

[15:23] To the fourth, one proceeds thus: It seems that eternity is not other than time. How is it going to argue this now. It is impossible for two measures of duration to be together unless one is part of the other. For there are not together two days or two but hours, right? But there could be an hour and a day together, right? Because one is a part of the other.

[15:56] But the day and the hour are together because the hour is a part of the day. But eternity and time are together. That's a very important word, that simo. Aristotle has a chapter on simo in categories, right? It's a chapter right after the chapter on before and after. Okay. The Greek word is hamma, simo. In English, how do you translate that? Essentially, the same. We can say together, or you know, at once, you know.

[16:33] At once. Okay. But it has more than one meaning, but they kind of correspond to the senses of before and after. That's kind of interesting, huh? It's like you understand simo by negation of before and after. Okay. Aristotle hints that way too about about

[17:00] more and less and equal. That more and less are actually before in our thinking, equal, and two lines equal, one is neither more nor less than the other.

[17:13] And I know in the fragment of Anaxagoras when he's talking about things being forever equal, right? But before he says that things are forever equal, he says there are never more because you can't get something from nothing, and there are never less because something can't go into nothing. So if they're neither more nor less, then all things are forever equal. But it's like he's he's showing that they're neither more nor less, and then concluding that they're not what equal, right?

[17:39] But it shows you how, and it's a strange geometry, yes, huh? Because in geometry, we consider the equal before the what unequal. And you notice when Euclid defines, he'll define the equal before the unequal. He'll define the equilateral triangle before the isosceles triangle, and the isosceles triangle before the scalene triangle. Or when he defines, let's say, the angles, he'll define right angle first. When a straight line meets a straight line, makes equal angles; those angles are right.

[18:23] But then when he comes to define obtuse angle and acute angle, he doesn't say when a straight line meets a line makes unequal angles, the greater is called obtuse and the lesser are acute. No, he defines obtuse by right angle, an angle more than a right angle, acute angle, angle less than a right angle. So not only does he define the equal before the unequal, but he defines the unequal to the equal.

[18:51] And even when he gives the the the axioms, he'll give the axioms of equality, like quantities equal to the same equal to each other. Before the axiom of inequality, if the whole is always more than the part, and I've been taking this example, it's kind of interesting. Most people have heard the Pythagorean theorem, right? But the first book of Euclid's Elements ends up with the Pythagorean theorem, forty-seven and forty-eight.

[19:20] The the Pythagorean theorem and the converse of it, forty-seven, forty-eight. Well, then it's not until you get to book two and towards the end of book two that he gives the corresponding theories for the obtuse angle triangle and the acute angle triangle. In the case of the obtuse angle triangle, the side opposite the obtuse angle, the square on that is greater than the two squares on the sides containing it.

[19:47] And with the acute angle, which is the reverse, right, that they're less than the other two. So he does the theorem of equality before the theorems of inequality. But when you examine the Proofs of the inequality theorems. He uses the Pythagorean theorem. That's kind of interesting, huh? And

[20:09] the same way, you know, taking an example there from the first book of Euclid, you know, he shows that in a triangle, if two sides are equal, the angles opposite them will be equal. That's Proposition five. Now, it's not until down to I think it's Proposition eighteen, that he shows that if one side is longer than the other, then the angle opposite that one will be greater than the one opposite the lesser side, huh?

[20:35] But if you examine the proof, he uses that theorem about the isosceles triangle to prove the one about inequality, huh? Okay. So that's kind of strange, huh? If we really know equality from neither more nor what less,

[21:00] that's kind of interesting because in the dialogue called the Phaedo there in the last day of Socrates' life, Socrates is trying to reason that we got our understanding of equality before we're in this life, and the reason he gives is that when we look at the bodies around us, you might say, for example, that these two chairs are equal, right? But when we examine them more closely, we realize they're not exactly equal, and so they approach equality but fall short of it.

[21:35] So where do you get the idea of equality from something that falls short? And but someone might come back and say, "Hey, but if you get the idea of equality from more or less, there are clearly some bodies that are larger or smaller than other bodies, right? " And then we get the idea of equality by negation: two bodies, one of which is neither larger nor smaller than the other, But then they're what equal, right?

[22:03] Then you have way way out of that particular argument of Socrates. But in geometry, we seem to go from equality to what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. You see something like that in modern science, where the basic mathematical expression is a so-called equation, right? Okay. So equation, as it's taken from the word equal, right? And so you can actually use an equation to know something that's unequal, right?

[22:35] But then you're knowing the unequal to the equal, kind of contrary to where my mind works here. So, but I make a kind of comparison there between knowing equal through more and less and knowing háma through before and after, and that's probably where Aristotle takes up. Before and after, before he takes up háma right together, okay. But eternity and time are háma together, huh? So it's kind of hard to translate háma.

[23:12] Sometimes you have to translate it by together, I think. Other times by at once, right? When you speak of two events as being simultaneous, what does that mean? They take place at the same moment. Yeah, yeah.

[23:35] Which both imply a certain measure of duration, right? Time, eternity. Since therefore eternity is not a part of time, because eternity exceeds time and includes it, it seems that time is a part of eternity, and not other from eternity, huh? That's interesting thing, huh? Stretches the mind a little bit there, right? Moreover, according to the philosopher in the fourth book of the physics, the now of time remains the same in the whole time, huh?

[24:10] But this seems to constitute the notion of eternity that be the same indivisibly having itself in the whole discourse of time. Therefore, eternity is the now of time. We talked about that a little bit in the definition, but Thomas is touching upon this. But the now of time is not other in substance from time. Therefore, eternity is not other according to substance from time. Okay.

[24:41] Incidentally, just go back a little bit to the fourth book of natural hearing there, the so-called physics. Aristotle says it is not the same now throughout time. When was the now corrupted? When is one now corrupted? Well,

[24:59] it can't be corrupted when it is. Therefore, it has to be corrupted in some what later now, right? Okay. But if you understand the now of time, it's a little bit like the point of the line. So, is there a next point on the line? No, no. Because two points cannot touch, right? Without coinciding, so if you have two points, one earlier and one later, there's always some distance between them, and therefore another point in between those, right?

[25:35] Okay. So, when is the now of time corrupted? It can't be corrupted when it is. It's corrupted in some later now. Then, in intermediary nows, it continued to be. That's a difficulty, sees right? Aristotle says the now in time, in some sense, is the.

[26:02] Remains right throughout time, but it's always in a different position, right? And he compares, in a way, time to the motion of a body, right? And the now to the body in motion. So when the stone falls to the ground, right? That motion takes some time, right? And one part of the motion is in one part of the time, another part of the motion to the part of the time, and so on.

[26:30] But it's the same body that you drop in that remains throughout the whole descent to the to the ground, right? But the falling stone, let's say, the same stone throughout the whole thing, but its position is always what different, right? So he compares the now time to the falling stone, right? To the body in motion, right? That body remains throughout the motion, but it's always a different position.

[27:02] So in that sense, the now of time is never corrupted, right? But he's probably going to bring in what what the great Boethius taught us, right? That the now that what flows along makes time, but the now that what stands still, right, makes eternity, right? But it's very interesting. He makes a comparison. This objection makes you stop and think.

[27:35] Moreover, as the measure of the first motion, is the measure of all motions. So we take the first and most regular motion, right? And for us and most of our life, it has been the motion of the sun around the earth, or at least the apparent motion of the sun around the earth, and we use that to measure all other motions, huh? Okay.

[27:58] So he says, just as the measure of the first motion is the measure of all motions, as he said in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, the physics. So it seems that the measure of the first being, right, is the measure of every being. But eternity is the measure of the first being. first being, which is the divine being. Therefore, eternity is the measure of every being, like Plato said, God is the measure of all things, huh?

[28:25] He says Protagoras is mistaken, saying man is the measure of all things, but God is the measure of all things. That's in Plato's last work, right?

[28:37] But the being of perceptible things is measured by time. Therefore, time is either eternity or something of eternity, huh? Now he said sed contra, but against this is that eternity is tota what simo. And I translate that what. All at once, altogether. But in time, there's a before and after. So you may recall the definition of time. I think we studied that a little bit. Okay. But it's the number of the before and after emotion, and especially before and after the most regular and continuous motion.

[29:20] So before and after is in the very definition of what time, right? And therefore, Aristotle in the categories distinguishes the senses of before and after. He gives us the first meaning of before and after out of time. And you could lead back that the before and after in the motion itself, and the before and after in the path that the motion takes. But he singles out before and after in time because that's most explicitly got the idea before and after in it.

[29:54] It's in the very definition of it. It's not the definition of time, even though you can maybe figure out to be before. Before and after, because of what you learned from the definition of time, but the definition of motion rather. But the definition of motion is the act of what is able to be, in so far as it's able to be. So before and after is not explicitly in the definition of motion, but it is explicitly the definition of time.

[30:23] It's kind of interesting, huh? Because you learn in the sixth book of natural hearing, the connection there between the before and after in the road and the before and after in motion going down the road, and the before and after in the time it takes you to go down the road, and how they're kind of divided together those three, huh? And so when Aristotle gives the first meaning, say, of beginning, in the fifth book of wisdom, the first meaning of beginning is the beginning of the table, beginning of the road, and as Thomas points out in his commentary to that first meaning of beginning, you reduce the sense of what beginning of the motion, you start at the beginning of the road, and the beginning

[31:13] of the time it takes you to go down the road if you start at the beginning of the road, right? Okay. So there, but he gives the first meaning, the one that's tied up with magnitude, with the with the place, and then the fourth book of natural hearing when he takes up the senses to be in, right? He gives the first meaning of to be in, to be in place, like our being in this room, right?

[31:40] And after he goes through with the eight senses that Aristotle distinguishes, he raises the question, why doesn't Aristotle talk about to be in time? And he says, well, that's led back to the first meaning, huh? Because place and time are both measures of what they contained, huh? But in the case of before and after, he gives the first meaning not place, but time, and then before and after in motion and in place are reduced to that sense, huh?

[32:10] But it's a real care that Aristotle wrote, right? But in the word beginning and in the word to be in, the first one is in place, and then the one of time is what attached to that, but with before and after, the first being given is time, and then the reverse is so. Before and after in motion or in magnitude is reduced to that sense, yeah. But there I begin to realize what Aristotle does.

[32:39] He doesn't give you all the meanings of these words, right? But he gives you the central meanings, right? And then there's some meanings are attached to the central meanings, but are not stepping stones the next meaning. And very subtly he does that. When you enter the details of it, that's why Aristotle is the first man to really understand the words he uses, and then we all use, we all use these words.

[33:04] But he really understood them, and he could distinguish the central senses and see the order among them. And not only else could do that except Thomas, because he doesn't. Aristotle in the physics, there he doesn't order the eight senses of in, and Thomas says, "No, we're going to order them in the way Aristotle teaches us in the fifth book of wisdom." I don't think anybody but Thomas could have ordered those.

[33:29] So it's absolutely amazing. You heard my famous propositions, right? If a man understands the words he uses, then he is wise. If a man does not understand the words he uses, then he is not wise. I told you that those two have been before. Are they true or false statements? If a man understands the words he uses, then he is wise. True or false? I think it's true.

[34:04] I'd say false. Because wisdom doesn't consist chiefly in knowing the what. No, no, it's chiefly in knowing the first cause, in knowing God, right? Okay. If a man understands God, then I'd say he's wise, right? I wouldn't say he's wise because he understands the words he uses. But now the second if then statement: if he does not understand the words he uses, then he is what? Not wise.

[34:31] That's that's true, right? Okay. Just like if I said, you know, if a man understands plain geometry, then he's a master of the science of geometry. I'd say no, because you had to be know solid geometry, right? You know. But if a man does not understand plain geometry, then he is not a master of geometry. That's very true, right? You see, and so if you can't understand the words you use, right?

[35:05] You know, you're obviously not wise, huh? And I just happened to, you know, I was clearing out my office, you know, reading a passage there of of David Hume, you know, he's talking about the word nature. Obviously, doesn't understand the word at all. It's just so obvious. you know, to a man who's been reduced to all the meanings of nature and the order of those meanings and so on, they just want the the the words they're using.

[35:29] This is like you know, Thomas is talking about those people getting mixed up. You know, I'm talking about incarnation, so on, and they'll say, you know, well, there's only one person, but there's two hypostases, huh? Hypostasis. Well, it's something like saying, you know, you know that. You and I are two animals, but we're one man, right?

[36:08] We're two animals. The only animal we could be would be a man. And so we're two animals. We're two men. So hypostasis is more general than a person. A person is a hypostasis of a rational nature, right? But the only hypostasis you can have, God or or a man, is is a person. So if you admit two hypostasis, you're admitting two persons, and now you are in heresy, right?

[36:31] But he says they don't understand their own lingua, their own language. Aristotle, the father of logic, says in the book on Sophistical Refutations that the most common mistake in thinking is from mixing up the senses of a word.

[36:52] How can a man be wise? right? Who will mix up the senses of the words he uses, and they will do so with these words because they all have many meanings. these common words, in certain order. So against this is that eternity is all at once, but in time there is a before and after. Therefore, time and eternity are not the same thing.

[37:21] I answer: It should be said that it is manifest that time and eternity are not the same. But the reason for this diversity, some assign from the fact that eternity lacks a beginning and a end, right? Time, however, has beginning and end. But this difference Thomas says is what, per accidens, and not as such, because it being given that time always was, and always will be in the future, according to the position of those who lay down the motion of the heavens to be eternal, there would still remain a difference between eternity and time, as the great Boethius says in the book on the Consolation of Philosophy.

[38:18] I've mentioned that book before. That's the last book of Boethius written in prison, right? And you know Boethius made the mistake, if I don't say that, of following the advice of Plato until philosophers are kings or kings are philosophers, you have bad government. So he went into government service, right? And apparently he was a very just man, and he was stopping some of the shenanigans that go on in government.

[38:45] And so he made what many enemies, and so on. Trumped up charges; they had him thrown in prison, right? And eventually he was what you might say martyred, right? As there was actually as Rome is now a local cult of his martyrdom there. But he wrote this book in prison, the Consolation of Philosophy. And I don't know if you ever had a chance to read that. He gave you a copy of the English copy of it.

[39:10] It's a beautiful work. And there are little verses, and then a prosa, they call it, and prose text, and then you know. And the little verses are very, very thoughtful as well as the text, but written in the form of a dialogue, right? And Lady Wisdom comes down to console him in prison. And what are you moaning for? Groaning for, and so on. And she gradually leads him out of his, you know, depression, and so on, huh?

[39:38] And the earlier books are dealing mainly with happiness, right? And Boethius takes up false happiness before true happiness on the grounds that it's more known to us.

[39:57] And so he refutes what false happiness is, then he shows you. What true happiness is, right? But you still have the problem of divine providence, and how can a good man suffer at the hands of Adam and so on. So in the later books, then it gets into the question of divine providence and divine knowledge, and so on. And that's where you get the definition of what eternity, right?

[40:18] But there's an awful lot of things that come from the Consolation of Philosophy. I think I mentioned how if we look in the probably probably the Navarre website, I think is in there. There's a a commentary on the on the Consolation of Philosophy attributed to Thomas, but no one thinks it's authentic, Thomas, right? But I mentioned how my brother Mark was looking at it and saying it's pretty good, you know.

[40:43] When we were teaching the Consolation, he was teaching the Consolation of Philosophy back at St. Mary's College. So it is a very thoughtful work, and he explains things like you know, Lady wisdom come down? And she'll have pi here, the letter Greek the letter pi here, and above it the Greek letter theta, right? And that's of course the commentary pointed out to you putting theoretical philosophy above what practical philosophy.

[41:12] Like we say, Mary has chosen the better part. Taking away from her, and then her garments are kind of torn, right? And the symbolism there is that in grabbing at the truth, men have what ripped it, kind of, you know, I got a tooth, you know, and we got to leave some part of the truth, but someone else gets another part that's already around. So there are very subtleties that are pointed out.

[41:33] But it's a very famous work, and many medieval later writers there, you know, translate like Chaucer translated into English and so on. And in the sketchbook of Washington Irving, there, right, the Scottish prince that was captured by the English and imprisoned there, you know, he's read the Consolation of Philosophy, so Irving refers to that. So it's it's a well-known work that's appreciated by sometimes people who may not be full philosophers, huh?

[42:06] But it's an awful profound work, you know. I put Boethius next to Augustine and Thomas, you know. So it's interesting. his little works in Thomas, which in the commentary is, not on the Consolation, apparently, but on the De Trinitate and the De Hebdomadibus and some other works.

[42:32] So even if time always was and always will be, right? Even if that were true, right? There would still remain a difference between eternity and time, as Boethius says in the book on the Consolation of Philosophy, from the fact that eternity is tota simul, right, all at once, which does not belong to time, right? Because eternity is the measure of a permanent being. Time, however, is the measure of motion.

[43:05] It's the number of the before and after in motion. Now, if, however, the force of differences, pay attention to, as far as the things measured, and not as far as the measures, thus it has some reason, because only that is measured by time that has a beginning and an end in time, as is said in the fourth book of the physics. Huh? Whence, if the motion of the heavens always endured, time would not measure it according to its whole duration, since the infinite is not what measurable, right?

[43:46] As Shakespeare says when he's talking about Mother Earth? "Common Mother, thou whose womb immeasurable, and infinite breast teems and feeds all." Almost like couples, immeasurable and infinite, huh? Same thing we have here, huh?

[44:11] But it would measure each circulation of the heavenly body, right? Which has a beginning and an end in time, huh? Okay. So my life as a whole is measured by time. My life as a whole is measured by time because my life in time has a beginning and a what end? That's what Aristotle is pointing out, huh?

[44:36] But if my life in time had no beginning and no end, right, would still have a before and after, and you could measure part of my life, right, by time—three years of my life, wherever it may be—but you couldn't measure my life as a whole because it's infinite. You can't measure the infinite.

[45:02] One can have, however, he says, another reason from the on the side of the measures if one takes a beginning and end in potency, because even given that time always was, nevertheless one can note in time a beginning and end, taking some parts of it, as we speak of the what beginning end of the day, or the beginning and the end of the year, which could not be done in what?

[45:32] Yeah. But nevertheless, these differences follow that which is first and through itself, namely that eternity is what all at once, not however what time, huh? Okay.

[45:53] And so, before and after is the definition of time as Aristotle defines it. He doesn't, you know. Defined by having a beginning and end, or not having beginning and end, right? But by before and after, that's the most essential way of distinguishing that in eternity.

[46:14] Now, the first objection was saying, "Can you have two measures together, right?" But the first, it should be said, that that argument proceeds or goes forward if time and eternity were measures of one kind, right?

[46:33] But this is clearly false from those things of which time and eternity are the what measure? Because one is a measure of motion, the other is a measure of.

[46:45] Yeah. Okay. Now the second objection was very interesting there about the now of time, right? To the second, it should be said that the now of time is the same in subject in the whole time, but differs in its what?

[47:09] Yeah. Okay, it's a count, you could say. Yeah, or another way of putting it, it's the same body throughout the motion, right? But its position is always different, right?

[47:21] In that, just as time corresponds to motion, so the now of time corresponds to the what? Body in motion, the mobile. But the mobile is the same in subject in the whole what? Unrolling of time, the whole course of time, but differing in its what? Definition, you might say, insofar as it is here and what there, differing in its position, right?

[47:52] So that so you'd say the now of time, the now of time is always moving forward, right? Okay. And this alternation is motion. For the flux, you might say, of of the now, according it is altered in definition as time. But eternity remains the same in subject and in position, right? Okay, so it's that's the way he states it more simply, though, saying the now that flows makes time, the now that flows along makes time, but the now that stands still makes what?

[48:31] Eternity, right? Okay. It's not a now that's being left behind. Because then you imagine it to be, you know, the now of time. Whence eternity is not the same as the now of what? Time.

[48:51] So sometimes I read a little bit into it this is a definition, right? when he says, "possessio," right? He's going to separate the now of eternity. From the now of time, because you can't repossess the now of time, because it's always getting away from you. It's always moving on, right? It waits for no man, that's what the poet says, right? Time waits for no man. It's our master, as they say, right?

[49:23] Now, to the third objection, that's talking about time or eternity being the measure of all being, right? To third, should be said that eternity is a proper measure of being, just as time is the proper measure of what motion. Whence, according as something recedes from the permanence of being, right, and is subject to change or transmutation, according to this, it recedes from eternity, right, and becomes subject to what time. For the being of corruptible things, because it is changeable, is not measured by eternity, but by time.

[50:11] Time measures not only the things which are changing and act, but also those things which are what? Changeable. Once, not only does it measure motion, but also what? Rest.

[50:26] Which is of what is apt to be moved and not moved, right? So when we say God rested on the seventh day, God is at rest. That doesn't mean rest in the way in which you and I might be at rest, huh? Or we we we go to bed at night or something like that, right? And we sleep for so many hours, if we're lucky. And but we could be moving during that time, right?

[50:54] So rest means a what? Lack of motion, right? In a subject able to move, right? That's not what rest means when it's said of God. It's not a lack of something that He's able to have. Okay. It's more more negation, simply of of motion, right?

[51:22] So, so we start the next article here. Before I take a break, then. Let's look at the objections at least, then. Divide evenly the time. That's we're slaves of time, right?

[51:41] To the fifth one proceeds thus. It seems that the evum is not other from time. Now it's hard to know exactly how to translate evum, so I'll leave it in

[51:56] Latin, huh? But this is more the the measure of what the angels, huh? So it's in between eternity and time, but. For Augustine says in the eighth book on Genesis to letter that God moves the spiritual creature and that would include the angel then through time, right? But the evum is said to be the measure of what? Spiritual substances. Therefore, time does not differ from the evum, huh?

[52:33] Moreover, it's of the notion of time that it have a before and after, and of the notion or definition of eternity that it be all at once, as has been said.

[52:46] But the evum is not eternity, for it is said in Ecclesiasticus that. Eternal wisdom is before the evum. We have to look up the text. That's that's one of the books. It's in what Greek, isn't it? The original. That's the get a different name now. Yeah, yeah. Used to be called Ecclesiasticus. I guess, yeah. Yeah, take a long time to get the the I and the E there.

[53:18] The E it's Ecclesiastes and at the I it's Ecclesiasticus, right? But now they call it Sirach, huh? But. I think that's originally in Greek. The text in the Greek. Yeah, I didn't say that in our prologue. Yeah. Translated. Yeah. Yeah. I don't know if that's in the in the Hebrew scriptures. I don't think it is. I don't think they ever found the Hebrew. Yeah. Have they? I don't think so.

[53:45] So, therefore, is not all at once, but it has a before and after, and thus it is what time. Moreover, if in the evum there was not a before and after, it would follow that in the eternal things there would not differ to be and to have been and to be future. Since therefore is impossible for the eternal things not to have been,

[54:23] it would be impossible for them what not to be future. But this is false, since God is able to reduce them to nothing. Moreover, since the duration of the Ev eternal things is infinite, on the part of what comes afterwards, if the evum is all at once, it would follow that something created is infinite act, which is impossible. Therefore, the evum does not differ from time.

[55:00] But against this is what Boethius says. You command time to what? Go forth from the evum, right? So, so we take a little break now, or what? Okay.