Prima Pars
71. Summa Theologiae I, Q.17 aa.1–2: Falsity in Things and in the Senses (fool's gold, likeness and deception, proper, common and accidental sensibles)
Class of 2007-03-01
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/071-summa-theologiae-i-q-17-aa-1-2-falsity-in-things-and-in-the/

[0:00] Okay, question seventeen on falsity. Then one asks about falsity or falsehood, and about this four things are asked or sought: first, whether falsity is in things; secondly, whether it is in the senses; third, whether it is in the understanding;

[0:32] and fourth, about the opposition of true and what, falsehood. There being four kinds of opposite, what kind of opposites are they? Same question you can ask about the good and the bad, right? And about the one and the many, and something and nothing, and being and unbeing. And they may not be opposed in the same way these different ones, kind of unusual way. Turns out. To the first, when it proceeds thus, it seems that falsehood is not in things,

[1:10] for Augustine says in the book on talking to himself, right? It's Soliloquies, fairly early work of Augustine during his conversion, I think, around that time.

[1:23] If the true is that which is, right, then the false is not what in any way. Although this is what repugnant, right? Okay, I don't see if I follow the grammar there too well. But if the true is what is, the false would be what is not, right? So there's no falsehood around things.

[1:54] Moreover, the false is said from what deceiving, right? But things do not deceive, as Augustine says in the book on true religion, because they do not show anything other than their own what form. Therefore, the false is not found in things.

[2:17] Moreover, truth is said to be in things by comparison to the divine understanding, as has been said above. But each thing, in so far as it is, imitates God. He is I am who am, right? So all things that are, in so far as they are, imitate God. Therefore, each thing is true without falsity, and thus no thing is what false. I'm convinced now, aren't you? Especially that last argument, I like.

[2:46] But against this is what Augustine says in the book on true religion. That every body is what true body and a false what unity, because it imitates unity and is not unity. Just as each thing imitates a divine goodness, and falls short from it, therefore in all things there is what falsity. Did the first two have goodness there, divine goodness? The second says divine unity.

[3:24] And the last sentence. Well, no, the second to the last sentence has goodness. Yeah. Goodness. The second to the last sentence has divine goodness. Well, okay, this one has divine unity. Okay. Yeah, this also is unity. Answer: It should be said that since true and false are opposed,

[3:47] and opposites are about the same thing, it is necessary that there first is found falsity, where truth is first what found, right? And that is in the understanding, right?

[4:08] And so when I'm talking logic, I'll sometimes say, "Where do you find truth? Same place you find falsity in statements, right? Maybe not the same statement, but in general, the same place in statements. But in things, there is neither truth nor falsity, except in order to what the understanding itself. And because each thing, according to that which belongs to it, to itself or as such, to itself or as such is simply what named, but according to that which belongs to it by happening, is not named except what secundum quid, in some way.

[4:55] A thing is simply false, or can be said to be false simply, in comparison to the understanding upon which it depends, which it is compared to which it is compared per se or as such. But in order to another understanding to which is compared by happening, it is not said to be false except secundum quid that's the old distinction we've met, the kind of distinction we've met again and again in here.

[5:28] Now, natural things depend upon the divine understanding understanding, as artificial things depend upon the human understanding. Artificial things. Are said to be what false, simply, and as such, in so far as they fall short of the form of the what art.

[6:02] Hence, that is said, some artists what to make a what false work, right? When it falls short of the operation of the art. That's not really a bottle of wine, I'll tell you that. What you've made. My father-in-law used to bring home, you know, sometimes a bottle of wine when his buddies you know, aged you know, a lot of times tastes like vinegar. This is false. Not living up to the requirements of the art.

[6:53] Thus, however, in things depending upon God, falsity is not able to be found in comparison to the divine understanding, since whatever happens in things, right, proceeds from the ordering of the divine understanding, except what perhaps in voluntary agents. What you might have in mind, in whose power it is, right, to lead themselves out from under, right, the ordering of the divine understanding,

[7:40] in which the evil of what guilt, right, consists, according to which sins themselves are called what falsities, falsehoods, and lies, according in the scriptures, according to that of the fourth psalm. Why do you love vanity and seek a lie?

[8:08] So the sinner's life is a lie. Just as by opposite, virtuous operation, right, is called the truth of what life. That's kind of unusual. He's the word truth, but speaking of the truth of life, in so far as it is under the order of the divine understanding,

[8:36] as is said in John, Gospel of John, I guess, chapter three, verse twenty-one, who does truth comes to the light. But by order to our understanding, to which natural things are compared by happening, things are said to be false not simply, but in some imperfect way, and this in two ways.

[9:10] In one way, by reason of the signified, as that is said to be false in things that is signified or presented by a false speech or a false understanding.

[9:29] By in which way each thing is able to be false, as regards that which is not in it, just as if we say the diameter is falsely what commensurable with the side, as the philosopher says in the fifth book of wisdom or metaphysics, and just as Augustine. says in the book *of Soliloquies* that the tragedian is a false what? Hector, huh? Was Hamlet compared? You know, the actor was weeping.

[10:03] You know, what's Hector about him? You know, he's weeping and tears are coming down. So he's falsely. but contrary-wise, each thing can be called true according to that which what? Yeah, it's fitting for it. Another way, by way of cause, this is a more common sense. And this, a thing is in this way, a thing is said to be false, which is apt to make a false what?

[10:38] Opinion about itself, huh? That's what we call false teeth, right? Why do we call them false? Well, if they're really well made, they seem to be what? The real thing, right?

[10:53] Um. And because it's innate in us to those things which appear on the outside to judge about things, huh? In that our knowledge begins from the what senses, huh? We've talked about that before. We talked about the natural road, right? So we tend to know things in an outward way before inwardly. And the senses, which first and per se are the outward accidents, right? Therefore, those things which, in their exterior accidents, have some likeness of other things, are said to be false by those things, just as what?

[11:43] What's fell? Yeah. Yeah, it's a false honey. And stannum, what's that? Yeah. Tin is a false silver, right? Okay. Or we speak of fools' gold, right? Because it appears to be gold. I'm rich, I'm rich! No, no, buddy, this isn't gold. You know, or what's the thing that looks like a diamond there? Not a diamond. That's a cheaper stone. Rainstone. Rainstone.

[12:18] Can't remember the name of it, but the average person couldn't tell them apart from a diamond. Not a diamond So a woman has her diamond ring, you know, just isn't like that. Maybe the guy, you know, puts one of these other stones in there, you know, and they don't discover it till later on, and then there's all kinds of problems. Anyway.

[12:59] And according to this, Augustine says in the Book of Soliloquies that we name those things or call those things false, right? Which have a likeness, right? Who apprehends as being like something else. And the philosopher, huh? That's the what? antonomasia for Aristotle, right? And the philosopher says in the fifth book of the metaphysics that those things are called false, which are apt to what appear either as they are not, right, or what they are not.

[13:39] And in this way also, a man is called false who is a lover of false opinions and speeches and so on. This guy comes out from the

[13:56] travel agency, right? Talk about you know the details of the, you know. And when you get on the Lithuanian airline, he says, "Wait, you're just going to react to other people, you know? Because you're going to Atlantic, you know? It's a nice airline. You know, before, but first he said, you know, Lithuanian airline, like say, you know, the Saudi Arabian airline is quite incredible, that kind of thing.

[14:23] But let's say these false things, you know, and react to other people, huh? And I guess there's some people who like to be around, you know, saying false things and making them sound kind of what incredible, right? I told you about when I was out in the vault there and the

[14:43] this priest I knew. He comes up and he tells me your teacher Kasurik is going to Russia. And now Kassirik had gone to Levall as an older man, you know, a little bit more students, and we first got up there and he told De Koninck, you know, if you teach philosophy the way it's been taught to me down in the states, I just get up and leave your class.

[15:06] Dikanic was fine, and they, but but they used to kill each other, you know. So Father Jerome, they told me this. So he says, I told De Koninck, you know, about it, and De Koninck says, I hope it keeps his mouth shut more over there than does here and never get out.

[15:26] And so I walked away and thought. Now as I realized it was April Fool's Day, right? And I said, Gee, you know, did I fall for that? Because that's exactly what De Koninck would have said if someone had told him that, right? You know, they would in some kind of remark at this, you know. But actually, ended up he was going to Russia. In fact, so I was nothing to see, but by fact, after a while, they realized it was April Fool's Day.

[15:52] People, you know, playing these tricks, and you see, he made it so credible, you know. And so, if you want to, you know, say that something happened to somebody, and you know how this person reacts, and you tell it, is very similar to it.

[16:08] So, there's a virtue in ethics which Aristotle calls truthfulness, where a man shows himself in his words and deeds as he is. Okay. Not, however, from this that he is able to what imagine them right. Is thus also the wise and those who know would be called false, as is said in the seventy-fifth book of metaphysics.

[16:44] So Thomas has made those distinctions, right? Okay. Now let's go back to the first objection. Where Augustine is saying what? If the true is that which is, right, then one would what?

[17:07] Yeah, yeah. To the first, therefore, it should be said that things compared to the understanding, according to that which it is, is called true. But according to that which it is not, is called false. Hence, a true tragedian is a what? Hector, as is said in the second book of the Soliloquies of Augustine.

[17:34] Thus, therefore, in those things which are, there is found some non-being, right? So also in those things which are, there is found some what? Some kind of falsity, yeah, some notion or some definition of falsity.

[18:00] Okay. Second objection, Augustine says. Well, things look like they're supposed to look, right? Kind of paraphrase them. To the second, it should be said the things as such do not what deceive, right? But paralogizans, right? But they give the occasion of what? Yeah. In so far as they what bear the likeness of those things, which they do not have the existence or the nature of them. So there really is fool's gold, right?

[18:34] And there are things that resemble something other than they are. Okay. The third objection. Moreover, true is said in things in comparison to divine understanding. But each thing, in so far as it is, imitates God. Therefore, each thing is true without falsity. He says. To third, it should be said that in comparison to the divine understanding, things are not said to be what false, which would be for them to be false simply.

[19:10] But in comparison to our understanding, which is for them to be false in some way, right? Okay, that was essentially made in the body article there, right? We had said the same thing about comparison to the divine mind.

[19:29] So there's no false teeth in God's mind, huh? But for us, there is false teeth, and there's fool's gold, right? But no fool's gold for God.

[19:43] Now the it's going to apply to the other side, right? Just kind of a sign that he was making distinctions in the body article.

[19:53] But again, this is what Augustine says in the book on true religion that everybody. Is what a true body and a false what unity? Because it imitates unity and is not unity, right? Okay. Maybe the same thing we said about the goodness. To this fourth that is objected on the other side, it should be said that likeness or a deficient representation does not induce the notion of falsity, except in so far as it gives us the occasion of a false opinion.

[20:33] Whence, not everywhere there is likeness is a thing said to be false, but wherever there is such a likeness that is apt to make a false opinion, not to anyone, but for the most part, then you're deceived huh And Aristotle begins the book on sophistical refutations and on fallacies and logic, right? He talks about likeness, right, and how likeness is what a cause of deception. And Plato said this in the in the Sophist, I believe it is, huh?

[21:11] That likeness is a slippery thing, right? And Aristotle says some men, you know, are really strong; others are wrong You know all these things that women have to make their their breasts you know see more than they are, or something like that. Well, these are what it's not really so, right? And so he he's kind of bring out the general idea and how one stone, you know, resembles another stone sometimes and appears to be something it isn't.

[21:40] And so he's kind of introducing the idea that likeness there can be a cause of what deception, and therefore when you get to arguments, you can have something that appears to be a good argument but fails, right? And

[21:59] you see that if you know professor there, you can see a lot that students are easily deceived by the most common kind of of mistake, you know,

[22:13] which is the fallacy of equivocation, right? But how easily they're deceived by this, huh? Easily deceived. Sometimes when I get through teaching the first reading there in the physics there, where Aristotle is showing that the general is before the particular, because we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly, right? And the general is not as distinct as the particular, so we know things in general before we know them in particular.

[22:44] And then sometimes I'll play the sophist enough, and then I'll say, well, but Aristotle says that our knowledge begins with our senses, and the senses know only particular things. And it's reason that generalizes, so therefore the particular comes before the general. So Aristotle has what contradicted himself? They all think he has done that, right? But they don't see that the word general and particular have two different meanings.

[23:14] When Aristotle says the general is before the particular, he means the more universal before the what less universal. But when he says that the particular is known before the general, he means the singular before the universal. So what he's saying, as a whole, but not in one place, right, is that singulars come before in universals in our knowledge, just as the senses come before the use of reason.

[23:46] But among universals, the more universal comes before the what less universal. Well, since we use the word particular both for the singulars and the less universal, but they don't see that distinction, right? Then they're all deceived into thinking that he's contradicting himself. But when I say that Socrates is a particular man, particular I mean say what individual. Or you are a particular man, or I'm a particular man, right?

[24:16] But when I say that the dog is a particular kind of animal, particular doesn't mean singular, does it? Individual. No, it means something less universal, right? Than animal, right? But they have a hard time seeing that even after you you know explain that. If you put it on an exam, there'll still be some students who won't distinguish the senses, But it's very easy, very easy to deceive people by those sort of things.

[24:55] Yeah. Or the example I get a lot in classes. I'll say, you know, is the whole always more than the part? And then I'll say, well,

[25:10] what's man? Well, he's an animal, but he's not just an animal, right? And often quote my mother, you know, she didn't like me to to say that man is an animal, right? I said, well, mom, I don't mean he's just an animal. He's an animal that has reason, right? Okay, so animal's only a part of what man is. So you ought to get into that, right? But animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, and elephant.

[25:34] So what's only a part of man includes more than man. So sometimes the part is more than the the whole. Yeah, I guess you're right.

[25:45] Again, there's two different meanings here of whole and part, and one is the composed whole, and the definition is one kind of composed whole. And the definition is composed of more than one of its parts. And then the other sense of whole is the universal whole, what is said of its parts. And the universal whole is always said of more than one of its parts itself. And so you say that man is more than an animal.

[26:18] You are thinking of animal as one of the composing parts, the definition of man. And the definition of man contains besides animal reason. But when you say that animal includes more than man, you are thinking of animal now as a different kind of whole. It's said of not only man but other things. It's said of more than man. It's said of. So you are confusing two different senses, right, of one part.

[26:42] But if you look at any one sense of whole or part, the whole is either is always more than the part. It's either made up of more than just that one part, or it's said of more than just that one part. It's said of. But they they have a hard time seeing that, right? Those are common examples, but

[27:06] it's very easy to to lead them astray if you wanted to. But to see the unity of the word, there is what deceives them.

[27:25] Now, if if the word was equivocal by by chance, it would not be easily deceived, and they'd laugh, right? You know, my example there: Roger Murray said 61 owns with a bat. The bat is a flying rodent, therefore he 61 with a flying rodent. Nobody's going to be deceived by that, right? But in the case of a word that's equivocal by reason, there is a certain likeness among the meanings and a proximity among them, and that's why you kind of be deceived by likeness.

[27:53] They found, you know, you heard about this in the radio now. They found some tomb there twenty-seven years ago. You know that has some guy named Jesus buried in it. Oh yeah. And so there is somebody else buried there, but they think it's some woman. You know that must be his wife. You know, and this time they're folding over again. You know, and and the father was saying at mass this morning.

[28:22] One good laugh. You know, watch the program about it tonight. Oh no. But everybody heard about it. You know, everybody's got laughing at the church that he ate at mass this morning. So we just don't make don't make some money on this thing, you know. And that'll be on all the TV stations for a while. Yeah, and then yeah, so.

[28:46] But here is you happen to have the same name. You know, I guess the name Jesus is fairly common. in the East there I was gonna say probably some Puerto Rican name Yeah, yeah,

[28:57] and even Mary, you know, I mean, you know, out the the crucifixion there's three three Marys there, right? So there's a Mary maybe in that in that tomb too, I guess, and Jesus and Mary, and Jesus and Joseph, so they must be same guy. That book in the Old Testament is just quoting Jesus Ben Siger. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And Joshua. Yeah. Then the other one must be, you know, the other one must be Mary Magdalene.

[29:21] The other one must be the son. you know. So the flimsy is, you know, like this is the son. Who we're seeing in Toynbee, you know, famous kind of story, right? We had a picture in one of his books there, you know, of of the the the Eucharist, right, and the thing, you know, and kind of you know, seeing legs between that and and grain worship there in the Greeks and so on.

[29:52] Yeah, yeah. These are very superficial things, you know, with the the the likeness between them. huh? It's just uh people are lit astray so easily.

[30:04] Okay, maybe time for one more article. Okay. Uh whether there is falsity in the senses. Okay. The second one proceeds thus: it seems that in the sense there is not falsity or falsehood. For Augustine says in the book about true religion that if all the senses of the body announce as they are affected, I don't know what more we can demand from them, right? And thus it seems that from the senses we are not what?

[30:42] No. And thus falsity in the sense is not in the senses, huh? So he's saying the senses merely tell us how they've been affected. What more can you ask of them?

[31:01] Moreover, the philosopher says in the fourth book of wisdom, the fourth book metaphysics, after the books of natural philosophy, that falsehood is not private or proper to the senses, but to the what? Imagination.

[31:22] Okay. The imagination is a great source of what? False in our thinking, imagining things to be what? Yeah. So they they discovered you know an accident you know when they if two people see an accident and they ask them to write down right away what they saw rather than wait until next week or next week to write down what they saw there'd be much more agreement between what they saw but a week later they'll start writing one more and your imagination takes over right and sometimes when you haven't seen something for a while you go back and look at it again and says it was I've been imagining it other than it is right so Thomas often speaks of the what on the side of

[32:11] knowing powers right false imagination is the main cause of what deception right and false imagination means what imagining things other than they are right and sometimes the thing can be imagined but you're imagining it other than it is and sometimes you know in talking about God or something like that you may be trying to imagine something that cannot be what imagined so any imagination is false huh so Weiss says you have to transcend imagination to think about God huh but you have to do that with a lot of other things too huh Even in trying to understand ability, you know, people want to imagine it.

[32:58] What is in something and ability to be actually in there, right? Like I I quoted Weizaker, the scientist there, saying that when we imagine something, we make it actual in imagination. So we try to imagine ability, and then we falsify it. That's a difficulty with Anaxagoras and with the students of the elementary particles. What was it?

[33:29] C. S. Lewis, the one book you know describes going down to some part of England he had never been in before, and he was being picked up at the railroad station, wherever it is, by his uncle so and so, you know, and they're driving down the the road there in that place, and he makes some remark about this is not the way I thought it was going to be, you know, the and his uncle turns him, you know, kind of, you know, what right did you have to think those, you know, but you know when you go to some place you imagine it to be a certain way, right?

[33:59] And you know, even I go traveling or something, imagine something, and you get there, it's not the way you imagined it to be, right? I often tell the example, you know, when I was in high school, you know, I used to get kind of tired of the monkey business of high school, you know, and said, wait till you get to college, and I imagine what it's going to be in college.

[34:17] That's where the real serious thinking is going on. And then you get to college, I found that wasn't exactly the way I thought it was going to be. So wait till you get to graduate school, you know, get the just what I want to study, you know, and that sort of stuff. And you found graduate school not the way you thought it was going to be. Said wait to get out teaching, you know, do what I want to do, you know.

[34:35] And you found teaching not exactly what you thought it was going to be, and nothing in this life seems to be, you know, the way it is, the way you think it's going to be. But Shakespeare in *Midsummer Night's Dream* is very good about you know imagination being the cause of what falsity.

[34:54] So there's a lot to be said to that. It's in the commentary on the. epistle of St. Paul that Thomas goes into this a lot. The chief cause of deception on the side of the knowing power is false imagination. On the side of the knowing power is it's the the will. It's what pride, you know. And so goes into how pride is a cause of deception too.

[35:15] huh? But uh moreover, in incomplex things there is not truth or falsity, but only in the complex things, huh? So unicorn true or false?

[35:37] If I say the unicorns in the woods around here, that's either true or false, right? But unicorn period. No, if I say unicorns are in fiction.

[35:49] My my granddad's got a pet unicorn. Yeah, I mean that's all. Yeah, that's not false, right? So unicorns are in fiction, right? That's true. Unicorns in the woods probably is is false, the best of my knowledge.

[36:09] But to put together and divide does not pertain to the senses, huh? They don't make statements, huh? Therefore, in the sense, there is no what falsity. Good argument.

[36:24] But against this is what Augustine says in the book on the soliloquies, huh? It appears what to us is it in all the senses by a likeness that is what. What's similitudo there? What's the word? Similarity. Yeah, that they deceive, right? Okay. St Thomas says, "I answer it should be said that falsehood should not be sought in the senses, except as there is in the senses.

[37:05] Truth is not thus in the senses that the senses know truth, huh? But in so far as they have a true what grasp of sensible things, huh? Which happens

[37:24] in this way when they grasp things as they are, right? Whence there happens to be falsehood in the senses when they grasp something or judge a thing other than they are, really, huh?

[37:51] But in this way, the senses have themselves to knowing things, in so far as there is a likeness of things in the senses. But a likeness of something is in the senses in three ways.

[38:10] Now he's going back to distinction which Aristotle made in the what second book about the soul, right? And in daily life, you know, you don't realize that people don't see this distinction too clearly, right?

[38:26] Do I see you? Or do I see your color and your shape and so on? What do I see? Do I really see you?

[38:42] Although I seem to in some way know you when I see your color and your shape and your movement and so on, right? But do I see you then really as such?

[38:55] No. I see your what, your color and your shape as such, right? Okay. So Aristotle distinguishes between the sensible as such, or per se, they call sometimes, do itself, and the sensible by happening or by accident, right? Okay. But the sensible by accident or by happening is known by something other in you when you do sense. I see you're alive, right? Still alive, I think. But do I sense your life as such?

[39:28] No. But something else in me recognizes you to be alive when I see you moving and talking and smiling and being amused and so on. Ah, do you see the point? Okay. But then he also sees a distinction among the sensibles as such, or per se, between what only this sense knows, like your color is known only by my eyes, right? But your shape, for example, could be known by my hand, right?

[39:59] Feel the shape of your head or something. And also by my eyes, right? And so he speaks of the proper or private sensibles, which are known by only one sense, and then the what common sensibles, right? And Thomas is going to use that threefold distinction.

[40:17] In one way, first and per se, as in the sight is a likeness of colors, and have other private sensibles, right? Sometimes they translate proper as proper, but I think it's a sensible but private yeah, private sensibles. In another way, per se but not first, as in sight is a likeness of shape and what magnitude, right? And the other common sensibles they call them, right? Okay.

[40:53] Now I make use of that distinction there, you know, when I'm manifesting the fact that it's not impossible that say philosophy and theology might sometimes know the same thing, but they wouldn't know the same thing in the same way. And you say, was it possible that you can know the same thing in two different ways?

[41:18] Well, you can see it already in the senses, huh? That I can know the shape of this what cup if I had kept my eyes closed since I came in this room, right? I can still know the shape, but I know it through touch, right? To how far the hardness of it extends, right? Without using my hands, without even touching it, I could know the shape through my eyes, right?

[41:42] So my eyes and my sense of touch both know the shape of the cup, but not in the same way, right? One knows it through color, you might say, how far the color extends, and the other knows it through hardness or something of that sort, right? But the color of the cup is known only by the eye, and the hardness of it only by the sense of touch, right?

[42:06] Okay. In the third way, neither what first nor through itself or as such, but by happening, happening. As in sight, there is the likeness of a man, not in so far as he's a man, but in so far as to this colored thing, right? It happens to be a man, right?

[42:37] Now Einstein gets all mixed up in this, right? Because as a scientist, he thinks that the actual sensible must be a what a hypothesis. And so I make fun of Einstein saying, you know, for Einstein then the existence of his wife is a what hypothesis Explaining a series of sounds and spells. Hypothesis. But I'll show you how that gets followed up, you know, by by his his specialty there, right?

[43:05] And he comes back, he looks upon it, huh? And you know the other famous example I know among the scientists there, and they used to use the book sometimes, the Introduction to Experimental Medicine by Claude Bernard. I think I mentioned that. But you know what he sees in experimental science is that you have an hypothesis, and then secondly you deduce the consequences of the hypothesis, and then third by experiment or observation you see whether those predictions are verified or not.

[43:34] Well, he says the philosopher he has hypotheses and he deduces consequences from them. That's all he does. So he's missing the third part, right? The the theologian he just has hypotheses and didn't even deduce them. So. So he sees, you know, experimental science is being completed as having these three things, right? Three is the first number, bump. You say, oh, the philosopher is two of the three, and the believer is just one of the three, right?

[44:04] So he imagines. I mean, the scientist imagines the hypothesis, right? Then he reasons out the consequences of it, and then he checks by experiment and observation to see whether those things are so. The philosopher he imagines things too, and you know deduces the consequences and doesn't go and check them or. And the theologian or the believer just imagines things. That's that's you can see how how guys influence right just by his own way of knowing, right?

[44:35] Huh? And tries to understand other things in terms of that. So when Einstein talks about you or me, you know, you're you're an hypothesis to explain a series of sounds and colors and smells and so on. That but that doesn't seem to agree with our experience of knowing each other.

[45:01] I got a whole bunch of you know twelve grandchildren, twelve hypotheses. So anyway, now he's going to distinguish. This is the important thing to see, right? And about the private sensible, huh? The senses do not, as a rule, you might say, have false knowledge, right? Except by happening and rarely, right? Within pochiori rebus, right? On account of the disposition of the organ, right? It does not receive the sensible form, huh?

[45:41] Suitably, right? Just as other things that undergo on account of some indisposition receive in a what deficient way the impressions of the agent, right? And hence it is on account of the corruption of the tongue. To those who are sick, sweet things seem to be what bitter, right? Okay. We all have some experience of that, you know. When I was a little boy, my mother said, "Eat your orange before you eat your candy."

[46:12] And if you eat the candy first, then the orange tastes almost what bitter, you know. But I usually, you know, I cut an orange, touch an orange in the morning. That's my my vitamin C in the morning, and and I don't have any candy or cookie or anything like that. I have an orange, and then I really taste it as it is right now. I've been somebody at a wine tasting where someone says, "Well, you know, if you eat this particular thing, then the wine's going to taste differently," you know.

[46:42] And so, a lot of times, people want to just have maybe some, you know, a bit of bread or something. You know, but rather something very fancy that'll make it. And when these dips all get hot, things then you can't you can't make taste good, but you don't really taste the wine as it is, right? Huh? So your organ is is indisposed, huh? And if you eat a lot of candy, you know, and lemon drops and so on, you can't really taste the wine, huh?

[47:11] Um. So sometimes your tongue is indisposed, right? But generally speaking, the sweet will taste sweet, and the bitter will taste bitter, and the salty will taste salty, and so on. You're not apt to be deceived about sensible things, and the rough will feel rough, and the smooth will feel smooth. Okay.

[47:34] So generally speaking, the senses are not deceived about their private sensibles, unless the organ is is indisposed, right? Um. But about the common sensibles and the per accidens there can be a false judgment even in the sense what rightly disposed, huh? Because the senses do not what directly refer to those things, but what prachidans, huh? That's the accidental sensibles. We were talking about that before, right? Fool's gold, right?

[48:12] Huh? You don't sense gold as such, right? You sense the color of the gold, right? So something else has a color of gold. You might, you know, oh, I've discovered gold. Right, I'm wealthy. But or else in the case of the common sensibles, because they're known in a way through the what private sensibles, right? I remember one time an assumption there the something I should have done more, but what they call optical illusions, right?

[48:41] You know, and all these ways people find out make lines look longer or shorter or bent or something like that, you know. But you know the simplest one is you know if you draw two lines like this, you say now they look to be the same what length, right? But then if you do like this.

[49:09] And I stand back, and the bottom line to me now looks shorter than the one on top, right? And apparently, you know, people have been studying these things. A whole number of different ways of doing this is the simplest way, you know. But there are ways to make things look longer or shorter than they are, or make straight things look bent. Things, right? But doesn't that look shorter?

[49:31] See, but now you're being deceived about what a common sensible, which is what length, right? And so these are known through something else, right? Through the private sensibles, through the color and so on. So there are ways in which you are more commonly deceived, right? What common sensibles about the what private sensibles, right? I'm Not deceived. About the color of this here, you know. But as far as the link there, now what?

[50:01] Easily deceived, right? Well, what's kind of interesting about this exhibition was they had the different ways of doing it that have been discovered gradually over time, right? And so it's kind of an art of deceiving the eyes, just as in logic, there's an art of deceiving reason. Aristotle gives the thirteen ways of deceiving reason, then, and that the sophist can can make use of, huh?

[50:25] And but what's important to know, especially, is the most common ways, right? And so he has six ways in speech and seven ways outside of speech, you know. And we did quite a discovery, right? But there's something like that for the eye, right? These these things.

[50:49] So Thomas will make this distinction, and when the moderns, you know, attack the senses, they don't make this distinction, or between the three kinds of what sensibles, right? I see your color, I see your shape, and I see you. But

[51:09] you and your your shape and your color are objects, are sensible in different ways. Your color and your shape, as such, but not you. And but yet there's a distinction between the way I see your color and the way I see your what shape? Because I see your shape because the color extends so far, right? If there are two gases in here, you know, I guess they tell me there's different kinds of gases in the air here, but I can't see this.

[51:38] where the hydrogen gets off, and hydrogen begins or nitrogen and so on because they don't have any what color, right? So I kind of know the the shape of this table here, even though I haven't really gone around and felt the whole shape all the way around, right? Because the color extends so far, right? And then it gives off, and if I came to know it by my shape, it because the hardness gives way as I go along, right?

[52:04] It is in. So I'm kind of knowing the common sensibles through the private sensibles. When you know one thing through something else, then you don't know it as well as the first thing, right?

[52:20] Now it's it's a little bit like, but you're not really reasoning from one to the other, right? You say, and you don't really go through a discourse, huh? Reason is ability for large discourse, right? Reason is ability to know one thing to another. The senses kind of know them together, you know. It doesn't really the the eye doesn't reason from the color to the shape, right? But in a way, it is knowing one through the other, right?

[52:45] And therefore, a little bit like the the reason. But reason is more deceived in the conclusions and in the beginnings, huh? Now the first thing there, huh? Where he quoted Augustine saying, "Well, the senses tell you how they feel. What more can you ask of them?" The doctor says, "How do you feel? Feel hot? I wasn't hot." So the first, therefore, should be said: for the senses to be affected is for them to what sense?

[53:22] Whence, by the fact that the senses thus announce things as they are affected, it follows that they are not deceived in the judgment by which they judge themselves to sense something. But from this that the senses otherwise affected sometimes, and the thing is, it follows that they announce to us sometimes a thing to be other than it is. And from this, the senses are what deceived, though not about the sensing itself, right?

[53:58] Okay. Of course, you know some people in the same room. Somebody says, "Kind of cold in here. I don't feel cold. You know, maybe they've been sitting there, you know, doing nothing, and and their body temperature is what gone down, and they, you know, feeling the thing in the way that person has been doing some work or something doesn't feel it, right? We used to notice this up at Laval there when we would, and cold, you know, afternoon, you know, the best professors like Monsignor Dionne gave the class at five in the afternoon, right?

[54:29] And so you come out, you've been sitting in the classroom room for from three to six of them like that, you know, and you get out of the classroom and out into the cold Quebec weather, you know, and then we go to the to the place where you pay your ten cents and get your trunks and your hot shower, and then you swim for half an hour, and then you take a hot shower, and then you come out, you

[54:53] know, just you know, you feel nice and you know warm, and your circulation is going, you know, so the way your body is disposed, right, in one case another, will make you feel the coldness more or less, right?

[55:10] But you have to distinguish between the way you deceive more by the accidental sensible and the common sensible, like up there, than by the private sensibles. on. But even the private sensibles and the senses can be what deceived if they've had what you made hot things and you try to taste the wine, yeah.

[55:36] I know when I taught with the Christian Brothers there, and they had their wines, you know, sometimes at dinner, you know, faculty and so on. But in those days, if you if you didn't smoke or something, but maybe you're at the blah blah beforehand, and someone offers you cigarettes, you smoke it, well, then my brother would say, "No, that's going to affect you, you know. It's going to affect your your judgment, right?

[56:00] Your tasting of the wine, right?". And more so for a person who didn't smoke regularly, right? You know, because in other ways you get to kind of know these things, right? A person who smokes regularly, they they kind of adjust for that, right? But someone who doesn't, you know, might destroy your sense of taste. cigar before you taste the wine, isn't it?

[56:26] Well, it's four thirty. I guess we got to stop. Isn't that time we stop? You'll start jumping up around four thirty, don't you? Yeah. Huh? It's time we stop. Okay. Okay. What reason? Sorry. Okay. So we're not going to find out whether there's falsity in the understanding and how true and false are what opposed, right? But we can't find out next week because I'll be in London, England next week.

[56:56] It'll be falsity here. Yeah. Yeah.