Prima Pars
51. Summa Theologiae I, Q.13, Article 7: Are "Lord" and "Creator" Said of God in Time or from Eternity?
Class of 2006-11-30
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/051-summa-theologiae-i-q-13-article-7-are-lord-and-creator-said/

[0:00] In the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of, the Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlightenment. Word of God form our words. Guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas, Aquinas, angelic doctor, Pray for us. and help us to understand all that you've written. Father, and of the Son, and of the, Holy Spirit.

[0:26] Amen. So I guess we're up to Article Seven now, which is a particularly difficult part of the teaching. That goes back to teaching about the relatives that the philosophers had made already, Aristotle. It's a very difficult thing to understand relatives because there are some relations that are are relations of real things, right? And others that are what relations only of reason.

[1:02] And then there's this mixed one where on one side it's relation that's real, and on the other side it's a relation of what reason. That's going to get involved in these things that are sort of God. This is a very difficult thing. So you've got to meet this thing many times in your thinking, and you only gradually begin to fit these things together. To the seventh one proceeds thus.

[1:30] It seems that the names which imply or involve relation to creatures are not said of God extemporary, right? In time, right? Huh? Because how can something truly be said starting in time for God, right? God is eternal, huh? Now he says first objection. That's a lot of objections here. Usually has about three. He's got six of them. All these names signify the divine substance, as is commonly said.

[2:10] Whence also Ambrose says that this name Dominus, which is what you translate Lord, right, is a name of power, right? And the power of God is the divine substance. And Creator signifies the action of God, the action of creating, which is also his essence or substance, right? Notice how he uses substantia, substantia... there's synonyms. But the divine substance is not in time, huh? But it's eternal. Therefore, these names are not said of God in time, but eternally, eternally.

[3:01] Moreover second objection. To whomever belongs something in time can be said to have been made, huh? For what in time is white has become white, huh? But it doesn't belong to God to be made in any way, huh?

[3:25] Therefore, nothing is said of God in time. Moreover, if some names are said of God from time, on account of the fact that they imply a or involve relation to creatures, for the same reason would seem to be about all of those things which imply some relation to creatures it would all be said of God extemporary. But some names involving relation to creatures are said of God from eternity.

[4:06] For from eternity, He knew the creature and He loved the creature, according to the famous thing in Jeremiah's chapter 31, verse 3: "I have loved you with a perpetual charity, eternal. " It's a very famous text.

[4:26] So if that's eternal, then why not other names which imply relation to creature, as Lord and what creature, right? It also then be said of God from what eternity, Distinction, okay? Of course, if you know the ninth book of Wisdom, you know that there's a difference between an activity that remains within the what doer, right? An activity that has an external product, right? And that might be involved in the difference here between God's knowing and loving us from eternity, but not being said to be our Creator before we've been created, or our Lord before we're subject to Him, and that's after our creation.

[5:21] Moreover, this is the fourth objection. Moreover, names of this sort signify relation. It is necessary, therefore, that that relation be either something in God or in the creature only.

[5:40] But it is not able to be in the creature only, because then God would be named Lord from the opposite relation, which is in creatures, but nothing is denominated from its what opposite, huh? It remains, therefore, that relation is something in God. But nothing can be in God from time, since He's above time. He can't acquire something. Therefore, it seems that these names are not said of God in time.

[6:18] Makes a tight knot, doesn't it? This Thomas. You've heard me say it before, huh? Aristotle in the *Premium to Wisdom* he says that the *philomuthos* is in a way *philosophos*, the lover of muthos is something of a philosopher. And the reason he gives there in the *Premium to Wisdom* is that a philosophy begins in wonder. And the *philomuthos* has a certain wonder about things.

[6:54] And but you could also say that the what *philomuthos* could mean a lover of plots. *Muthos* is the word for plot in the *Book on the Poetic Art*, and a plot consists of tying the knots and then untying them. So if you love plots, then you're something of a philosopher, because philosophy consists in tying knots and then untying them. And he does this also in in theology.

[7:26] He's tying you into several knots and then, say, like Houdini, he can untie himself for you. But Chester and Elvis said, you know, he loved those detective stories. Yeah. And yet he was one who was always untying. knots. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. St. Thomas would have liked the Fr. Brown mysteries. Yeah. I. Remember C. S. Lewis? You know, dealing with some kind of difficulty, he said, "Now let us look for the loose end.

[7:54] You want to try to untie it or unravel it? " Now the fifth objection is one that really gives you difficulty here. Moreover, something is said relatively by some relation, right? As according to domination, let's say, one is said to be a lord, right? Just as one is said to be white by whiteness. If, therefore, the relation of domination is not in God, secundum rem, really, but only secundum rationem according to reason, would follow that God is not really the Lord, which is clearly false.

[8:44] I think that touches upon the difficulty of understanding a relation which is what real on one side, right, and the other side it's not real but of reason. Okay. We'll come back to that. That's that's a long. That shows the difficulty of understanding relations.

[9:09] Moreover, in relatives which are not. simul natura, not together by nature or same. I mean, same time together. One is able to be, the other not existing. But the knowable exists, even if there is no what knowledge about it, as is said in the book of the categories, or in Latin they call it Predicamenta. But the relatives which are said of God and creatures are not together by nature.

[9:44] Therefore, something can be said relatively of God towards creature, even though the creature does not yet what exist. And thus these names, Lord and Creator, are said of God from eternity and not. from time, right?

[10:05] But now, against all this, is what the great Augustine says, in perhaps his greatest book, the fifth book of the Trinity, right? That this relative naming "Dominus," Lord, belongs to God ex tempore So Augustine is lining up against all these objections on the other side, which makes us stop and think. Maybe there is something we didn't see and we've been taken in by these objections due to the weakness of our of our mind.

[10:37] The rest of the story I heard years ago. I don't know if it's true or not that Voltaire is supposed to have gone through the Summa, you know, collecting all these objections. Not caring about the rest of it, just thinking so loud, you know, he ran into a. He believed in Catholic, you know, just because most people could never handle these these objections, huh? And I remember reading somewhere else too, where someone was saying, you know, the Church fathers, some of them were to be commended, you know, for holding on to the faith despite the fact that there were objections they didn't know how to answer.

[11:18] But as a philosopher, you know, I know that there are objections even to the obvious that most people can't answer. And so it isn't surprising, you know, that you might have objections to things that are above reason that most people couldn't answer, and it shouldn't be such a a scandalous situation, huh? You know, everybody's heard of the the paradoxes of Zeno, right? And praised Zeno. There is no way I can walk out that door.

[11:47] Well, we know I can walk out that door, but most people can't answer the argument against it. So even things that are obvious, right, are

[11:59] can have objections that most people can't answer. And Aristotle gives an answer to Zeno in the sixth book, right? That's not the real answer. And then, as Thomas explains, right, but it in the way answers is argument, right? But the real answer comes later on in the last books of the Natural Hearing.

[12:28] I answer. It should be said that names implying a relation to creature are said of God from time and not from eternity, huh? Now, Thomas is going to go and give us a little bit of a summary here of some of the teaching about relation, which is a very, very difficult thing, a very obscure thing. In a sense, relation usually.

[13:01] It's like trying to understand motion and time. You know, Aristotle begins a consideration of time, and he says, "Well, time is made up of the past and the future. The past doesn't exist anymore. Future doesn't exist yet. And there's no time in the present.

[13:25] Now, would you say if this chair exists if its legs didn't exist and the seat didn't exist and the back didn't exist? So how can time exist when its parts don't exist? There's no problem, right? Okay. And in a way, that same difficulty is in motion, right? When does motion exist? So if I'm walking across this room, part of my motion across the room is is gone.

[13:58] Part of it is to remain. And how much of my motion is ever there? All at once. If any part of my motion was there all at once, I'd be in two places all at once.

[14:13] So things like motion and time, they barely exist, as Aristotle says. And the difficulty in understanding them is in them, right? And something like that is true about relation or most relations, that they are relations and creatures. They have so little existence; they almost seem to not exist at all. So Thomas is touching upon that.

[14:50] To the evidence of which it should be known that some people lay down that relation is not at all a thing of nature. It's not a real thing, but of reason only, huh? As if relation exists only in the comparison that our mind makes between one thing and another.

[15:12] It seems that's kind of a sign of relation not having much existence. People think it's only something in the mind and nothing out there.

[15:30] But this he says appears to be false. But this appears to be false from this that things themselves have a natural order, right? In relation to each other. Now, my example I always take with the family cat, and I was pretty big compared to the cat, right? Put the cat in its place sometimes, huh? Tabitha didn't like to go down the basement at night time, but we didn't want her running around the house and jumping on the beds in the middle of the night.

[16:07] So Tabitha had to be put down in the basement, and I pick Tabitha up around that time. I was going to bed, and she'd be kind of nice purring in my arms, and so on. And. Then I'd take that first step downstairs. Ah! You could get get a good scratch or something, right? So I say to my son Marcus, "You you put her downstairs." If I did, I mean, I made sure that I secured the paws before.

[16:40] But I used to say, you know, if Tabitha was what, let's say, bigger than me, right? If I was like a toy soldier, you know, compared to Tabitha, I would have been chomped upon and played with and eaten and nibbled, and so my whole relation to her is is really quite different because I was so much bigger than her, right? And so that that convinced me that that this being bigger or smaller is something very real, and you know, if if you start a fight there in the bar, you know, and the guy gets off his stool and he's slouching, let's say, on his stool and gets off, and as he stands up, you see he's, you know, towering over you, and you realize the

[17:25] the magnitude of the man that he's much bigger than you, right? Then you regret that you have have engaged him, huh? Yeah. So there is something in the thing, right? Huh? We have a real relation to each other because of our size, right? Huh? Okay.

[17:45] And if you generate somebody or you teach somebody, you get a what real relation to them, and they have a real relation to you. It's based upon something.

[17:57] But now Thomas goes into a distinction among relations. Huh? Nevertheless, it should be known that sense of relation requires two extremes. Huh? In three ways, huh? It can be that there be a thing of nature or just a thing of what reason, huh? So he's going to make this that I referred to briefly there in the beginning of today's talk, right? There is going to be some relations where it's real on both sides, huh?

[18:37] Others where what it's something of reason on both sides, and then there is this mixed case, right? Where it's something real on one side. And something a reason on the other. That's the thing that is especially difficult to understand.

[19:06] Does that make one of your boxes? Does that make one of your boxes? I suppose you could, but it's it's example of a division into what three, right? Okay. Um, and you'd say that you have the two extremes, right? Huh? Okay. And then one where you have the kind of mixed one. Okay. Because it's a very self-teaching. so it goes back to Aristotle. Thomas has learned it from his his master, the Aristotle.

[19:39] So it says sometimes on both sides it is a thing of reason only when the order or the having itself, you might say, huh? Um, cannot be between some things except only. By the what grasping of reason, as when we say the same thing is the same as itself, right? So if I said to you, could you say that Socrates is Socrates? I mean, you can't say Socrates is not Socrates, right?

[20:19] So you say Socrates is Socrates. You're saying Socrates is the same thing as Socrates, right? But is that a real relation? Say, no, because Socrates in reality is only one, right? And it's because my mind has taken Socrates twice that you can what?

[20:40] Yeah, yeah. It's not a real relation because in reality there aren't two Socrates is just one. Okay. This is the way De康 Koninck refuted Bertrand Russell, right? Because Bertrand Russell was giving a syllogistic argument saying that the what part can be equal to the whole, right? He's denying that the whole is greater than the part, right? You've heard my syllogistic argument, right? This is easy to understand, right?

[21:09] Well, the one that Russell gave was this. He had since we take all numbers, you know, and for them, of course, one is a number. One, two, three, four, five, six, can go on forever, right? And then you can what put an even number opposite each one of these, right? So the double of one would be two, two, four, three, six, eight, ten, okay? So you can go on forever with numbers and making opposite them a what even number, right?

[21:45] So if for every number there's an even number, then even numbers equal to all numbers, right? The part is equal to the whole. He said. This is Bertrand Russell.

[21:59] Okay. But what is he doing here, right? He's multiplying what two twice, right? And it's only in the mind, right? De康 Koninck says, well, I can do this with just two, huh? But two opposite each one of these, right? So that's only multiplication in the mind, huh? Okay. But this is not the same two in the mind, but in reality there aren't two twos, right? If you talk about reality, you can't have two over here and two over there because if you use the two over here, there's no one over here for this.

[22:37] But if you have a two on both sides or or as many twos as you want to, it's because the mind can say Socrates is Socrates, right? And the statement Socrates is Socrates is a statement Socrates is Socrates I can form, and I can keep coming back and saying something is itself, right? It's like I can know that I know what a triangle is, and I can know that I know a triangle is, and I can know that I know that I know what a triangle is, and so on forever, right?

[23:03] But confusing this beings of reason with the the real thing, huh? But yet you're you're as Boethius says, nothing is more true than when you say something is itself, right? A dog is a dog. You know that doesn't tell you much, but but it's very true.

[23:25] In fact, at first sight it might seem, how can you say something is anything other than itself? Because then it would be itself, huh? Yeah.

[23:36] For according as reason grasps twice something one, right? It places it as two, right? As in the subject and in the predicate, right? And thus it grasps the certain relation of it to itself, right? Okay.

[23:58] That's one kind of relation of reason. Okay. And likewise about all relations which are between being and what none being, huh? Which reason forms in so far as it grasps none being as one extreme, right? But really none being is nothing, right? I'm

[24:28] talking about the relation between something and nothing, right? I said well nothing is really nothing, but the mind takes nothing as what something. Something in in reason. And so we can say that nothing is nothing. So we say that nothing is in some way, right? But nothing is only in the mind. Outside the mind, is nothing. That's why it's not even nothing.

[25:01] You may remember we did a little bit of fifth book there, the chapter on on being, right? And that's the being, you know, is true or false, right? Which extends to beings then that are not real, right?

[25:16] So that's the second one it takes, huh? See here, one of the two things is not real, right? So you can't have a relation between something that isn't real. Okay. In the first case you had something real, but what was not real is that you take it twice. Okay. Really there aren't two, Socrates. Though

[25:41] in the mind there are two. One's the subject, one's a predicate. Okay. And then he gives you a third group, right? And the same about all relations which follow upon the act of reason. As genus and species and things of this sort, huh? Because genus and species are taken up together by Porphyry and the Isagoge, right? The genus is that which is set of many differing in species and answer the question, what is it?

[26:14] And the species is what is placed under the genus and whose the genus is set in answer to the question, what is it, huh? But genus and species are tied up with universality and things are universal only in the mind, right? Okay. So there can be a science named logic about what relations of reason, huh? And they can be very what? Exact, right? Um, very very certain about some of these things, huh?

[26:44] But still not every day in things, but only in the mind. So these are three different kinds of relations or reason. but he's illustrating that, huh? Then he goes to the other side. There are some relations which, as far as both extremes, are a thing of nature, right? When there is a having itself between the two, according to something really belonging to both, right?

[27:16] And then he gives the two kinds of relations that Aristotle distinguishes in the fifth book of Wisdom, huh? As is clear about all relations which follow quantity, right? So if I'm taller than you, if I'm really taller than you, you're really shorter than me.

[27:40] Okay. As large and small, double and half, right? So if four is really double two. Two is really half of what? Four, right? For the quantity is in both of the what extremes, huh? And this being double and half for taller and shorter is based upon the quantity that's really in both of these things, huh? And likewise about relations which follow upon acting upon and undergoing, as the mover and the mobile, right?

[28:19] Father and son, right, huh? Okay. And similar. Okay. So I really generated my son and he was really generated by me, right? So my relation to him of of being a father to him and he being a son to me are really in both of us, okay? Um.

[28:44] It's based upon something real, in us, huh? the act of generation. Okay. Now this is the third now, the stranger case, huh? Sometimes though the relation is in one of the extremes is a res naturae, right? A real thing, you might say, huh? Thing in the in the in rerum natura in reality. And the other is a thing of reason only, right? How can this is a very strange thing?

[29:16] Aristotle discovered this. He's a awfully smart guy. That Aristotle, I'm not he. He's just so smart. And this happens whenever two extremes are not of one what order, right? Now the example that Aristotle sometimes would take would be this: as sense and science or knowledge are referred to the sensible and knowable, right? Which, in so far as they are certain things, they exist in their natural being, right?

[29:50] And they are outside the order of what sensible being and understandable being. And therefore, in science and in Sense there is a real relation, according as they are ordered to knowing or sensing things. But those things considered in themselves are outside the order of this, huh? Okay. So, used to see the Love and Friendship course sometimes, right? Um,

[30:24] if you know somebody, you've seen somebody, you've kind of attracted them. But they don't know that you know them, and that you like them.

[30:43] You have a real relation to that person, right? Now, since you know them, you have to conceive of them as being known by you, loved by you, right? Is that anything in them? See,

[31:04] it's all based upon what the act of knowing and the act of loving in you, and are they in their real being in your knowledge and love? No. So I have a real relation to them, but not them to me, right? Okay. Or if I know the tree in my backyard, what kind of tree it is, and so on. Um, my knowledge of that tree is really related to that tree.

[31:38] It's the knowledge of that tree, right? And on the side of the tree, we got to say it's it's known by me, right? But is that something really in the tree? Something added to the tree? See, there's something added to me really when I come to know the tree, right? And so the relation ah to the thing known is following upon something real in me, my knowing of the tree.

[32:06] But does my knowing of the tree affect the tree at all? Is something taking place in the tree? No. So the relation of being known by me, which we turn to the tree, is relation of reason, not of real relation. Okay. But that is the kind of subtle thing. Can you say the tree is really known by me? Yeah. But you say really known by me because I really know it, not because there's something you know really added to the tree in being known by me, right?

[32:44] That's kind of a subtle thing, right? Aristotle suddenly speaks there in the fifth book of of the measure being to the measured like that. The measured is really measured by the measure, right? But the measure is not really affected by this, huh? And the thing known in a sense measures my knowing. God is a measure of all things, right? Okay. So this is very interesting. This this third case, huh?

[33:22] So he says, and therefore, in scientia, in knowledge, and in the sense, there is a real relation, according as they are ordered to knowing or sensing things. But those things themselves, considered by themselves, right, are outside the order of this sort, right? You don't have this kind of immaterial being that things have, in knowing, right? Whence, in these, there is not a relation, really, to the what knowledge and to the what sense, right?

[34:07] But according to reason only, right? And of course, Thomas will say sometimes more explicitly about this that reason can't really think of this towards that without thinking of that towards this.

[34:22] But in this case, in thinking of that towards this, it's inventing a what a relation that is not really in that other thing, right? Okay. Whence the philosopher. That's the philosopher with a capital P, right?

[34:46] I I notice when when I read the sentences there and so on. I mean the sentences there and from the because you don't have the complete sentences, huh? But you can get off the the Navarro website, but they don't capitalize philosopher like they do here in the Aristotelic text, you know. So I think it's better to capitalize, you know, because you're you're using it by antonomasia, right?

[35:12] So I when I transcribe it capital P, you know. But it shows Thomas's respect for him, right? They call him the philosopher, but that's a that's a very common figure of speech, huh? And sometimes we we do it in Latin. Of course, you've got a problem because Latin doesn't have the article, right? But a lot of times to bring out that something is being said by antonomasia, we'll say the book for the Bible, right?

[35:47] And when Christ says, you know, I am what the way, the truth. In the life, right? Well, is there truth in life apart from him?

[36:01] Yeah, there's some truth, you know, the Pythagorean theorem, there's truth there, right? So on, but he is the truth, right? See, by antonomasia, and he is what the life, right? By antonomasia, and he is the road, right? I talk about the roads and our knowledge and all the first roads there, and and Thomas, you know, says virtue is the road to happiness, vice is the road to misery, but Christ is the road, huh?

[36:32] See, and I use the article there in the Greek; you have the article, right? Latin doesn't have all the figures, doesn't have all the parts of speech, doesn't have the article. You'll see sometimes in the scholastics, you know, they'll stick in an article that the Latin doesn't have. You see "ly" sometimes, you know, because they realize the defect of Latin. Sometimes they stick in the Tau omicron.

[36:58] I've seen that done. Yeah. Tau. Yeah. Yeah. Once the philosopher says in the fifth book of of metaphysics of wisdom that they are not said relatively these things in that they are referred to other things, right? But because other things are referred to them, right? And then he gives a common example, a very easy example, but it's a good one to bring out this. And likewise, "dextrum, which means right, huh, is not said of the column, huh?

[37:36] Except in so far as it is placed to the right of the animal, right? Hence, this relation is not really in the column, but in the animal. So there's a real difference between my what right side and my left side and me, right? Because one's more powerful than the other, and so on. But if I have a column, right, there's a circular thing there. Is that on my right or on my left?

[38:02] Well, if I'm on your, you know, right, it's on my left or something, vice versa. Is that real relation? Is it based upon something in the column? To the right? No. Yes, I do. Yeah. That's kind of a simple example Thomas often gives to bring out this, right? But the relation is really in me, right? Right and left, but not in the in the column. And something is said the column of the left, the column of the right, because of me rather than something in it.

[38:35] That makes it to the right and the left. So that's kind of a simple example that Thomas gives sometimes to try to explain this strange kind of what situation, right? Because I say sometimes he speaks explicitly that our mind.

[38:54] Can't think of one thing towards another without thinking the other thing reversely towards it. That's kind of kind of the necessity of our thought.

[39:10] Okay, now he applies this to the question of God. Since therefore God is outside the whole order of the creature, and all creatures are ordered to Him, a non-e converso right, is manifest that creatures are really referred to God Himself, right? So we have a real relation to God, but in God there is not a real relation to creatures, but according to reason only, right?

[39:46] In so far as creatures are referred to Him, to be said to be my Lord because I really what belong to Him, I really depend upon Him, right? Okay. Or he's said to be my creator, because what? I was really brought into existence by you. Okay.

[40:10] And therefore, nothing prevents names of this sort, implying a relation to creatures, to be said of God, in time, right? Not on account of any change in Him; He's unchangeable, right? But on account of the change of the what creature? Creature. Just as the column comes to be, to the right of the animal, no change taking place in it, but the animal being translated from one place to another, right?

[40:43] Okay. So the column's on my right, and now it's on my left. Any change in the column? No, there's a change in me, right? Okay. Very subtle this this teaching, huh? You see why Thomas has an article just on this because it's a difficult thing.

[41:07] Okay, now he's going to apply it to the first objection. Let's look at that again. Now, Ambrose and others seem to be saying that what these names signify the divine substance, huh? Okay. The divine substance, as we saw before, was eternal, right? Okay. Now, in the reply to this objection, he's going to give another famous distinction, and this distinction goes back to the book called the Categories, right?

[41:36] Because in the beginning of the chapter, the category on relation or towards something, as it's called in Greek, Aristotle begins the definition of Plato. Right. Whatever is said to be of another or towards another in any way is is relative, right? And Aristotle goes along as if that was it, right? And then he starts to raise a problem later on, huh? Because my arm is the arm of me, right?

[42:08] My leg is the leg of me, right? And my knowledge is knowledge of something, right? And everything is going to be what a relation, and there won't be any even the parts of substance will be right. And then he sees necessity of making the distinction that Thomas is repeating here, right? There's some things whose whole what nature is to be towards something else, right?

[42:40] And there are nothing in themselves or by themselves. How much is double? Twice. It could be four. It could be six. It could be eight, right? You know, in itself, it's it's what it's

[43:01] it's no amount, isn't it? So it's only can be said to be double towards another, right? And that's what they call a relativa secundum esse in the Latin, right? Okay. There are other things which are fundamentally something other than a relation, but they have followed upon them that they're towards something else, right? So knowledge, for example, is a certain quality of my mind, but implies a certain relation to the thing known, right?

[43:39] Okay. And so they call those relativa secundum what secundum dici right? Okay, because they're said to be of another, but they're fundamentally belong in a different category than towards another, right? And they have kind of relations following upon them. Okay. Thomas is referring to that.

[44:00] To first, therefore, it should be said that some relatives are placed upon things to signify the very what relative having yourself towards another, right? As lord, servant, right? Father, son, right? And things of this sort, and these are called relativa secundum what esse. And that's kind of goes back to Aristotle's nasty habit of referring sometimes to to the nature of thing as its being, right? Huh? Okay.

[44:44] Some things are imposed to signifying things which are follows upon them, right? Certain having themselves towards another, right? As mover and moved, head and what headed, and so on, and other things of this sort, which are called relativa secundum dici right? Now, just stop them, huh? These are the fundamental distinctions we make of relatives,

[45:17] and don't confuse these two distinctions we've made. relativa secundum esse, relativa secundum dici, and relative, what um, what's called a res dure, it's a res dure, real relation, real relation, sometimes. And then a relation of reason. Okay. Now some people mix up these two, and I've seen also in Thomas, you know, where an objection based on mixing up these two ones. They'll think that oh, secundum esse means a real relation, and secundum dici well, just said to be another that's based to reason.

[46:27] You misunderstand what these words mean, right? And as Thomas will point out, a real relation could be secundum esse or secundum dici, right? So my being taller than you, let's say, or shorter than you, is a real relation, and it's secundum esse, right? Okay. But my knowledge of you, right, Uh some relation to it, right, so that's a real relation, but it's secundum what? dici, right? Because knowledge is fundamentally in the category of quality, right?

[47:17] It comes under habit or disposition for a species of quality, right? But this is a disposition or a habit that consequently, right, as its very nature, involves consequently a real relation, right? But it's fundamentally naming a quality of my mind, okay? But a quality of my mind, because of the kind of quality as it has a certain asseveration following upon it, so knowledge would be translated knowledge of the known.

[47:50] That relation would be a relative secundum what? dici, right? Okay. But still a real relation, right? The relation of reason could be what? Secundum esse, right?

[48:08] So genus and species, right? The whole meaning of genus is to be towards another, right? Okay. Rather, be something more fundamental than asseveration. So don't mix up those two ones, right? In the body of the article, Thomas was was touching upon this distinction here on the left here between the real relation and the relation of reason, right? But now he's making the other distinction here in the reply to the first objection.

[48:41] Thus, therefore, also concerning the divine names, this difference ought to be considered, right? For some names signify his very what? Having itself towards the creature as Lord, right? And these names do not signify the divine substance directly, right? But indirectly, in so far as they presuppose it, right? Just as dominion presupposes power, which is the divine substance, right?

[49:22] But some signify directly the divine essence, right? And consequently, they imply what a relation as savior, creator, and so on, right? They signify the action of God, which is his what essence, right?

[49:42] But both names, right, from time are said of God as regards the what relation, right? The habitudo, which they imply, either chiefly or consequently, right? Not, however, as regards their signifying the essence directly or what indirectly, right? Okay.

[50:09] So, Ambrose is thinking of the fact that God, being our Lord, presupposes His what His power, which is His substance, right? Okay. But nevertheless, is being Lord over us, right? Is signifying a certain relation towards us, and that relation towards us cannot be in God, really, right? But? It begins to be said of Him when we begin to be subject to Him, and then it said, therefore, of Him extempore, right?

[50:45] Okay. This is all subtleness is right because we learn that God is eternal, right? And it might seem, therefore, that how could anything be said of God extempore, Latin phrase, right? And he says, "Well,

[51:04] because that can't be something real being added to God, because then God would really have acquired something, right? He'd really had changed, and that's impossible."

[51:22] So Aristotle says, you know, in the ninth book of Wisdom, that that motion is the act most known to us, right? And therefore, it seems most real, right? And if something doesn't move, you know, we tend to think it's what it's not real, you know, it's not.

[51:44] And you know, I told you, you know, the the seminary one time we asked me, you know, do angels really exist? And I said, you know, they're more real than you are, right? But you know, God is much more real than something that moves. That's not hard for us to understand.

[52:09] You know how young people want to go where the action is. Yeah, that's a reality, huh? Of course, you have this in the philosophers, right? In Hegel and in Marx and so in the Communists, you know, what is real is is motion, right? And that's why you have you know special emphasis upon history in the modern philosophers, huh?

[52:34] You know, they used to summarize the even the existentialist position as saying, "Man has no nature; is only history." So, when you read Karl Marx, and there's no such thing as man really, there is there is bourgeois man, and there is proletariat man, and there is slave man, and you know, but you know, but there is no man, you know, that's abstraction, you know, that's not real, huh?

[53:00] They just, you know. Have a book there by the great physicist Max Born called The Restless Universe. He says in there, "Strange, we have a name for what doesn't exist: rest."

[53:20] What's real is motion, right? Okay, so you see how Thomas replies to first objection, right? Okay. To the second huh? Let's look at the objection again, so you remember it. To whatever something happens from time or in time can be said to have been made, right, or to become. Maybe you could say too, I suppose. Okay, but doesn't belong to God to be made or to become, right?

[54:04] Huh? So if God is said to be our Lord, but He wasn't our Lord until we were, then He's become something that He was not, and now it's been a real change. Okay.

[54:23] Well, of course, that's no problem for Thomas because he said these relations are what So you know, it becomes secundum rationum. To the second, it should be said that just as relations which are said of God in time are not in God except what secundum rationem, by reason, so neither coming to be nor has been made is said of God except according to what reason, right? No change existing about Him, right?

[55:00] Just as it is said, the Lord has been made a refuge for us, right? Have been real making in Him. No. Now the third objection was saying, "Hey, but He loves us eternally, right? Okay, He chose us. He knew us. He always knew us. Okay, God didn't. we don't say God began to know us when He made us. Didn't know us before that. I suppose the moderns would think that, right?

[55:36] He had nothing in us to make it, but God knew us before He made us. Okay. Well, Thomas brings out the distinction that Aristotle again talks about between the activity that remains in the doer, right, and the one that has an exterior what effect, right? To the third, it should be said that the operation of the understanding and of the will is in the one doing it, right?

[56:04] And therefore, the names which signify relations following upon the act of the understanding or the will are said of God ab eternum, eternally. Let's have that quote from Jeremiah, right? I love you with eternal love.

[56:22] But those which follow actions proceeding according to the way of understanding them to some kind of exterior effect, transitive actions, to call it in grammar, you know, are said of God. What? Yeah. As Creator, Savior, and so on, right? Okay.

[56:46] That's where Thomas distinguishes between those two, right? Okay. So God always loved us, huh? But did He always create us? No, because there was a beginning, the creation. Okay.

[57:10] Okay. Now the fourth objection. That's the one about being named from your opposite, right? Huh? Okay. That's got to be solved, I suppose, by understanding this little kind of what situation, huh?

[57:35] To the fourth, it should be said that the relations signified through names of this sort, which are said of God in time, are in God by reason only, right? But the opposite relations in creatures are really there, secundum rationem huh.

[57:59] Nor is it inconvenient, right, that from relations really existing in a thing, God is what denominated, right? Nevertheless, according as what are understood together through our understanding, the opposite relations in God, right? You know, as sometimes Thomas says, there is a kind of necessity of our mind, right? That you can't think of this as being towards that without thinking of the opposite as being conversely towards you, right?

[58:33] The subtle thing is, in some cases, that other thing isn't really towards you, huh? Realize how independent God is of us when you hear this, huh?

[58:56] And thus God is said relatively to creatures because the creature is referred to Him, right? Just as the philosopher says in the fifth book of wisdom, right, that the knowable is said relatively, not because as a relation to the knowledge, but because the science is referred to what, to it, okay?

[59:27] Takes a while to digest, Thomas, right? Says a lot in a few words. De Koninck I guess had some teachers, you know, the way to learn these things to memorize the summa, you know, So the conic sits out there writing the summa. There's a lot to think about there, you know. Okay, now the fifth objection, remember, was the one that you can you know hard to see at first. The answer to it.

[1:00:02] Moreover, by a relation something is said relatively, right? As by dominion, lord, or by lordship, lord. As by whiteness, white. If therefore the relation of lordship is not in God, secundum rem, right, but only secundum rationem, it follows that God is not really lord, which is clearly false. That's where it's hard to see, right? Okay. But Thomas is going to answer that God is really lord because we really are dependent upon Him.

[1:00:39] Okay. He's not really lord because something has been added to him. Say. But because if anything doesn't add to us, or because we begin to have something, right? But in dependence upon Him.

[1:00:53] In the same way, you can say, you know, if I know that tree in the backyard, right? That tree is really known by me, right? It's really known. Is it right? Yeah. Even though it's being known, is nothing added to the tree? Say. Before I studied the tree, I didn't know it. So when I come to know the tree, it's not really added to me. I've been improved in my mental condition, right?

[1:01:24] But does the tree gain anything from being known by me? No. If you didn't know the tree and we asked you about it, you'd be stumped. You got to the root of the problem. You know, the old saying: the girl is supposed to say, you know, she likes a guy, and he's not paying attention, to her, right? You know, the old saying: he doesn't even know I exist.

[1:01:56] Well, maybe he does. but I mean, it's as if he doesn't know I exist, right? But it's kind of there's nothing in him apparently towards her, right? But just towards you know her towards him, right? That's the way. This is the tree right tree, right? You know.

[1:02:13] I really have acquired something of a relation to that tree by knowing it. But is the tree, you know, developed some relation towards me now?

[1:02:24] Only secundum rationem, not secundum rem right? Yes, sir. To the fifth, then it should be said that for that reason God is referred to the creature by which the creatures refer to Him, right? Since the relation of subjection is really in the creature, right? It follows that God, not by reason only, but really is Lord, right? Okay.

[1:02:59] For in that way he is said to be Lord in which the creature is such to him. So that's kind of a subtle thing to see, huh? That because I'm really dependent upon God, he really is my Lord. But his lordship is not something added to him, right? That's a subtle thing, right? You might think as, you know, he's not really my Lord because his lordship is not something added to him, right?

[1:03:21] But because I really depend upon him, he really is my Lord. That's kind of a subtle thing to see, huh? Okay. The sixth objection was talking about things being simul natura, right? Aristotle speaks of relations as being simul natura. Can I be taller than something without that thing at the same time being what shorter than me, right?

[1:03:49] Okay. So Thomas says, to knowing whether relatives are together by nature or not, is not necessary to consider the order of things about which the relatives are said, but the meanings of those relatives. For if in one of them is included the understanding of the other and a converso, then they must be together by what nature, right? As double and half, father and son, and similar things, huh?

[1:04:24] So I can't be a father before someone is my son or my daughter, right? And I can't become double without something at the same time becoming half, right? If, however, one includes in its understanding the other and not a converso, then they are not together by nature. And in this way, knowledge and the what knowable are right.

[1:04:52] Because he's saying knowable rather than the known, right? Okay. For knowable is said according to ability and not according to act. But knowledge by habit or by act, right? Hence the knowable, according to the way of its signifying, pre-exists the knowledge, right? But if one takes the knowable in act, that is to say, the known, then it is together, and that's really strict relation, right? And the third, which relation?

[1:05:25] The strict relation, right? Yeah, yeah. Because the known is is relative to knowledge, right? I would say he might say knowable is relative to knowledge, right? But strictly speaking, if you have knowledge, isn't there something known? And something known is known by some knowledge. Okay.

[1:05:45] So if something is taken as knowable in act as known, then it is together with knowledge in act. For the known is not except such except. Because there's science of it, huh? There's a science or knowledge of it. Thus, although God is before creatures, right? Because nevertheless, in the meaning of Lord is included that He had a servant or a slave, or what he calls. in a converso, then these two relativa, Lord and servant, are together by what?

[1:06:22] Nature. Nature Okay What's Thomas called himself in the communion prayer Indignum famulum tuum I mean, right Indignum famulum tuum Okay. Whence God was not Lord before He had a creature. What? Sub to Him, right? Okay. He didn't acquire anything.

[1:06:41] Yeah. Take a little break here. You need a little rest after that. That article, huh?