Prima Pars
67. Summa I q.16 a.1–3: Same Knowledge of Opposites, Truth in Judgment, and Truth Convertible with Being
Class of 2007-02-08
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/067-summa-i-q-16-a-1-3-same-knowledge-of-opposites-truth-in-judgment/

[0:00] So, is this final statement here? Is this his conclusion to the question? To objection? There, yeah. In in the body of the article, he's answering the question, right? And he's saying, but he's doing two things here. He's saying chiefly that truth is in the mind, right? Okay. He's making the great contrast that the philosopher had done in the sixth book of wisdom. That truth is primarily in the mind, and good is primarily in things, right?

[0:31] And you can kind of develop that, huh? One time I gave a whole talk on that, another kind of contrary to them. But connect you with that is the other thing that he points out: that knowing is perfected by getting the known into your what? Into your understanding. Yeah, yeah, and that's what I was pointing out, you know, the fact that we tend to use the word grasp, right?

[0:56] To understand, okay? Like get a hold of this. We all see something like that, the teacher, right? You know, and to get a hold of something, to get a grasp of it, even we take the word take sometimes, right? Okay, you know, if you want to define something, you got to take its genus and take its differences and what, put them together in your mind, right? Like a square, let's say, is an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral, right?

[1:28] In general, what a square is is a four-sided figure, right? And quadrilaterals that the genus of square, and then you have equilateral and right-angled, and you got the whole definition, right? So I got to take the genus and take the differences and put them together, right? But notice the word take is like the word grasp, right? But is that the words we use to describe love? Is love basically taking and grasping?

[1:57] Huh? No. With love, we tend to use the word what? To give, right? Okay. Okay. So love is more going out to the thing, right? It's more so we said to give your heart, right? Okay. As I mentioned before, we even speak of losing your heart, right? Okay. But as I say in that song, I left my heart in San Francisco, right? Um, or Romeo say, you know, can I go when my heart is still here, right?

[2:35] You know, your heart is your heart is said to be in what you what? Love, right? And that's why we can, by the saints, huh? can more perfectly love God in this life than they can what know Him, right?

[2:59] Because in knowing, they're trying to get God into their mind, and their mind is not able to get God entirely into it, right? But by love, they, in a sense, go into God, right? Okay. And so I make kind of a little metaphorical comparison there, you know. It's easier to jump into the ocean, like when you go swimming, than it is to get the ocean inside of you.

[3:26] And so, in love and sense, you go into God, right? Why not? You're trying to get God into you. So, so our will is more adequate to God in this life than our reason, right?

[3:41] Now, maybe you know a little different there when you see God as He is, right? But that's requires the light of glory and so on.

[3:52] So, or I was pointing out, why is it always bad in sense to lose your mind? But not necessarily bad to lose your heart. Depends upon to whom or to what you lose your heart, right?

[4:16] So that's a fundamental. Distinction that Aristotle first saw—that the good is chiefly in things—and your desire is good because you want the good that's in things, right? But the known is primarily in the knower. Knowing takes place because you can get the thing in you, right? So you know Shakespeare says, "You know, my heart is, my my mind is played the painter, right? It's like I made a little painting of you in my inside my head, right?

[4:52] But I, but if I don't have a painting of you in my head, and that way, if I can't get you into my head that way, I can't really know you, right?

[5:02] If I can't remember your your color and your shape and so on, I can't remember you, right? Okay, so I got to get your color and shape somehow into me. Okay, that's the way knowing takes place. So in a way, they work in just kind of contrary ways. Now, another very important example or way of showing this is the thing that Plato and Aristotle show a lot,

[5:35] and that is that there is the same knowledge of opposites. Okay. So by the same knowledge, or by the medical doctor that said knows what normal blood pressure is, right?

[6:05] He knows maybe that my blood pressure is is high or something, right? Okay. So couldn't you know what abnormal or high blood pressure is? The opposite too, sometimes, right? But could you know what abnormal blood pressure is without knowing what normal blood pressure is? Or some people have a overactive or underactive thyroid. You probably know some people like that, you know. I remember someone taking what they call the atomic cocktail.

[6:35] You know, sounds pretty bad, you know, but they got overactive, you know, and they got to slow it down, right? But they only take the atomic cocktail sometimes. It slows them down, and they got to take some remedial thing to to get it up again, right? You see? Okay. But could you know what an overactive thyroid is or an underactive thyroid is if you didn't know what the normal should be?

[6:57] See? And you know, people talking all the times about people being overweight, right? Well, unless you know what the correct weight should be for your height and so on and frame and so on, could you know what overweight would be? Then there's some of these, you know, thin women, you know, they're underweight, really, right? You see, or people have been in concentration camps, you know, they're underweight, right?

[7:24] You got to build them up again, right? And I know there's one guy in high school who'd been in the, in a, in a missionary school, right? He was going to be a missionary, and they really, you know, prepared you to be a missionary by a very stringent diet and very rough thing, and he developed a spastic stomach. They finally threw him out, saying because you know this guy can't take the life of a missionary, right?

[7:52] So he's quite underweight. right? And so it's his mother and aunt are trying to build them up, you know. And I go to his house and he likes some ice cream. I say, yeah. She brings out bowl of ice cream like this.

[8:06] I didn't realize what they were doing, you know. I mean, they're trying to build him up, you know. So anyway, you see the point. There's the same knowledge of opposites. I told you about the student when I was first teaching in California that said we shouldn't be teaching ethics. I said, why not? He says, well, you learn not only what virtue is, what vice is, right? And there's not two different ethics.

[8:36] One that you learn about virtue, and about vice. huh? You can't know what cowardice is without knowing what courage is, and vice versa. And since many of us aren't trying to be bad, they don't know how to be bad,

[8:48] But in truth is the same knowledge of opposites, right? Okay. And by grammar, I know how to speak correctly and how to speak what incorrectly. You am my students, and I use your professor. See? How do I know I'm speaking incorrectly when I say that? Because I know how to speak correctly to some extent, anyway. Do you see the point? So it's the same knowledge of opposites, huh?

[9:16] And Socrates is pointing this out at the end of the Symposium, right? Where he has the great tragic poet there. Agathon has won the prize that year for his tragedy, right? And and the Aristophanes, the great comic poet, right? And Socrates is making the point. If you guys knew what you were doing, you could write you not only tragedies but also comedies, right? And you not only comedies but also what?

[9:42] Tragedies, right? Okay. In the rhetoric, Aristotle shows you how to arouse anger and how to cool somebody off. You know, shows you opposites, right? So there's the same knowledge of opposites, right? There's two medical arts: one about health and one about sickness, right? But it's the same art about both, right?

[10:13] Logic is about correct reasoning and incorrect reasoning. Now, is there the same love of opposites? No. But there is not the same love of opposites.

[10:42] So, if I love health, can I love sickness? No. You could say the the love of one opposite excludes the love of the opposite, huh? So, if I love health, I can't love sickness, right?

[11:08] But if I know what health is, I can also know what sickness is, right? And in fact, knowing what health is helps me to know what sickness is, huh? Do you see? Or if I know what order is, I also know what disorder is, right? So the knowledge of disorder doesn't exclude the knowledge of order, does it? And the knowledge of order doesn't exclude the knowledge of disorder.

[11:39] But the knowledge of one helps you to know the what other, right? But the love of order is opposed to the love of disorder, right? If anybody could love such a thing, right? And vice versa, okay. Now, how are things in themselves?

[12:01] In your body, how about health and sickness? Can I have normal blood pressure and high blood pressure at the same time? No. If I have normal blood pressure, then I don't have high blood pressure, right? If I have high blood pressure, then I don't have normal blood pressure, right? If I have an overactive thyroid, I don't have a properly functioning thyroid, right? If I have a properly functioning thyroid, I can't have an overactive one at the same time, can I?

[12:35] If I have sight, can I be blind at the same time? See, or if I'm blind, can I have sight, right? No. So, love follows the way things are, doesn't it? Because in things, one opposite excludes the other. If I love virtue, can I love vice?

[13:01] No. The love of courage eliminates the love of cowardice, right? Okay. The love of justice is incompatible with the love of injustice, right? But the knowledge of justice is compatible with the knowledge of injustice, right?

[13:20] And knowing one helps you know the other, right? So the two opposites are together in the mind, but in things they can't be together. So love goes out to the things in themselves, and that's why you can't have the same love of opposites.

[13:40] But knowing, you bring it into your mind, and you can have both opposites in the mind because of the way they are in the mind. But in the very definition of abnormal, it's normal, right? So the knowledge of one involves the knowledge of the other. Overactive thyroid involves the knowledge of what the proper should be, right?

[14:03] Put too much salt in the soup tonight, or food, whatever it was, right? Well, then I know what the amount should be, right? I don't love, that too much salt in the thing.

[14:19] You see the idea? So there's many ways you can see that love goes out to the things in themselves, right? But in knowing, you bring the thing into your your mind. This is a very good way of showing it that there's the same knowledge of opposites, and the knowledge of one opposite helps you know the other one. But there's not the same love of opposites. The love of one opposite excludes the love of the the other one.

[14:50] But what is the condition in things? It's that one opposite excludes the other, right? If the body is beautiful, it can't be ugly at the same time. At least with the ugliness that's opposed to that beauty, right? But I can know one and the other, right?

[15:12] Mozart has a piece there called the musical joke, right? He teaches you how not to write music, and there's some obvious mistakes in music, you know, and notes and so on. But they say the more subtle things are there too, if someone understands music, huh? Someone knows how to write well and how to write badly, you know.

[15:36] And I know myself as a logician, you know. If I want to deceive, you know, the students and give an argument that seems good that I know is bad, I know how to do it. You see?

[15:51] So I know how to make bad arguments. I know how to make good arguments. You see? But I can't love one opposite by loving the other one. Can't love justice by loving injustice, or vice versa. So truth is primarily in the mind, right? But yet Thomas is saying there's a secondary way in which we can say that what truth is in things, right? Okay. But that's in a secondary way, okay.

[16:27] In comparison to the mind, in some way, right? But in the case of love, it's the reverse. Love is said to be good because the thing loved is good, right?

[16:43] So the love, the good, is primarily in things. It's because wisdom is good that the love of wisdom is good, right? It's because injustice is bad that the love of injustice is what bad, right?

[17:09] So Thomas, in the body of the article, he makes basically the point that truth is chiefly in the in the mind, right? And that's why he takes it up here when he takes up the mind of God, huh? The knowledge of God. But if you look back, some of you weren't here earlier in the course, but he takes up the goodness of God back in question six.

[17:33] He takes up the goodness of God when he takes up the substance of God. The goodness of God is attached to the consideration of the perfection of the divine substance, huh? And he's not going to take up the will of God until after he gets through with truth and falsehood here, and that's going to be

[17:57] question nineteen, area on the will of God. So he takes up the goodness of God before he takes up the will of God, right? But he takes up the knowledge of God before he takes up the what? Truth.

[18:19] You see the order there. Because the good is primarily in things, right? And what we find out later on that God primarily loves his own goodness, right? And he's going to try to share that goodness with us, right?

[18:40] So it's very interesting the way he proceeds here, right? Consideration: the goodness of God comes up in the consideration of the divine substance before you go into the divine operations. His knowledge and will, right? But truth is taken up, attached to the consideration of the divine what? Knowledge, right? It's very careful the way Thomas writes, huh? But very illuminating when you start to understand what he's saying.

[19:07] He doesn't explain every reason why he considers things in this order. I mean, he gives some explanation of it. But if you stop and think about this, you can say, "Yeah, yeah, I can see in the body of this first article, right, the reason why he considers good with the substance of God, but not truth with the substance of God, right? Because good is primarily in things, right?

[19:39] And the divine substance is a thing, okay? But truth is primarily in the mind, and so he takes it up, attached the consideration of the divine mind, the divine knowledge. Do you see that? A lot, lot to think about there. Should we take a little break now before we go on to the next article? Because we should get a little bit of breathing space here. Now the second article.

[20:10] It seems that truth is not only in the understanding, putting together and dividing, right? That's going back to Aristotle's way of speaking in the sixth book of wisdom, but also in the third book about the soul, where the second act of reason, first act of reason is what understanding what something is, right? Better or worse. And the second act is what putting these things together in an affirmative statement or dividing them in a what negative statement, right?

[20:41] And Aristotle teaches that truth is found in that second act primarily, huh? And in logic, you state that second act with the study of this product of the statement, huh? The statement is speech signifying the true or the false. So the second one proceeds. Thus, it seems that truth is not only in the understanding, putting together and dividing. For the philosopher says in the third book about the soul that just as the sense of its own sensibles is always true, so the understanding of the what it is.

[21:20] That's the first act of the reason. But putting together and dividing is neither in sense nor in the understanding, knowing what it is. Therefore, truth is not only in the putting together and dividing of the understanding. Well, he's going to admit in some way there's truth in the senses, right? Truth in the first act of reason, but fully, right, and properly, only in the second act. But we'll see that in the things.

[21:47] Moreover, Isaac says huh In the book about definition, that truth is the equality, right, of the thing and the understanding. But just as the understanding of complex things of a affirmative or negative statement can be equal to things, so the understanding of incomplex things and even the senses sensing the thing as it is. Therefore, truth is not only in putting together and in the dividing of the intellect.

[22:23] But against all this is what the philosopher says in the sixth book of wisdom that simple things and the what it is is not truth. Neither in the understanding nor in what things, right? But only in the second act of what Aristotle says there.

[22:43] So Thomas is going to reply now. I answer: It should be said that true, as has been said, according to its first definition, is in the what understanding, right?

[22:59] Now, since everything is true, according as it has its own form of its own nature, it is necessary that the understanding, in so far as it is knowing, is true, in so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, which is its form in so far as it's knowing. And an account of this, the conformity or agreement of the understanding of the thing. Excuse me.

[23:29] An account of this through the conformity of the understanding, the thing. Truth is what defined, huh? In Aldi's special way, he's going to talk about truth here. Whence to know this conformity is to know what truth? Okay.

[23:51] Now this in no way does the sense what know, huh? Because although the sense has a likeness of the thing visible, nevertheless it doesn't know or consider the comparison between the thing seen and that which it what apprehends of it, yeah. But the understanding is able to know the conformity of itself to the thing what understood, huh? So he's saying that the senses there can be a conformity of what is in the sense of what is out there, right?

[24:34] Okay. But the senses don't consider that conformity, right? Yeah. Okay. But the understanding is able to know, he says, the conformity of itself to the thing understood. But nevertheless, it does not grasp this according as it knows about something what it is. But only when it judges right a thing thus to be as is the form which it apprehends about the thing. Then first it knows and says the what true.

[25:18] And this it does by putting together and dividing. For in every statement, some form signified by the what predicate, huh? It either applies to some thing signified by the subject of the statement, or it removes from that, right? So when I say that man is an animal, I say that animal what belongs to what man is, right? When I say man is not a stone, I say stone doesn't belong to what a man is.

[25:54] Okay. I'm not doing that when I understand what a man is, period, or understanding what a stone is, right? Or Understanding an animal is,

[26:09] and therefore it is well found that the sense is true about something, or the understanding and knowing what it is, but not that it knows or says the true.

[26:30] And likewise, is it true about the vocal sounds that signify what's in the mind, the complex ones or the incomplex one? So is man true or false? I'm going to say something now. You tell me what's true or false. Man,

[26:52] stone. Say, is true or false, right? Okay. When I say man is an animal, no. Or man is not an animal. It's going to be true or false, right? Man is a stone. Man is not a stone, huh?

[27:11] So he says truth is able to be in the sense or in the understanding, knowing what it is, as in a certain what true thing, right? But it's not as the known is in the knower, which is implied by the name of true. For the perfection of the understanding is the true, as what, Known.

[27:40] And therefore, properly speaking, truth is in the understanding, putting together and dividing, but not in the sense nor in the understanding, knowing what it is, right? And in this way, the solution to the two objections is what clear, right? Huh? In a sense, he's saying that the senses can be what conformed to the object, right?

[28:15] And the intellect understanding what something is can be conformed to that thing, right? But that's not to know that conformity, is it? And to say that conformity, right?

[28:33] It's only in the second act when you affirm or deny something or something that you know the conformity itself of the mind to things, and you speak of that conformity of the mind to things, huh?

[28:50] And then you know the true, the true as known, right? So the senses might know the taste of something truly, right? But do the senses know

[29:13] that they are conformed to the thing? No. Or do they speak about that, right? And reason in knowing what something is might be conformed to that thing, then, right? But in being conformed to that thing by knowing what it is, is it saying that it is conformed to that thing? And knowing that it is conformed to that thing, yeah. No. So truth is only fully in the second act of reason in putting together or dividing these things, right?

[29:55] And saying man is an animal or man is not a stone, right? Okay. That's a subtle. Thing right, but you can see it more simply. I say, in sensible sign of these things, right? Strictly speaking, not only is unicorn neither true nor false, but neither is man or stone, right? True or false. It's not until you put these things together that you really have truth or what falsity, right?

[30:28] So when you define the definition there, which kind of perfects the first act of reason, you say it's speech signifying what a thing is, right? But when you talk about the statement that is perfecting the second act, then you say it's speech signifying the true or the what false. If you go back to the idea here of

[30:53] sentence, huh? And sometimes in grammar we distinguish five kinds of sentences, right? And one kind of sentence might be called a statement, declarative sentence. They sometimes call it, right? Another sentence would be the what question. Another would be the command.

[31:35] Another would be the prayer, the request. Another would be the exhortation, right? So if I say "shut the door," grammatically speaking, that's called a sentence, right? But "shut the door" is a kind of sentence called a command,

[31:56] direct to the will of an inferior in some way, right? Okay, but it's directed to the will of an inferior that you want to do something, right? Like shut the door, shut your mouth. Okay.

[32:12] The prayer is directed to the will of a superior, right? So give us this day our daily bread. That's grammatically a sentence, right? But it's a prayer addressed to superior, help me, right? Then that's actually addressed to God, help me. Well, that's a what? A sentence,

[32:35] but it's like a prayer, right? Let's go to the movies. Again, kind of addressed to an equal, right? Okay. Now, what time is it? Well, that's a what question, right? Okay.

[32:52] But none of these four that we've spoken about so far is really true or false. What time is it? True or false? Okay. What's your name? True or false?

[33:15] Isidore. Isidore. Isidore. He's the one of the doctors in the church, I think. Yeah. Isidore. yeah. Isidore, Yeah. Yeah, I read about him in here. yeah. Isidore Suthila, right? Yeah. Yeah, I can read about him in here. Okay, it's in there. Thirty-three. Shut the door. True or false?

[33:41] Now that door over there is already shut, right? You might say that if I say shut the door, I'm thinking that the door is open, right? Which is false about the door over here, right? But the door over here. But shut the door. Yeah. By itself, is neither true nor false, is it? Help me.

[34:04] If I say I am in need of help, that's either true or false, right? Probably true. But help me, true or false? Let's go to the movies. Let's go for a walkin. True or false?

[34:23] So none of these is a sentence signifying the true or the false. Neither question nor command nor prayer nor exhortation. But the statement, which Thomas calls a propositio but originally proposition is used for the premise of a syllogism, and it got being called later on for statement. But the statement is a sentence signifying the true or the false. I am a man. I am not a stone, right?

[35:00] So is it true? I am not a man. I am not a. I am a stone. They're false, right? But a statement is a sentence that signifies the true or the false. Now, the logician is primarily interested in that sentence called a statement, right? The logician is not much interested in commands or prayers or exhortations, but they're more oriented to action, right? Question we have some interest in too, as a logician, right?

[35:28] But primarily interested in the what statement. So the second book that's come down to us from the father of logic, it's called in Peri Hermeneias, but it's really about the what statement.

[35:43] The second book in logic that's come down from the father of logic, who is the philosopher here, huh? Historians call Aristotle the father of logic because Thomas calls him the philosopher, right? But he's got a lot of excellences.

[36:06] Okay, I don't know if we got time to go through Article Three here. I think we might, because it's short like the last one. Okay. Unless you thought it was more complicated than it looks. Now, to the third one proceeds thus: It seems that true and being are not what convertible, right? Now, what does convertible mean in in logic, huh? In philosophy.

[36:34] True, one is a thing to another. Well, yeah. We say that A and B are convertible if every A is a B, and every B is a what A, right? Okay.

[36:50] And so there's a number of words that are what most universal, right? And one of those words, a fundamental one, is is being, huh? Ends in Latin. I see. That's most universal because can there be anything that doesn't come under being as a name? Being means what is, right? So everything that is is a being, right? That's most universal, right? Now the second most universal is the word thing or something, right?

[37:33] Can there be something out there that isn't something? Something is is most universal, right? Now what's the opposite of being? By the way. Yeah. Okay. What's the opposite of something? Nothing. Yeah. So they're almost the same, right? They're both universality, right? Nothing and non-being seem to be almost the same, right? Okay. But being is is named more from to be, right? And something from what a thing is, right?

[38:10] Okay. Okay. Now the next one is is is one, right? Okay. And something is said to be one because it's undivided and distinguished from other things, right? Was that true about everything that is

[38:32] that is undivided? Well, how do you destroy a thing? Yeah. Yeah. So everything is either simple or composed. If it's composed, it doesn't exist unless it's what put together, and therefore is not divided. And if the composed is undivided, if it's already, the simple is undivided. And can something be without being distinct from other things?

[39:03] So Thomas at various times had talked about being and thing and what one right okay, but now he's comparing what more difficult case? How about true and being right? Okay, are they equally universal? Right? Are they convertible? Right? Every being is something, and every something is a being. Right? Okay, is this true about true? Right? And later on, we ask it about the good too, as we did before.

[39:41] To the third one proceeds thus: It seems that true and being are not convertible, for true is properly in understanding, as has been said, right? But being is properly in things; therefore, they are not what convertible. It's a pretty good objection, right? Okay.

[40:01] Moreover, that which extends Itself to both being and non-being is not convertible with being, right? But true extends itself both to being and non-being. For it is true that what is to be and what is not to be, what is not not to be, right? Okay. True means not only that what is is, but what is not is not. So true is not only about what is, but about what is not.

[40:34] Therefore, true is more universal than being, right? Right. Well, the first objection says that true is what less universal than being, right? Or at least it's not true is in the mind and being is in things, right?

[40:55] Moreover, what have themselves according to before and after do not seem to be what convertible, right? I guess most easily seen the more universal, less universal, right? If it's an odd number, then it's a number, right? But if it's a number, then it's an odd number. No. Okay. So number and odd number are not what convertible, right? Okay.

[41:27] But true seems to be before being. For being is not understood except under the notion of what true. Therefore, it seems that they are not what convertible, right?

[41:45] But against all this nonsense is what the philosopher says in the second book, Metaphysica right? After the books of natural philosophy, second book of wisdom. The term Metaphysica came from what Andronicus of Rhodes, right? But Aristotle, in the premium to the fourteen books of the metaphysics, calls it what Sophia, wisdom. So I have to say the second book of wisdom, but the second book, meta, meaning after, ta ta physica the books of natural philosophy.

[42:18] But as the philosopher says in the second book of wisdom, the second book after the books of natural philosophy, that the same is the disposition of things in being and in what truth. I was mentioning that. That's very interesting for us as Christians to see that, right? Because the one who says in the Old Testament, "I am who am," right, says in the New Testament, "I am truth itself."

[42:45] Aristotle, would say, that'd be a motive of credibility for Aristotle if he was to run into a Christian, but he was he died in 322 BC, right? Okay. But he saw that connection between being and what truth, right? And he says, I answer. It should be said that just as good has the notion of what, what is desirable, so truth has an order to what, knowledge. Huh?

[43:14] We've made that thing before. But each thing, in so far as it has being, to that extent it is what, knowable. And an account of this, it is said in the third book about the soul, Aristotle's famous three books about the soul, that the soul is in some way what, all things, huh? By sense and by understanding, huh?

[43:48] And therefore, just as good is convertible with being, right? That's something we took up back in question five, article three, huh? So also the true is convertible with being, huh?

[44:05] But nevertheless, as good adds the thought or the meaning or the idea of desirable above being, right? So true adds a comparison to the what, understanding, right?

[44:26] So in a sense, you're talking about being being what, knowable, right? So that true adds something to the idea of being, right? Namely, knowable, right? Its conformity to the mind. And good adds to the idea of being that it's what, desirable, right? Okay.

[44:55] Now the first objection was saying that true is properly in the understanding, but being is properly in things. How does he answer that? Well, he goes back to distinction that he made in the first article. To the first, therefore, it should be said that true is in things and in the understanding, as has been said, huh? Now it's the true as it is in things that is convertible with being.

[45:24] secundum substantiam, he says, huh? But the true that is in the understanding is convertible with being, as what, making known with the thing made known, for this is of the notion of true, huh?

[45:49] Although one is able to say also that being is in things and in the understanding, just as it true. Although true is chiefly in the understanding, being chiefly in what, things. And this happens in account to the fact that true and being differ in their what definition, right? Okay.

[46:17] So you can say that the if you go back to the great first man to talk about the mind, there, Anaxagoras, right? Remember that. And what's the first thing that Anaxagoras said about the mind or reason? This one about it's purest of all things. Yeah, but but what's the very first thing he said about the mind? He said that it's one. He said that it's infinite. Oh.

[46:46] Yeah. It's unlimited, right? Okay. Okay. So even the the weakest of of understandings, which is our own, right? In some ways, open to knowing all things, right? Okay. In fact,

[47:16] our mind distinguishes between something and nothing, right? And we even talk about everything knowing. Now I might say, well, I don't know everything, and that's quite true, right? But what am I saying there that I don't know?

[47:40] If I didn't know in some at least imperfect way, right? In fact, in a very imperfect way, what the word everything means, could I know that I don't know everything?

[48:01] You know the Greeks had a common thought: you can't get something from nothing, right? Makes sense, doesn't it? Understand that? Okay. Now, if you understand the statement that you can't get something from nothing, just like you understand the statement that man is not a stone, right? Now you know the you understand the statement man is not a stone, don't you? Okay. But if you understand the statement that man is not a stone, you must understand in some way both man and what stone, right?

[48:33] Makes sense, right? So if you understand the statement that you can't get something from nothing, right? You must understand both something and nothing, right? Okay. Now everything that is is what. Something. Yeah. So in some way you know everything, don't you? Right. I have some bright student in my class. They say I would go home and tell my dad I know everything. Professor Berquist said that. But, huh?

[49:06] In some extremely confused way, you do know everything, right? Because everything is something, right? And you know the difference between something and nothing, don't you? And everything is said of, and something is said of everything, right? So you know something about everything, right? Not very much, right? But you know something about everything, right? That it's something and nothing. You know that everything has being. That's what you know about everything.

[49:40] Yeah, yeah. But you also know that it's something, right? Okay. So you can say, in that sense, the mind is open to knowing what everything, right? And as it goes from a confused knowledge that everything is something, right, it's getting more distinct knowledge, more perfect knowledge, right? But you can see that the mind is open to knowing what everything. And

[50:13] just the fact, you know, that you know, for example, the universal, right? That's the way we usually try to show that the mind is infinite.

[50:21] If I know what a a number is, right? In a way, I know an infinity of things, don't I? That there's an infinity of odd numbers, and there's an infinity of even numbers, right? And when I say no odd number is even, I'm making a statement about how many things. Yeah, yeah. So, in a sense, my mind is open to knowing what an infinity of things. That's why Shakespeare, you know, when we talked about Shakespeare's definition of reason, its ability for large discourse, right?

[50:56] And one meaning of large discourse is a discourse about the universal. Any discourse about the universal can be a discourse about many things, right?

[51:10] When I say man is an animal, I'm making a statement in a way about all men, right? Past, present, future no matter how many there are, right? When I say no prime number is composite, I'm making a statement about infinity, right? Of numbers, right? When I say something is not nothing, you can't get something from nothing. I'm, in a way, saying something about everything. So, in some sense, the mind is open to knowing everything, right?

[51:43] And so, you might say that the mind, therefore, is open to making known everything, and therefore, truth in a way extends to what everything.

[52:01] Everything, in some way, is knowable, right? So that, in a way, being and knowable are what equally universal. Think about that, huh? Okay. Um.

[52:27] Now, the second objection is, if I'm interesting, the second objection is saying we can know non-being as well as what being, right? That isn't true. More universal. Okay. It might be simple to use that word just knowable, right? Isn't knowable more universal than being, right? Now, what is the great weight this says nothing is more true than when you say something is itself. What can be more true than a dog is a dog or a cat is a cat, right?

[53:07] Huh? Okay. So it's knowable both that being is being, right, and non-being is what non-being, right? So isn't knowable more universal than being? That's what the second objection is saying, right? Okay. And isn't it true not only that being is being, but isn't it true that non-being is non-being?

[53:40] Isn't it true that something is something, and nothing is what? Yeah, right. So isn't knowable more universal than something? Isn't knowable more universal than being?

[54:09] Now, Aristotle, of course, you can solve this if you know the fifth book of wisdom, right? And when Aristotle distinguishes the senses of being there, right, he distinguishes not only being according to the figures of predication, substance, and quantity and quality, and so on, and according to act and ability, but also being according to the truth of a what statement, right?

[54:39] And this includes then what we call beings of reason. So is nothing something? What would you say? Is nothing something? Yeah. By in the sense you can know. You see. See

[55:04] when I when I talk about nothing, right? I say nothing is nothing, right? Am I talking about something or not? Yes. Yeah. So now I get a problem. How can nothing? How can nothing be something? Right. Right. See, well, nothing is nothing in the world, right? Nothing. Yeah. It's something in the mind Yeah. So it's a being of reason, right? Yeah. So there is a kind of being there, right?

[55:31] But as being only in the mind. Okay. Okay. That's a very subtle thing, right? See, and notice we might say about somebody that he is blind, right? Okay. Or he is ignorant, right? Now, is to be blind? Is that really to be or not to be?

[56:02] What really is? Not to be. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But. We make an affirmative statement about we say he is blind, right? As if to be blind was was a kind of to be, right? But in reality, to be blind is not to be something. Okay. But the mind takes it as if it were a kind of what? Something. Being right, is it or? Right. Okay. Is it or probably points it out in his famous book.

[56:35] Aristotle distinguishes that as another meaning of the word being, but as being only in the what mind. You know, Professor Kerserk used to joke on, Philosophy is the only subject where you can get paid for talking about nothing. But the philosopher does talk about nothing, right? Okay. And so when you say nothing is nothing, what does the word is mean there? Say, or the mind takes nothing as if it were what?

[57:06] Something. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. So he says to the second, it should be said that none being does not have in itself, whence it is what known. But it is known in so far as the understanding makes it what knowable, right?

[57:28] Whence the true is founded in being. In so far as none being right is a certain what. Being of reason, huh? Apprehended by what reason, huh? Okay. Incidentally, this expression here ens rationis, huh? Ens rationis. which you translate as a being of reason, right? And there's two kinds of being of reason, and one is the negatives, right? Like nothing, right? Blindness and so on, and then there are some relations which are only what beings of what reason.

[58:16] Okay. Okay. So it's a very subtle thing. Those two kinds of of beings of reason, huh? Negations and there's some relations. There's some relations that are real relations, right? But others are only what relations of reason. That's a very subtle distinction. Um. The relation of God to creatures is not a real relation. But the relation of the creature to God is real. Those are very subtle things.

[58:49] But here he's saying that. Nothing or negation, none being, is something what in reason only. Reason. Makes nothing to be something to talk about. There's something to talk about over the what Mind. huh? Remember, there was a little boy, thinking about nothing. Did you ever think about nothing, little boy? I think. What if there was nothing? Absolutely nothing. You know, you got thinking about that. You know, you couldn't even know that there was nothing because there's nothing, you know, around to to know about nothing, right?

[59:37] So it's not true that. knowable is more universal than being right, because non being wouldn't be knowable unless it had a kind of being in the mind. Nothing would not be knowable except what from the kind of being that it has in the mind.

[1:00:17] So when I say that you can't get something from nothing, I understand something by the word nothing, don't I? If I didn't understand anything by the word nothing, I wouldn't be able to understand the famous statement "You can't get something from nothing." And then someone might come along, the sophist, right, and say, "Well, how can how can nothing be something?"

[1:00:45] Well, he's what confusing two senses of the word being, right? The being that is in things and the being that is only in what reason, right? And so, in in things, nothing is is nothing.

[1:01:04] It's not there. It's an unbeing of something, you know, but it's something in the mind, right? And then the contradiction disappears, right? Because we're not saying that nothing is is something in things. Okay, but the same is true even about things like blindness and ignorance, right? Okay, is ignorance something in me? Just like my knowledge is in me, I have knowledge in me, and then I also have this ignorance in me.

[1:01:40] Is that something in me? See, no, it's really the absence of something in me, right? What is what is ignorance in me? Is it something in me? I'm ignorant of a lot of things, you know. See, and and Aristotle speaks of this in the fifth book of wisdom as being in the sense of the truth of a statement, right? Because it's true that I'm ignorant of many things, but is that ignorance in me something in me really?

[1:02:11] It's it's an it's an unbeing of something, right? Yeah. But reason takes ignorance as if it were something to talk about, right? We talk about your ignorance or my ignorance, and sadly wanting and that sort of stuff, right?

[1:02:31] So ignorance is something in the mind, but only in the mind. In that sense, you can say that the to be in the mind is in a way more universal, right? Than to be in things, right? But so is a kind of being there, and so we say nothing is nothing. So use the word is. It's kind of so some kind of isness there, right? Some kind of being there.

[1:03:04] Nothing is nothing. But Aristotle calls that the being according to the truth of the statement, right? Because you can't say that nothing is not nothing. That's what it is. So what kind of isness is that? What kind of being is that? Well, it's only in the mind, right? As opposed to man as an animal, that's not just in the mind. Man as an animal, right?

[1:03:39] That's a very subtle thing. Now the third objection was saying, well, you can't know being without what? It's being knowable, right? And therefore, being true. So isn't that before? To the third, it should be said that when it is said that being cannot be grasped without a knowledge of true, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, thus, that when that being is not grasped, unless the notion of true follows upon the grasping of being, and thus the way of speaking has true.

[1:04:18] In another way, it could be understood that being cannot be grasped unless the notion of truth is grasped, or true is grasped, and this is false.

[1:04:31] But true cannot be understood or grasped unless the notion of being is grasped, because being falls in the what definition of true. And it is similar if we compare the understandable to being, right? For one cannot not understand being without being being understandable. But nevertheless, being can be understood without its understandability being understood. And similar,

[1:05:13] being understood is true, but not an understanding being is true understood, right? Okay. So something can't be known without its being knowable, right? But you can know something without knowing that it's knowable. Okay. And you can see how how people like you know Parmenides have difficulty understanding how something is knowable, right? And they thought that the thing had to be in you the same way it's in itself, right?

[1:05:43] And it's actually in the knower in a kind of immaterial way. But so he didn't really know its knowability, did he? But still, he couldn't know it without being true that it was knowable. So those are very subtle distinctions. You got to think about those for a while before you get a hold of them, right?

[1:06:05] You have to admire Aristotle back there in the fifth book of wisdom when he takes up the word being. The most common word of all, and the first man to what? Understand the word being fully.

[1:06:24] Okay. The difference between is when you say, "I am right," and when you say that nothing is nothing, right? Aristotle saw that distinction. So they're convertible, right?

[1:06:50] You can consider that though to use the word sometimes something too, right? Now it's interesting in Greek. You know the Greek word for nothing is "ouden," which means not one. Our word is no, not thing. That kind of shows you how both thing and one are very universal. They they take it from one, we take it from from

[1:07:18] something, nothing. We negate thing, and they negate one. Right in English, you said no one, you'd think you know more particular, you know, person, right? I don't really know why that should be so, right? If I say, "Is someone home? Is there someone in that room? " What does that mean?

[1:07:41] Yeah, you think you're a person. It's kind of strange, huh? Because in the chair, there's one chair in there, so there's some one thing in there, right? But you wouldn't say if there's a chair in the room and no no person there that there's someone in the room, would you?

[1:07:56] I can't really explain that except that just the peculiarities of our way of speaking, right? But the opposite of something for us in English would be what? Nothing, not no one. Get mixed up these languages, huh? You know, in the Church Fathers, you know the the famous thing was.

[1:08:31] You had the word in Latin here. You had the word "substantia" that covered unity, and in Greek you had the word "hypostasis." Okay. And hypostasis in Greek came to mean the same thing, almost as person, right? Though it could be used for any individual substance of a rational nature. But hypostasis and substantia are etymologically the what same? To stand under, right? But substantia in Latin can also mean the nature of a thing, the substance of a thing, right?

[1:09:16] So when they're translating this from one to the other, the Greeks would say three hypostases, right? Well, if you translate and say then there are three substances in God, then you're saying there's three natures, right? And so what's his name? Jerome says, you know, there's there's poison in another's word, right? But he's the problem, right? Huh? So so we're not accustomed now. Isn't that our custom to speak of three substances in God?

[1:09:49] Because we associate this word too much with the nature thing. So we say three persons, and but the Greeks would say three hypostases, right? But you carry it over and you get that problem, heresy, right? So we'll see if we get to the Trinity if we get that far eventually.