Prima Pars
44. Summa I q.12 a.8–10: What the Blessed See in God, Seeing Without Likenesses, and Seeing All at Once
Class of 2006-10-05
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/044-summa-i-q-12-a-8-10-what-the-blessed-see-in-god-seeing-without/

[0:00] Okay. Now the next article. To the eighth one proceeds thus: It seems that those seeing God through His essence see all things in God, right? And of course the famous quote from Gregory. For Gregory says in the fourth book of the dialogues, "What is it that they do not see who see the one seeing all things?

[0:36] But God is seeing all things, right? Therefore, those who see God see all things. Moreover, whoever sees a mirror sees those things which are resplendent in the mirror, right? But all things, whatever that come to be, are able to come to be. Shine in God as in a kind of what mirror? For He knows all things in Himself, right? Therefore, whoever sees God sees all things which are, and all things which are able to come to be.

[1:22] Huh? Moreover, who understands that which is greater is able to understand lesser things, as is said in the third book about the soul. That's when Aristotle is making the famous distinction between

[1:37] the senses and the reason, right? If you see something very bright, you're kind of what? Not able to see for a while, right? Or if you hear something very loud, you're it even be be deaf, right? But if you consider something very understandable, and then you turn to something lesser, you're not what? Impeded from understanding it. You can understand it what? Better, right? Okay. That's why I say, you know, that you know my teachers, you know, had this respect for Shakespeare and Mozart and so on.

[2:11] But these things are less understandable than things they're doing in philosophy, right? But when you turn, you know, from the things that were understandable to the music of Mozart, which is only understandable in potency or in participation, the way the emotions partake of reason and so on, you're not able to judge that, right? Okay. And and they saw that romantic music, you know, is kind of not following reason.

[2:36] That's the difference between the music of the, you know, in general, the Baroque period and Mozart's music as composed compared to the music of the Romantic period, right? Because the Romant, the Baroque period, Mozart saw that the emotions should be in harmony with reason, right? Follow reason, and that's the thing that the Romantics won't quite admit. But you can kind of see that their music is not what.

[3:02] So good for the soul, right? Good for the emotions, huh? And you know, like Tchaikovsky goes out to the what to drown himself one time, at least, and so on. And people kind of surprised that Tchaikovsky would what go listen to Mozart, right? Why to escape from the madness of his own life and the madness around him? So they recognize in some way the excellence of Mozart's music, and the same could be said in general about the music of the Baroque.

[3:31] There is something noble, more reasonable. But the philosophers who really are good philosophers can judge those things better. They can judge the less understandable better after considering the more understandable. And they have good judgment in fiction and things of that sort, huh?

[3:54] Like once he has said, you know Shakespeare keeps on kind of an even keel, you know, not the way other things do. Kind of disperse your your faculties and run them down and so on. But you can make that judgment, huh? Well, of course, God is the greatest thing you can understand, right? Huh? But all the things which God makes or is able to make are much less than His own essence.

[4:19] Therefore, whoever understands God is able to understand all things which God makes or is able to make, right? So, kind of all those lesser things, huh? That's always to me a very, a very striking argument.

[4:35] Moreover, the rational creature desires naturally to know all things, the whole universe. If, therefore, in seeing God he does not know all things, his natural desire would not be put to rest. And thus, in seeing God, he would not be what blessed, which is unfitting, inconvenient. But in my stronger sense that doesn't fit together. In seeing, therefore, God, he knows all things, right?

[5:13] But against this is that the angels see God through His essence, and nevertheless, they do not know all things. For the lower angels are purged by the higher ones from ignorance, right? As Dionysius says in the seventh chapter on the celestial hierarchy, for they do not know future contingents and the thoughts of the heart.

[5:38] So, my teacher, Kostik, said, "Make an act of will opening your heart to your angel, your guardian angel." But this is of God alone. Therefore, not whoever sees God's essence sees all things, huh?

[5:59] Follow the Latin word order in my English. It's kind of funny to see how to tell the people who read Thomas very carefully that they have kind of an English Latin word order, you know, and you can tell by the way of speaking, you know, this guy is one of those, one of those strange people.

[6:17] Answer: It should be said that the created understanding, in seeing the divine essence, does not see in it all the things which God makes or is able to make.

[6:33] For it is manifest that thus some things are seen in God according as they are in Him, but all other things are in God as effects are in the power of their cause.

[6:51] Thus, other things are seen in God as effects are seen in their cause. But it is manifest that the more perfectly some cause is seen, more are able to be seen of its effects in it.

[7:09] Who has therefore an elevated understanding at once, in one principle demonstrated, proposed, is able to take a knowledge from that of many conclusions. Of course, you see that all the time, even in physics, right? Einstein can see all kinds of consequences of something. People don't see them right away. Okay.

[7:36] Which does not belong to the one of of a weaker understanding, huh? But each thing has to be explained to him. Okay. You see it all the time as a teacher, right? Okay. That understanding, therefore, in a cause is able to know all the effects of the cause and all the reasons for the effects. Who totally comprehends that cause?

[8:02] But no created understanding wholly is able to comprehend God, as has been shown in the previous article, right? You can see how this article follows upon that. Thomas has well ordered these things, huh?

[8:19] I think I think in the two Sumas you find the things better ordered than maybe the Disputed Questions, where sometimes they go up in kind of an odd, odd fashion, and perhaps a little bit easier, a little bit in in

[8:34] the sentences too. Lombard, you know, that it's kind of an odd, odd thing, you know. And this reminds me of this, you know, and

[8:44] but this is according to the what Thomas calls the beginning the what order of understanding or order of yeah, of the discipline. Yeah. That's one of the reasons why he wrote the Suma, right? So you can get your get the things in the order in which they can be learned, best learned.

[9:09] For no created understanding in seeing God is able, no created understanding therefore in seeing God is able to know all the things which God makes or is able to make. For this would be to comprehend his his virtue, his power.

[9:28] But of those things which God makes is able to make, more that understanding knows that more perfectly. What sees God more perfectly? See God, the more things you'll see in God. But you not can never see all there is to see in God, because that would be to comprehend God. Now, how does he reply to the text? from? Gregory the Great who's one of the major doctors of the Western Church.

[10:04] To the first, therefore, it should be said that Gregory speaks as regards the sufficiency of the what object to which God, huh? That as far as in itself is concerned, it sufficiently contains all things and what demonstrates all things, huh? But nevertheless, it does not follow that whoever is in seeing whoever sees God knows all things, because he does not perfectly comprehend it, huh?

[10:41] And the second objection was taken from the idea of God being kind of a mirror, right, a likeness of all things. To the second, it should be said that the one seeing the mirror is not necessary that he see all things in the mirror unless he comprehends by his vision the what mirror, right?

[11:03] Now the third objection, which is the most interesting in some ways to me, to the third, it should be said that although it's more to see God than all other things, huh?

[11:16] Nevertheless, it is more to see God such that all things are known in him, right? Then thus him that not all things are seen him, right? But fewer or more are known in him, huh?

[11:32] But it has been shown already that the multitude of things known in God follow the way of seeing him, which is either more perfect or what less perfect, huh?

[11:50] Now some days Thomas will make out the distinction between what seeing this thing in itself by itself and seeing it in God, right? Okay.

[12:04] And so, although you could know it more easily by itself, then you could know God, right? To know it in God requires you to know God

[12:17] better, right? Okay. And just know God some way. So the better you know God, the more you see in God, right? Okay. Um. Now, Thomas talks about these things more explicitly in the other Summa, but he's going to make the point here. What about the natural desire to know the whole universe? Well, Thomas says, well, in seeing God, you know all that you naturally desire to know.

[12:49] To the fourth, it should be said, huh? That the natural desire of the rational creature. Is for knowing all those things which pertain to the perfection of the understanding, and these are the species and genera of things and their reasons, which in God we see whoever is seeing the divine essence. Okay.

[13:17] But to know other singular things, such as the thoughts and doings of others, right, is not other perfection of the created understanding, right? Nor does its natural desire tend towards this.

[13:35] So I don't have a natural desire to know what you guys. have. Been doing all day long, which I've been thinking, right? As Thomas says, it doesn't pertain to the perfection of my mind to know how much you understand.

[13:54] Nor again to know those things which are not, but are able to come to be by God, right? Okay, so what Thomas says more fully in the Summa is that we have a natural desire to know the what the existing universe, right, and all the kinds of things that are in it, right, and so on, and all that we'll see in seeing God, right? So our natural desire will be satisfied, huh?

[14:27] But we'll see all this at once, huh? Okay. I said my house study, and see it is. I'm reading the sentences right now, you know, but I'd like to go back and read some more Euclid, you know, or go back to the physics. But I can't do all these at one time. It's kind of a circle, you know. I say, gee, that's a nice piece of Mozart, but that's only one of you know my CDs of Mozart, and so I kind of circle try to go through them, you know.

[14:57] But I can't hear them all at once, you know. And see it is that's been a beautiful piece. I haven't heard it for a while, you know. Say that's a beautiful thought, right? You know, and um, reading this Summa Contra Gentiles you know, a couple chapters or something, you know, and see it, but you know, 150 chapters, and I can't do all in one day. So it's kind of a cycle there, right?

[15:29] You say, go back, you know, go back and get the commentary on the Psalms again, you know, or the commentary on John, you know, commentary on Matthew. But can only do these little bit at a time, you know. See, when when you see God as He is, you see all these other things that you naturally want to know in this life. At this, all at once, right?

[15:51] Then it goes on here, huh? This famous text of Augustine, right? If nevertheless God alone was seen, right, who is the fountain, right, and the beginning of all being and truth, so would the natural desire of knowing be filled, right? That nothing else would be what, and one would be what blessed, right? Okay, It doesn't melt anything, right? I always like this beautiful quote from from the great Augustine.

[16:28] Once Augustine says in the fifth book of the Confessions, "Infelix, unhappy or miserable, right? The man who knows all those things, namely creatures, right, but who does not know you,

[16:45] blessed also the one who knows you, even if he knows those is ignorant those other things. Who knows you and those things, right? Not an account of that is more blessed, but an account of you only blessed, right? So he's saying, miserable the man who knows all the things but doesn't know God, right? Blessed the man who knows God, even if he doesn't know anything else. Blessed also the man who knows God and other things, not the more blessed for knowing other things, but for knowing God alone.

[17:23] That's that. That's kind of amazing, huh? To see that, huh? Is that interesting? So that when you see God as He is, I don't know if we're going to pay attention to each other much in heaven or not.

[17:41] You know, you know, yeah. These famous saints and other people that that you read about and so on, you know, you say, "Well, I like to meet them, you know, and say, 'Hey, do I understand that right, Thomas? ' Or you know, I just thought I thought you meant, you know, and if I never have any desire to pursue those questions or to be clear to me anyway, or

[18:03] you're curious, I mean, you know, to see Christ in the flesh, right? Mary in the flesh, you know, what she would look like, and yeah,

[18:13] the saints, you know, like that. Can't tell. The people that are worried if their dog is going to be in heaven or not. You know the proper answer to that, right? It's just the dog will be outside the city. The answer as it gets a little child is that if your dog or cat is necessary for your happiness in heaven, your dog and cat will be there.

[18:38] You're not saying they're going to be there. They're saying if you would not be happy without your your your kitty cat or your dog in heaven, your kitty cat or dog will be there. That's true. So if the statement is true, even if the parts are what not true, right? So the one has an immortal soul. Then no, no, not necessary for your happiness. Yeah, yeah, it's like if I say, if candy is necessary for your happiness in heaven, there will be candy in heaven.

[19:13] Oh. If why? I have to change that poker that goes in heaven. There ain't no beer. That's why we have it here. Doesn't believe it. See, it's a characteristic statement, though, right? You know, if you say if Socrates is a mother and Socrates is a woman, that's true, even though it's false that Socrates is a mother. Socrates is a woman, right?

[19:47] What is a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed a beast no more? So you can say that's true. If man's chief good is no more than the chief good of the beast. Then man is no more than a beast. That's true, even though both simple statements that is put together from are what false, right? See, you know, you talk about if then statement.

[20:11] You point out that you can have what a true if then statement made out of two false simple statements, and you can have a false if then statement made out of two true statements. If I am a man, then I am a father. See, well, I am a man and I am a father, but that statement is false. If I am a man, then I am a father.

[20:42] If I am a man, then I am doing breakfast. Well, that's false, isn't it? I think so. What? I think so. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

[20:56] It shows you the difference in what falsity means there. You know, that's why in the if then argument you use a a regular statement, right? In order to back the regular statement as a conclusion, you said, "Mind doesn't want to arrest me if then, now. " You don't spend all this in the chat. You say, "If candy is necessary for your happiness in heaven, there will be candy in heaven.

[21:27] " Keep quiet. Keep keeping quiet for now. Yeah. Or sometimes we think we can't be happy without this person, right? If that person is necessary for happiness in heaven, they'll be there. They may not be, but anyway, if necessary happiness, they'll be there. So St.

[21:56] Thomas is more explicit about this reply to the fourth objection there in the Summa Contra Gentiles. Okay. Now, Article Nine is is what talking about those things we do see though in God, right? And whether they're seen by some what likeness, huh? You know, God is not seen by some likeness, huh? To the ninth, it proceeds thus: It seems that those things which are seen in God by those seeing the divine essence are seen through some what likenesses, right?

[22:42] Of course, that can't be so. long. A bunch of likenesses floating around in God. Where are you going to? For all knowledge is by the likening of the knower to the what. Known, for thus the understanding in act is the understood in act, as Aristotle says. In the sense in act is the sensible in act, in so far as they are informed by what their likenesses, right?

[23:13] As the pupil by the likeness of color, right? So when I have the definition of square in my mind, right? I have the nature of square in me. In a way, I've become a square. Right. If therefore, the understanding of one seeing God through its essence, through his essence, understands in God some creatures, is necessary that it be informed by their what likenesses, huh?

[23:57] Moreover, those things which we saw before we hold in our memory, right? But Saint Paul, and this of course is the position of both what Augustine and Thomas, huh? That Saint Paul saw God as He is, in a passing way, right? And that Moses did too, but just those two, huh? Okay. But Paul, seeing in rapture the essence of God, as Augustine says in the twelfth book in Genesis to the letter, after he ceased seeing the essence of God, recorded or recalled, brought back to his heart, you might say, huh?

[24:41] Many of those things which he had seen in that rapt in rapture, whence he himself said that he heard hidden words, right? Hidden thoughts, which is not licit for man to speak, huh? Therefore, it is necessary to say that there are some likenesses of those things which he what recalled, huh? And these remain in his intellect, huh? And for the same reason, when they are seen presently, ah,

[25:19] when when the vision when the essence of God is seen presently, of those things which are seen in it, there are some kind of likenesses or species, huh?

[25:30] But against all this, he says is that through one species or through one form is seen the mirror and those things which appear in the mirror. But all things are thus seen in God as in a certain understandable mirror. Therefore, if God is not seen through some likeness but through his essence. Neither are those things which are seen in Him seen through some likenesses or species.

[26:01] I answer: It should be said that those seeing God through His essence see those things; those things which they see in the very essence of God, they do not see through some forms, but they see it through the very what essence of God, right? Joined to the understanding.

[26:26] Now, is this the form of the mind, which in this case is the divine substance itself? Right? Is a form adequate to knowing not only God but other things? Right? And through that one form, one knows God and other things in God at the same time.

[26:51] Thus, for thus he says, is known each thing according as its likenesses in the knower. But this happens in two ways. For since some things right are like to one and the same, they are also what like each other, right? The knowing power in two ways can be assimilated to something knowable. In one way, by itself, when it directly is informed by its what likeness, and then it is known by itself, right?

[27:35] In another way, according as it is informed by the species or form of something which is what like it, and then it is the thing is not known in itself but in its what what is like it.

[27:52] For other is a knowledge by which a man is known in himself, and other by which is known in his what in his image. Thus, therefore, to know things through their likenesses existing in the knower is to know them in themselves or in their proper natures. But to know them in so far as their likenesses preexist in God is to see them what In God in God.

[28:21] And these two knowledges differ. Whence, by that knowledge by which things are known by those seeing God through His essence in God Himself, they are not seen through some what other likenesses, but only through the divine what essence which is present to the understanding, through which also God Himself is what seen. So the divine substance is what. A likeness in some way of everything, right? And this goes back to what Aristotle taught us that every agent makes what is like itself.

[29:02] So, since God, in some way, made all things, right? All things have some likeness to God, right? And they're all contained in the power of God in some way. And therefore, God, in knowing himself fully, right, knows everything else. And we, the more perfectly we see God, the more we see in Him all the other things. But through seeing Him, right, not to a likeness adapted to those things in particular, that's kind of amazing thing that that God is, right?

[29:33] But your kind of approach as you go up, you know, the angels even our natural knowledge, the higher angels have what fewer ideas, but they see things more what? Yeah, yeah. Kind of just talked about a little bit about our striving to be like the angels a bit, huh? And it seems that we need. To know everything distinctly, we need a separate thought for each thing, right? Okay.

[30:06] So, to know, let's say, a triangle or a square or something like this, a polygon. Sorry. We need one idea, and to know a circle, we need a what? Other idea, right? We can't know the two by the same idea, okay? But now,

[30:31] Euclid shows us how to what inscribe a square in a circle, right? He said, inscribe a square in a circle, and then we can bisect these things, right? To

[30:47] bisect the four things, and then we can bisect the remaining ones, right? And as we do this, we get a polygon of an increasingly number of sides, but it's approaching the what? Circle. But because it continues to be divisible forever, it's never immediate. So the circle is a limit that it what? Never reaches. Yeah, but now we have an idea of the polygon, right? That these polygons are approaching the circle as a limit.

[31:24] So we seem to be knowing circle and polygon at the same time, And uh the connect says, you know, it's a sign of the intellectual decadence of our time—They're not impressed with this imitation, how think it might be, of what the angels have, right? And if you understand strictly speaking what the limit means, this limit that you approach, you never can never get there. You see how different is a polygon in the circle?

[31:53] That no matter how many times you bisect the, you know, the arc cut off by the the part of the circle cut off, and and uh uh you never get to the circle. So you see the distinction between the circle the polygon. at the same time, you seem to be knowing them what? In one idea, right? And that's the way the angels do, right? But one idea, they know two things, or more than two things, distinctly.

[32:27] They're very distinction, right? So that's just a thin imitation of our trying to be like a superior mind. Sometimes, when they compare the nature of things to numbers, they said that if ten understood itself, right? Fully would it understand not only ten but also nine, eight, seven, six, five, four, yeah? And you know, when you understand, let's say what what the human soul is, right? Do you understand somewhat what the animal soul is, and even the plant soul?

[33:18] See, so, but like you know, understanding in in ten, nine, eight, seven, six, right, is something, but not the whole, right? It's like what they call sometimes a potential whole, right? The soul, right? That's kind of struck. I mentioned I was reading Thomas there talking about the the character and so on, and talking about baptism and in a baby, baptism removes what original sin from the person, but in an adult, what does it do?

[34:00] Original and actual. Yeah, both original and actual sin of the person is you know contrite and so on. Well, one of the objections against saying that baptism removes actual sin, right? Affects that is what we get through the sacrament, confession, and and and okay, but then Thomas speaks in a way of baptism as being like a potential whole that it does

[34:34] what confession can do, right? But also original sin, right? So that it has, in that sense, more power than confession, huh? Or confession has part of the power of baptism, huh? Mm-hmm. I never hear him say that elsewhere. maybe he does say it elsewhere. but I'm just happy to see it there. I mean, that second part there, that fourth part that he's talking about baptism, you know, and amazing things, you know, you know.

[35:05] But in a way, this is what it means to know God, right? Like knowing ten and knowing ten fully. You see, nine, eight, seven, six, and all these things in a way are contained in ten, but

[35:23] they can imitate God more or less, right? Nine imitates ten, but not perfectly. Eight is less so. Seven is less so, right? All the way down. So, the more perfectly you know God, the more you know these lesser things. It can, but be like Him more or less, but never exactly like him. huh? Mm-hmm.

[35:45] I noticed in that speech there of Benedict there. he quoted the reference to the Fourth Lateran Council. I first, you know, happened to thinking about that text, you know, and. When Paul VI back, in one of his talks, you know, referred to explicitly. But what what the text says is that you can never see a likeness between the creature and God without a greater what unlikeness. You know, it's kind of a key text.

[36:13] See, so sometimes you see, like in the Psalms, who's like the Lord our God, who's in front. So, and so, I told you the little counter I had with Hamilton eight years ago, because because we were doing the text of Shakespeare, right? And he objected to reason being called godlike, and so I was got talking to him about it a little bit and trying to explain, you know, the Christian position.

[36:38] And I was quoting the Fourth Lateran Council, you know, where we say that. But if you deny there is any likeness of the creature to to God, then in essence you're denying God's causality, And the, and the idea that the agent makes something like itself.

[36:55] Now, what they call univocal cause When a when a dog produces a dog or a cat produces a cat, then then the likeness is exactly the same, right? But then you get to higher things. The higher cause contains the lower like ten producing nine or eight or seven or something, all the way down the line. There is still some likeness there.

[37:22] Otherwise, you wouldn't be giving somebody what you have. There is no likeness at all, right? Like a dog producing a cat or something else. Okay, so you get

[37:44] to the body article here now. Now, notice in in the next world, there if we see God as He is face to face, this doesn't exclude, as Thomas will say, elsewhere, that we might have some what knowledge of other things, right? Through their own likenesses, right? But that would not be in the vision of God. Wouldn't be any likeness. We'd be seeing all them through the divine what, divine nature, yeah, which only has a likeness of all things.

[38:27] That guy can say, you know, I'll show you all good. Yes. myself. Okay. Now, the first objection was taken from the idea that you have to be assimilated to the thing, right? That you know in some way. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the understanding of the one seeing God is likened, is assimilated to the things which are seen in God. In so far as it is united to the what divine essence, in which the likenesses of all things pre-exist, right?

[39:10] So it's more perfect knowledge, even of those things. Yeah, yeah, more perfect likeness of it than the likeness that would be appropriate to that thing.

[39:21] This goes back again to the central question of philosophy, right? That the the way of knowing doesn't have to be the same thing as the way of thinking.

[39:34] Yeah. So, yeah, actually, knowing the creature better in God than you know the creature in itself. Yeah. This is among other things, Father Bernard Lonergan speaks of the the concept: what is conceived in the mind is the means by which we know. So it's the likeness of the thing that we know. Well, he says, "No, that's what we know. That's that's the problem. One of his main problems.

[40:05] He supposedly attributes all this to St. Thomas. Although he does. Oh, yeah. Okay. Now, the second objection was taken from St. Paul, right? Now, Chris? what they're confusing here is that when Paul saw God face to face temporarily, then he saw all these things in God, right? But when that vision passed away, there are some effects of it, right? I say, and those can be multiple likenesses, right?

[40:44] Okay. To second, it should be said that there are some knowing powers, right? Which, from the species or forms first conceived, are able to form other ones, right? And as imagination, right? From the preconceived species of mountain and gold forms the species of a gold mountain, right? I remember in the fairy tale the diamond mountain, you know, and kind of mount up the diamond thing, the guy and the horse or something.

[41:25] But you never seen that, right? But you can form an image, right? And the understanding from the preconceived species of genus and what difference, right, forms the ratio of the species, you know, from porphyry, right?

[41:46] So the genus of what square is quadrilateral, right? And the differences are equilateral and right angle, right? So from them you form a ratio, he says, definition of the species, yeah. And likewise, from the likeness of an image, we are able to form in us a likeness of that of which it is, right, John. And thus Paul, or anyone else, seeing God, right, from the vision of the divine essence, is able to form in himself likenesses of the things which he sees in the divine essence, which remained in Paul even after he ceased seeing the what essence of God.

[42:37] But this vision by which things are seen through species thus conceived is other from the vision by which things are seen in God. Okay. Now we come to the idea now of you see all these things at once. Or is there a what discourse from one to another? Well, you are going to be partaking of eternity. Going to be timeless.

[43:08] It's another you know in Shakespeare. I think I think timeless means in Shakespeare untimely, right? Oh. Now untimely means different meaning, and timeless means it is usually taken a good sense, right? Yeah. You know, but timeless is timeless death. Oh. Is untimely death? I get the other with the notes, you know, my my profound scholarship here with the the Yale Shakespeare, you know, that's pretty good, pretty good edition.

[43:35] Oh yeah. Yeah. We were looking last night at the we were talking about Shakespeare's definition of reason, you know, and I was remarking how Theobald was one of the great editors of Shakespeare. When he comes to the words "looking before and after" in Shakespeare's definition there in Hamlet, he says a phrase almost Homeric, right? Uh huh. And so I was taking out the Homer there in the Iliad, and Homer's phrase is "look before and behind yourself."

[44:07] Mm. And Polydamas there in the eighteenth book of the Iliad, he looks before and behind himself, and he says, "Let's get back in behind the walls before Achilles comes back into the battle." And Hector says, "You know, you coward," you know, and and everybody thunders and you know along with Hector and so on, and Homer says that you know, Zeus or Athena taken away their minds, you know, because they wouldn't listen to the advice of Puli Damus, who was better with words, than Homer was, I mean, Hector's better with muscles, huh?

[44:41] But the next day, of course, Achilles blows him down the wheat, you know, just you know, and so that's very much like Shakespeare's phrase, right? But

[44:54] Theobald also made the what's regarded as the as the greatest emendation, the happiest emendation ever made in in Shakespeare's plays, you know, in the death scene of the account of the death of Falstaff and it's a corruption of text, you know, and said and table of green fields. What the hell does that mean? You know, these are the dying words again, right In a table of green fields, and of course Theobald amended it to and a babbled of green fields.

[45:25] A babbled of green fields, huh? Is it beautiful? And and I was taking out one of my editions there, and and the in note guy talking about the corruption of the text and the emendation of Theobald said, you know, perhaps the you know the most you know excellent emendation in all fiction, you know, but certainly in Shakespeare, you know. So that's improving upon a line that you enjoy fictionally.

[45:53] Hmm. In the account of Falstaff's last things, and then this other one, terms of understanding, right? It's just praise for Theobald. You know, we don't always agree with his imitations, but he's responsible for the happiest imitation. But for seeing the likeness between the two greatest poets, Homer and Shakespeare, they both see reason as characterized by looking before and behind. But Shakespeare's just a little more extendable way when he says looking before and after, he can extend those bridges a little better.

[46:29] But you know, even in Chaucer, you know, the idea of the man of prudence, you know, he's got eyes in front and behind, you know. That's who he's representing, you know. So he can see before and behind himself. Might even telling you know, the Pope, you know, to watch his back now. But that's kind of expression: watch your back, right? You know, look before and behind yourself.

[46:50] That's what the the man of foresight does. So, yeah, yeah. But as I was saying to them, we go to the greatest poets there to see what reason, what's most known about reason. See, because the philosophers are too much into reason, they get kind of lost in all the things they want to say about reason, and they forget what's most known, right? See, where the poet kind of brings out what stands out first.

[47:16] That's very important for the philosopher to see what's more known. So the poet is a help there to the philosopher in thinking about reason to know where to begin.

[47:31] Can't remember what play is Falstaff's death in. In Henry V, Henry V. Yeah. Okay. Yeah. See, you don't. It doesn't really appear there. Yeah. But we hear about his ill health, his being, you know, rejection. The Prince Hal gives him at the end of Henry the Fourth, you know, and then Shakespeare decides, you know, to finish him off, you know, because it's a very important role to play there, you know, and Henry the Fifth, you know, glorious deeds, Henry the Fifth.

[47:59] So, he the description by the hostess thereof, his death is very kind of very funny, but very true to the man, right? Yeah. And just

[48:12] saying God, God, some reference to God, and hostess said, "I didn't think it was time for him to get involved in those things yet, " you know. Kind of this lack of comprehension what death is all about, you know, the part of it is very, very, very interesting scene, very, very interesting.

[48:30] And then he complained about woman, you know, in his deathbed, said they're devils incarnate, and and the hostess says he never could stand incarnation as a, you know. Missing the point, it would. It's a barbarous seed, you know, but it's something you'd say from in terms of fiction, you know, in terms of the character, Falstaff.

[48:58] It's interesting, you know. Incidentally, you know, the tie these two texts together, though, when Falstaff is first introduced to the world, right, Shakespeare's greatest comic character, into the fourth pun, one, he's asking Prince Hal, "What time is it?" And he said, "What's it got to do with you? Time, you know, with you, you know. Unless, you know, he goes on, you know, unless, you know, these are the signs of body, houses, and so on, and all this stuff.

[49:24] But why would you ask something so superfluous time? But that's the first sentence of before and after, right? But the life of Falstaff is not a life of what? Yeah, it's a life of the tavern and the brothel and the, you know, and and all these things, you know. So it's kind of genius that Shakespeare should hit upon that way. That's really the natural gift, huh?

[49:53] So they ask me, you know, does Shakespeare really see all these things you see in Shakespeare? I said. Of course. Yeah. Now, whether those seeing God through essence see all things which are seen in Him, which they see in Him rather, to the tenth one proceeds thus: It seems that those seeing God through His essence do not see at once or together, right? All those things which are what which they see in Him, because according to the philosopher, and that's Aristotle, it happens what to know many things, but to understand one thing, right?

[50:45] Aristotle's thinking there about what? Like I possess geometry, so I know many things in the sense of merely, but I can only think about one of them at a time. Okay. But those things which are seen in God are understood, but by the understanding, God is seen. Therefore, it does not happen that those seeing God at once see many things in God, right? So it's kind of arguing from what you know in this life, right?

[51:18] Okay. So I can't do the Pythagorean theorem and all the other interesting theorems at the same time. I do one at a time. You know, I'm almost dead, as Deconic would say, in my mind—it's hardly alive. That's a little spark there, and that's about it. Good goes now, little spark. Yeah, yeah. Saint Thomas.

[51:41] Moreover, Augustine says in the eighth book of Genesis to the letter that God moves the spiritual creature through time, right? And Saint Thomas explained that the time of the angels is not time in the sense of the fourth book of Natural here. It's discrete time, not continuous time. That is through understanding and affection. But the spiritual creature is the angel who sees God. Therefore, those seeing God successively understand and are affected.

[52:16] But for time implies some kind of what succession, right? If you're talking about the natural knowledge of the angels, right, he doesn't understand everything by understanding himself, which he always understands. So he has some additional what form which understands more or less, depending on how high up he is. And there's a certain what going from one to the other, right? That's called kind of a like time, right?

[52:42] Another kind of time. And but that's maybe not talking about the beatific knowledge of the angel. And this is clear from what Augustine says in the last. Book of the Trinity, right? For our thoughts then will not be what in motion,

[53:06] going from these to those, right, and coming back again. But the knowledge, all our knowledge, we will see with one what sight at once together. Okay, simul in English we translate it together, right? Okay, it's not you translate it at once, but

[53:33] picture we get it at once together. Well, that's what the word conspecto then. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah, but the idea is simul you know, simul comes up in the categories, right? Aristotle has a chapter on before, or you can say really before and after, because you understand that, and then the next chapter is on simul right? What's hama in Greek? Right, and simul Latin. In English, we usually translate it what?

[54:00] simul No, At once, at once or together sometimes, right? Okay. I mean, if two things, if two events are simultaneous, use a Latin word, right? But you wanted to use English, where would you say these two events took place? What? At the same time, at once. Yeah, we say at the same time. Yeah, or or together, right? So,

[54:28] okay. I answer. It should be said that those things which are seen in the word are seen not successively but at once or together.

[54:44] Now, for the evidence of this, it should be considered that the reason why we are not able to what understand many things in this life is because we what know many things through diverse species, right? So I can't know all these terms in Euclid at the same time because the syllogism which I know each of these is what different, right? And one syllogism makes me know this, and another syllogism makes me know that, another syllogism makes me know that, and so have can't know all these things at the same time.

[55:26] That's terrible, right? I can't know all multiple that at the same time. Okay, because we understand the many through many what species or forms, right? And the understanding is not able by many what species, right,

[55:52] to be informed. To understanding through them at once in act, right? Together, just this is the comparison he always makes. Just as neither one body is able to be what shaped at the same time by diverse figures, huh? So your mind is like a piece of clay, and it's in this shape, and then in this shape, in this shape, but it can't be in two shapes at the same time, right?

[56:17] So your mind, in a sense, can't be formed by two forms at the same time, right? A Thomas or say can be formed at the same time by two forms not of the same kind. So the the clay can be yellow, let's say, and and spherical at the same time, right? But it can't be spherical and cubical at the same time, right? That's important to realize that later on that we can have with the direct vision actual knowledge because they're not forms of the same kind.

[56:49] Okay. If you have forms of the same kind, the the mind can't be formed actually completely by both of them at the same time.

[57:02] So I can't think about all the things I know at the same time. This is very frustrating. I just can go one to the other, and then another one, another one. How do you see the worth? Wow! Sometimes.

[57:19] Once it happens, huh? That when many things are able to be understood by one form, right? Huh? They understood what together, right? Huh? Just as diverse parts of some whole, right? If the each one of them are understood by their own forms, they are understood what successively. Like I think about the seat of the chair, I think about the back of the chair, right? Okay. But if I think of the chair, I think of them all together in one form.

[58:00] If, however all are understood by one form of the whole, they understood what together, right? Huh? But it has been shown, however, that those things which are seen in God are not seen each one of them through their own likenesses, but all through the one essence of God. Whence they are seen together and not what successively.

[58:27] Trying to see those things all together—that would be nice, huh? Same more time. But I don't have any time all together, right? That's what Chesterton said: the chief demonstration for the immortality of the soul is you can't get enough of a good thing.

[58:46] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, I used to speak, you know, of what I call a self-sustaining collection, you know of. Of CDs and so on, right? That you know, you can go from one to another. You never get tired of it because so long before you get around to the one you, you know. If you have a very small collection, you know, you get a little tired of playing the same things all the time.

[59:19] But usually, I play a CD and I play it twice at least, and then I go on the next one. It'll be a while before I come back to that.

[59:35] So now we're down to private objections. To the first, therefore, it should be said that thus we understand one thing only, in so far as we understand by one species. But when many things are understood by one species, they are understood what together, right? Just as in the species of man, we understand what animal and rational, the definition, and in the species of house, the wall and the roof.

[1:00:13] Okay. I was talking to the students last night, and they said, "Now, you understand what a dog is a little bit, okay? And you understand what a triangle is, okay? Now, when you understand what a dog is, are you understanding what a triangle is?

[1:00:41] When you are understanding what a triangle is, are you understanding what a dog is? Because a dog and a triangle are not something one, right? And I was talking about the statement that what Aristotle says, and I think the fourth book of Wisdom, that who understands must understand something one, right? Okay. But now, is there a way to understand dog and triangle together?

[1:01:12] Yeah, Now, if you form a statement: a dog is not a triangle. Then you must understand dog and triangle together, but they become one by what? Being made the subject and predicate in one statement, right? So you got to make them one in some way, right? Okay. But if you are understanding them not by one form, just understanding a dog by the definition of dog and a triangle by the definition of triangle, you can't understand them at the same time.

[1:01:44] Go quickly from one to the other, but you can't understand the other, right? I am understanding what a triangle is, but I am understanding what a dog is. Am I? When I am understanding what a dog is, I am not understanding what a triangle is. But can I understand at the same time what a dog is and what a triangle is? Not if I know them each by their own form.

[1:02:05] I can only know them know both successively, right? But in the beatific vision, we're knowing whatever we know in God by the same what form, divine substance, right? And so we know them all together, right? It's quite an improvement upon our mental state, huh? What it is is now, right now.

[1:02:37] Okay. Now, the second objection was taken from the idea that Augustine says that God moves the spiritual creature through time, right? And even the angels, in a way, there is a kind of discrete time.

[1:02:53] To the second, should be said that the angels, as regards their natural knowledge, right now, not their knowledge in seeing God as He is. By which they know things through what diverse species that are innate to them, or yeah, they do not at once know all things, right? And thus they are moved by understanding through time, right? But according as they see things in God, they see them together, right?

[1:03:24] So I don't know if we'll make use of all these thoughts we have here from Euclid and other people in heaven, right? But they'll be around there, you know, for the free of our mind, huh?

[1:03:38] Okay, now you really want to get that vision of God as He is, right? So now we got the next starting point, right? It comes up naturally, right? Whether someone in this life is able to see what God, but we have to stop now. Yeah, three days. So it's going to be three weeks before we find out whether we are able to know this God, but.