Prima Pars
59. God's Knowledge of Things That Are Not and of Bad Things; Knowing Our Own Ignorance (Summa I, q.14, aa.9–10)
Class of 2007-01-04
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/059-gods-knowledge-of-things-that-are-not-and-of-bad-things-knowing/

[0:00] Nine here now. Whether God has knowledge of things that are not, okay? The knowledge of God is not except of things that are what true. Can you know the false?

[0:24] Can you know that two is half of five? You can maybe think that two is half of five. You can't know that, can you? No.

[0:39] Um. So the knowledge of God is not except of two things, but true and being are what convertible. Therefore, the knowledge of God is not of non-beings, huh?

[0:56] I can answer that. Moreover. Knowledge requires likeness between the knower and the known, but those things which are not cannot have any likeness to God, who is to be itself. I am who am. Therefore, those things which are not are not able to be known by God.

[1:21] Moreover, the knowledge of God is a cause of the things known by Him, but His knowledge is not a cause of non-beings because non-being does not have a cause. Therefore, God does not have knowledge of non-beings. Huh? I'm sorry, but. But against this is what the apostle, like in that Antonomasia for Saint Paul. But against this is what the apostle says in the epistle to the Romans, who calls those things which are not just as those things which are which are, huh?

[1:58] I answer: It should be said that God knows all things, whatever that are in any way whatsoever, huh? For nothing prevents those things which are not what simply to be in some way, right? This is that distinction we've talked about many times, huh? It corresponds to the second kind of mistake outside of what speech, huh?

[2:27] It's the kind of mistake that Mino makes in the dialogue, right? And when Socrates tries to answer it, he makes the same kind of mistake. You wonder whether Plato did that knowingly or.

[2:41] Those things are simply, without qualification, which are an act, right? But not those things are in potency, right? So someone said to me, without qualifying it or simply, "Am I standing now? What would you say? No, because I'm not standing an act, although I'm able to stand, right? Okay, I'm standing an ability. You can't say simply; you can't qualify it. Those things, however, which are not an act, are in the ability or the power either of God Himself or the creature, right?

[3:23] Whether in an active power or in a passive power, those are the two kinds of powers that Aristotle first distinguishes in the ninth book of Wisdom, right? Or in the power of what thinking or imagining or in some other way of signifying. Whatever things, therefore, by the creature are able to what

[3:48] come to be or to be thought or to be said, and also whatever things he is able to make, God knows all these things, right? Even if in act they are not,

[4:01] and to this extent, it can be said that he has knowledge of what non-beings, huh? So God wouldn't know His own power and the power of other things if only knew what was an act, because His power extends to things besides the things He's made, and even our power extends to things that we have not made or done, and so on. Mozart said, "when they paid him too much for what I do, to live for what I could do."

[4:34] But of those things which are not an act, there should be no distinction diversity. For some things, although they are not now an act, nevertheless they were, or they will be, or they were, right? In all of these things, God is said to know by the knowledge of what vision, right?

[5:01] Because since the understanding of God, which is His very being, is measured by eternity, the things He comprehends, ah, without succession, the whole of what existing time.

[5:22] In so far as the inside of God goes over the whole time, right? And all things which are in any time whatsoever are in what? yeah, subject to him presently. This is what what as I mentioned again, the Boethius takes up in the fifth book of the Consolation of Philosophy, right? Huh? How can God know the past and the future and so on when His knowledge is eternal, right?

[5:53] And he has to, you know, start all first, and it shows the way of knowing doesn't have to be the way things are, right? But Thomas often makes that comparison to the circle, right? And he says, you know, the points on the circumference of the circle are before and after each other, right? But to the point which is the center of the circle, which is not a point on the circle, they're all what they're the opposite, right?

[6:18] So the past and the future and the present in time, one is before and after each other, but they're all present to what God in His eternity. That's very hard for us to understand, right?

[6:34] But the way we know is not the way things are, right? But you have a little hint of that when you and I know the past, what now, right? And sometimes you groan when you recall the past, or you laugh again when you recall something funny that happened in the past, right? And so the past is present to you now, right? But the future is also present to God, right?

[7:00] Of course, we kind of try to anticipate the future, right? And imagine we're going to be doing later on today or tomorrow or next week or something, right? But they're all present to God. Amazing, amazing. God.

[7:15] You know, used to be a program on TV in the old days. You know, you were there, Jeremy. And they always reenacting events, right? Reenacting famous events, right? You know, and and one time they had the trial Socrates on, you know, and they're interviewing people, you know, what's going on. But the sir used to joke about because that program, listen to it, heard about it, you know, and so when get the vision, you'll be there, so you'll be present to the past, you'll be present again.

[7:46] You were there. You'll be there. But some things there are which are in the power of God or the creature, which nevertheless will not be, or or what? Nor were they. They neither are nor nor were they nor will they be, right? And in respect to these things, is not said to have the knowledge of what? Vision, right? But a simple what? Understanding, right?

[8:20] Which is said thus because those things which are seen with us have distinct being outside the one seeing, right? So that's what we call the one, the knowledge of vision, right? Okay.

[8:40] Okay. Now the first objection said the knowledge of God is not except of things that are true, but being and true are convertible. Therefore, the God, the knowledge of God is not of non-beings. To the first, therefore, it should be said that according as they are in ability or in potency, thus they have truth those things which are not in what act. For it is true for them to be in potency, and thus they are known by God.

[9:09] So, in some sense, they are right. So, when you say that true and being are convertible, you got to realize that being is said in many ways—in act and in ability. To the second objection, there can be a likeness between the knower and the known, but those things which are not cannot have any likeness to God. To the second, it should be said that says since God is being itself, in so far as each thing is, to that extent each thing is, to the extent that it partakes of what a likeness of God, huh?

[9:57] Just as each thing, to that extent, is. hot insofar as it partakes of, what heat? Thus, those things which are in potency, even if they are not in act are known by what God, because they have even some kind of likeness to them, however distant, right?

[10:25] Because every agent makes what is like itself, right? So the agent could not make God could not make matter unless, in some way, however remote, it is like God, right? Okay.

[10:48] The third argument says God knowledge is a cause of things. To the third, it should be said that God, the knowledge of God, is a cause of things joined with what the will. Whence it is not necessary that whatever things God knows either are or were or will be in the future, but only those things that He wishes to be, right? Or that He permits to be.

[11:23] Again, those things that are not of this sort are not in the knowledge of God as if they were, but as if they were what able to be, right? Okay. So God chose you to be, right?

[11:39] So He chose for your parents to meet, right? But notice, even if your parents meet, your chances of being right are very good. very small, right? Huh? You know, you know. So that in the marriage act and so on, there's lots of what sperm and so on, right? Hundreds or thousands, I don't know, huge numbers, right? And so even that day you were conceived, your chances are not very good, you know.

[12:17] And and maybe only on that day or that month or whatever it was could you have been conceived at all, right? Okay. So I mean, all these other people could have been besides you. So why why are you you know insignificant? You why were you chosen to be huh? You know, but you realize that He's choosing you to be was kind of very much gratuitous, huh? Very much gratuitous.

[12:43] So like in that passage I was reading from Jude, you know, says the mercy of of Christ, right? Eternal life, huh? So even if you have belief and hope and charity, still the eternal life is something. You're not quite worthy of, right? Still, through the mercy of God, it's still not completely, simply justice, right?

[13:11] It's going to be better than you thought it was going to be. You know, people, you know, they they they think of some like some movie or something, you know, and and how can I spend eternity just looking at God? You know, I mean, when I want to get restless, you know, and like Origen said, and you gotta go back into the body, you know, or escape the vision.

[13:35] Well, no. you never completely comprehend God, right? He always remains wonderful, marvelous. It's hard for us to kind of understand that, right? Huh? That's all you're going to be doing. And Scripture speaks of us in like a a pillar, you know, that doesn't go out anymore. And when Thomas talks about the gift of agility, right, to you know show you the power you have over your body now, the control of your body, not that you really need to go anywhere.

[14:07] No, it seems to me it'd be it'd be interesting to see in the flesh, you know, all these saints and you know obviously Christ Himself and Mary and so on, but all these saints. I like to see Thomas, you know. Hear his voice now. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You're doing it. My squeaky voice. Yeah, yeah. Did you ever go? Did you ever go? I thought you first heard

[14:45] Churchill's voice. Not too good a voice, you know. Oh, really? No, I mean, I mean, his words are very good, but his voice is not really that that that good. This is a recording made by the BBC toward the end of Chesterton's life. He had some essay he'd written. I've never heard it. I always wanted to hear it because I

[15:09] could picture it. The BBC. Just doesn't carry the weight. The weight of Chesterton. Yeah. I guess FDR had a pretty good voice, though, huh? As they say. Sonorous. Yeah, yeah.

[15:27] That's what somebody said. Saint Francis, when we were ordained deacon, one of your poor Clare friends sent us a card because Saint Francis was a deacon, and some contemporary Saint Francis described as chanting the gospel with a very sonorous voice. I remember that card.

[15:48] Okay, the tenth article whether God knows bad things. For the philosopher says in the third book about the soul. That the understanding which is not in potency does not know lack. Aristotle is talking about how our mind knows lack by knowing the fact that it sometimes knows this and something it doesn't know that, right? But bad is a lack of the good, as Augustine says. We talked a little bit about the bad before, right?

[16:29] But strictly speaking, the first meaning of bad is a lack of something you are able to have and should have, right? And when you should have it.

[16:40] Therefore, since the understanding of God is never in potency but always in act, right? It seems that God does not know bad things, right?

[16:51] Aristotle is talking about one way in which our mind knows the bad, right? One way in which our mind knows lack by the fact that itself is lacking at times, right? That's not the way God knows lack, right?

[17:09] Moreover, every knowledge is either a cause of what is known or is caused by it, right? I mentioned Thomas sometimes. takes a third thing of the angels, right? Because the knowledge of the angels as regards natural things is it a cause of natural things? No. Is natural things a cause of it? No. Well, it's the third thing then. God is a cause of both, right? And so Augustine explains, you know, the Genesis there.

[17:42] You know, when something is made in the material world, it's also made in the thoughts of the angels, right? And the parallel pre-established harmony there.

[17:57] So all knowledge is either a cause of the thing known or is caused by it. But the knowledge of God is not a cause of the bad, nor is it caused by the bad. Therefore, the knowledge of God is not a bad thing. So there is a special difficulty here, saying how does God know bad things? Now that'd be nice, if he didn't know my sins. I'm afraid that's wishful thinking.

[18:21] He's very much aware of my sins. Too yeah, too much for comfort on my part. Okay. Moreover, everything that is known is known through its likeness or through its opposite, right? Whatever God knows, He knows through His very essence, right? But the divine essence is neither a likeness of the bad, right? Nor is anything bad opposed to it. huh? And incidentally, Aristotle already pointed this out. For the divine essence, there is nothing contrary, as the great Augustine says in the twelfth book on the City of God.

[19:03] Therefore, God does not. No, bad things, huh? Moreover, what is known not to itself but to another is imperfectly known. But the bad is not known by God to itself, because thus it would be necessary that the bad would be in God.

[19:30] It would be necessary for the known to be the knower. If, therefore, is known to another, as to it, through the good, it would be imperfectly known by him, which is impossible, because no knowledge of God is imperfect. Therefore, the knowledge of God is not of bad things, huh? Knowledge is But it would be knowledge of perfect good, which is not the cause of knowing what is imperfect and bad, right?

[19:59] Yeah. I mean, Isn't the cause of it yeah, but this is a a different objection now. And which objection you're giving here? No, no, I'm just trying to think that out and then what he says about this. Yeah. But against this is what is said in the book of Proverbs, the 15th chapter. In fairness, hell and perdition are before God, right? He knows these things.

[20:33] I answer: It should be said that whoever perfectly knows something is necessary that it he knows all. all things which can happen to that thing, right? But there are some good things to which it can happen that they be corrupted through bad things. Hence,

[20:52] God would not perfectly know good things unless he knew what bad things, right? But thus, a thing is knowable in so far as it is, right?

[21:09] Hence, since this is the what the being of the bad that be a privation of the good to the very fact that God knows good things, things, he knows also bad things, just as through light are known what darkness. Hence, Dionysius says in the seventh chapter of the Divine Names that God, through Himself, gets a vision of what darkness.

[21:43] Not otherwise or elsewhere seeing the darkness except what from the light. Now, he explained the words of Aristotle was talking about a special way that our mind knows lack.

[22:02] To the first, therefore, it should be said that the word of the philosophers should be thus understood: that the understanding which is not in potency, right, does not know privation in this way, namely by what the privation existing in it. Okay. As often

[22:26] you remember manifesting matter and form and privation by knowledge and ignorance and ability to know. Remember that. Not. But teaching you, you teach something as a freshman, you know, and then you get them in a class as a junior, a senior, and you know. But I did. I was in college, huh?

[22:54] If Casuri, you know, was teaching two sections of a course, I'd sit, and I was free at both times, I'd sit on both sections, right? Yeah. And after I finished the course and got my A and so on, then next year I'd sit in that course again, you know. And finally, say stop coming to it. You don't know anything I'm going to say. But I mean, really, I kind of realized that you know it takes a long time to to get these things, huh?

[23:25] So you manifesting that matter, form, and lack of form can manifest that by the ability to know, right? And by the lack of knowledge, right? And the knowledge itself, the relation of the three together.

[23:53] Okay, well maybe we'll go back to that today, though. So he says the word of the philosopher should be thus understood: that the understanding, which is not an ability, does not know privation through the privation existing in it, huh? And thus it what

[24:17] agrees with what was said above: that the point and everything indivisible is known through the privation or lack of division, huh? Which happens from this fact that simple forms and indivisible forms are not enact in our understanding, but in potency only. For if they were enact in our understanding, they would not be known through what Privation. privation, and thus simple things are known by what the separated substances like the angels and God.

[25:00] God therefore does not know bad through the privation or lack existing in himself, but through the opposite way, good, huh? Now the second one says, "Well, God knows things because His knowledge is a cause, of it, right? " But he's not the cause of bad. Well, to the second, it should be said that the knowledge of God is not a cause of the bad, but it's a cause of the good through which is known what bad, yeah.

[25:40] Now the third objection is saying, "Well, there's no bad that is opposed to God, okay? " Or no, the way Thomas solves that. To the third, therefore, it should be said that although the bad is not opposed to the divine essence. Which is not corruptible through anything bad, huh? It is opposed, nevertheless, to the effects of God, right? Which he knows through his essence, right? And in knowing them, he knows the what bad things that are opposed to them, right?

[26:15] So he doesn't know the bad as something opposed to his own nature, right? Because his nature does not not capable of anything bad, right? But he knows the bad that is opposed to what the good of the creature, right? Through knowing the good of the creature, he knows what's opposed to that good. Okay. So this is necessary that there be something bad that's

[26:46] or some lack that could be in God, in order for him to know the bad, right? But the lack that there could be in the creature something that pertains to its goodness, right? Is that clear enough?

[27:06] I mean, for example, for my courage as opposed to that cowardice or something of that sort, right? To my knowledge, ignorance, right? Okay. But is there some vice opposed to God's virtue? Some vice he could have as opposed to some virtue, or is there some ignorance that God could have opposed to? No, no. So he can't know bad as a lack of something that he's that he has and should have, right?

[27:39] He can only know the bad as a lack of something that some creature is able to have and should have, right? Okay. So he doesn't know the bad as the opposite of his own nature as a lack of something that he should have, but he knows it in knowing the goodness of the creature what would be the lack of what that creature should have. Okay. Is it?

[28:04] As the teacher says, it's not just sadly lacking. Okay. Assuming the teacher knows everything, do you see the idea? The objection is saying, you know, that what

[28:21] look back at the objection there, right? Huh? Everything that is known is known through its likeness or through its opposite, right? Whatever God knows, he knows through his own essence, right? Dangerous word there, pair, right? Um. But the divine essence is not a likeness of anything bad, right? Okay. Nor is what there something bad that is opposed to the divine nature, right?

[28:53] For to the divine essence, there is nothing contrary, right? There can't be any lack in God because He's pure act. Okay, so therefore, how can God know the bad, right? Well, if He knew only Himself and didn't know anything outside of Himself, right, or besides Himself, would He know bad? Well,

[29:20] there's no bad opposed to Him, right? There's no lack that nothing He could lack. You see? So what the bad really is is the non-being of something you're able to have and should have, right? So you have to have an ability to have something, and therefore, what you're able to have is not the same as your ability to have it, right? And so you can lack that which you're able to have and should have, but in God, there's no what ability to be actualized.

[29:57] God is pure act, right? Going back to the argument. that Act is before ability, simply speaking, right? In the ninth book of wisdom, huh? You remember how he reasons out, right? Back in the in the beginning of the question on the simplicity of God, is where he brings it out here, right? Um,

[30:24] look back in in question three, article one, right? The middle argument there, right? Because it is necessary that that which is the first being to be an act and in no way in potency, right? And then he gives the reason for it from Aristotle's ninth book of wisdom. Although in one and the same thing that goes forward from ability to act, it is an ability in time before it's an act, right?

[30:59] Simply, without qualification, act is before what ability, right? Because what is an ability does not come to be an act except through what is. being an act. Yeah, it has been shown above that God is the first being. It is impossible, therefore, that there be in God something in ability, right? So, if there can't be anything in ability in God, then there can't be any what lack of God, and therefore there can't be bad as opposed to God, huh?

[31:35] So, if he knows the bad as opposed to the good, it must be by his knowing the good of creatures, to which there can be a lack that is opposed, not by knowing what his own goodness, right? Which has nothing bad opposed to it, right? Yeah. And so then, the Aristotle is talking about the equivocation of words, right? Huh? He says,

[32:10] if one has an opposite, the other doesn't have an opposite. it can't mean the same thing. So, if good is said of God instead of us, but the good that is said of us has an opposite, and the good that is said of God doesn't have an opposite, then good can't mean the same thing said of God instead of us. That's one of the canonical rules, huh?

[32:32] In the first book of Places, And so actually the reason why why Christ says God alone is good, right? In one sense, in the fullest sense, God alone is good, right? But that's because He's goodness itself, huh? So there can't be any lack opposed to God as such. But to my virtue, there's opposed to vice I can have, right? To my knowledge, there's a mistake, right, or ignorance, right, And error follows ignorance.

[33:09] A lack. That's because there's a real distinction in me between my ability to know and my actually knowing, right? Or in God, there's really no distinction there, right? That's right.

[33:25] He has knowledge only in the actual sense, huh? There's no ability to know that needs to be actualized or could be actualized in God, right?

[33:38] Think of back to the nature and the existence. Yeah, the simplicity of God. Yeah. Okay. Now, God is whatever He has. Whatever God has said to have, He is. That's not true about you and me, right?

[34:01] I might have some knowledge of geometry. That's not what I am. I may have some health, right? But that's not what I am. Health itself. Whatever God has, He is. Because he's altogether simple, right? Not only because of our way of knowing that we speak of God as having things, right?

[34:27] That's what I was thinking. Because, because of the use of that word, that's like thinking back to that. Yeah, yeah. Are you mixing up the way we know God with the way He is?

[34:43] So we negate any distinction between God and what He has. But because there are a way of knowing, we speak of God as having knowledge and having love for us, right? But Saint John John says, God is love, right? You know. Now we can have love for somebody or something, but we aren't that love. I'm a lover of wisdom, but am I the love of wisdom? Right.

[35:13] Not at all. Start calling Phil. Not even Romeo is the love of Juliet, right? He may have love for her, but he's not the love of Juliet.

[35:30] But God is love itself, I don't think? He's amazing. Very, very wonderful. Now, think about this. I always go back to what Aristotle says. You know, in the the beginning of the De Anima, where he says that all knowledge, as such, is good, right? But one knowledge is better than another because it's more certain or more sure, or because it's about a better thing, huh? And but in the parts of the animals, he says of those two criteria, the simply that knowledge is better, which is about a better thing.

[36:12] So knowledge of the triangle and knowledge of the soul, maybe my knowledge of the triangle is more certain than my knowledge of the soul. But my knowledge of the soul is better in the sense it's about a better thing than the triangle. And so, simply speaking, knowledge of the soul is better than knowledge of the triangle. Although in some qualified sense, you can say knowledge of the triangle is better because I know better what the triangle is.

[36:38] than I want to know what the soul is, right? Or I know with greater certitude, right? what I say about the triangle, I'm more sure of my knowledge of the triangle, you know, the soul. But nevertheless, it's still better to know what the soul is, right?

[36:56] But then, when you know what God is and how good He is, right? If God is infinitely better than anything else, and infinitely better than all the things together, right?

[37:12] Well, then the knowledge of God is how much better than all the knowledge together, let alone any other kind of knowledge by itself, right? You know, and that's in harmony with those things. I'm always quoting from Augustine, you know, where he says, you know,

[37:33] miserable the man who knows all other things but doesn't know God. Blessed the man who knows God even if he knows nothing else. Blessed also the man who knows God and other things, but not so from knowing other things, but for knowing God alone, right? Huh? So God will be so interesting. I don't know whether you want to, I'll be thinking much about seeing Thomas Aquinas in the flesh.

[38:00] You know, I can't imagine would be a little bit of desire to see Thomas in the flesh, but it's going to be a drop in the ocean, you know, or less than that even. It's um,

[38:17] God will be all things and all, right? That's the way it's said, and it's hard to realize that, but but you can reason out that He is going to be that, you know.

[38:34] Okay, so let's see now. Yeah. Oh, you did talk about the objection there, Jimmy. The first one was taken from the words of Aristotle, right? Huh. And Aristotle is talking about. One way which we know lack, right? We can know lack too by knowing the good that it's opposed to, right? But we can also know lack by the fact that our mind is what.

[39:08] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Now you see, kind of the person I was talking about matter and forms. Go back to natural philosophy a little bit. Refresh your mind.

[39:22] Temporarily forgotten, as Thomas says. But Plato kind of confused what matter with non-being, right? Okay. And how did Aristotle refute that? Well, he took something that was common to him and Plato, right? And that was that form is something God. Okay, something good and desirable. Right? That's a profound, common understanding of form that Plato and Aristotle share. Okay. And Aristotle used what was common to him and Plato to say that Plato should distinguish between matter and lack.

[40:31] Okay. Because matter could be said to desire form, because matter is perfected by form. Form is the good of matter, right? But if form is something godlike and desirable, lack, being opposed to form, would seem to be something what bad, right? And if lack were to desire what form, it would desire its own what? Yeah, its own destruction, right? So, how can matter and lack be the same thing if the one desires right form, while the other couldn't be desirable form?

[41:16] Or if the one is perfected by form and the other is eliminated by form, right? They can't be the same thing, right? Now, sometimes I would manifest that by what something like that and say, well, we might admit that knowledge is something godlike, good, and desirable, right? Okay. Now, can the mind

[41:46] or the ability to know, right, be the same as a lack, which in this case is called ignorance, right? Well, if knowledge is something godlike, good, and desirable, then the mind being capable of knowledge is something good also, right? And you'd say the mind wants to know. To know would be the perfection of the mind, right? But if knowledge is something godlike, good, and desirable, ignorance, being opposed to knowledge, right, would seem to be something bad, being opposed to the good, right?

[42:25] And would make any sense to say that ignorance wants to know? Because knowledge is going to be elimination of ignorance, right? So ignorance is destroyed by knowledge, and the mind is perfected. How can they be the same, right? So, kind of using this to bring out, right, this likeness here, and this is easy to see in some sense, right? But to see the the nature or the character of this argument, right, um, but this involves the idea that our mind has what sometimes is prejudice, quite quite often.

[43:04] We're in that that state, right? Huh? And Hegel makes that mistake when he speaks of the pretentious power of the negative, right? Well, the, negative doesn't have any power. That's why in Richard II, Shakespeare says dull, barren, unfeeling ignorance, right? And he calls ignorance barren, right? Because ignorance doesn't give rise to knowledge. In discourse, your knowledge of the premises gives rise to a knowledge of the conclusion.

[43:37] Now, before you know the conclusion, you are ignorant, right? So, ignorance comes before the knowledge of conclusion. But does ignorance give rise to the knowledge of the conclusion? No, it's the premises, right? Okay. Or if you wanted to know the the the area of this room, right?

[44:00] Before you know the area, you are ignorant of the area, right? But your knowledge of the area is produced by a knowledge of the length and the width, not by a knowledge of the not not by ignorance of the area, right? Okay. And then I sometimes make the comparison to to Sartre, right? Where Sartre identifies our freedom with none-being, nothingness, right? You see, and you can see kind of why he do that because if I am really free to choose, right?

[44:38] You know, my stock example in the restaurant, they only give a menu. If I am really free to choose to have steak or chicken or fish or something else, then before I choose, right, am I determined to have steak? Then I will be free, right?

[45:00] Um. So he says that my indetermination, which is the kind of none-being, is my freedom. And of course, this is the great source of man's superiority over everything else is non-being. And for the point of view of theology, it's really funny because you know he's a revolt against God, right? Sartre does, and he sees the source of man's greatness as non-being, which is the only thing that man has.

[45:29] He didn't get from God. If we have anything from ourselves, it's our none-being, right? Okay. But you could argue against his position in the same way that he's confusing the ability to choose with the lack of choice before you choose. Just like if I confuse ignorance with what the mind, right? I'd be confusing the lack of knowledge before you learn, right, with the ability to learn, right?

[46:01] Okay. But you argue against the same way. You could say, the ability to choose is for the sake of choice, huh? The lack of choice is not the sake of choice, and the lack of choice, the indetermination of your will before you choose, is lost when you choose, right? But the lack, but the ability to choose is fulfilled, and it's very purpose, right? Which was choose, huh?

[46:26] Is it? But I come back to this, you know, because it strikes me that I always use this particular example here, you know, to kind of manifest this by likeness about matter and lack of form, right? And you know, sometimes, you know, Aristotle goes on a good example there. You know, does the sick man want to be healthy? Yeah. Now, but the sick want to be healthy.

[46:53] The sicknesses such want health. See, but a lot of times, without thinking too deeply about it, we'd say, "Yeah, the the sick want to be healthy. The ugly want to be beautiful. The the poor want to be rich, right? But the sickness want health. No, it's the body that wants health, right? Because health is the perfection of the body. Health is not the perfection of sickness; it's elimination of sickness, right?

[47:24] So, if health is perfection of the body, but not perfection of sickness, sickness can't be the same thing as the body, right? Okay. And likewise, if beauty is a perfection of the body, but not the perfection of ugliness, but the elimination of it, then the ugly as such don't what want to be beautiful, right? But we probably say the ugly want to be beautiful, right? Not seeing the distinction there between the as such and the by happening, right, huh?

[47:58] So it's not the ugly as such that wants to be beautiful, but that to which ugly happens, Maybe the body, you see? And it's not ignorance as such that wants knowledge, but that to which ignorance happens, the mind as such that wants knowledge, okay? So you remember that a little bit that we talked about that before, huh? But I mean, in a way, in manifesting that, I am doing so because the fact that my mind is sometimes what lacking, right?

[48:32] Huh? That's not the way God was lacking. Well, sometimes I lack a knowledge of purposes. Sometimes I lack a knowledge of geometry, and yeah, yeah. No, there is no lack in God, nor could there be a lack in God, right? Because lack has to be found in something that is able to have some act, right, but doesn't have it when it should have it, right. And therefore, there has to be a real mixture there of ability and act, and to have the bad, right?

[49:06] Well, if God is pure act, there can't be anything bad in Him, can there? There can't be an ability that is lacking the act. You see, so God can't know bad as something opposed to His very nature. This is a lack that I could have, no. But this is a lack between breakfasters. So, what picture could could could have right or?

[49:40] Strictly speaking, you don't have a lack, do you? Because strictly speaking, lack is not having what you should have, right? Yeah. But but notice how we do speak of someone as having a lack, right, or having blindness, right, or having ignorance, you That's kind of like the way being is, said in an analogous way.

[50:12] So that's always replying to the first objection, right? Okay. Now the second objection is saying, well, God knows things insofar as He's the cause of them, right? But He's not the cause of the bad, right? Okay. Okay. But He is the cause of the good of creatures, right? Which is the opposite of the bad of creatures. So through knowing the good of creatures, He knows the opposite of them, right?

[50:46] Now the third one, of course, is saying, is if God was going to know bad as the opposite of Himself, right? He doesn't know bad as the opposite of Himself, because there is no bad as the opposite of Himself. Okay. So you know we're speaking kind of metaphorically, speaking hurting God or you know, or don't don't sadden the Holy Spirit as Saint Paul says sometimes, right? But this is said what metaphorically, right?

[51:14] Just as God is metaphorically said to be angry with us, right? So He knows the bad as the opposite of the good of creatures, not as opposite of His own goodness. Then it'd be false. So.

[51:38] Um. Now, now the fourth objection. Let's look at again. That's one we didn't talk about before. I don't think. Moreover, what what's the objection again? Moreover, what is known not to itself but to another is imperfectly known, right?

[51:54] But bad is not known by God to itself, because thus it would be necessary that bad be in God, huh? For it's necessary that the known be in the knower.

[52:09] If therefore it is known to another, namely to the good, it would be imperfectly known by him. But that's impossible, because no knowledge of God is imperfect. Therefore, the knowledge of God is not of what evil things, huh?

[52:26] No. But evil is not a thing to be known to itself. Yeah, yeah. To the fourth, it should be said that to know something through another only pertains to imperfect knowledge if it is knowable through itself, right?

[52:46] But the bad is not knowable through itself because it's of the very definition of the bad that would be the lack of the good. And therefore, it can be neither defined nor known. Except for the good, right? So the imperfection is not in God, that it's known in that way, but in the thing itself that it's not knowable any other way, and that's in a way true to some extent of potency too.

[53:17] I know potency through act. Well, that's because potency is not knowable through itself, but only through act. But if for it's your privation or lack,

[53:30] so ignorance or blindness is knowable only through what? Yeah, you can't. You know what blindness is, and that. So there's an order there. Yeah, I used to sometimes say to students, you know, do you know if you're ignorant?

[53:47] Well, in in a sense, to to really know you're ignorant, you have to know what you're ignorant of, and you have to know what you don't know, and then you're not ignorant, right? So really, the professor knows more than the student. The student's ignorance.

[54:06] Can the student know he's ignorant of something? So you you might argue yourself, you know, don't you know you're ignorant of rocket physics or something? You know, you know. But you know, strictly speaking, how can you know what you're ignorant of if you don't know what it is that you're ignorant of? In which case, you you would know what you're ignorant of, and then you would not be ignorant of it.

[54:32] You know, in some way, you know, you know what you're ignorant of. You know, in some imperfect way. Do you know the number of pages in that book?

[54:51] No. So you don't know what you're ignorant of then. Yeah. Assuming assuming the number is right here, see, I'm going to look here now. It's 605 pages here, right? You know. So did you know you're ignorant of 605? No, I didn't know that.

[55:18] See, you didn't fully know what you're ignorant of, did you? You were ignorant of 605. No, you knew was in some general you were ignorant of some number, but I don't know A lot of numbers you're ignorant of. Yeah, it's kind of

[55:35] interesting to think about that, huh? To what extent can you know your ignorance, right? I like you could show Pythagoras' theorem, and I could see what it is I'm ignorant of in a certain way. I don't even know how to get there. Yeah, I don't know all the reasons to get. Yeah, but I can see. When you say you know, I don't know God. I don't know God as He is, right?

[56:06] Do you really know what it is to not know God as He is? You don't really know what it is to know God as He is, right? So you don't really realize how ignorant you are. God, see, but the blessed are now who see God as He is, right, they know our ignorance much better than we know it. See, I can know in some imperfect way that I don't know God as He is, right?

[56:33] But what it is for me not to know God as He is? I don't realize fully ignorance in the way that Thomas Aquinas now realizes fully our ignorance of of God. You know, those who see those who see God as He is, right? They know what it is we don't know in a way that we we we don't know very well down there. Would you say the demons don't see God as He is, but they would know better our ignorance than we do by nature?

[57:03] Yeah, yeah, yeah, but still not as not perfectly as we do. Yeah, yeah. You don't know what you're missing. they don't know what they're missing, but they know better what we're missing than what we know. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. But seems so much better than we do what what we're missing, what we don't see now.

[57:25] Again, the distinction between simply and in some way, right, is very important. That that comes up in the Mino when when Mino argues with Socrates. Socrates wants to investigate what virtue is, and in a sense, he wants to direct his thoughts and his thinking towards what the other knows. And Mino says, "Well, how can we direct ourselves towards what we don't know? " So it's like asking the guy in the gasoline station how to get there.

[57:59] You know, and he says, "Well, if you don't know where you want to get, but I can't tell you how to get there. " So, but but as I say, that's an objection, a logical objection against the very possibility of logic, right? Because logic is the art that helps us, that directs us to coming to know what we don't know, right? And so, how can we direct ourselves towards what we don't know when we don't know it?

[58:29] How can you aim at something if you don't know what you are aiming at? Let's see. You got to see the guy moving or something, David. You got to see the deer or whatever it is, you know, moving. And you know, how can you aim at the deer if you don't see the deer in some way?

[58:51] So that would seem to make impossible, right? Logic and logistic too, logic. But that is is a sophistical argument from not distinguishing between what is so simply and what is so in some respect, right?

[59:16] If I didn't know the number of pages in this book, I could direct myself to six o five. You know, I know how to get there. In fact, just by counting the pages in them, one by one. Now, where comes the money? Money gets my thing. You know, I have to pay pay for this, and so I must know in some way what I don't know in order to direct myself towards that.

[59:44] You know, the simple example I always give in class. You know, I had a class of about thirty students, something like that. I'd say, you know, I don't know how many students are in class today. I really don't know how many students are in class today, but I know how to get to what I don't know. I know that by counting I can come to know the number of students in class today.

[1:00:07] So I count them. I end up, let's say, with twenty-seven. And I say, now that I know I was trying to get to twenty-seven? No, because then I'd know what I was trying to know, right? But I must have known twenty-seven some way to know that the way to it was counting. Well, twenty-seven is is in fact the number of students in class today, and I knew I was trying to get the number of students in class.

[1:00:32] So in some sense, twenty-seven was known to me, right? Yeah. You know my simple example of that fallacy, right? There's a knock on the door there, right? And I say to you, do you know who's at the door? What would you say? You open up, and maybe it's the abbot, or maybe it's your mother, right? So you don't know your mother. You say you didn't know the person who was knocking at the door, right?

[1:00:56] And it's your mother. So you don't know your mother. What's wrong with the argument, right? Something. I didn't know. In some way. Yeah. You know your mother, so you can say something. You know your mother is, yeah. I know my mother, but I don't know my mother as a person knocking at the door. So in some way, I don't know my mother, right?

[1:01:24] So that's a distinction that comes up again and again. It's a very important. So next time we'll start with whether God knows singularia, singular things, right? Huh? Okay.