Prima Pars
53. Summa I, q.13, aa.10–12: Univocal, Equivocal and Analogous Names; 'He Who Is' as God's Most Proper Name; Affirmative Statements About God
Class of 2006-12-07
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/053-summa-i-q-13-aa-10-12-univocal-equivocal-and-analogous-names/

[0:00] Now, notice it is replied here to the first objection. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the multiplicity of names, the multiplicity of names, yeah, I suppose their meanings, is not to be noted according to the predication of the name, right? It's being said, right? But according to its meaning, right? That's what I was talking about. The example I know the students in class, you know, sometimes when you say, you know, animal said of man and dog, or animal said of dog and cat, they'll want to say that it doesn't mean the same thing.

[0:41] But they're thinking about the fact that dog and cat are not the same thing. I'm not thinking about that. See, and so it's one thing to say that that animal said of dog and cat are not the same thing, right? It's said of diverse things, right? But does it mean diverse things? You see, and you can confuse those two. Could it should? Yeah, and I speak from experience.

[1:09] Students would do that, right? You see, and you try to exemplify these things, and you see that they they make that confusion, right? Well, Thomas is pointing out the distinction between what it is the predication of the name, what's said of, right, and the signification of the meaning of the name. Not the same thing, are they? Maybe you said somebody is a woman instead of a beautiful woman and ugly woman?

[1:45] Have same meaning? No, no, not at all. But it does have the same meaning. Even though it's a different, if you want, let's speak said of. So this this is a a a fundamental distinction that needs to be seen. Aristotle says, you know, that men are not good. Most men are not good at seeing distinctions, huh? And that's quite true. I know that from experience.

[2:21] For this name, man, of whomever it is said, right, whether truly or falsely, right, is said in the same way, right, huh? Okay, so if I say

[2:39] three is an odd number and four is an odd number, right? Does odd number mean the same thing in those two? Yeah, but in one case I'm saying it's truly, in other case falsely, right? But it has the same meaning, right? I'm not saying it's some peculiar meaning myself but

[3:02] a philosopher Yeah yeah Yeah yeah But then it is said in many ways, if by this name man we intend to signify diverse things, right? See, so when I say the word animal of dog and cat, if when I say a dog, I mean not animal but dog. You see, and when I say a cat, I mean not a living body with senses, but I mean a living body with senses that meows.

[3:38] Then it has different meaning, right? Okay. As if when, if through this name man we understood to signify diverse things. If by one, if one intended to signify by this name, man, that which is truly a man, right? Another intends to signify by the same name a stone, or something what else?

[4:12] Whence it is clear that the Catholic saying that the idol is not God contradicts the pagan asserting this, right? Because both use this name God to signify in the true God.

[4:32] For when the pagan says the idol is God, he does not use this name. Of course, it signifies God by the opinion of God. Yeah. For thus he would say something true, right? Since also Catholics sometimes, in this meaning, use the name, right?

[4:52] As when it said, and he actually quotes scripture using it this way, right? Psalm ninety-five: All the gods of the Gentiles are demons, right? So, what does the word "gods" there mean in Psalm ninety-five, verse five, right?

[5:10] We're not saying the true God is is a demon, right? We're saying that the God by opinion is a demon, right? Yeah. And the same thing can be said to the second and the third, right? Objections, huh? Because those arguments proceed according to the diversity of the predication of the name, and not according to a diverse what meaning? Okay. So the objections are having the same difficulty my students have, right?

[5:45] Confusing the two, huh? So if I'm saying the sense pleasures there are true beatitude, and you're saying they're not, we're contradicting each other, right? Because we're both using it for true beatitude, right? But if I, if you mean that the sense pleasures are apparent happiness or something, right? And and and I say that, but they're not true happiness. Well, then we're not using in the same sense, right?

[6:15] Although we're using in a analogous sense, right? Okay. Um. Now the other two objections, in a way, are looking at the are kind of being answered by Thomas, insofar as they say or seem to say that it's purely what equivocal, right? Huh? And so taking the objection of what Aristotle says in the perihemanist there, or I mean in the actually the categories, huh? He takes the example there of the animal.

[6:49] To the fourth, it should be said that animal said of the true animal and of the one in the picture in the statue is not said pure equivoce, right? And we talked about this last time.

[7:07] Purely equivocal is often called also equivocal by chance, right? There's no reason to say the same name about both. It just happens that the two have the same name. But the philosopher, and that's Aristotle himself, in a largo modo, right, takes equivocal according as it includes in itself what analogous, right?

[7:36] Because also being, which is said analogously, is sometimes said to be predicated equivocally of the diverse predicaments. Okay, we talked about this before. Sometimes

[7:59] a common name said of two things with the same meaning in mind is kept by one of them as its own name, right? And then the other one that adds something significant to the common meaning gets a new name, right? Okay, so we could say equivocal, and we can divide it into two: equivocal by chance, you find sometimes in Aristotle, and equivocal

[8:41] by reason. Okay. Now, what does equivocal mean instead of these two? It means has more than one meaning. Period. That's all it's saying Now the word is equivocal by chance. That's all it has. There's many meanings. There's no connection among the meanings, right? But the name equivocal by reason not only has many meanings, such as a common meaning here of equivocal, but there's a connection among the meanings, an order among the meanings.

[9:19] And we've talked enough about reason and order to know the connection between reason and order, right? So, where there's a connection and order among the meanings, they call that equivocal by reason. That's something noteworthy and important that equivocal by reason adds to the common meaning. Both they have many meanings, but in addition, equivocal by reason has an order among the meanings. Okay. While the equivocal by chance has nothing noteworthy, nothing besides meaning.

[9:54] That's all it has, okay? So sometimes the equivocal by chance then keeps the word equivocal as its own name, okay? And the equivocal by reason gets a new name. And the one that's come in here, I'm just endangering this, but the the name that gets as as its own is a new name, analogous, right? Okay.

[10:30] Um, I'd say it's a very common happening in our naming, right? You'll find that again and again. You know, they're always distinguishing between a thing and a person. Take the thing and the person all the time, right? But is a person something or nothing? See? Well, thing is divided then into thing and person, right? And person adds something very noteworthy, reason and will and so on. So it gets a new name, person, and those other things just keep the name thing, right?

[11:13] So sometimes we say we got to treat the girl like a person, not like a thing. Is it? But you have the same thing with the word animal, right? You know, you have the rational and irrational animal, right?

[11:29] Or the rational animal adds something significant beyond animal, which means a living body with senses, namely reason. So sometimes the rational animal is given a new name, man, and the irrational animals keep the common name animal, right? Okay. Now you could call this here. Let's call it beast, right? Okay. And then you have each have their own name, right? Beast and man, right? But because the beast adds nothing noteworthy to the common name animal, sometimes we keep the name animal for beast, and then we divide man against the what animals, right?

[12:16] Then. So I'd say to my students that if the biology teacher calls you an animal, he's probably not insulting you. Or maybe is if you hear everything you need to know about evolution. But if your girlfriend calls you an animal, she's probably insulting you, right? Um. So that that's a common common thing in naming, right? So that in one sense a person is a thing, another sense they're not a thing, right?

[12:47] In one sense man is an animal, and another sense man is not an animal, right? Now going back to the thing at hand here. So sometimes, more precisely, you could say, right? This kind of equivocal is called equivocal by chance, right? Sometimes it's called purely equivocal, right? Now, pure means there's nothing else mixed up with there, right? Like some orderliness, right? But then sometimes it keeps the name equivocal as what its own, and the other one is given a new name, not equivocal by reason now, but a a new name which is analogous.

[13:34] Okay. Now, as a footnote, the only concern I have about analogous, I mean, it's very common Thomas uses all the time, is that. But analogous actually comes in the Greek word for what proportional likeness

[13:52] of ratios And that's only one of the, what? Kinds of names equivocal by reason. So sometimes I think people take equivocal by reason too narrowly, right? To mean, only those ones that are equivocal by likeness of ratios, okay? Or by ratios in general, right? When there are other ways in which this takes place, you know. Sometimes a name becomes equivocal by reason of having part of its meaning lost.

[14:24] Thomas is a beautiful thing. The only thing is that when he talks about the names of the emotions and how some of these names can be carried over and applied to the acts of the will. It's like the word hope first names an emotion or love first names an emotion. And in the emotion, there is something that comes from the body. There's a bodily aspect, this bodily turmoil, and there's something that comes from the soul, right?

[14:49] The formal aspect of the emotion. And when you carry it over to the act of the will, you drop the bodily aspect of the emotion and keep the formal aspect. And so, you know, but this will come up when we point out by Thomas. He talks about the virtue of hope and so on, because that hope is in the the will, right? But the same when you talk about the love of God, that love of God or the love of wisdom, that's in the what?

[15:15] The will, right? It's not really in the emotion. There might be some emotional disposition for this, or might be some overflow, but it properly names an act of the will. And so it becomes equivocal by what? Dropping part of its meaning, right? Or or the the meaning that the very famous one, the De Anima, there is the word undergoing, or actually in Greek, is be the word paskein, right?

[15:43] Or passio, right? And Aristotle points out that you know that if you call sensing even an undergoing, it's not like suffering, you know. And the first meaning of suffering is not only that you're being acted upon, but you're being acted upon in a way that's painful and contrary to your instructive, view, right? And then

[16:17] Shakespeare kind of plays with the word suffering, you know, when Beatrice says to Benedict, you know, for which of my good qualities did you first suffer a love? He said, "A good thing, you know, I call it suffering because I can't help myself. " So it's not really suffering in the sense of being what painful, right? And then

[16:43] so you drop out the idea of something contrary to your nature, right? But keep the the idea receiving something. So so eventually, see that sensing is a what? A passion. Now, I try to, you know, in English, the word passion or the word suffering doesn't seem to to have been moved. So I take the word undergoing myself, and I think to some extent, undergoing still keeps a little bit of that first meaning of suffering.

[17:14] When we say, you know, that he's undergone a lot, well, that means that he's what? Yeah, he suffered a lot of things, right? But then you can say that sensing in a way is undergoing because the sense is is being acted upon. And then, and the body's involved too, but not it's not something contrary to nature of the animal, right? It's perfecting of the animal. So undergoing now is is being perfected in a way, as opposed to being destructive in the first meaning.

[17:48] You dropped out that that aspect, and then when you speak of understanding as an undergoing, right? Then you have the whole body dropped out, right?

[18:02] And undergoing kind of fits in with understand, right? To understand the Eucharist means to know what stands under the accidents of bread and wine, right?

[18:20] So I just have a an aside there, but I I'm trying to revive the use of the phrase equivocal by reason, right? In order to avoid

[18:34] limiting equivocal by reason to one or two kinds, you know, of equivocal by reason, right? Nevertheless, whatever you want to call that thing, the fact that you give it a new name indicates that it has something noteworthy, and that is the order among the meanings, huh?

[18:56] So coming back to reply to the fourth objection on the first said contra, right? It says, "Animal said of the true animal and the pictured animal is not said pure equivocally, right? " Is being more precise because he has to be to answer this objection, right? But the philosopher, when he says it's said equivocally, he's taking equivoca largo modo in in a large way. I don't think it's a large, you know, large discursive that same word.

[19:26] But then that's equivocal up here on top here, right? Um, according as it includes in itself analoga, as it includes under itself, equivocal by chance and equivocal by reason or analoga, huh? Because and he gives an example here, Thomas. Because being which is said analogiche, right? Sometimes is said to be predicated equivocally of the diverse what predicaments, right?

[20:03] In the categories Aristotle is not so much concerned with whether showing there that being is said equivocally by reason or by chance, right? But it's not said univocally of everything, and therefore you have different highest genera, right?

[20:25] A man and his shape are not a thing in the same meaning exactly, huh? Man is more a thing, and the shape of man is something other thing. But something other thing is a thing in a way, you know. So

[20:41] now the last said contra, second one. He's talking about the the Gentile not knowing the nature of God, right? Therefore, he can't mean the same thing. To the fifth, it should be said that the very nature of God, as it is in itself, neither the Catholic nor the pagan, huh, knows, huh. But both know it according to some meaning of causality, as God is said to be the unmover or the first maker or the first cause or excellence, right?

[21:24] He's the sumum bonum, the highest good, or of the motionis negation, huh? As he's incorporeal, he's not composed, and so on. And according to this, in the same meaning, the Gentile can take this what name God, right? As we do when he says the idol is a god, and he's going to worship him, right? You know, he's taking him the same way that we do, huh? Because we think he should be the one who is God and should be worshiped, too.

[21:58] Except we just don't think the statue is the great Archelaus says as if a man should chatter to his house, you know, talk to his house.

[22:12] If, however, there was someone who by no meaning at all knew God, right? He would not be able to even name him, right? Except in so far as we sometimes put forth names whose meanings we don't know, right? So Thomas says that you know, you know, the the young student in metaphysics, right? Though he says it with his mouth, he doesn't attain it with his his mind, you know.

[22:40] So take a little break before we look at eleven here. So now we go to the eleventh article, which we divide against the three previous articles, just dealing with another name. With the other three articles, we're dealing with the name God.

[23:02] To the eleventh, one precedes us. It seems that this name Who is is not maxime, most of all, the proper name of God. For this name God is a what incommunicable name, properly speaking, right? But this name Qui est is not an incommunicable name. Therefore, this name Who is is not most proper name of God. I suppose certainly what is is communicable to many, right? Although God tells what's her name, Saint Catherine.

[23:43] Remember, these two things: I am who am, and you are she who is not. It's interesting in John's Gospel how many times the Lord says I am. Yeah. How many times I am He, and when Saint Peter denies Him three times, Peter says I am not. Yeah. I am not. I am not. It's kind of. I don't know what it's going to mean

[24:06] Moreover, Dionysius says in the third chapter of the Divine Names that the naming of the name God, I mean Good rather, is manifestive, is making known all the divine processions, right? But this most of all belongs to God that He be the universal beginning of things. Therefore, this name Good is most proper to God, right? And not this name Who is, huh? Because

[24:44] Dionysius in that work is is taking these names as they signify, you know, procession from God into creatures, you know. So, I think he begins with the name Good, right? Even though in some sense is not the first name we say about God. Moreover, every divine name seems to imply some relation to creatures, since God is not known by us except the creatures. But this name Who is implies no relation to creatures.

[25:16] Therefore, this name Who is is not most of all the proper name of God. I can think of all those objections. But against this is what is said in Exodus three, that Moses asking, "If they say to me, 'What is the name of the one who's sending you? ' Right? What shall I say to them?" And the Lord responds, "Thus you shall say, 'Who is sent me to you?

[25:47] '" Therefore, this name, who is, is most of all the proper name of God. Okay, Thomas says, I answer: it should be said that this name, who is, for a threefold reason, is most of all the what proper name of God. Now, first, on account of its what meaning, huh? For it does not signify some form, but to be itself, huh? Whence, since the being of God, the to be of God is his very what essence, his very substance, his very nature, and this belongs to nothing else, as has been shown above, is manifest that among other names, this one most properly names God, for each thing is denominated from its what form, right?

[26:49] This is unique about the divine form that is is the very existence, the same thing. Secondly, because of its what universality, for all other names are either less common, right? Or if they are convertible with it, nevertheless they add something above it by reason, huh? That goes back to the distinction that Aristotle makes in the what beginning of the fourth book of Wisdom, right? That the name being is more fundamental than the name good or the name one, and even if one is convertible with being, it adds something by reason namely the undivided being, right?

[27:37] Okay, or good means desirable being or something of this sort, then. So, ah, whence, if they add something to it in a certain way, they inform and determine it, right?

[27:56] But our understanding is not able to know the divine essence in the state of the via in this life, according as it is in Himself. But whatever mode it determines about it, what it understands about God, it falls short of the way in which God is in Himself. And therefore, when some names are less determined and more common, absolute, to that extent they more properly are said of God by us,

[28:32] because God is what infinite in a sense, huh? Whence Damascene says that more principal or more chief of all those things of all those names which are said of God is the name who is, right? For the whole which is in him, it comprehends, having to be itself as a certain. Now the word Pelagos is actually kind of transliteration of the Greek word Pelagos, right? Which means the ocean.

[29:05] This is like the ocean, huh? The infinite and undetermined, what infinity or ocean of these divine what substance, huh? So no wonder he had one of the five things about the substance of God was his being what infinite, right? Because unless we knew that God was infinite, we wouldn't appreciate this what name, because we name things as we know them, right? So we have to know that God is infinite before we can appreciate this name, huh?

[29:36] Did you ever read that in the life of Saint Thérèse of Lisieux? You know, when she goes to the ocean and sees it for the first time, she's so impressed with the the the. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's kind of you know reminds me you know of her obviously being ordered to God, right? And she sees the universe. But I mean, the word is very concrete, almost like a metaphor, you know, Pelagos huh?

[30:00] The ocean of the divine being, kind of the infinite ocean there, because the ocean to us seems to be endless, huh? The endless ocean of the divine being, huh? So think about that. Um,

[30:21] I know myself, and I talk about the the choice that you had to make in your studies. Your choice you can make is between knowing all things in general, and and the best things in particular, or knowing lesser things in detail. And so it's kind of interesting, huh? That the science of being as being is also science in which we come to know the best thing, God, right?

[30:54] And the or general parts of natural philosophy, like in the eight books of Natural Hearing and the three books on the Soul, are useful for knowing the best things in the natural world, like the soul itself, huh? But the man who studies, you know, ants in particular, the entomologist, right? He knows lesser things in detail, right? But in a sense, because the limitations of our mind, you have to almost make this choice, right?

[31:21] It's kind of interesting that this name here, that is in some sense most proper to God, and the second reason, on account of its what universality, right? It's better to you know almost in a sense to say the one who is.

[31:39] I always say it at the house chapel. Let us thank the one who is for all it is, as if he's the one who is. Nothing else quite is.

[31:51] I'm not quite here. Just within the definition of God's being, being all the being can possibly be. Yeah. For any other, for by any other name, right, you determine some way of the substance of the thing, right? But this name, who is, determines no particular way of being, right? But it has itself indeterminately to all, and therefore it names the what? The infinite ocean of substance, right?

[32:34] Justin, keeps that word. And. In Greek, it's what pi, epsilon, lambda, alpha, gamma. You know, and I think. In Greek. it's OS at the end, omicron sigma. Okay, but so so Pelagos, I don't know if it's originally a Latin word, but it's originally a Greek, you know. But it's the same, same almost letter letter for letter.

[33:01] And third, from its consignification, it signifies to be in the present, and this most properly is said of God, whose being or to be does not know past or future, as Augustine says in the fifth book of the Trinity. So Christ says, you know, before Abraham was, I am. And

[33:28] in a sense, he's saying I am who I am, right? So the reason of signifying the present, right? Seems ungrammatical, but it's it's more proper to speak that way than to say before Abraham was, I was. You know, he said, "Before Abraham was, I am." Okay, so

[33:51] these are very difficult reasons, you know, but I think you know it makes some sense to when you first hear them, and the more you think about them, the more the more meaning they'll have.

[34:05] In the chapter on perfect, there in the fifth book of Wisdom, right? Aristotle, you know, distinguishes three senses of perfect, which really fit creatures, and the perfect. The first meaning of perfect is that which has all its parts. So if you're missing an arm or a leg, you're incomplete.

[34:27] Or if you have all your arms and legs and parts, then you're complete. In some sense, you're perfect. Then the second sense of perfect is in a way like that, but what has all

[34:41] the ability of its kind. So Homer is the perfect poet, right? He can write good plots. In fact, he teaches all the other Greeks how to make good plot, and his characters, you know, are you know multi-dimensional. They're not the one-dimensional passion of the of the French dramatists and so on. And then his his words, you know, are so everything comes alive, as Aristotle says. Everything's in motion, right?

[35:12] So when somebody shoots an arrow, you know, the arrow is striving to get into your insides, you know, and so and it's a vivid image, you know, the arrow, you know, and

[35:23] or or his great similes, right? Give this, you know, what Shakespeare says in the very whirlwind of passion, you must get a calmness, right? So these terrible battle scenes, you know, you have these beautiful similes that kind of give a, as as Hegel says, gives a tranquility to the scene, right? And so he said, okay, he's the complete poet. He has the whole ability of a poet.

[35:44] But he doesn't have the ability of Mozart, or the ability of the medical doctor, or the ability of the logician, or the ability, you know. So it's it's an ability of a particular kind, right? And then a thing is perfect that has reached its end. See, well, God is endless, right? God is. And then Aristotle goes on to the sense in which God is perfect, right? Other things are perfect in their kind, but God is not what lacking in anything, right?

[36:17] Okay, so even Averroes saw that Aristotle's talking about God there, right? Thomas sometimes says you know as Averroes points out there coming on the fifth book. This is the sense in which God is perfect, right? But it's tied up with his what, not being limited in any way, and while everything else is perfect in its kind, so in some. imperfect way, it's perfect, and that's very much brought out here by this infinite ocean.

[36:50] Yeah. Now the first objection, though, is an opportunity for Thomas now to to see another distinction now, because. This name God may seem to be more proper, and in some sense maybe it is, Thomas says. Okay,

[37:15] and this is a very subtle distinction here. The first, therefore, it should be said, that this name "Who is" is more the proper name of God than this name "God" that seems strange, right? As regards that from which it is imposed, because it is taken from to be right.

[37:43] And that's looking back to the first reason he gave in the body of the article why this is the most proper name of God. Is taken from to be, and we name a thing from its what, form, its substance, right? But only God is the substance is. To be, okay. No other thing is its substance or what it is. It's to be, okay. So as far as what is taken from, it's more what proper to God, right?

[38:22] And as regards the way of signifying, because it's not what particular in the way other names are right, which seem to confine God a bit, right? Don't fence me on God, is saying. And the way of consignifying is conly, right? Signifying the eternal presence of God, right? But as regards that to which the name is imposed to signifying. The name God is what more proper, right? Because it is imposed as signifying the what divine nature,

[38:58] and even more proper is the name Tetragrammaton Okay, the name there, which is imposed as signifying the incommunicable divine substance, and if one can speak thus, as the singular one, right? Okay.

[39:22] Now that's a lot to think about. That reply to the first objection, right? So, which is more the proper name of God? I am who am, or God? What Thomas says? Well, as far as that from which the name is taken, I am who am is the most proper name of God, right? But as far as that to which the name is applied, God is the most proper name of God.

[39:52] Okay. I think that's interesting, because it's kind of strange if God is not the proper name of God, you know. Now, to go back to the to the to the the problem here in this article, um, you know, when you stated a problem, you used the word utrum and thus you say whether the name who is is most properly the name of God. Well, you can't even raise the problem without using the name God, right?

[40:28] And so, in some way, you are asking about the name of God using the name God to refer to what you are asking the name of. So, in some sense, the name God should be the yes, should be most proper, yeah. And he says, as far as that to which the name is applied, right? Huh? That's most proper, but as far as that from which the name is taken, who is for the three reasons given the body article is the most proper name of God, right?

[41:01] So he's coming back to that distinction that we saw in the earlier article, right? When he's asking whether God is the name of what substance, right, of God, or is the name of his operation, right? And then he made the distinction between the two, right? But now he's making use of that same distinction to say that in one way I am who am is the most proper name of God, and it must be in some way because Moses saying, "What's your name?"

[41:30] Well, and that's what he says: "I am who am," right? Okay. But in another way, the name God is his name most properly, huh? Well, how can both be true? Well, as far as that from which the name is taken. I am Qui est is the most proper name of God, right? As far as that, to which the name is imposed, right? God, and even more so, maybe Tetragrammaton.

[41:59] The Tetragrammaton is the name of what God. Okay, it's more common to see the use of the name God in terms of what it refers to, and it seems more. I mean, Aristotle did something about it. maybe some of the other philosophers and certainly divine revelation revealed to us, or not only divine revelation, but the philosophers had an idea that this first name from which it's taken is more proper It seems because it seems like that's more um subtle.

[42:42] Yeah, the name. of. God from which it would be taken. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And you know, Thomas, you know, he talks about this truth in the Summa Contra Gentiles that in God, the substance of God and his existence are the same thing. You know, he speaks of this sublime truth. Of course, he's in a place where he's talking about all kinds of sublime truths. You might say, but he's kind of struck as this as being a sublime truth.

[43:05] And I think I mentioned before that Hilary of Poitiers, right, as he became known as Hilary, was a you know a Greek philosopher, so to speak, before he became a Christian, right? And in his book on the Trinity, there he has a little autobiographical sketch and how he first picked up the Bible and he heard this, you know, I am who I am, and all that. That was a motive of credibility for him as to the the sublimity of this book, right?

[43:35] That this was maybe the word of God after all, you know. And but as a philosopher, he was struck by that, right? In a way, maybe that other men would would be struck more by the miracles or something else, right? But he was struck by that, and it was kind of a credibility for him as a philosopher. He saw how profound this this was.

[43:59] Okay, so that's quite a quite a thing. Okay, let's look at the twelfth article here, if we can, a little bit. Now this is a little different now because now we're talking about we can make affirmative statements of God, huh? About God, huh?

[44:16] To the twelfth, one proceeds thus. It seems that affirmative statements are not able to be formed about God. This illumines us a little bit of theology, right? For Dionysius says in the second chapter of the celestial hierarchy that negations about God are true, but affirmations don't fit. Don't come together so much.

[44:44] Moreover, Boethius says in the book of the Trinity that a simple form cannot be a subject, right? But God is most of all a simple form. Therefore, he's not able to be a subject. But everything about which an affirmative statement can be formed is taken as a what subject subject of the sentence, right? Therefore, of God, an affirmative proposition cannot be formed. Moreover, every understanding, understanding a thing to be other than it is, is false.

[45:21] But God as being without any composition, as has been proven above. Since, therefore, every understanding, every affirmative understanding, understands something with a composition, it seems that an affirmative proposition cannot be. What formed about God? Now this third objection is confusing the way we know what the way things are, right? And the old question I asked before, you know, the central question of philosophy: Does truth require that the way we know be the way what things are, right?

[46:00] And Aristotle says no, And Plato seems to be saying yes, right? But the great Boethius, as I mentioned in the Consolation of Philosophy, when he's approaching, you know, talking about the divine knowledge and the divine knowledge of temporal things, right? But the divine knowledge of temporal things is what eternal. So you have an eternal knowledge of what is not eternal, and how is that possible, right? But at that point, Lady Wisdom, who's leading the conversation, introduces Aristotle as her true follower.

[46:39] And it's kind of a subtle thing, you know, that Boethius is is is going after Aristotle there because in the beginning of the Consolation of Philosophy, he gives himself as a member of the Academy, right, and therefore the school of Plato, right. And when he talks about happiness, to some extent, he proceeds in a kind of platonic order, right. But now he has to give up Plato and follow Aristotle, and without saying this, you know, he has Lady Wisdom introduce Aristotle as a true follower.

[47:10] But against this, to faith nothing can be false, under faith. But there are some affirmative propositions under faith, right? For example, that God is three and one, and He's omnipotent, right? You have to believe these things. But these affirmative propositions, right? Therefore, they can't be false if they come under faith, right? That's nice, argument, isn't it?

[47:39] I answer. It should be said that affirmative statements are able to be formed about God. But now let's have some evidence for this, huh?

[47:51] Now, it should be known that in every affirmative proposition that is true, it is necessary that the predicate and the subject signify the same thing, secundum rem, in some way, right? But something other in reason, right? Okay. And this is clear both in propositions which are what are about an accidental predication, as in those which are of a what substantial predication. For it is manifest that man and white are the same in subject, right, in different definition.

[48:32] For other is the definition of man and the definition of white, right? And likewise, when I say man is an animal. The very thing that is a man is truly an animal.

[48:56] In the same suppositum, right? In the same individual substance is the sensible nature from which it is said to be an animal, and the rational from which it is said to be a what man?

[49:11] Whence here also the predicate and the subject are the same in subject, but they differ in what definition. But in propositions in which the same thing is said of itself,

[49:29] this in some way is found, in so far as intellect, that which is placed there on the side of the subject, is drawn to the part of the suppositum, and what is placed on the side of the predicate is drawn to the nature of the form existing in the suppositum. According as it is said that predicates hold themselves formally and subjects what materially, the the predicate is like a a form, right?

[49:59] Okay. And the subject like matter. To this diversity, which is by reason, there corresponds the plurality of predicate and subject. But the identity of the thing, the intellect signifies through the what composition, right?

[50:23] Now all has got to be applied to God. God, considered in himself, is altogether one and what simple. That's interesting. It puts one and simple together, huh? But in in the treatise on the substance of God, the first attribute of God was a simple, and the last one was one. Why did he do that? I I notice in the in the compendium of theology, he he considers the unity of God in among the considerations of simplicity of God, right?

[50:57] But here they're kind of separated, huh? But here they're together again, huh? Um. But nevertheless, our understanding knows him by diverse what thoughts, huh? In that is not able to see him what. Himself. As he is in himself, huh? But nevertheless, although he understands him under diverse conceptions, nevertheless he knows him. He knows that to all these thoughts. There corresponds one and the same thing. thing. Simply, this plurality, therefore, which is by reason, it represents by the plurality of the subject and the predicate.

[51:50] It represents unity by what? Understanding. By the composition of the statement. Okay. Now, I'm noticing. you know, I would take the example of the of the circle circle, right? But maybe a better way of doing it is the way Thomas does it in the proemium to the fourth book of the Sumacan Gentiles, where he speaks of from the one simple God all the perfections of creatures descended, right?

[52:35] Okay. And then, quoting the great Archytas, that the way up and the way down is the same, but going In different directions, so we start down here with the perfections that are found in creatures, and that's why we have many what thoughts, right? And so we say God is the beginning of this; he's the beginning of that perfection; he's the beginning of this perfection; he's the beginning of that perfection.

[53:01] So we have many thoughts about God. When we say the beginning of this perfection is the beginning of that perfection, then we signify that it's the same thing, right? Okay. So the multiplicity is in the side of our many thoughts of God derived from creatures, but we don't attribute the multiplicity of our thoughts to some multiplicity in God, right? And so we we affirm one of the other, right?

[53:30] Okay. Now, is our mind false doing that? No, because that's multiplicity in the way we know God, right? So we know a simple thing and one in a composed way and a multiple way, where he knows composed things and multiple things in a one and simple way, or just the reverse for both, right? But in either case of his knowing us, that is to say, and we knowing him is the way we know the same as the way things are, right?

[54:02] But the mind is not false, because those two don't have to be the same, and that's why we we affirm to point out that what is many in us is one in what in him, yeah, yeah. Now, to the first one, the text of the authority from Dionysius. To the first, therefore, it should be said that Dionysius says that affirmations are what incompat; they don't fit together, or they're unsuitable, according to the translation.

[54:37] Insofar as no name belongs to God by its way of signifying, huh? This is what we said before, right? Difference between the simple names and the what? I mean, the concrete names and the abstract names. Neither one fits God perfectly, right? And so we say God is good because he really is good, and we say goodness itself because he's really what good in a very simple way.

[55:04] But he's not. We don't say only that he's goodness because that might seem to imply that he's only that by which things are good, right? But he's a goodness that is good, and a good that is goodness itself, and so we can't overcome the defect of our way of knowing, knowing God. Now,

[55:29] the second objection about God being simple. To the second, it should be said that our understanding is not able to grasp simple forms subsisting according as they are in themselves, and that's true about the angels as well. I'm going to be surprised when I finally see what my angel really is. Oh, that's what you are. I didn't know didn't know what you were at all.

[55:53] But it it grasps these things according to the way of composed things, right? In which there is something that is subject and something that is in it, right? And therefore, it apprehends the simple form in by reason of a subject, and it attributes something to it. That's because of the way we what we know, huh? Now, the third objection gets right down to the what I call the central question of philosophy, and that thing that answers.

[56:27] To the third, it should be said that this statement, the understanding understanding a thing other than it is, is false. Is able to be understood in two ways, because this adverb otherwise can determine the verb understands on the part of the thing understood or on the part of the one what understanding. If on the side of the thing understood, then the proposition is true, and the sense is that whoever understands a thing, whatever understanding understands a thing to be other than it is, is false.

[57:08] But this does not take place in what is proposed here, because our understanding forming a statement about God does not say that He is composed, but He's simple. In fact, one of the things we say about Him is that He is simple. Right.

[57:25] Yeah, yeah, yeah. We say in composed way, right? We say in composed way and know in composed way that God is simple, right? Because we put together God and simple, right, and say God is simple, right? Okay. Okay. If, however, on the side of the one understanding, then the statement is false, right? Okay, because other is the way of the understanding and understanding than of the thing and being, right?

[57:54] That's true even about things you know more known to us, huh? For it's manifest that our understanding, huh, understands material things existing below it in an immaterial way, right? Not that it understands them to be immaterial, right? But because it has an immaterial way in understanding,

[58:19] huh? I told you about that that funny thing there in modern physics, huh? Because there they're knowing matter mathematically, but there's no matter in what mathematics. And so, Erwin Schrödinger says the modern atom consists of no stuff at all. You know. And you know, then the Communists, you know, got concerned about this because there are materialists, right? And modern science, but too material. You're knowing it very much so.

[58:56] You're knowing material thing in a material way, huh? Okay. And likewise, when our mind understands simple things which are above it, it understands them in its own way, right? To it in a composed way, right? Not, however, that it understands them to be composed, and thus their understanding is not false, forming a composition about God. So we're going to make and continue to make some affirmative statements about God.

[59:31] That's that's so fundamental, though, and you know, as a philosopher, I know that most philosophers have gone off this idea and thought that the way we know has to be the way things are, right? And they don't always say it explicitly, but I mean it's kind of implicit in in their way of thinking, huh? And what does Spinoza say? You know, the order in our thoughts and the order in things is the same.

[1:00:01] And then Hegel, you know, takes it over from the great rationalists, the Germanist rationalists, so that for Hegel, the most the being which is said of all things is the being who said, "I am who am." So he takes the the first thought of our mind, the most confused thought of our mind, and makes that first in reality. You know, it's terrible, terrible. The position ended up and done, but it follows necessarily if you say that the way we know is the way things are, right?

[1:00:39] And and even the great Sherlock Holmes know that we have to reason backwards, right? You see, but there's all kinds of examples of this, and you've got to see it kind of in particular things and to realize. If

[1:00:52] I say to the students, "Huh? Can you remember yesterday? Say, can you can you remember now? Yesterday? Hmm. " Are you false remembering yesterday now? Because it isn't now, and you're remembering it now, right? You see, it's

[1:01:17] kind of a simple example. Because even talk about the future now, don't we? You know, can we know? I suppose you can know the past, better than the future, obviously, huh? But we can know the past now. I think that's how one of the things I've heard. Maybe it was in the itinerarium of Saint Bonaventure again when he refers to memory, refers to it as might say what contains the past, the present, and the future.

[1:01:50] Because by memory, you can make the past, present, and you can make the future. present.