Prima Pars
50. Carrying Names Over to God: Analogy Between Univocal and Equivocal, and Whether Names Apply First to God or to Creatures (ST I q.13 a.5–6)
Class of 2006-11-16
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/050-carrying-names-over-to-god-analogy-between-univocal-and-equivocal/

[0:00] Now these next two articles here, especially the next one here, this is important now because if we know God from creatures, if we know the perfection of God in sense of perfections of creatures, right? Which in some distant way, right, infinitely distant way, imitate him, huh? We name these perfections as they are found in creatures first, right? Then we turn to God. What do we? What names?

[0:37] What words do we use? See, do we invent new words or do we carry these words over? Well, we carry these words over, but when we carry them over, do they have the same what meaning? No. So Thomas is very concrete. I mean, he'll use an expression even when he's talking in the fifth book of wisdom that we place a word upon something, right? And we, you know, in Latin, you say "impositio nominis," but "impositio" means a placing upon, right?

[1:10] But we speak that way in English. You know, we say put a label upon something, put a name upon something, right? So you put a name upon something, then you pick up the name and we carry it over and place it upon something else, but. In the case of an equivocal word, an equivocal by reason, especially, it has a new what meaning, right? And it sometimes be carried over again, right?

[1:35] Okay. And so, you know, I mentioned the famous text there in the fourth book of Natural Hearing, Physics, where Thomas points out how the word "in" or the words "to be in" are first placed upon being in this room, and then they're carried over to a part being in a whole, right? And then carried over to the genus being in the species, and then carried over to the species being in the genus, and then carried over to the form being in matter, and then carried over to the whole being in its parts, and then carried over to your being in my power, and finally to you know where your treasure is there your heart shall be. It's carried over, but each time it's carried over, there's

[2:27] a little different meaning, right? But the mind is led along by the word that's carried over, right? But it's got to understand the difference in meaning when it's carried over each time.

[2:44] In Latin, you see sometimes the phrase there translatio nominis. but trans is across or over, and latio is carrying, right? Carrying over of a name. huh

[3:00] Now, when Monsignor Diana says sometimes about somebody, you can't move the word. You can't pick it up and carry it over, right? But people get into trouble, you know, mixing up these meanings, right? What you'll notice is that in trying to understand or use a word in a later meaning, they fall back upon the earlier meaning.

[3:24] And so, for example, Anaxagoras is trying to see you can't get something out of nothing, right? And so, if something comes out of matter, it's got to already be in there, right? So he's kind of imagining everything that can be made out of matter as being in there, something like things are in a place. And so he's falling back upon the earlier meaning, yeah.

[3:53] Or like a part in a hole or something. Okay. To the fifth one proceeds thus. It seems that those things which is are said of God and creatures are said of them what univocally. Univocal means with the same what meaning, right? Exact same meaning. For everything equivocal is reduced to something univocal.

[4:25] As a mini to the one. For if this name what dog, right, is said equivocally of the what the latrabile, the barking one, and the what sea one, right? Like the word lion, sometimes speaking of sea lions, you see the little things, you know, like a little or horse, like that horse. Um.

[4:54] Is necessary that of some things it be said univocally, right? Example of all those that are barking, right? Okay. Otherwise, one would go on forever, right?

[5:10] There are found, however, some univocal agents which come together with their effects and names and definitions, as man generates man, right? And some agents are equivocal, as the sun causes heat.

[5:30] Since, however, it itself is hot, only in the equivocal sense. It seems, therefore, that the first agent to which all agents are reduced is a univocal agent, and thus, whatever is said of God and creatures are said of them what univocally, right? Okay.

[5:56] Well, in a sense, I suppose you're thinking here is you take a word like bat, let's say, right? Huh? And bat is said of the thing used in baseball and of the thing that flies out of the church belfry, equivocally, right? Okay. But it's said univocally of the baseball bats, right? And it's said univocally of the ones that fly out of them, right? So it seems fundamentally there's something univocal underlying the what equivocal, right?

[6:27] Huh? Okay. In other words, if if if bat was not said of baseball bats, it wouldn't be said equivocally of baseball bats and the flying ones, right? Okay. And it could be said of of say the baseball bats, and we had a different word for the thing that flies out of the the thing, right? Okay. So that's kind of seeing, trying to make the idea that the univocal is underlying the equivocal, and therefore God underlies everything.

[7:00] He must be something like that. The argument is going. That's a famous distinction between the univocal and the equivocal cause. Huh? So when dogs produce dogs or cats produce cats, that's called univocal causation because the offspring is a what cat in the same way that the parents are cats, right? Okay. But

[7:29] when the sun produces something, huh? It is equivocal. It's interesting there. Thomas is using that when he's talking about whether he just got through the treatise on the Resurrection there, forty third distinction, and he's asking, is the Resurrection of Christ a cause of our Resurrection? Okay. And Thomas says, well, the divinity of Christ, right, is an equivocal cause of our Resurrection, right? But the human nature of Christ is as a what univocal cause, huh?

[8:08] See. Because God in His divine nature can't what rise from the dead in the way we are going to rise from the dead, right? But we're going to rise from the dead in the same way that what Christ did, right? Okay. But of course, he's a univocal cause that is joined to the equivocal cause, right? So through him, right? We're going to rise, huh?

[8:38] Interesting. That's a very important distinction. Moreover, according to equivocals, there is not noted any likeness. Now he's thinking, of course, of what we call what equivocal by what chance, right? Okay. But let me come back a little bit to the equivocal. of this word. here.

[9:14] Remember this way of naming that I talked to you about before. That sometimes a common name said of two with even the same meaning is kept. by one of them as its own name, and the other gets a new name, right?

[9:35] Because it has something stands out, right? I just got through reading an article by Thomas there in the sentences. Whether incest is fornication? Well, in the broad sense, a fornication is fornication. But because it has a special, noteworthy, extra reason for being bad, right? It gets a new name, incest, right? And the one that just has keeps the name fornication, right? Okay. Okay. And then he gives another meaning, of incest.

[10:24] there, not castus. And he says, and then he says, you name it by antonomasia You know, the the fornicator is unchaste, but you could say the man of incest is really, very much so, terribly so, right?

[10:44] Okay. Now, when you talk about one name said of many things, sometimes we divide that into what two. Now, if it's said of many things, ah, with the same exact meaning in each,

[11:25] then we say it's what Univocal, right? If it's said with other meanings, then we say it's what Equivocal right? Okay. But we also subdivide, right? And we say, well, sometimes it merely happens that the same word, the same vocal sound, signifies two, right? And then we say it's by what chance? Like in class, might have two students named Michael or two girls named Mary, right? And someone looks at these two and they say, oh, they they need the same name because they got the same shaped noses.

[12:19] No, it's just happened that these. Two persons were what had the same name, right? Okay. But sometimes there's a reason why the same name is given to two, right? And then we say it's equivocal by reason, right? Okay. Now, in that case, there's a connection among the meanings, an order among the meanings, right? In this case over here, there's no connection among the meanings, no order among the meanings.

[12:56] Does bat, first of all, mean the piece of wood used in baseball, or does it first of all mean the what? Yeah, neither one. Then there's no order there, right? You see. Well in the case of the word to be in, right? It first means to be in place, right? And then you can go through the meanings, right? So this adds something noteworthy, right? This adds nothing beyond the idea of what many meanings.

[13:25] It just has many meanings, period. But this has not only many meanings, but many meanings in a certain order, right? There's a reason for it, right? Now, sometimes then the equivocal by reason gets a new name because it adds something significant. And then that word that people have used is analogous, right? Again, to clarify that word because it comes in the word for proportion, and not every name equivocal by reason takes place to reason or proportion or proportions.

[14:06] But anyway, they give it a new name, and this keeps sometimes the what common name, right? Okay. Now sometimes Thomas when he divides one name said of many things, you know, following rule of two or two or three, since two never two, sometimes you know he'll divide into three right away, and he'll say either it's set of many things with entirely the same meaning in each case, which is this here, right?

[14:44] Or with entirely different meanings, and that's this down here, or else you have this middle case where it's not entirely the same, but it's not entirely different. There's a connection among them, right? Okay. So similarity meanings. And then you speak of univocal, and again you might use the equivocal for the other extreme, and the analogous for that that middle one, right? You often divides into three instead of into two, right?

[15:10] Okay. And neither way is the correct way. You can use either way. Okay. So. I mentioned this as being of general use to see how we use the words, but also because of this objection, right? Because this objection is taking equivocal as meaning what? There's no likeness among the meanings, no connection among the meanings. They sometimes call this purely equivocal, right? Okay, as other ways you find them speaking of it sometimes, huh?

[15:47] But sometimes they simply call it equivocal. You see? But they say you can use the word equivocal also for equivocal by reason, right? Okay. So this objection is saying, according to equivocal words, there's not to be attended or noted any likeness, right? But since therefore there's some likeness of creature to God, according to that of Genesis one twenty six, let us make man to our image and likeness, right?

[16:21] It seems that something is said uniquely of God and creatures, huh? Okay. Now the third objection. Further, the measure is homogenous to the measure. It's not the same kind as the thing measured, as is said in the tenth book of metaphysics. So of course you can see this most clearly in mathematics, huh?

[16:50] You might measure a line by by inches, right? But the inch is really a what? A length, just as I is a length. You might measure a surface by square inches. See, you wouldn't measure a surface by inches, would you? How many inches is a surface? You know, it's got to be it's got to be a surface, and a square inch surface. And you measure you measure a a volume by let's say a cubic inch or something of that sort, right?

[17:18] But a cubic inch is a what? Body or a three dimensional thing, just as the thing you're measuring, right? So this is the idea that a measure has to be homogeneous.

[17:34] Of course, Aristotle says the virtuous man is a measure of all other men. But Mozart is a measure of all musicians, huh? Or Homer of all poets. But God is the first measure of all things, as has been said, right? Now it's interesting, you know, how Thomas and I think I mentioned this in in our study of the attributes of God. To some of the attributes, he attaches some other attribute.

[18:04] So to perfect, he attaches good, huh? To infinite, that he's everywhere, right? And to unchangeable, that he's eternal, right? But he could, and he often does. Following Aristotle, say that it's appropriate to the one to be a measure, right? And so you could attach to consideration the unity of God that He's the measure of all things. And the great teacher there, of, Aristotle, Plato there in his last work, the the Laws, you know, he says, "Well, Protagoras is mistaken when he says that man is the measure of all things.

[18:43] If God is a measure of all things, right? Okay. And so, so if God is the first measure of all things, He's got to be homogeneous, and there something must be said what univocally, right? Okay. But again, this may be using the word measure in a broader sense when you say God is the measure of all things. And therefore, something is univocally of God in creatures.

[19:18] But against this, whatever is said of some things according to the same name and not according to the same meaning is predicated them equivocally. But no name belongs to God according to that reason, according as it is said of the creature. For, for example, wisdom in the creature is a quality, right? One of the kinds of accidents, but it's not an accident in God. For the genus varied changes the notion, right?

[19:49] Why? Because genus is the first part of the definition, as Porphyry tells you. And the same reason other things. Therefore, whatever is said of God in creatures is said equivocally. That seems to be good to me. Moreover, God is more distant from the creatures than creatures from each other. But in account of the distance of some creatures, it happens that nothing can be said of them what univocally, just as of those things which do not come together in the same genus.

[20:22] So the ten categories, right? So if you say thing of what of a man and the shape of the man, it doesn't have exactly the same meaning, does it? Right. And a man and a dog are two things in a different way than a man and his shape are two things. You know, if you went down and asked a man of ministry, you'd kind of see that.

[20:48] Just saying, a man and a dog do the same thing, but they're two things, right? Yeah. How about a man and his shape? Are they two things? You know, it seems to be different than than the man the dog. Because the man the dog can exist by themselves, right? But the shape of the man seems to be something of the man, right? And not really a something a thing really distinct from him.

[21:18] So some creatures are so far apart that you can't say anything with the same meaning of them, right? You can't say thing of the shape of the man, the man in the same sense. Then even much less, right? Of God and creatures, right? Okay. So my being a man and my being in this room—is that being said of my being a man, my being in this room in the same meaning?

[21:50] No. And that's why when I was generated, I came to be, right? But when I came into this room today, did I come to be? Came to be, in this room. I got to qualify, right? So it's not exactly the same meaning, right? You know. And when I leave this room, I'll cease to be.

[22:10] Yeah, yeah, I got to qualify, You see, so being is not said the same meaning. So if if my being and my being in this room are that far apart that you can't say something with the same meaning of it. Being can't be said of these with the same meaning. How much more so the one who says I am who am, right?

[22:28] So he can say to Saint Catherine of Siena, you know, remember two things: I am who am, and you are she who is not. But that's very far apart, right? More so than my being in this room, right? I wouldn't say that my being in my room is my not being, but it's, you know, it's not being a man.

[22:50] Okay. My answer: It should be said that it is impossible for something to be said of God and creatures what? Univocally, right? Because every effect, not equaling the power of the agent cause, the mover, the maker, receives the likeness of the mover or maker, the agent, not according to the same what definition, but in a what deficient way, right?

[23:27] Thus, that what is in a divided and multiplied way in effects is in the cause simply and in the same way, just as the sun, according to one power, produces many and various forms in these inferior things. In the same way as has been said above, all the perfections of creatures, all them, which are in created things in a divided, in multiplied way, exist pre-exist in God in a what united way, right?

[24:02] Thus, therefore, when some name pertaining to perfection is said of the creature, it signifies that perfection as distinct, right, by reason of its definition from others things, as when this name wise is said of man, it signifies some perfection that is really distinct from the nature of man and from his power and from his being and from all of these things. So, for me to be is not to be wise.

[24:38] as it were were, but it ain't. But when this name we say of God, we do not intend to signify something distinct from his what? nature, power, or his being, right? So, for God to be and for God to be wise are not two different things.

[25:06] And thus, when this name wise is said of man, in a certain way, it what draws a line around and comprehends the thing signified, but not when it is said of God. But it leaves the thing signified as not comprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the what name, like the Dionysius speaks of super sapiens, you know. Okay, whence it is clear that not according to the same reason or same thought or definition, this name is said of God and of man, right?

[25:43] And the same reason about others, whence no name is said univocally of God and what creatures, huh? But neither is something said purely equivocally, like I've mentioned another way they speak of this sometimes, huh? Okay, equivocal by chance or purely equivocal, right? Okay, as some say, because

[26:16] according to this, from creatures nothing could be known about God, right? There are nothing demonstrated, but there would always happen the fallacy of what equivocation, and this is both against the philosophers who prove many things demonstrative of God, and also against the apostle saying in Romans verse one or chapter one rather, verse twenty, the invisible things of God are understood the things which are made, right? That's the famous text the church uses in the first Vatican Council, right?

[26:51] When it's saying ex capita that man can know God from what creatures, It should be said, yeah. It should be said therefore that these names are said of God and creatures by what analogy, right? That's the Greek word analogia, huh? That is proportion, right? So you look at the English translation there of of Euclid, huh? The Greek word would be analogia, and it would be translated proportion, right?

[27:24] Okay. And then he distinguishes two ways in which this happens, right? Either because many things, and Thomas often uses the word proportion, not the way Euclid does for a likeness of ratios, but for a ratio itself, right? Okay. So the word proportion becomes what equivocal, right? It can mean a ratio or a likeness of ratios, huh?

[27:59] But either because many things have a ratio to one thing, right? As for example, healthy is said of medicine and urine, right? In so far as both of these have some order, right, and ratio to the health of the animal. Of which the one is a sign, right? The urine, and the other a cause, the medicine, right? Okay. Or if I said your complexion is healthy, right?

[28:30] Okay. Or if I said your exercise is healthy, right? Was healthy mean the same things said of your complexion, your looks, instead of your exercise? No. Because said of your exercise, because it's productive or conserving of health. Instead of your complexion, not because it does that, but because it's a sign that you're in good condition.

[28:55] So sometimes it's said of two things by other ratios to the same thing, or it's said of two things by the ratio of what one to the other, right? As healthy is said of medicine and of the animal, in so far as medicine is a cause of the health which is in the what animal, right? So I like to say the first meaning of healthy is to have your body in a good condition, right?

[29:23] Other things are said to be healthy not because they have their body in a good condition, but because they are productive of that, or because they signify that, or something of that sort, right? And in this way, some things are said of God and creatures analogically, right? And not purely equivocally, nor univocally. There he has the three that he distinguishes sometimes, huh?

[29:51] For we are not able to name God except from creatures, right? So we have to carry over names from creatures to God, right? This will be a proper address, or explicitly the order there in the next lexicon. And thus, whatever is said of God and creatures is said according as there is some order of the creature to God, right? As to a beginning and cause, in which pre-exists in a more excellent way all the perfections of things, right?

[30:23] In this way of community is a middle, right? Between pure equivocation and what is simply univocal Okay. Thomas is touching upon that division where you simply divide them into what three. Three. Yeah, yeah. You know, you have the two extremes and something in the middle, right? Oh yeah. Okay.

[30:59] Nor in those things which are said analogously is there one definition as in univocal things. Nor the wholly diverse as in equivocals. Now he's using equivocals just to mean what purely equivocal or equivocal by what chance, right? Well, here he just calls it in equivocis, right? Okay. And that's an example of what? Is keeping the common name right as its own right, okay? So the equivocal by chance is is more precisely understanding it maybe right, purely equivocal right, but the equivocal by chance or purely equivocal sometimes just keeps the name equivocal as its own, okay?

[31:39] As I said to students, if the biology teacher says you're an animal, he may not be insulting you. He may be the way they understand it now, but but but if your girlfriend says you're an animal, it's an insult. But in one case you're using animal as common to man and the beast, right? Other case you're keeping the name animal for the beast, okay? So sometimes we divide man against the what?

[32:11] Animals, right? Other times you say man is an animal without being, yeah. Okay. Nor are they totally diverse, huh? But the name is thus said many ways. It signifies diverse what ratios to something one, right? As healthy said of urine signifies a sign of a healthy animal. Of medicine, it signifies a cause of insanity. That's the old example. Aristotle uses in the fourth book of wisdom, right?

[32:48] He's talking about how the word being is said, simply right. He compares it to the way medical is said or the word healthy is said. He uses those two examples. But

[33:04] okay, take a little break here before I do the last objection here. Let's go back to the reply to the second objection here now. I guess

[33:18] the first one is about reducing the equivocal to the univocal, right? To the first therefore, it should be said, although in predication is necessary for the equivocal to reduce to the univocal, right? Now I was trying to explain how that wasn't the most sense, right? You could have the word bats said univocally of the baseball bats, right? Without it being said of what baseball bats and the flying rodent, right?

[33:51] But so in some sense, the univocal predication is more fundamental than the equivocal one. See, so bat has to be said univocally of baseball bats and univocally of what a flying rodents before it can be said of all of them equivocally, right? Okay.

[34:16] But in actions, the agent that is not univocal, that's equivocal, in other words, a necessity precedes the univocal agent, right? So just the reverse, right? So Thomas is, I think that the word univocal and equivocal was said of words first, and then carried over to what the cause, univocal cause, equivocal cause, huh? And I was mentioning earlier today, you know, I happened to see this thing in Thomas, you know, that he's saying the divinity of Christ is an equivocal cause of our what resurrection, right?

[34:59] And the humanity of Christ is is a word a univocal cause of our resurrection, right? Okay. Because God, his divine nature doesn't doesn't rise at all. He's at the top, right? Okay. But Christ, in his human nature, does rise, right? Just like we will rise. And so, but nevertheless, the first cause is is divinity of God, right? Huh? And the human nature of Christ couldn't be a cause of our resurrection without his divinity.

[35:39] But his divinity could be a cause of resurrection without his what humanity, but he's chosen to do it this way, right? And he you know quotes you know Christ is the mediator of God and man, so his human nature. Okay.

[35:55] For the non-univocal agent, right, or the equivocal agent, is universal cause of the whole what species, right? As the soul is the cause of generation of all men.

[36:11] But the univocal agent is not a not universal cause of the whole species; otherwise, it would be the cause of itself, right? Okay, so I'm not I'm not the cause of man. I'm the cause of what a man is being found in this individual is my son, right? I'm not the cause of man as such, because I'm the cause of myself. Because I am a man, right?

[36:36] Okay, but he's the particular cause, univocal agent, of this individual, right? Who is constituted in the partaking of the species. But the universal cause of the whole species is not a what, Univocal agent, huh?

[36:55] But this universal agent, although it's not univocal, is nevertheless not entirely what equivocal. Because it's always going to be some likeness between the effect and the maker, because thus it would not make something like itself, right? But it could be called the analogous agent, right? Okay. Okay, just as in predications, all univocal things are reduced to something first, Not univocal, but what, Analogical. He's thinking there about being and thing, right, and one.

[37:32] They're all said what, equivocally, right? Okay. You remember how we did that in logic, there? We say that the same thing can be a genus and a species, right? Okay. So, but is there always something more universal than what you have?

[37:54] See, Can you say, Is every genus a species, and of it to a higher genus, right? " Well if that were so, you'd never come to a what? Most universal, right? But don't you come to most universal names or words like being and thing?

[38:14] Could there be something that isn't a being in some way? They've had different terms, right? Could there be something that isn't something? You know, so something is said of everything that is, right? Being is said of everything, right? But now those most universal ones, like being and something and thing and so on, are they said of all things, genetically or equivocally. Is being said of my being a man and my being in this room, univocally?

[38:48] So even there, eventually, you get to what? You reduce the univocal to the equivocal. I was trying to show a way in which you the other you know seemed to be so, but if you look at the ultimate thing there, right? What's said of all is said of all what, equivocally. Equivocally by reason, right? Or analogously, this Thomas likes to say here.

[39:14] Just as in predications, all univocals are reduced to something one first, not univocal, but analogous, which is being, right? And of course, the other most universal things like one, something, and so on.

[39:31] Okay, I'm going to apply to the second objection here, right? This is taking the word equivocal there to exclude what likeness, right? Okay. To the second, it should be said that the likeness of the creature to God is imperfect, because neither is it the same of representing it according to genus, as has been said above. Now Thomas could have been a little more complete in his answer to that.

[40:06] The objection is taking maybe the purely equivocal, but there's no likeness between the meanings, right? And therefore no reason to give these things the same what name, right? Okay.

[40:23] But Thomas again is emphasizing the fact that the likeness is so distant, right? That nothing can be said with exactly the same meaning. I always quote that text there from the fourth Lateran Council that Paul the Sixth brought to my attention first, but then I see it referred to since, where he says, "You can never know the likeness between the creature and God without at the same time a greater what?

[40:47] Unlikeness, huh? Okay. So Scripture sometimes say, "Who is like the Lord? " Right? As if you know, "Who is like the Lord? " Right? Because we're more unlike him than like him. But even for more unlike than like him, we still like him.

[41:05] Okay. I told you how I used that with the Mohammedan head in class in Saudi Arabia, right? Who objected to Shakespeare calling reason God-like, right? Nothing is like God. Well, I wanted to explain that our position was what the fourth Lateran Council says, right? Or Lateran Council says.

[41:26] The third objection was that God is the measure of things, and the measure is homogeneous, right? Well, to the third, it should be said that God is not a measure that is proportioned to the things measured, right? Hence, it is not necessary that God and creatures be contained under one genus. Now the other objections conclude that nothing is said univocally of God and creatures, not that they are said what equivocally, and equivocally there means Just equivocal, right?

[42:03] Okay. So, nothing is said of God and creatures, what, univocally. Now, when you get to the treatise on the incarnation, you've got to make a little qualification there, right? Because is man said of Christ and of us? Yeah. So you're talking about God in His divine nature, right? Huh? But when God becomes man, then something can be said unifically of us, huh? So

[42:36] when you say that Christ or the second person of the Word is is a man now, right? And you say I'm a man, the word man means the same thing because it means human nature, and He's a man, body and soul, just like I am, a man, body and soul, huh? Okay. But when my soul is separated from my body, then I'm going to be a man, by secundum quid right?

[43:04] Okay. But when I resurrect, then I'll be a man in the same sense I am now. Now the next question is is talking about the order because in the name the equivocal by reason there's an order among the meanings right

[43:23] so it's a different meaning of good instead of us instead of God right and wise instead of us instead of God huh but is it said first of us or is it said first of God right well you might need a distinction here of the order right okay to the sixth one he proceeds thus. thus it seems that names are said of creatures before they're said of God

[43:51] for according to this we know something for as we know something so we name it that's the the principle right we name things as we know them say in English since names according to the philosopher are the signs of things understood but we know the creature before we know God right therefore the names placed upon things by us first are placed upon creatures then before they're placed upon God right so Daddy is said of my Daddy before it's said of God right

[44:30] moreover according to Dionysius in the book about the divine names we name God from creatures ah here comes the divine names translata huh but names notice the word translata there right names carried over from creatures to God right are first said of God before they're said I mean of creatures before they're said of God as lion stone and things of this sort right therefore all names which are said of God and the creatures are said of creatures before they're said of God of course notice those examples are from the metaphors right when the name is properly said of the creatures and not really properly of God

[45:17] moreover all names which are commonly said of God and creatures are said of God as the cause of all as Dionysius says but what is said of something by way of causality is said of it afterwards right it goes back to the old example for health

[45:40] is said of the animal before it's said of medicine which is the cause of health right therefore these names are said before of creatures and of God right well if names were said of God only in that way you might have a point huh but some names you solve is substantially of God right

[46:02] but against this is what is said in Ephesians chapter three verses fourteen to fifteen I bend my knee to the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ from whom all fatherhood In heaven and on earth is named right. I think I pointed out before how Thomas says, "What does he mean in Ephesians?" Is there fatherhood in the angels?

[46:28] well, in a sense, the teacher is a father of the students, right? And one angel illuminates the other one, right? So there's a kind of fatherhood there. It's kind of interesting, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. When we have a kind of little break in class, there with De Koninck you know, in the long seminars, you know. Yeah. Okay, children, he'd say, "Come on in." You can say it too, you know.

[46:58] Get away with saying those sort of things, students. Yeah. But no, my teacher, Kasurik you know, was like a father when he died. It was like you know, my own father died. So there's that kind of that reason. And the same reason would seem to be true of the other names which are said of God and creatures. Therefore, these names are said of God before they're said of what creatures, right?

[47:23] Well, obviously, there's a need in here for distinction. that Thomas will probably make in the body of the article, and that's why he handles this place in other places.

[47:34] I answer: It should be said that in all names which are said of many analogously, is necessary that all be said with regard to something one, and that that one thing be placed in the definition of all. And because the thought or the definition which the name signifies is a definition, as is said in the fourth book of wisdom, the fourth book after the book of Natural Philosophy, is necessary that that name be said before of that which is placed in the definition of the others, and afterwards of the others, according as to the order in which they approach to that thing which is first, either more or less.

[48:18] Just as healthy is said of the animal, as it's said of animal, falls in the definition of healthy which is said of medicine, because that is called healthy in so far as it causes the health of the what animal, right? And in the definition of healthy which is said of urine, which signifies which is called healthy in so far as it is a sign of the health of the animal, right?

[48:44] So obviously, the first meaning is healthy, is as it's said of the animal, right? Now he says, thus therefore, all names which are said metaphorically of God, right, are said of the creature before of God, right? Because said of God, they signify nothing other than what. Likenesses to such creatures, huh? Just as to laugh is said of the field, right?

[49:19] Signifies nothing other than that the field has itself in beauty when it flowers, just as a man when he smiles, right? Okay. A woman's face is most beautiful when she smiles, huh? Okay. Not when she laughs. According to the likeness of what? Proportion, right? Thus, the name lion said of God signifies nothing other than that God similarly has himself that he does what? Strongly in his works, just as the lion in his, right?

[49:57] And thus it is clear that according as they said of God, their meaning cannot be defined except through the meaning that they have in their set of creatures. But about other names which are not said metaphorically of God, right? Some names which said are said properly of God. we had already gone through that earlier right that earlier, right? It would be the same reason if they were said of God only by way of causality, right?

[50:26] Okay. Thus, when he said that God is good, for example, if nothing other was meant than that God is the cause of the goodness of creatures, right? Then the name good said of God would include in its understanding the goodness of the creature, right? Or if wise meant only that God is the cause of the wisdom of Aristotle, right? Then the wisdom of Aristotle would be the definition of wise as said of God, right?

[50:52] Okay. Hence, good would be said of the creature before God. But above it has been shown that these names are not only said of God what? Causality as a cause, but also what? Essentiality, which he said before he spoke of what substantiality, right?

[51:18] When then God is said to be good or wise, not only is it signified that he is the cause of wisdom or of goodness, right? But that these things also preexist in him in a more excellent or more eminent way. Your eminence. What's according to this? It ought to be said. And now he makes distinction that's necessary made here. That as far as the thing signified through the name, right?

[51:50] They are said of God before they are said of creatures, right? Because from God these perfections flow into creatures. But according to the placing upon of the name, they are placed upon us what? On creatures, before right, because we know the creatures before we know God right. Whence they have the way of signifying that belongs to creatures right. Okay. I might mention that Aristotle, in the fifth book of Wisdom, with some words, he makes this distinction right.

[52:29] Okay. Like for example, the word nature right, is first placed upon birth right, huh? Okay. And later on, it's placed upon the source of birth within. Okay. But really, in things, that's more fundamental. It's within than the outward birth right. And certainly, Aristotle makes that distinction of those two orders right. Okay. Um. So it's not like Thomas is drawing this distinction out of nowhere just to meet a problem in theology right.

[53:07] Aristotle's already made this kind of distinction right. About names, right? The order, and the imposition of the name, right? And the order in the what things themselves, okay? But more immediate to the name is is the what meaning of the name, right? And the order in which we know these things, right?

[53:33] Okay. So the order in which we know the goodness of God in creatures is the goodness of creatures is known before the goodness of God by us, right? But the order in things of the goodness of God and the goodness of creatures is that the goodness of God is the source of the goodness of the what creatures, right? Huh? Okay. So Thomas will make that same distinction when he's explaining the words in the Epistle to the Ephesians, right?

[54:06] And make that distinction. Okay. Now the first objection, he agrees that that objection proceeds as regards the placing of the the name, right? So he placed the name Father upon Daddy first before he placed it upon God, right? Okay. No, so kind of a sign of that is you know that people who have a bad father, right? Yeah. Human father sometimes have a hard time with speaking of God the Father, right?

[54:45] I always remember this, but the reverse of that, you know, is Saint Teresa of the Little Flower you know, one of the counsels of her towards the end there, you know, and she's just thinking the words are our Father, that part of the Our Father prayer, you know. And and to one of her one of her, anyone of her nuns or something, one of her sisters there, she says, "How sweet it is to think of God as our Father," right?

[55:12] Okay. But I think she had a very good father, human father, right? And and she said he loved him, you know, very much, and so on. He met me Canada, he says. He was talking about he made the money too, but could she could

[55:33] could our father have been so sweet to think of God as our Father if she'd not found her own father, you know, a sweet father, right? Kind of father. No, it's a real problem for people. Yeah. And if you ever met random people who have this problem, you know. Yeah, yeah. This is Kershaw. Her father was really. I think her father was a. I think he committed suicide or something.

[55:57] Yeah. And she never really knew him, but that marred. She said she told me was explicitly. She says I have a hard time saying relating to God as Father because. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Because sometimes you find this other example too, you know, where a man doesn't get from his natural father what he should get, right? And then he gets attached to another man who kind of becomes a father figure for him, right?

[56:24] I suppose the same thing happened with, you know, a, daughter and a mother, you know. Yeah. So then, how I think I'm missing his point. How does this work then with the? There's that sense with the father, but then there's the other one that works with the Ephesians, where it's the fatherhood is. Yeah, yeah. God is first. But but you know Thomas explains it as not that we actually place the name father upon God first, right?

[56:58] Huh. But that in the things themselves, right? God is a father before your human father is a father, right? Yeah. Okay. So the same point making about good, right? Huh? You place good upon something that you find in the creature first, right? Yeah. But the goodness, whatever there is in the creature, is derived goodness of God, right? So the order in things is just the reverse, right?

[57:27] Goodness in in things is found in God before it's found in the creature, right? And is found more perfectly, obviously, infinitely more perfect. But as far as the placing of the name upon things, we place the name good upon candy or something before we place it upon upon God, right? Huh. Okay. Yeah. Mixing up the senses of before or another thing. Yeah, in a sense, yeah, different senses of you.

[57:57] So you have to make some distinction in you know to say the text of the Ephesians, but we don't reason, huh? And I got a reason and a faith; they're always in harmony, right? But sometimes they appear, you know, to be in disharmony because we don't see some distinction, right?

[58:20] Never affirm some deny always distinguish I just dislike that. There's some truth to that. I mean, you know, it's kind of an exaggeration, right? But the importance of distinguishing or seeing a distinction, huh? Okay. now we've got time to start seven, series. I suppose you should wait. Yeah. So you don't have to just fly through it. This week is Thanksgiving. Oh yes. Oh yeah. You want to meet on Tuesday instead or something or what?

[58:49] Monday there might be something. Wait, just wait a minute. No, no, I'm going to the doctor on Tuesday. Yeah.