Prima Pars
57. Summa I, Q.14, Arts. 5–6: God Knows Other Things in Himself, and Knows Each One Distinctly
Class of 2006-12-21
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/057-summa-i-q-14-arts-5-6-god-knows-other-things-in-himself-and/

[0:00] Okay, now the next question is: whether God knows other things besides Himself? Right. To the fifth, thus one proceeds. It seems that God does not know things other than Himself.

[0:20] For whatever things are other from God are outside of him, right? But Augustine says in the Book of Eighty-Three Questions that God does not what look upon anything outside of Himself. Therefore, He does not know things. outside himself. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I don't want to see. Okay, so the the solution is going to be that that that God in knowing other things, he's not going to look out upon them, right?

[0:58] To know them or receive something from them, right? Get information coming into him. I mean, sometimes Scripture speaks this way, kind of metaphorically, about God. You know, now I know you love me,

[1:14] you know. You know, but he really didn't know it already. But God has to know other things in knowing Himself, and not by going out to them or by receiving from them something. And not by, in fact, even reasoning, as we'll see from one thing to another. Okay. So Augustine's really touching upon this, but you can misunderstand in what sense, huh?

[1:48] Moreover, the thing understood is the perfection of the one understanding. If, therefore, God understands something other than Himself, something else will be the perfection of God and more noble than Him, which is impossible. That again is going to be solved by God only knowing other things by what knowing Himself, right? So the perfection of His mind is Himself, and not the other things.

[2:19] Moreover, to understand has its species, huh, from the thing understood, just as every other act from its what object, right? Whence to understand itself is, to that extent, more noble, more excellent, as more noble is the thing that is what understood.

[2:49] That's the way we kind of reason out that the best knowledge is the knowledge of the best thing, because one knowledge is better than another because it's knowledge of a better thing.

[3:02] So if knowledge of a better thing is better knowledge, then the best knowledge must be a knowledge of the best thing. So if wisdom is the best knowledge; it must be a knowledge of the best thing.

[3:19] But God is as very what to understand. If, therefore, God understands something other than Himself, God Himself will be specified to something other than Himself, which is impossible. Therefore, he understands does not understand anything other than himself, right? These are all showing in a way that God can't understand anything other than Himself as what He chiefly understands, and it's only in understanding Himself that He can understand other things.

[3:57] But against all this philosophical nonsense is what is said in the Epistle to the Hebrews, chapter four, verse thirteen, that all things are naked and open to His eyes, right?

[4:12] So that sounds like He does know other things, right? In fact, all the things They're open, then. I answer: It should be said that it is necessary that God. Know things other than himself, huh? For it is manifest that he understands himself perfectly, right?

[4:40] Otherwise, his very being would not be perfect, since his being is his understanding, huh? But if something is perfectly known, it is necessary that its power be perfectly what known, huh?

[5:01] But the power of something is not able to be known perfectly unless there are known those things to which that power extends. Whence, since the divine power extends to other things, in that he is the first what, the efficient cause of all beings, as has been is clear from what has gone before. It is necessary that God what understand things other than himself.

[5:35] I could say that because God is what the cause of all the things, right? If he knows himself perfectly, he must know himself as the cause of all the things, and he couldn't know that unless he knew the other things.

[5:51] He says this more even more evidently comes about if one joins or adds to this, that the very being of the first agent cause of God is his what to understand, huh? Whence, whatever effects pre-exist in God is in his first cause, they are necessarily in his what understanding, and that all things are in them according to a what understandable way, because this is a common principle that everything that is in another is in it according to the what way of that in which it is.

[6:32] So, since God is his very what, yeah, everything must be in God in an understandable way. Somebody understands me. He knows you better than you know yourself.

[6:54] Yeah. So look out. Sometimes you think in real life, you know, somebody knows us better than we know ourselves, and it's kind of it's kind of uneasy, you know. The

[7:11] parents, to some extent, know the little child more than the child knows himself or herself. But to understanding in what way other things he knows other things from himself, right? It should be considered that in two ways something is known, right? In one way, in itself, right? In another way, in another. In itself, a thing is known when it is known through a form that is private and adequate to the thing being known.

[7:50] Just as when the eye sees a man through the what form of the man. In another, however, is seen that which is seen through the form of the one what containing it, just as the part is seen in the whole through the form of the whole. Or when a man is seen in the mirror through the form of the mirror, or in whatever other way it happens that something is known in another right?

[8:20] Thus, therefore, it should be said that God knows himself in himself, right? Because he knows or sees himself through his very nature essence, but things other than himself he sees not in themselves, right? But in him, right? In so far as his very substance contains a likeness of all the things from him, right? Because every agent makes what is like itself.

[8:54] Can't give what I don't have in some way. Okay. Then he explains the words of Augustine that he had in the first objection. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the word of Augustine saying that God sees nothing outside himself should not be understood as if nothing that is outside himself is seen by him, but because that which is outside himself he does not see except by himself.

[9:26] Okay, so it's in seeing himself that he sees other things, right? It's not by turning away from himself to them that he sees them, right? That's an unusual thing, right?

[9:41] I don't see much seeing myself, but I turn to other things to to see them, right? Now the second objection was about the understood being perfection of the one understanding, right?

[10:01] To the second, it should be said that the understood is the perfection of the one understanding, not according to its very substance, huh? But according to its form, right?

[10:19] By which is in the understanding as the form and perfection of it. For Aristotle says the stone is not in the soul, right? But the form of the stone, right? As is said in the third book about the soul. So those things which are other than God are understood by God in so far as the divine substance or essence nature contains the what? Yeah, or their forms.

[10:50] Whence it does not follow that something other is the perfection of the divine understanding, but the very what form which understands, which is the essence of God.

[11:03] Now the third objection was saying, well, to understand is what defined by what you understand, right? And the more perfect a thing you understand, the more perfect it is, right? Okay.

[11:22] Well, Thomas makes this clear distinction here. To the third, it should be said that to understand itself. Is not specified through that which is understood in another, but through what is chiefly or principally understood, in which other things are understood.

[11:47] For to that extent, to understand is specified by its object, in so far as the understandable form is the beginning or source of the intellectual operation. But every operation is specified by the form, which is the principle of the operation, as heating through heat. Whence, through that understandable form, is specified intellectual operation, which makes the intellect to be what in act, and this is the what form of the chief object, or the chief thing understood, which in God is nothing other than His what, yeah, in which all these species of things are comprehended.

[12:34] Whence it is not necessary that the divine understanding or God Himself be specified through something other than what the divine essence, because He understands nothing else except in understanding himself, right? So His understanding is what specified by nothing other than Himself.

[12:58] Now, if He understood something else, not by understanding Himself, then that something else would be specifying the understanding, right? And that would be something less,

[13:11] something imperfect, huh? So, for me to understand the soul is better than for me to understand the body, right? And for me to understand an angel is better than to understand what the soul is, and for me to understand what God is is better than to understand what an angel is, huh? Okay, but for me, each one of those understandings is different and specified by a particular thing I am knowing.

[13:43] But God knows what God is chiefly, right? And in knowing what God is, He knows what a soul is, and what an angel is, and what a body is, and all the rest.

[13:56] So His understanding is specified only by the divine substance, and not by these other things that He knows, because He knows them only in knowing what Himself. Okay, if He knew them in themselves and not in knowing Himself, then He would have some imperfect acts of understanding, right, in addition to the act of understanding Himself. And you'd have also a problem having multiplicity of acts in God, and they couldn't be a substance, and so on.

[14:34] You get accidents and all kinds of problems, right? But he understands everything other than himself only in understanding himself. Take a little break here now. Now that we know that God knows other things, now He goes into how well He knows them, and particular things that there seems to be some difficulty about knowing, huh? Whether God knows other things from Himself by what a proper knowledge, does He have any kind of a confused general knowledge of things, like, okay?

[15:14] For thus He knows things other than Himself, as has been said, according as other things from Him are in Him, right? But other things from Him are in Him as in a first what, common universal cause. Therefore, other things are known by God as in a what, first and universal cause. But this is to know in in in universal and not according to what, private or proper particular knowledge.

[15:49] Therefore, God knows things other than Himself in general and not in particular. Um, and there you're confusing the two senses we talked about before: universal, right? The universal cause and the universal in predication, right? Boy, Thomas, make the distinction. in his own way huh.

[16:12] Okay. Moreover, the more the essence of the creature, ah. Oh yeah, the same distance that there's between the essence of the creature from the divine essence, the same distance is there between the the divine essence from the creature. Okay, you know you're as far away from me as I am from you. That's what he's saying, right, huh? Okay, as far away as the creature is in its essence or its nature from the nature of God, so also likewise the nature of God has got the same distance from creature.

[16:55] But through the nature of the creature, the essence of the creature, one cannot know the divine nature, right? That makes sense. We discussed before. Therefore, neither through the divine nature can one know the creature. Equally distant, huh? That's nice, democratic argument.

[17:19] And thus, since God knows nothing except through His own nature, it follows that He does not know the creature according to what its nature, so that He knows about it what it is, which would be to have a a particular or private knowledge of the thing, huh?

[17:41] Moreover, private knowledge is not had about a thing or particular knowledge, precise knowledge, except through what its own its own definition. But since God knows all things through His essence, it does not seem that He knows each thing to its own what definition. For the same is not able to be the proper reason for many and diverse things. Therefore, God does not have a particular knowledge of things, but a common one.

[18:19] For to know things not according to their proper or private reason is to know those things only in what general. But against this, to have a particular knowledge of things is to know things not only in general but according as they are distinct from each other. But thus God knows things. Whence it is said in the Epistle to the Hebrews that it goes so far as to the division between the spirit and the soul, right?

[18:53] Between your higher powers and your lower powers, and the what? And then we talk about the sinews or something. Sinews, yeah, and the medullas, the marrow, marrow, yeah, and the discrimination of the thoughts and the intentions of the heart, which we can't even do ourselves. Nor is any creature invisible in His sight. Okay,

[19:20] so he says. I answer. It should be said that about this, some, and in my Marietti edition refers to verism. Some have erred saying that God does not know things what other than Himself, except in general, right? To wit, in so far as they are beings, just as the fire that knew itself as the source of heat would know the nature of heat and all other things in so far as they are hot.

[19:54] Thus, God, in so far as He knows Himself as the source of being, knows the nature of being and all other things in so far as they are being. Sounds like He's a metaphysician, right?

[20:07] But this cannot be, for to understand something in general and not in particular and special is to know something imperfectly. Whence our understanding, which goes from potency to act, first arise at a universal and confused knowledge of things before it arises at a what proper or particular knowledge. As proceeding from the imperfect towards the perfect, this is clear in the first reading from the first book of Physics.

[20:44] There, if therefore the knowledge of God about things other than Himself were in general only and not in particular. It would follow that his understanding was not in all ways perfect, and consequently neither would his being, which is against what we showed above. It is necessary, therefore, to say that he knows things other than himself by proper or particular knowledge, not only according as they come together in the notion of being, but according as one is distinguished from the what other.

[21:24] Okay. So he rejects this mistake here on the grounds that it what is contrary to perfection of divine knowledge. Okay. Now, to the evidence of this, it should be considered that some wishing to show that God, through one thing knows many, they use many examples, right? As if the center knew itself, right? If it know all lines proceeding from the center, or light, if it knew itself and know all what colors.

[22:07] But these examples, although to some extent are similar, right? Nevertheless, as regards universal causality, nevertheless they fall short in this respect that the multitude and diversity are not caused by that one universal principle.

[22:34] As regards that which is the source of their distinction, but only as regards that in which they what come together. For the diversity of colors is not caused from light only, but from the diverse disposition of the transparent receiving it. And similarly, the diversity of lines from their diverse what position.

[23:00] And hence it is that this sort of diversity and multitude is not able to be known in its beginning according to a what particular knowledge, but only in what general. But it's not thus in God, for it's been shown above that whatever is of perfection in any creature, right, the whole pre-exists and is contained in God in some more what excellent way.

[23:34] For not only that in which creatures come together, for example, in being, retains perfection, but also those things to which creatures are distinguished from each other, as to be alive, right, and to understand, and things of this sort, For which living things are distinguished from non-living things, and things understanding from those not understanding are distinguished. And every form through which anything in its own species is constituted, is a certain, what perfection.

[24:09] And thus, all things preexist in God, not only as regards that which is common to all, right, but also as regards those things by which things are distinguished one from another. And thus, since God in Himself contains all perfections, the essence of God is compared to all the natures of things, not as something general to something particular,

[24:41] as the unit to numbers or the center to the lines, but as a perfect. Perfect act to what? Imperfect acts, as if I were to say, for example, man to animal, or six, which is a perfect number, to the imperfect number is contained under it. But it is manifest that through a perfect act is able to be known the imperfect acts, not only in general, but by a what particular knowledge.

[25:18] Just as who knows man knows animal by particular what knowledge, and who knows six knows three by what? Proper. Yeah. So six knew itself fully would know what can partake of six imperfectly like three, right? Okay.

[25:40] Since therefore, thus therefore, since the essence of God has in itself whatever perfection the nature of any other thing has, and something more, then God in himself is able to know all things by a what particular knowledge.

[26:02] For the particular nature of each thing consists in this, according as it partakes in some way of the divine what perfection. But God would not know himself perfectly unless he knew in whatever way he could be partaken of by other things, in which his perfection could be partaken of by other things. Now would he know the nature of being itself perfectly unless he knew all the ways of being?

[26:37] Hence it is manifest that God knows all things things by a particular distinct knowledge, according as they are distinguished one from the other. That's hard for us to understand, huh? Yeah.

[26:53] Because we seem to need, you know, at a different thought for each thing we're trying to know distinctly, huh? But well, you know, at the idea of limits there in mathematics, as the economist used to point out, there, you know, that is our mind striving to be a little bit like an angel, right? And even more remotely like God. So you have, let's say, you have one thought about what a circle is, and another thought about what a a polygon is.

[27:28] Let's say, right? Okay. Two different thoughts, right? And so I'm understanding what a circle is, and not understanding what a square is, and vice versa, right? But now let's say if you inscribe a square in a circle, right, and then you bisect these lines. These parts of circle and make a thing of twice as many things, and you bisect these, right? Well, then you begin to understand the circle as the limit of polygons as the number of sides increase.

[28:04] So, if you know the circle as a limit of polygons, then you know the circle and polygon are the same thought, so to speak, right? And there, in a very feeble way, even mind is trying to know two things distinctly, right? If you properly understand this, the fact that the polygons, no matter how many times you divide it, will never what reach the circle. Yeah, it's a limit you can never quite reach.

[28:31] You see the distinction between the circle and the polygon at the same time, right? So there, that's just kind of the feeble attempt of our mind to be a little bit like the angels, right? A very simple thing like that. Isn't that same figure? Yes, the circle is a perfect figure. Yeah, something like that. Maybe related. Yeah, yeah. But this thing here is all different. The point you're trying to make here, right?

[28:59] I mean, the point is that in knowing the circle as the limit of polygons, right? You're knowing the circle and the polygon and seeing it by the same thought, and you see the distinction of them because this is a limit that you can never reach. So you see, the polygon is never a circle, circle, yeah. No matter how many times you can, but you keep on approaching it, right?

[29:20] So you're, in a sense, defining the circle as a limit of polygons. You're knowing circle and polygon together. That's kind of a very vague thing, right? Then. Now, look

[29:40] at the first objection there, right? God is knowing other things as in a first universal cause. That's not to know them the way they are. To the first, therefore, should be said that to know thus something,

[30:11] as it is in the knower, can be understood in two ways. In one way, according as this adverb "sick" implies the way of knowing on the side of the thing known, and thus it is what false.

[30:30] For not always does the one knowing know the known according to that being that it has in the knower. For the eye does not know the stone according to the existence that it has in the eye, but through the form of the stone that it has in itself. It knows the stone according to the being that it has outside the eye, and as someone knowing knows the known according to the being that it has in the knower.

[31:06] Nevertheless, it knows it also according to the being that it has outside the one knowing. Just as the understanding knows the stone according to the understandable being that it has in the understanding, right? Insofar as it knows itself to understand, right? But nevertheless, it knows the being of the stone in its own what nature.

[31:34] If, however, it be understood according to this adverb "sick" that implies the mode on the part of the one knowing, it is true that thus the one knowing knows the known in the way it is in the knower, right?

[31:55] Because the more perfectly the known is in the knower, the more perfect is the way of what the knowledge. Thus, therefore, it should be said that God not only knows things in Himself, but to the fact that He contains in Himself, right, things He knows them in their own what nature, and the more perfectly, the more perfectly each thing is what in Him. So they're more perfectly in God than they are in themselves.

[32:36] So God's way of knowing them is more perfect than their way of being, but He still knows them as they what are, right? Okay. I'm surprised Thomas doesn't distinguish. Like you might do it sometimes between those two senses of universal, right? He doesn't do that here. I mean, that's not the way he takes the objection as focusing on that.

[33:04] The objection is focusing more upon them being in God in a different way than they are in themselves. Okay, but God knows not only the way they are in Him, but the way they are in themselves, just as we know that.

[33:31] What's the old the old mistake there that you have in the moderns and Berkeley especially, huh? Where it's true that everything I know is what known by me,

[33:48] and I don't know it is known by me. And it's known by me only insofar as it's in me. Therefore, I don't know anything outside myself. Is that good? I'm pointing it outside myself. I don't think so. What's wrong with that argument?

[34:18] Well, I know what a a triangle is, right? It's true that it's known by me, right? But do I put "known by me" in the definition of triangle?

[34:36] In other words, what do I know? I know the triangle. I know what a three-sided plane figure is, right? But in my definition of triangle. Do I say three-sided plane figure known by Berquist No. Because then none of us would be ever knowing the same thing, would we? I could never have learned about the triangle from Euclid because his knowledge would have been what? His knowledge. His definition of triangle would include known by Euclid, and and my definition of triangle would include known by Euclid.

[35:11] So we have the same definition. But yet, it's always true of what is known by me that it's known by me. But in that case, it's accidental to what I know that it's known by me. Yeah. Even though it's necessarily known by me, I know it. Yeah. What does Aristotle say? The fallacy of the accident deceives even the wise. I think it especially deceives the wise when it's necessarily what there.

[35:49] You know, Hegel kind of universalizes the mistake of the accident when he speaks of the portentous power of the negative. Everything arises negative. Can I teach you something you already know?

[36:07] No. Only teach you if you're ignorant of something, right? So the only reason why you're able to learn is because you're ignorant. Right. True.

[36:23] Is your ignorance your ability to learn? Ability to know. Is it? To itself and to another. We see you come to know what you don't know, to something you know already, right?

[36:46] Now you're ignorant of it before you come to know it necessarily, but is it through your ignorance that you come to know it? In Richard II, there,

[37:00] Norfolk speaks of dull, barren, unfeeling ignorance, right? Why is he called ignorance barren? It gets nothing through itself. Yeah. Yeah. So before I multiply the length by the width, I don't know the what area, and it's necessarily true, right? But do I come to know the area through my ignorance of the area? Through your knowledge of the length and the width. Yeah, yeah. So even though my ignorance of the area necessarily comes before my learning the area, it's not really the cause of my coming to know it.

[37:44] It's something that happens to the real cause, but it's something accidental to to my coming to know. And you know, we've talked before, I think, about the the mistake there of of

[38:06] Sartre, you know, where he takes our freedom to be a kind of non-being. Well, you know, if I go to the restaurant and they give me a menu there, and if I'm really what free to choose between steak and chicken or something else, then before I choose, my will is what determined to choose steak rather than chicken. But

[38:38] then my will is not free, right? Right. So he says, before I choose, then there must be this non-being in my will, this lack of determination, right? And that's my freedom, he says. Is that true? No.

[38:57] He's identifying my ability to choose between steak and chicken, right, with my lack of choice between the two. Are they the same thing? That's like confusing my ability to know with my ignorance or something, huh? But because

[39:21] it necessarily is found there before I choose, you can think that that is the real what. Cause. Cause, yeah. Because Bernard Lonergan says that knowledge is like an empty stomach that's hungry.

[39:41] That's a good thing, there. You know about two opposites attract, right? You know. Suchi, okay. Now the second objection was saying, "Well, the divine nature is as far away from the nature of the creature as the reverse, right? "

[40:07] But he says the nature of the creature is compared to the nature of God, the essence of the creature, to the essence of God, as an imperfect act to a what universally perfect one. And therefore, the nature of the creature does not sufficiently lead us to the knowledge of the divine essence, but the what reverse, huh? Okay. In other words, the nature of the creature is contained already in God in a superior way and more excellent way than is found in the creature.

[40:42] But that's not true that the nature of God is found in a more excellent way in the creature than in itself, but in but in a perfect partaking of it. So you can't really know that, right?

[40:59] Now the third one is the one we're talking about here. You know what they call the universal representation, right? To the third, it should be said: to the same is not able to be taken as the reason of diverse things by way of a kind of what equality, right? But the divine essence is something exceeding all creatures, huh? Whence it can be taken as the proper reason of each thing, according as it is in diverse ways able to be partaken of, or to be imitated by diverse creatures, huh?

[41:34] So if God knows Himself perfectly, then He knows every way in which He's able to be what? Partaken of, yeah, or every which can be imitated, right? Some some ways more perfectly, and some ways less perfectly, right? So He wouldn't know Himself perfectly if He didn't know how it could be imitated.

[42:00] But the creature in knowing Himself couldn't know God, right, huh? Because He's only in a perfect way like God, huh? So. So I guess we got to kind of stop right now for four fifteen, huh?