Prima Pars
52. Summa I, q.13, aa.8–10: What the Name 'God' Signifies, Whether It Can Be Shared, and How It Is Said Analogously
Class of 2006-12-07
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/052-summa-i-q-13-aa-8-10-what-the-name-god-signifies-whether/

[0:00] Name of the Father and of the Son and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlightenment. Guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor, and help us to understand all that you have written. Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit. Amen.

[0:28] So I've been asked to go back over eight and nine and ten here because there was a a malfunction here. To the eighth one proceeds thus. It seems that this name God is not a name of what nature, huh? I noticed in eight, nine, and ten, and then also in eleven, Thomas is distinguished is descending to some actual names of God, right, huh? Of course, the first name is God, right?

[1:02] Deus, Deus. And so he has three articles in the name God, and then one article on the name that God gives us His own name to a guy named Moses, huh? I am who am, right? Okay, so let's look at eight now. The first one.

[1:22] This is what this is the name of the divine nature, the divine substance, and the divine essence. For Damascene says in the first book that God is said from Theín, which is to run, right,

[1:42] and to what foster all universal things, or from aithein, which is to burn, huh? For our God is a consuming fire, a fire consuming all evil. Or this is one that Thomas usually tends to favor, theasthai, which is to consider, right? Omnia consider all things, but all these pertain to operation, to what God does. Therefore, this name God signifies the operation of God and not His what nature.

[2:27] I think that one, Curare, is to care. For very, Curare, or it's not to run. I think the one you're thinking of has two R's? This sounds pretty in this one. It says curare, C U R R E R. Ah, that's interesting. This says okay, maybe. No, this says two R's too. Yeah. Yeah. It says C U R A R D. Oh, yeah. I like the care too.

[2:53] Oh, you're both the same edition. Yeah, that's curious. Maybe it's. Anyway, but against this is what Ambrose says in. The first book about faith that God is a nomen naturae, a name of the nature, right? Now this is what the feast is in Ambrose today. Do you celebrate Ambrose at this? Yeah, yeah. So he's getting quoted here, huh? Appropriate on this feast day, huh? One of the four or five great doctors of the Western Church.

[3:28] Okay. Now Thomas is going to begin by pointing out a distinction, right? Common distinction about names. I answer: It should be said that not always is the same that from which a name is placed upon something to signify something, and that to which it is going to signify is placed upon. Now sometimes we call first of these the etymology of the name, right? As that from which the name is taken, right?

[4:04] And that which is applied, the meaning of the name, the signification of the name. Like I'm often pointing out the word philosophy as you know, even philosophers. What is philosophy? And they'll say the love of wisdom, right? And I suppose you could use it to mean that, but at least in Aristotle, I see him using the word philosophy always to name the knowledge which the lover of wisdom pursues.

[4:30] So you might say, well, the love of wisdom then is the id a quo nomen imponitur that from which the name is taken. But it's not the meaning of the name, huh? Okay. The meaning of the name philosopher would be lover of wisdom, and therefore you might think the meaning of the word philosophy would be the love of wisdom itself. And I suppose it could be used in that sense, but it's not the way that Aristotle uses it.

[4:56] I don't think even Plato. it's. It's used in the sense of the knowledge which the lover of wisdom would pursue. So Aristotle, in the 14 books of wisdom, will sometimes call this knowledge wisdom, but sometimes just call it philosophy. And when Thomas talks, you know, about definition there in the seventh book of wisdom, and he says, "Definition," as Aristotle is saying there, "the definition is always a logos, huh?

[5:24] It's always a compositio nominum a putting together of names, right? It's never just one name, right? " And Thomas says, "Now sometimes, in explaining a word or a thing, we give another name that the thing has. It's more what familiar, right? "

[5:45] Like the student who was saying, you know, desiccation is a greater problem with land animals than water animals. But you might use a more known word, right? Drying up or drying out, but that's not really a definition of desiccation. It's a word meaning the same thing, but a more familiar word, huh? Okay.

[6:08] So I just want to mention that Thomas says. Now we get the word philosophia, and in Latin we give sapientia. That's the meaning of the word, right? Not the amor, sapientia, but sapientia itself, wisdom. Okay.

[6:28] So he's going to apply that distinction now to the thing at hand, right? For just as right, we know the substance of the thing, right? And that's the way Thomas uses these words somewhat. Insofar as they are univocal and are synonyms rather, nature, substance, essence. Sometimes, although they can, these words have more than one meaning, and not all the meanings are the same. But the one meaning they have in common.

[6:57] Sometimes you use the one, sometimes you use the other. For just as we know the substance of a thing from its properties or from its what operations, right? Like we said, a dog is a four-footed animal. It barks, right? Well, I don't know what really separates the dog from the cat, but I do know that the one barks and the other what meows, right? And so, but I'm not really talking about that.

[7:26] I'm talking about the kind of animal it is, right? For so just as we know the substance of the thing from its properties and operations, so we denominate the substance of the thing sometimes from its operation or property, right? So denominamus means the name from, right? Okay. And then Thomas is talking example here. Just as the substance of lapidis, which is what the word for stone there in the genitive, we denominate from some action of it, which is laedit pedem, hurts the foot, right?

[8:08] I don't know if that's the official Latin etymology of the word, but it's simply a good Isidorian etymology. And whether it's true or false, it illustrates the point he's making, right? That if the the word stone is taken from hurting the foot, that's not the meaning of the word. It's a thing. It's the substance of the thing which is apt to do this, right? So it's being named from that, but that's not the meaning of the word.

[8:35] Nevertheless, this name is not placed upon something to signifying the action, but the substance of the what stone, huh? It's enough to make a little aside here, just to occur to my mind here. Now, when Thomas speaks of the impositio nominis,

[9:01] that's what you have. In a word that's equivocal by reason, you have a new impositio nominis, a new placing of the name. Impositio means a placing upon. Okay, you're placing this name upon something else with a different meaning now, but it's become now the name of this other thing, as well as what it had been before. But in the case of a metaphor, you're not really getting a new impositio nominis.

[9:31] And when Thomas explains that word impositio in Latin, he he does so in the text of Saint Paul. You know where Saint Paul is he's positus, you know, in his position. You know, and part of the meaning of impositio is you don't place yourself; someone else does. God places you in this position, but also the idea that there's something what firm. About this,

[10:03] and that's the difference between a name equivocal by reason and a metaphor. Metaphor is kind of in passing that you call the the glutton, the pig, right, or the guy who does something nasty to your rat or something, right? You know, it's not as if you're giving a new meaning to the word pig or the meaning to the word rat. And it's only kind of what you're calling it.

[10:26] I would say this, right? Not really naming a glutton a pig now. See what when you when there's a new impositio nominis, then you're what naming something, right? So, you had the word impositio in the definition of what the syllogism too. You know, we say it's a speech in which some statements laid down, right? The way you translate in English, but in Latin be positis, right? And the same Thomas says that in that idea of positus or positio, there are three things.

[11:06] Someone places you; the thing doesn't place itself. There's a firmness to it, and then it leads to something, right? And you see that a little bit in English when you say the word. uh we translate positus by laid down. Now, I'm going to lay down the law. See, well, the law doesn't lay itself down. I'm laying the law down, and there's a firmness there when I lay the law down.

[11:28] You better not violate it, right? And a certain course of action is expected of you as a result of the law I've laid down. That's what the premises are of syllogism, right? They're laid down by reason, right? And they've got to have a certain what stability and firmness in the mind. I mean, if I if I thought of the major premise and I forgot about it, and I thought of the minor premise, I'd never be able to syllogize, right?

[11:51] I've got to lay them down together, right? They got to be made firm in the mind, and then they lead to something else, right? Okay, so

[12:03] we sometimes have a word like impositio and say put a label upon something, you know, put a name upon something, right? But that's in the sense what the Latin is saying, impositio.

[12:16] Nevertheless, this name lapis is not imposed to signifying the action of hitting our foot, right? But rather, substance of the stone itself. That's a a nice, clear example of what he's trying to say. The old teacher, the sort of said, you can tell a man's understanding by the examples he chooses, and the modern philosopher should take an example that's kind of setting in itself, you know, but doesn't particularly illustrate the point.

[12:42] And Aristotle and Thomas, you'll take a very simple example that's very clear for the matter, and you find Thomas often using the same example in different texts, or in fact using the example Aristotle used, right? You know, if he had done so, and this one is peculiar to Thomas.

[13:05] But if there are some things which are what known to us by themselves secundum se, right, some things that are per se sensibles, as hot, he says, or cold, or whiteness, and so on. We don't tend to name these things from others because they're not known from others; they're known secundum se. So in those cases, it is the same thing that the name signifies, and that from which it is placed upon something to signify something.

[13:42] Now, because therefore God is not known to us in his very nature, right? But he becomes known to us from his doings, his operations, and from or from his effects. From these, we are able to what to name him, right? Whence this name God is a name of operation, as regards that from which it is what placed upon something, signify something. Because it is placed upon something, this name from his universal providence or foresight over things.

[14:23] For all speaking about God intend to name God what has a universal providence over all things. Whence Dionysius says in the twelfth chapter about the divine names that the deity deitas is what sees all things by a what perfect providence and a perfect what goodness, huh?

[14:54] So from this operation, this name God is taken, but it's placed upon what it's imposed to signify the divine what nature. That's the way he replies then to Damascene, who's looking at that from which the name is taken, right? All things which Damascene lays down pertain to providence, from which is imposed this name God to signifying something, right?

[15:31] Now the second objection, about the God divine nature being unknown to us. So how can we name something we don't know, well we have to know it in some way, right? To the second, it should be said that according as the nature of something, as we're able to know the nature of something from its properties and its effects, right? Thus we're able to what. Yeah, to signify it by a name, right?

[16:05] Whence, because, take his example again. Because we are able to know the substance of the stone from its property by itself, in knowing what is a stone, this name, what stone, signifies. Nature Yeah. According to what is it itself. According as it is itself, for it signifies the definition of stone to which we know what is a stone. I'm not sure we do know what a stone is.

[16:38] But the for the ratio or the thought which the name signifies as a definition, as is said in the fourth book of wisdom. But from the divine effects, we are not able to know the divine nature according as it is itself, so that we know about it what it is, right? But nevertheless, we know it in some other way, right? And the three other ways are what?

[17:02] By way of eminence, and by way of causality, and by way of what? Negation, right? So when he say God is the summum bonum, right? That's by way of eminence, I suppose. Huh? When he says the first cause, that's by way of causality. When he says we say he's bodyless, or he's not composed, it's by way of negation, right?

[17:31] And thus this name God signifies the divine nature, right? In so far as it's known in these three ways, through his effects and what he does, huh?

[17:46] For this name is imposed to signifying something that exists above all other things, right? And that's the way of eminence. That is a beginning of all things, and that's the way of causality. And that is remotum. That's the way of negating from all things.

[18:07] For this, they intend to signify who are naming God. Now the next article, whether this name God is communicable, right? To whatever is communicated, the thing signified by the name is communicated also that name. But this name God, as has been said in the eighth article, signifies the divine nature, which is communicable to others according to that of what?

[18:50] Second Peter. Second Peter, the first chapter, the fourth verse. The great and precious promises he gave us, to which we are made. Partakers of the divine what nature?

[19:04] It's one of the texts that Photinus used, right, trying to prove that Christ was not God by his birth. I know it's said in the same way, right? You know. Okay.

[19:22] Moreover, those names, huh? Proper names are not communicable, right? But this name, God, is not a what? Proper name, but a what? Nickname. Nickname. Appellative huh? An appellation, we'll say, huh? Which is clear from this that it has a plural. I have said that you are gods, right? That's another one that Photinus takes, right? Therefore, this name, God, is communicable, huh? Moreover, this is the third objection. This name God is placed upon something from operation, but other names which are imposed upon God from operations or from effects are communicable, as good, wise, and others of this sort.

[20:22] Right. Therefore, also this name God is communicable. Right. But against all this is what is said in the Book of Wisdom, fourteenth chapter. They placed the incommunicable name upon wood and stones, right? And he spoke about the name of the deity. Therefore, this name God is a what incommunicable name, right?

[20:55] Well, again, Thomas begins with a distinction. He's going to then apply to the matter at hand. I answer, he says, it should be said that some name is able to be communicable in two ways.

[21:13] In one way, properly; in another way, by a certain likeness. Properly, it is communicable when the whole what meaning meaning of the name is communicable to many, right? Okay, so we say man of each one of us here, or something like that. Huh?

[21:41] So I'm a man, but that name is communicable to you guys, I think, because you have the whole meaning of the name right there. Two-footed animal with reason, right? And no feathers. Huh? And no feathers.

[22:08] This name, for example, of lion, is properly communicated to all those things in which is found the nature which is signified by this name, what lion.

[22:23] But by likeness, that name is communicable to those who partake of something lion-like, huh? As for example, audacity or fortitude, huh? And these are what metaphorically, metaphorically called lions, huh? So, which is the lion-hearted, right? Kings are often called lions.

[22:51] I was reading, reading, Abbotsford there, you know, which is Irving's account of his first visit to to Walter Walter Scott, right? Walter Scott had all kinds of dogs. He was very fond of and so on. But he also had a cat, right? And the cat, you know, was the supreme authority among the animals. And when the dogs come in the house, the cat would sit on the chair there and put her paw on each of his one by.

[23:18] And they they put up with this, right? So you see, kind of the you know the the regal authority of the of the big cat, even the little cat.

[23:35] Now, it should be known, okay, to knowing says which names properly are communicable, right? It should be considered that every form existing in a singular suppositum is a word. We don't really have an exact word in English to translate that by. But it's an individual in the genus of what substance, right? Suppositum. Suppositum is is more general than the word person, right? Because person is a suppositum of a rational nature, but suppositum is of any substance, individual.

[24:21] So he says, every form existing in a singular suppositum, by which it is individuated, is common to many, right? Either secundum rem or at least what secundum ratione. Now, why does he make that distinction? We'll say. Well, exemplifies the first one, just as human nature is common to many secundum rem and ratione. But the nature of the sun, of which he thought there's only one like that, is not common to many.

[24:58] In reality, you'd say, right? Secundum rem, but it could be found in many, huh? Okay. For one is able to understand the nature of the sun as existing in many what suppositum, right? Okay. Just like if there's only one what square in the what world, right? Now, one cube rather, let's say, in the world, right? You say, okay, there's only one cube in the world, but that form, that cubical shape, secundum rationem these Thomas's words there, could be in many things, right?

[25:42] Okay. And you can see, you know, a Pietà, let's say, a famous statue in Rome, something like that. Well, if no one had imitated that statue, right, it might be the only one, the only piece of marble in the world that has that shape. But yet that form or shape could be understood to be found in many what pieces of marble without any contradiction or any impossibility in that right even though secundum rem it might be only in that one piece of marble in the in the Vatican actually I got a piece of I got a little statue my son my son brought that get up yeah yeah yeah so that's then both secundum rationem and secundum rem right that in things are now are

[26:35] many of that same form right okay when you when you mentioned suppositum then then you put it in reference to some other word what was that exactly well individual of of a in the genus of substance right okay mentioned as opposed to person person well person is a more particular name a suppositum of a rational nature right yeah okay and this will come up again these questions a lot when you get into the Trinity right because yeah some people want to say there's two supposita but only one person or you know or vice versa or something and and they're not really understanding what the words mean but Thomas here is thinking here you know especially of material things where matter is the source of individuation

[27:23] right and so the same form can be realized in different matters and this because the understanding understands the nature of each species by separation from the singular whence to be in one singular suppositum or in many is outside the understanding of the nature of the species whence saving the understanding of the nature of the species it can be understood as existing in many things but the singular from the very fact that it is singular right is divided from all other things right

[28:10] whence every name imposed to signify in something singular is incommunicable right both in re and ratione and it's what there is in me that separates me from everybody else if you give a name to that it would not be communicable to anybody else because signifying that in me which separates me from everybody else this flesh and this bone okay for it is

[28:44] not possible that in apprehension there fall a plurality of this what individual right so even if they do some quoting right they won't get to me right they won't the other guy won't be thinking see what see what I think.

[29:05] Or no, but his thoughts, he thought the same way I think. It wouldn't be my thinking or my thoughts. Hence, no name signifying something individual is communicable to many, properly speaking,

[29:25] but only according to some kind of what likeness. As someone is metaphorically called a what Achilles, right? Insofar as he has something of the properties of Achilles, namely what fortitude.

[29:46] Now he says forms, huh, which are not individuated to something underlying them, suppositum, but to themselves, because to it they are. subsisting. forms. If they are understood according as they are in themselves, they are not able to be communicated, neither in reality nor in what understanding. But perhaps by likeness, as has been said about the what individual, right?

[30:27] But because simple forms subsisting by themselves, we are not able to understand according as they are. But because we understand them in the manner of what composed things, having forms in matter. Therefore, as has been said, we place upon them concrete names, signifying nature in some suppositum. Whence, as far as pertains to the meaning of the names, the same is the reason about the names which are imposed by us to signifying the natures of composed things, and the names which are imposed by us to signifying what simple subsisting things.

[31:14] Huh? Now he's gonna answer all this to the thing at hand. Whence, since this name God is imposed to signify the divine nature, and the divine nature is not able to be multiplied,

[31:37] because even the Trinity, you don't multiply the divine nature; remains one. It follows that this name God is incommunicable, secundum rem, right? But it is communicable secundum opinionem Well, he makes a distinction. Just as this name Son

[32:06] would be communicable according to the opinion of those laying down that there are many sons. And according to this, it is said in Galatians four verses eight.

[32:24] To those who by nature are not gods, they serve right. And the gloss says, huh? They are not nature. They are not gods by nature, but by the opinion of man. So that's the distinction he makes.

[32:47] Nevertheless, this name God is communicable, not according to its whole meaning or signification, but according to something of it. through a certain what likeness, huh?

[33:03] As those are called gods who partake something divine by what likeness, huh? According to that text we quoted before from Psalm eighty-one, I have said, "You are gods, huh?" I presume that's God God speaking there, right? Okay, and

[33:25] I think Christ refers that too, doesn't he? When the gospel's there, when he's being accused, yeah. If there were some name imposed to signifying God, not on the part of his nature, but on the part of the suppositum, right? According as he's considered as a this something, that's the individual, right? The genus, substance. That name would be in every, in all ways incommunicable, as is perhaps this word tetragrammaton, after Hebrews.

[34:01] Have you come across that in your Hebraic studies, Father? Um, yeah, a little bit. Tetragrammaton. It's got four letters. Is that what it is? That's the divine name. Yeah, yeah, Four letters. Yeah. Okay.

[34:17] And it's similar, if one were to impose a name to the Son, designating this individual, son, right? Okay. That's what the the very strict Jews won't even. They won't not only do they not pronounce the divine name, but they have sometimes when they read scripture they'll pronounce they'll say Adonai when they come across it, so they won't pronounce it. But then, out of reverence, this I learned this not too long ago.

[34:53] Out of reverence, the pious Jews won't even say Adonai unless they're praying. So, if you're learning Hebrew, when you come across the divine name, you won't say Adonai. you'll just say Hashem, which means the name. So they get a name for the name. Master Thomas here, the name Hashem. That's what they call it. Yeah. So now he applies the first objection, which is taking the what

[35:24] texts in Peter and so on that we are something of the divine nature, right? And of course Thomas will say, "Well, one sense this is possible, another sense not." To the first, therefore, it should be said that the divine nature is not communicable properly, but only according to a partaking of likeness, huh? Okay.

[35:49] And that likeness is very distant, according to the Vatican. I mean, to the Fourth Latin Council, right? You cannot know the likeness of the creature to God without a greater what. Unlikeness, a particular text.

[36:10] Oh, that comes in the. The guy was getting confused, you know. The Father and I are one, and we're going to be one, you know. Christ's prayer for the unity. In in the Gospel of Saint John, towards the end there, the prayer, you know, Christ is saying, praying for our unity that we be like one, like you and the Father are one. Well, yeah, but tremendous distance, right?

[36:36] And if you if you brought the Trinity down to the kind of unity we can have, you'd be destroying the Trinity. And if you brought us up to the unity that the Trinity has, you would be making you and me one man. You see, we can't be one man. You and I, can we? Confounding the nature or the mind. Yeah.

[37:00] Well, we sometimes say one soul, right? In scripture, I think in the in the Acts of the Apostles, huh? Okay. To the second, it should be said. This is about the name being appellativum, huh? To a second, it should be said that this name God is a nomen appellativum. Appellativum means what to be called, I guess. Oh, yeah. What? Yes. Called. And not proper because it signifies the divine nature, as in the one having it, right?

[37:46] Although God Himself, Secundum Rem, is neither a universal nor a what particular. But names do not follow the way of being, which is in things, but the way of being, according as they are in our what a knowledge. But nevertheless, according to the truth of the thing, is incommunicable. Just as has been said about this name, what Son, huh?

[38:21] Okay. Now the third objection was taken from names like Bonus and Sapiens, which are taken from operations of God and so on, right? To the third, it should be said that these names, good, wise, and similar ones, are imposed from perfections proceeding from God into creatures. They are not imposed to signifying the very divine nature itself, but to signifying the perfections themselves absolutely.

[38:54] And therefore, they are, according to the truth of the thing, communicable to many. But this name God is imposed from the operation proper to God, which we experience continuously, and taken from that to signify the divine what nature, right? Okay.

[39:15] So Thomas says, you know, you talk about goodness, huh? Absolutely, like that. You can apply it to God or to what creatures, right? If you add something to it that restricts it to God, and you say sumum bonum, the highest good, then can only say it of God. And if you say something that pertains to the what way of having goodness in the creature, like you say virtuous, he was a habit, right?

[39:49] Then it could be applied only to the creature, right? The health of the body or something like that, right? Okay. Now. Well, Article Ten presupposes what we see in Article Nine because we've seen that the name God is said properly of what God, and it's said though sometimes of other things by participation of a certain likeness of God, right? To God, and then it's said by opinion, right?

[40:24] Okay, and so Thomas now comes back upon this and says, "How is the name God said of all these three, right? Okay, you know, in the Greek, "Come out and sacrifice" was in Ephesus to Saint Paul. No, no, I'm not. Yeah, yell them to stop them from sacrificing to him.

[40:58] Zeus. Yeah. So this name being said univocally was you'd probably guess it's not going to be said univocally, but anyway, to this tenth one proceeds thus: It seems that this name God is said univocally of God by nature and God by participation and by opinion,

[41:21] for where there is a diverse meaning, there is not a contradiction between the one affirming and the one negating, for equivocation contradiction impedes contradiction.

[41:36] So to have a contradiction, you've got to have one person affirming of something, but someone else denies it, right? But if they just affirm the one guy the word in one meaning, and the other guy denies it in another meaning, then they're not contradicting each other.

[41:55] But the Catholic saying that the idol is not God contradicts the pagan saying the idol is God, right? Therefore, God is taken the same way by both, right? Taken univocally by both. Otherwise, you'll make a contradiction.

[42:21] Moreover, just as the idol is God according to or by opinion and not by truth, so the enjoyment of carnal delights is called happiness by opinion and not by truth. But this name beatitude is said univocally of this opined beatitude and about the true beatitude. Therefore, this name God is said univocally of God by truth. And of God by what opinion? Huh?

[43:12] Is that so about the word beatitude? It said univocally. We'll see what he says. Moreover, univoca univocals are called those things of whom there is the same ratio, the same meaning.

[43:32] But the Catholic, when he says there is the God is one, understands by the name of God, an omnipotent thing, that, and something to be venerated above all things. And this same thing is understood by the Gentile when he says the idol is a god.

[43:56] Therefore, this name God is said univocally in both places. But against this, huh? That which is in the understanding is a likeness of that which is in the thing, as is said in the first book of the Peri Hermeneias, Aristotle's book on the statement, right? But animal said of the true animal and of the pictured animal, painted animal, is said equivocally. Therefore, this name God said of the true God and of God by opinion is said equivocally.

[44:37] Moreover, no one is able to signify that which he does not know. But the Gentile does not know the divine nature. Therefore, when he says the idol is God, he does not signify the true deity. But this the Catholic signifies when he says as one God. Therefore, this name God is not univocally but equivocally of the true God and of God by what opinion? Right.

[45:13] Now Thomas is going to reply to both sets of objections in this case, right? Which maybe is a sign that he he wants to point out some truth in between. uh, The name being said univocally and the name being said maybe purely equivocally, right? Or equivocally by by chance, huh?

[45:38] So he says, "I answer that this name God in the aforesaid three meanings is not taken either univocally or equivocally, but analogously, right? Okay.

[45:58] Now, what's the distinction between those three? Right. Well, when a name is said of many things with exactly the same meaning in all cases, we say it. You say it's said univocally, right?

[46:12] And you know, sometimes people get all mixed up. But you know, I say to ask students sometimes when animal is said of dog and cat does it mean the same thing. And sometimes they're thinking that dog and cat are not the same thing. therefore doesn't mean the same thing, but it does mean the same thing when it's said of dog and cat.

[46:32] Even though it's being said different kinds of animals, right? The name animal doesn't signify those differences between those two things. It signifies, what they have in common, right? A living body that has sensation. Period. And and the dog is just as much that as the cat, and the cat is just as much that as a dog, right?

[47:00] Who would say that air is like infinity degrees universal or something? Which air? The air. The people's air that they can. Yeah, well, they're they're mixing up just mixing up the fact that the dog and the cat are not the same kind of animal, as if that means that the word animal said of them doesn't have the same meaning. Yeah, mixing up those two things. I'm trying to figure out what that air is.

[47:29] What What is it? That the species of one another. Yeah, they're thinking of the the differences of the subject of the two statements, right? And putting that in the in the meaning of the predicate.

[48:00] Or another way, they're they're mixing up the meaning of a word, right, with what it's said of. Oh. Okay. And is that the same thing, the meaning of a word, what it's said of? No, they they they might you might person might confuse them a bit though, right?

[48:30] You know, you know, and you're talking about a purely equivocal word like the word "bat," right? Well, when it's said of the piece of wood used in base plates, one meaning. Instead of the thing coming out of the belfry or something, it had another meaning, right? You might think think well, the meaning depends on what's said. So.

[48:51] So you might say, well, when the word "bat" is said of. The thing in baseball, it has one meaning, and when said of the other, has another meaning. So

[49:03] you're thinking that, therefore, the meaning is what what it's said. Was kind of accidental in a way, too, then. And sometimes, you know, in that kind of equivocation that I talk about, sometimes it's not too equivocal. But now Thomas will sometimes say that man, as well as the angel, has the ability to understand, and therefore they both have an understanding. Then other times they'll keep the word understanding for the angel, and they'll say man doesn't have understanding; he has reason.

[49:51] Reason is kind of a overshadowed understanding, right? A defective understanding, and so. Sometimes understanding is said of man sometimes is denied of him, right? It has something to do with it, it has a different meaning in two cases, But is meaning the same thing as it being said of?

[50:24] So you gotta yes, say when I say man of each one of you guys, what do I have in mind when I say the word man of each one of you? Right? I have exactly the same meaning in mind when I say of each one of you.

[50:41] If I say are you a man or a mouse, I might be using man now in a different in a different sense, right? Because of things that are univocal, there is omnino altogether, right? Entirely, right? Holy, the same ratio, the same meaning, right?

[51:14] Of equivocals, there is omnino entirely holy a ratio. What diverse? Diverse, yeah. So you have a in the case of equivocals, you have a meaning that's wholly other in cases univocal, wholly the same. In analogous things, it's necessary that the name taken in one of its meanings, right, be placed in the definition of the same name by what taken in other meanings. I see an interesting example there from ethics there that Thomas brings up in the sentences, and someone is saying, "Well, do you divide

[52:05] foresight or prudence against the the moral virtues?" Huh? And the objection is saying, "Well, foresight or prudence is placed in the definition of moral virtue." Now, when you divide one thing against another, you don't put one the definition of the other.

[52:34] So if you well, I suppose that's true for the most part, anyway. And Thomas says, "Well, that's true when the thing being divided instead of these things is

[52:55] belongs to all of them equally, right?" And not to one more than another, right? So you wouldn't put dog in the definition of cat, or cat in the definition of dog, when you divide one against the other in your animal, right? Because the animal is said to them equally, right? Okay. But now, in the case of moral virtue, you put reason or foresight in the very definition of it.

[53:26] The definition of moral virtue is a habit existing in the middle, right? Towards us, as determined by foresight. foresight, as determined by right reason, as we sometimes say, right? Meaning by foresight. So you're defining moral virtue by foresight, huh? Well, the good of men is to be in accord with what Reason. reason, and foresight, being a virtue of reason, partakes of the good of reason more than the moral virtues, which are not in reason but in the emotions or in the will.

[54:07] And so it's not being said what equally of these, right? But it's said primarily of reason, huh? What's in reason? And the other ones by participation. So what has something essentially the good of reason, and what has the good reason only by participation? It can't be said of them what equally, right? And what is said of essentially is going to be the definition of what is so by what participation.

[54:43] So since the good of reason is said essentially of foresight, but of the moral virtues by partaking of foresight in some way, huh? Then foresight enters into the definition of them, right? I mean, it's something like that with at least two of these meanings here. God essentially, and God by participation of God, some participation, of likeness to God, huh? And therefore, when we define grace, sometimes sanctifying grace, we say it's our partaking of the divine nature, right?

[55:21] We don't say that it signifies the divine nature. We have not become God, but we are partaking of the divine nature. So the meaning of God, instead of God,

[55:35] signifies the divine nature essentially. But instead of us, it signifies only a partaking of the divine nature, and it's going to be defined by the divine nature. So it's a partaking of the divine nature that that text from Saint Peter that he had there, right? Divinae consortes naturae, right? Partakers, in a sense, of the divine nature, right? So you're you're putting the divine nature, in the definition of grace, a little bit like we put the def, we put foresight in the definition of what, moral virtue, yeah.

[56:17] Okay. So, so in analogous things, is necessary that the name taken in one of its meanings be placed in the definition of the same name taken in other what meanings, huh? Just as being said, of substance is placed in the definition of being, according as it is said of what accident, right? And of course, and this reminds me of what Aristotle brings out in the seventh book of wisdom, when he's talking about the definition of substance, and then he says, can accident also be defined, right?

[57:11] And what's funny about this is that the word definition comes from the word for limits, huh? And going back to the first meaning, say of limit, there, like in the city limits of Worcester, let's say, that's a very precise notion. All Worcester has to be within the city limits of Worcester, and no part of Shrewsbury or either or Holden or any other surrounding towns can be within the city limits of a Worcester, huh?

[57:48] But now, as Aristotle points out tonight in the seventh book of wisdom, when you try to define an accident, you have to bring in something other than the accident into the definition, namely the subject in which the definition or the accident rather is, right? So if I try to define what health really is, I'm going to have to define health as the good condition of the body, right?

[58:19] Huh? I can't define health by itself without reference to the body of which it is a good condition. You have to define an accident as something of another, huh? For the simple reason that it is. That's what it is. It's something of another. It's not something by itself, huh? Um.

[58:46] That's why, too, when Thomas, you know, is explaining the famous statement of Aristotle, which runs through Scripture too, that belongs to the wise to order things, right? And Thomas says the reason for this is that wisdom is the highest perfection of reason, and as Shakespeare tells us, reason is the ability for a large discourse, looking before and after, right? So it's the very nature reason to look for order, right?

[59:18] Try to order things. So if wisdom is the highest perfection of reason, it most of all must know order and be able to order. But in a sense, he's defining wisdom by saying it's something of reason, right? Our wisdom, anyway, right? Our wisdom is not something by itself. It's not a package put in the mind, let's say, that could be left outside the mind, right? No, it's something of the mind, right?

[59:49] It's the highest of the greatest perfection of the mind, and therefore it has what the mind reason has in a in a superlative degree, right? So substance then enters into the definition of accident, and that's where Aristotle says in the seventh book of wisdom that either then there's no definition of accident, or its definition in a somewhat lesser what sense,

[1:00:20] because of the fact you're bringing something in, yeah, other than what you do, other than what you define, right? He gives another example, which is taken from the fourth book of wisdom, which Aristotle uses an example there. Not the original examples, this guy.

[1:00:44] Healthy said of animal is placed in the definition of healthy, as it is said of urine and of medicine, right? Because what does it mean to say the urine is healthy? Well, because it's a sign of the health in the animal, right? It's a sign of that good condition of the animal. And why is healthy said of the medicine? Because it's factivum, it makes or produces, right, that good condition of the body or maintains it or something of that sort, right?

[1:01:17] So the healthy, as meaning this condition of the body, right, Isn't the definition of healthy said of urine or healthy said your complexion, right, which might be a sign of your health. And you know, so you don't you look sick, you don't look, you know, but your sick expression is a sick in the sense it's a sign of the sickness that you are undergoing in your body, right?

[1:01:50] So the sickness you're undergoing in your body, in the meaning of sick, as that bad condition of your body, is in the meaning of sick instead of your complexion, right? If I said your diet was sick, we had a

[1:02:07] we had a cokaholic. Did I tell you about the cokaholic? No. Well, we'd see, you know, the you know that that big truck that delivers coke to the supermarkets. We'd see it, you know, come down our street and stop in front of some house, and the guy bring things in. I said, what the heck is this? Yeah. And so one time, my wife happened to run into the wife of the of the man who lives in that house, and she said, oh yeah, he's a cokaholic, you see, and he drinks so much coke, and he has to get these big bottles and drinks it, that he wanted the truck to deliver it to his house.

[1:02:43] He didn't have to go to the market, right? Oh. And of course, the coke people, the the local guy at least didn't want to drive that thing at this guy's house and deliver there. You know, I make an extra trip, and he called the national coke company, said you deliver it to this guy, right? Oh wow. So I would say this is a sick diet, you know, he's drinking coke all the time.

[1:03:05] Oh boy! I had a history professor there in high school. You know, an admixture. A freshman had a senior course, too, or junior course, and he had real bad teeth. You know, he maintained he got it from drinking coke when he worked in a factory. You know, and you drink a lot of coke. And the story is told you you put a loose tooth in a glass of coke.

[1:03:27] He's going to dissolve it. You know. So, so six out of this diet signifies is productive of a teeth rot and other other harms it does to you. I suppose.

[1:03:51] Now, having made these distinctions and illustrated them, right, Thomas is now ready to apply it, right? And thus it happens in what is proposed here. For this name, God, according as it is taken for the true God, right, is in the meaning of God, according as is taken when God is said according to opinion or by what by taking, right?

[1:04:25] For when we name something God by participation, the Scripture itself does, right? We understand by name of God something having a likeness of the true God.

[1:04:41] Likewise, when we call the idol God, right? By this name, God, we understand to be signified something about which men think that it is God, right? Huh. Okay.

[1:04:59] And thus it is manifest that other and other is the meaning of the name, but one of those meanings, right, is contained in the meanings of the others. Huh. Whence

[1:05:15] it is manifest that it is said what? Yeah, it's not said purely equivocally, right? Huh. There's a connection among the meanings, huh? So one meaning of God, the fundamental, the first meaning of God, is that the divine nature, right? What has a divine nature? And then what has a likeness by participation to that nature is said God because it's a likeness of that nature. Let us make man to our image and likeness, he says, right?

[1:05:45] Even in even in the Genesis, I guess. And the other is said what to be called God because it's what people think is God, not what in fact is God, but what they think is God. Right. Makes sense.