Prima Pars
76. Summa I, Q.19, Arts. 1–2: Light and Life in St. John; Whether There Is Will in God and Whether He Wills Other Things
Class of 2007-03-29
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/076-summa-i-q-19-arts-1-2-light-and-life-in-st-john-whether-there/

[0:00] Father, the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order, illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, and help us to understand what you've written. Name of the Father, the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Before I go to the Summa here, just another thing about this coupling in

[0:32] Lord's words, you know, of truth and life, right? I was looking again at the Gospel of Saint John, right, and in the fourth verse, right after you get to it, the his being the Word and being God and so on, and his being responsible for the rest of creation and so on. He says in the fourth verse, in auto, right, in him zoe en there was life,

[1:02] and then the rest of the verse, and the life, the zoe en was to phos the light, ton anthropon. But there you're coupling phos or light with life right light with life, right? It's similar to coupling truth and life, because light is usually on the side of the knowing power. So now, if you remember, I don't know, did we give you one time the logical and understandable division of the Gospel of Saint John?

[1:39] As you know, following rule of two or three, Thomas divides the Gospel of Saint John into two parts. Right, the first chapter, which is about showing the divinity of Christ, and then chapters two through twenty-one, right, the manifestation of this by his life and death, right, and then two through eleven is by his living, and twelve to twenty-one by his death and resurrection. Well, how is that two through eleven divided?

[2:11] Well, of course, he divides it into two. Chapter two, which is showing his superiority to nature, right, and he transforms the water into wine and so on, and then three through eleven is his spiritual

[2:28] power, and that's of course divided also to two, because in three and four he talks about spiritual generation. Three is where you have the Nicodemus coming and getting his lesson of the baptism, and then four is kind of extended to the non-Jews, like the Samaritan woman at the well and so on. So three and four are dealing with spiritual generation, and then five through eleven are dealing with the gifts bestowed upon those spiritually generated.

[3:00] And chapter five, this is divided now into three. Chapter five is is spiritual life. Chapter six is spiritual food. That's the famous one, the Eucharist in Saint John. And then seven through eleven are dealing with his what spiritual teaching. He divides that last part into two: seven, which is about the origin of his teaching, and then when he divides eight through eleven, it's very interesting because eight and nine are dealing with the enlightening character of his teaching, and ten and eleven with the life-giving character.

[3:41] And he first does it. Each of those is divided into parts. In the first chapter, he deals more with this in words, and then the next chapter reveals it with a deed, right? So, like example in eight and nine, eight has the famous words, "I am the light of the world," right? Okay, and then nine has the curing of the blind man, right? So that's kind of a miracle that illustrates the life-giving or light-giving thing.

[4:13] And then ten emphasizes life, and he's going to give eternal life to us, and so on. And eleven is the resurrection, is the raising of the dead of Lazarus, right? Okay. But looking at chapter eight here, where Christ says, "I am the light of the world," he says, "Ego eimi I am to phos I am the light tou kosmou of the world okay and the one walking or following me will not walk in the dark he says But he will have and he says the world, okay, and the one walking or following me will not walk in the dark," he says.

[4:47] But he will have, and he says, "to phos tes zoes." He will have the light of life, right? So light and life are joined, and that's I think similar, really, to it's the same reason that truth and and life are joined in the words, "I am the way, the truth, and the life." Okay, but it goes back to what we're saying about Thomas that in the Summa Theologiae he puts the consideration of the life of God with his his intellectual thing.

[5:19] So he had that in two ways here. He says, "I am the way, the truth, and the life." It couples those two, and then when he says, "In him there was life, and the life was the what?" Yeah, yeah. Of course the word, but again, that's appropriation because obviously there is life in the in the Holy Spirit, and there is probably another way in which life is is appropriated in Holy Spirit, but in this way, it's appropriated to the Son.

[5:49] And that's similar to Aristotle has there for when he talks about God, Zoe, right, life, the root for life. It's kind of interesting. You know the Greek word for animal is zoon. We get the word zoo and zoology and so on. But the Greek word or name for animal comes from the word life, and the Latin word for animal comes from the word soul. And soul is the you know first cause of life in the living body, right?

[6:22] So it's something similar, right? And it kind of goes back to what you learned in the three books about the soul, where Aristotle says that life in the plants is hidden. And so, although the plant does have a soul, does have a cause of life within itself, it's not named from soul the way animal is because it's not in it's more hidden. And that corresponds to Greek, or the animals named from what life.

[6:48] Not that plants aren't alive, but they're not so clearly. Well, Aristotle, if you recall, when you're looking at the first book about the soul, Aristotle, after the proemium, he goes to what his predecessors said about the soul. And some of them investigated what the soul was, the fact that you know a dog or a cat moves around from one place to another, and others investigated it from what would be the cause of sensation, right?

[7:15] So they investigated life, where it was most known to us in animals and in the life of plants. So you had it seen with the Zoe in Aristotle. You have it in the Gospel of John. Okay, well now we can come to the will. Okay. Question nineteen, and of course this consideration of the divine will is divided, of course, into three parts. And the first part is going to be this question nineteen.

[7:47] The second part, which will be the next two questions, will be on those things that pertain absolutely to the will. Then the third part, which will be getting down here in twenty-two, those things which pertain to the understanding in order to the will, right? Kind of both of them.

[8:10] Now about the will, he says twelve things are asked. First, whether in God there is a will, right? Secondly, whether God wills things beside Himself.

[8:30] Then the third question: whether whatever God wills, He wills from necessity. And fourth, whether the will of God is the cause of things. And the fifth article: whether some cause can be assigned for the divine will. Why did He choose you to be?

[9:03] Whether divine will is always fulfilled. Seventh article: Whether the divine will is changeable. Eighth article: Whether the will of God imposes necessity upon the things that He wills. The ninth: Whether in God there is will of bad things.

[9:31] The tenth: Whether God has free judgment. We'd say free will, but free judgment. They said. Ah, and then the eleventh and the twelfth ones: Whether one should distinguish in God the will of the sign. What the hell does that mean? And whether conveniently, there are posited five signs about the divine will. We'll see what that strange doctrine is. But obviously, the first question is whether there's any will in God at all, right? the first, therefore, one proceeds thus: it seems that in God there is no will, for the object of the will is the end or purpose and the good, but you can't assign some end for God.

[10:23] Therefore, there is no will in God. Moreover, will is a certain what? Desire, right? But desire, since is of a thing not had, designates some kind of imperfection, which does not belong to God. Therefore, the will of God. Therefore, will is not in God. That reminds me a bit of Socrates' argument there in the

[11:04] symposium, I guess, where he's talking about the philosopher, and he says that the philosopher is a lover of wisdom. Now, if you love something, then you want it. If you want something, you lack it. Therefore, the philosopher must be lacking wisdom. And that sounds like a good argument, right? But sometimes I put to a student in class and say, "Well, Saint John tells us that God is love.

[11:39] But if you love, you want; if you want, you lack. Therefore, God is lacking, right? Something wrong with this, right? Of course, in English, the word 'want' the word 'want' can designate both desire and lacking something, right? So, if I say the students are sadly wanting, I'm not talking about their desire being sad, or that might be true also, but they're simply lacking something they should have, right?

[12:14] Now, what's what's the defect in Socrates' argument that that you're lacking in a certain way? Is it that that they have they have wisdom in a certain way, not fully? They don't. Can you love something that you don't lack? You can, yeah. And so, when we take up even the emotions, and then later on the acts of the will, we say love is more basic than wanting or joy.

[13:03] But when you love something but don't have it, then you want it. When you love something and have it, then you rejoice. So it isn't necessarily true that what you love you want. There's probability because that's so common in our things, right? But what there is in God is love and joy, but no wanting, strictly speaking. So, but it's interesting that this group of powers is often called the appetitus, which means wanting or desire, right?

[13:38] And I suppose going back to what Shakespeare says, things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs, and that can be applied kind of in a in a certain way to even the reason and the will. So the act of reason that is so characteristic of reason that stands out reasoning is like a kind of motion, and wanting is a kind of what seeking too.

[14:02] So it seems to be like motion. So we're more aware of things like hunger and thirst and so on. And so it gets its name from what's more known, but it's not really limited to that. Just like the the irascible appetite's name from ira anger right, which stands out, but it doesn't involve just anger. Moreover, according to the philosopher in the third book about the soul, the will is a what?

[14:31] Yeah. Why the good is the unmoved mover, but God is the first unmoved mover, as is proven in the eighth book of Aristotle's Physics or Natural Hearing. Therefore, in God there is no will, right?

[14:50] Against all this nonsense is what the apostle, meaning Saint Paul, says I don't know if that's very common Thomas, that what do you call that figure of speech? Yeah, terrible word, Romans 12, that you might prove what is the what will of God.

[15:13] Now Thomas gives the basic reason why there's will in God. I answer it should be said that in God there is will, just as in him there is what understanding. For the will follows upon the understanding, just as the emotions what follow upon the sense part.

[15:36] For just as a natural thing has existence and act through its form, so the understanding when it understands an act it does so through some understandable form.

[15:53] But each thing has to what has some relation has this relation you might say to its natural form. That when it does not have it, it tends toward it, and when it has it, it rests in it. And the same is so about any natural perfection, which is the good of nature. And therefore, this relation to the good in things lacking knowledge is called natural desire, right?

[16:26] And so you go to the place to buy a plant, you know, and sometimes you say, "Well, this plant wants a lot of sun, or it wants a lot of water, or a big feeder." They say sometimes, you know, about broccoli and so on. But there you are talking about natural desire, right?

[16:45] Whence also the intellectual nature to the good grasped by the understandable form has a similar relation: that when it has it, it rests in it; when it does not have it, it what seeks it. And both of these things pertain to the will. Whence, in everything having an understanding, there is will. Just as in everything having a sense, there is the animal desire, which is the emotions, the feelings, huh?

[17:19] And thus is necessary that there be in God will, since there is in Him what understanding, right? And just as His act of understanding is His very being, so His what? Will. Yeah. There is no accidents in God, we saw before, right? And if His understanding or His willing was not His being, then He would be to His understanding and His willing His ability is to act, and He would not be pure act, huh?

[17:47] So Thomas is very brief there. Now, to the first objection, he says: Although nothing other than God is the end of God, right? Nevertheless, God Himself is an end with respect to all the things that come to be from Him.

[18:11] And thus, in this through His very what nature or substance, since through His very substance He is good, right? In fact, as good as himself. But the end has a notion of something what good.

[18:29] Is it would it ever be proper sometimes to translate this type of use of ratio as character? You would say that, I suppose. Yeah. Yeah. See, when when they define the good, sometimes they define the good through the end. They say the good is what is perfective of another by way of an end, right? Okay. In this sense, you would say that God is an end, right?

[19:02] But he is the end of other things, right? So in that way, still pertains to the idea of end in some way, huh? And so he is something good.

[19:16] Okay. Now the second objection was saying that will is a certain what? Desire, right? That's why it's named. To second, it should be said that the will in us pertains to the desiring part, which, although it is named from desire, right? Nevertheless, it doesn't have this act alone. That it desires what? What it does not have, but also that it loves what it has, and that it what?

[19:47] Delights in it. As I mentioned before, in Greek, you know, they talk about the emotions. They divide them into two: epithumia in Greek and thumas, right? And these are translated into Latin by the concupiscible appetite and the irascible appetite, right? But they're both named from the emotion that kind of stands out to us. So when you're hungry or thirsty, or very hungry or thirsty, you're very much aware of your what?

[20:21] Need, yeah, your condition, yeah. And when you're angry, you're very much aware of this, right? So it's named from the emotion that stands out, right? But it's not limited to that particular emotion.

[20:38] Just like you might say, reason is named from the act of reasoning, right? But it also involves understanding, right? And not just reasoning. And as regards loving and

[20:57] delighting or joy or pleasure, will is posited, he says, in God, right? Okay. So there's three acts here. Basically, the basic act is in us is to like or love something, right? Now, if I like candy but don't have it, then I want some candy, right? If I like candy and I get some candy and eating it, mmm, then I have joy, pleasure, right? You see. But of these three acts, only the first, love or liking, and what joy, can belong to God, right?

[21:30] The middle one of wanting can't belong to God because he doesn't lack any good. He contains all good. He said to Abraham, "I'll show you every good," right? Meaning himself.

[21:48] As regards this, will is posited in God, in regard to amare and delectari. Who always has right the good which is object, since it is in no way different from his very what substance or nature.

[22:05] You see, coming back to to Socrates there, both of the chief philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, make it very clear that the beginning of philosophy is wondering, and wonder is basically a desire to know, especially to know the cause, the unknown cause of some effect, huh? Just going to eclipse the sun, that's the cause of this? And but the philosopher is not named from wonder; he's named from the love of wisdom.

[22:41] Now, why is it appropriate that the philosopher be named from the love of wisdom rather than from wonder? Wisdom is the end instead of the beginning. It can be there at the end, yeah. I can love wisdom whether I have it or don't have it, right? Okay. Why desire wonder? Wonder. I say, twinkle, twinkle, little star, how I wonder what you are! I don't know. big word, right?

[23:11] So the love of wisdom can be found when you don't have wisdom, but even after you have wisdom, and in fact, as Augustine says, you can love it more after you know what it is than before, right? Okay. And that same same reason why charity, say, you know, remains in heaven, right? Because charity is basically love, huh? Okay. And you can love God when you don't have Him, but when you have Him, when you see Him face to face, you're going to love Him more than you ever did in this life.

[23:49] And but hope is going to what? Yeah, hope hope is something you don't have yet, right? So hope is going to disappear, right? Faith is going to disappear too, because you're going to have this clear vision of God, right? Okay. But love is going to remain, and so it's more appropriate to name the philosopher from the love of wisdom, huh? Doesn't imply that he's necessarily wise yet, right?

[24:17] But as he starts to acquire some wisdom, he doesn't love wisdom less, but he loves it more. Why the wonder in a sense is diminished, right? Once you start to see the reason why things are so, right? The desire has been satisfied, huh? So so wonder is like a hunger or thirst, they say, right? But a hunger or thirst for knowledge. But when you get the knowledge, and the hunger or thirst disappears, huh?

[24:44] It's more appropriate to name the philosopher from the love of wisdom than. So God doesn't have any desire for wisdom. He doesn't want wisdom. What's wrong with him? See, yeah, he's wisdom itself, right? So he loves wisdom and he rejoices in his wisdom. What's his happiness?

[25:10] Okay. Now the third objection was saying, well, the will is a moved mover, right? So the good moves the will, and then the will moves us to do something. To the third, it should be said that the will, whose chief object is a good outside the will, is necessary that it be moved in some way by that. But the object of the divine will is his own goodness, which is his very what nature.

[25:41] When, since the will of God is his very nature, his very essence, it is not moved by another from himself, but by himself only, right? And this is not even the strict sense of motion, right? In that way of speaking in which to understand. Bad into will is said to be a what emotion, huh? And according to this, Plato says that the first mover moves itself, right? I mean, he he knows loves himself.

[26:12] He's very very nice to Plato when he defends him in saying these things, huh? Now, second article: whether God wills something other than himself, right?

[26:36] The second one proceeds thus: it seems that God does not will things other than himself, for the divine act of will is his very being. But God is not other from himself. Therefore, he does not will something other than himself. Huh? Kind of a strange argument. The dogs have been down there.

[27:05] Moreover, the thing willed, the object of the will, moves the will as the desirable desire, as is said in the third book about the soul. If therefore God willed something other than himself, his will would be moved by something other than himself, which is impossible.

[27:28] Moreover, to whatever will suffices something willed, it seeks nothing outside of itself. But to God, his own goodness suffices, and his will is what satiated from his own goodness, huh? Therefore, God does not wish something other than himself, huh?

[27:56] Okay, now get into those objections, huh? Moreover, the act of the will is multiplied according to the things willed. If therefore God wills himself and other things from himself, it would follow that the act of his will was multiplied, huh? Like to be one act whereby he wills his own goodness, and then no, he wills your goodness or my goodness, huh? And consequently, his being would be multiplied, would be composed, huh?

[28:29] Because that's his his will. But this is impossible. Therefore, he does not will things other than himself, huh? Okay. Professor, huh? But against all this is what the apostle says. Who's the apostle? Saint Paul. 1 Thessalonians, huh? Chapter four. This is the will of God, your sanctification.

[29:03] So Thomas says, "I answer it should be said that God not only wills Himself, but also things other than Himself, which appears in the likeness before introduced. For a natural thing not only has a natural inclination with respect to its own good, so that it tries to acquire it when it doesn't have it, or it rests in it when it does have it, but also that it diffuse, spread out its own good to other things according as is what possible.

[29:47] Whence we see that every agent, in so far as it is an act and perfect, makes something like itself. Whence this also pertains to the notion of the will that the good which one has he communicates to others according as it is possible, and this especially pertains to the divine will from which through a certain likeness is derived every what perfection.

[30:24] Said Thomas, "Both can you said like will, divine will, is that and and and the notion of will, but that's really this text is bonitas. Do you have that? Like. And this especially pertains to the divine will from which through a certain likeness is derived every perfection. They say goodness. You mean? Oh yeah, you you do have will there. Yeah. Okay. First part. yeah Then it says derivatur omnis perfectio But we saw a connection between perfection and good there back in the articles on perfection, good.

[30:59] Whence, if natural things, in so far as they are perfect, communicate their good to other things, much more does this pertain to the divine will, and that it communicates its own good to other things by way of a certain what likeness, huh? In the way that is possible, right?

[31:25] Thus, therefore, he wishes both himself to be in other things, but now a little difference here, right? But he wills himself as the end, other things as towards that end,

[31:41] in so far as it is befitting the divine goodness also that other things partake of it. That's like what our Lord said. If you who are evil know how to make good things. to your children, How much more? Yeah. Yeah.

[32:02] That's the same as that article. Okay, now the first objection is saying, well, the the divine willing is the divine being, and the divine being is now in itself something else, right?

[32:22] Now this is something very important that Thomas so often point out, talking about God. Now we have many thoughts about God, and no thought is adequate expressing God, right? But something about God is brought out in one thought that's not brought out in another thought. So he says to the first, therefore it should be said that although the divine act of willing, the divine to will, is his being in the thing itself, nevertheless they differ in their what?

[32:55] Yeah, in their definition, yeah. Okay. Now this goes back to the teaching of Aristotle in the Peri Hermeneias, right? That words signify things through what? Thoughts. Okay.

[33:15] And as Thomas pointed out back here, these many words said of God, although they signify the same thing in God, they don't signify it through the same thought, and therefore they are not strictly speaking synonyms, right?

[33:38] So although the divine being and the divine willing are the same thing, the words, the the being of God and the willing of God differ in their meaning, right? And one brings out something the other one doesn't bring out. Okay. That's a very important distinction that we met before, but it comes up again again. According to a diverse way of understanding and signifying, right?

[34:11] In this that I say God to be, there's not implied any relation to something, right? Else. As there is in this that I say God what? Wills, huh? And therefore, although he is not anything other than himself, he wills nevertheless something other than himself, right? Okay. Just like he understands something other than himself, right?

[34:43] Okay. Now the second objection is saying, hey, if God wills something other than himself, isn't he being moved by the goodness of this thing other than himself? And now he's not the unmoved mover that we thought he was, and so on. Well, of course the answer going to be that God doesn't will anything else except in willing himself.

[35:10] To the second, it should be said that in those things that we will on account of an end, the whole reason of moving is the end itself, and this is what moves the what, the will. And this, most of all, appears in those things which we will only on account of the end.

[35:34] Who wishes to take a bitter medicine or potion, right? Wishes in it nothing except what, health. So nothing moves you to take the bitter potion except the what. Health. Yeah, yeah. And of course these. I had some. Yeah, when I was young, and and they had these red pills that are like cinnamon, those little cinnamon things, and it actually tasted pretty good. Yeah. I put it in my mouth and. And I I went right through there, thinking, oh what an awful taste of medicine right So I didn't try to enjoy it you know

[36:22] Well, they shouldn't make medicine taste too good. That's saying the dangers for little boys and little girls but they don't take it. so Thomas takes the example of a bitter potion right where there's nothing in the medicine that would appeal to the little boy or girl but the only medicine

[36:42] is different he says than the one who takes a sweet potion is meant, which is not only on account of health but also on its own sake right someone can will right you seen these orange flavored vitamin C pills you know yeah they taste pretty good I like them you know and I don't get much candy nowadays so I take one of these things so I've got a yeah

[37:17] when since God does not will things other than Himself except an account of the end which is His own goodness right it does not follow that something other is moving His will beside His own what goodness

[37:36] and then he makes this comparison and thus just as he understands things other than Himself by or in understanding His own nature right so also He wills things other than Himself in willing His own what goodness

[37:54] God only in that way can will us huh? It's only in willing himself that he can will us we can will something without because of you know directing it to God right but He cannot will something except in willing Himself otherwise there'd be some what God being moved by something other than Himself and there'd be multiplicity of acts and so on

[38:27] okay now third objection was saying that isn't he satisfied with himself you see now people think you know he he got bored there by himself alone had to make the universe to play with you know but this is all nonsense of course to third it should be said from the fact that His own goodness suffices to the divine will it does not follow that He wills nothing else right but that He wills nothing else except by reason of His goodness

[39:09] You know what they say about the American consumer. No, happiness is always one purchase away, one more purchase away. But what you purchase is never enough to satisfy you, right? Okay. What's the famous book of Thackeray there, Vanity Fair, right? But on the kind of last page of Vanity Fair, which kind of sums up the moral of the story, huh? Where he says, "For who in this life ever gets what he wants?"

[39:37] He says, or having gotten it, is satisfied. Okay. So, we're always wanting something more because we're not satisfied, right? So, the fact that God is completely satisfied by His own goodness, right, is a sign that He can't will anything else except by willing His own what goodness, and all these other things as something suitable to His goodness, huh?

[40:10] Okay. Now, beautiful proportionality now in the reply to the fourth objection. The fourth objection, is, saying, "Well, if God wills Himself and wills something else, aren't there two willings in God and therefore multiplicity?" To the fourth, it should be said, and Thomas makes the comparison now, going back to what we learned about to understand that just as the divine understanding is one, right, one act, because He does not see many things except in one thing, so the divine willing is one and simple, right?

[40:45] Because He does not will many things except through one, which is His own what goodness, right? So he's quite the, quite the. I can't say quite the creature, the creature. He's quite the being, right? The being.

[41:08] So God can't understand anything other than Himself except by understanding Himself, right? And He can't will something other than Himself except by what? His own goodness. Okay. Willing His own goodness. Yeah. Now you got to be a little bit careful about this proportion, right, between the intellect and the will, because as Thomas is going to point out now in the next article,

[41:40] God in understanding Himself necessarily understands everything else, not only everything else that He has made or will make or has made, right, but everything that He could make and didn't make. But does God, in necessarily willing Himself, necessarily will anything else? The answer is no. Okay. And to me, this is you know extremely important to see, just for your own. Thankfulness, right? You realize that did you ever, thank God for choosing you to be.

[42:21] See, and that's kind of the first thing to thank God for, right? What you realize is choosing you to be was not because you were more deserving to be than all these other people that could have been, right?

[42:37] You stop and think, you know. Obviously, if your mother and father had not met, you would not have been right. But even if your mother and father met, you are only one of thousands, if not millions, of people that could have been generated from your mother and father. And I forget, you know, what they say, you know, about the sperm. But there's, you know, thousands. I guess you know, and only one of those would be lead to you.

[43:05] So your chances of being are practically nil, even if your parents do meet, right? And so when you realize that it's completely free in God's part and purely gratuitous that He chose you to be, it makes you rather humble, right? Huh? And and should make you very what thankful that He chose you to be. It's very, very, very worth thinking about. I think you know that particular thing.

[43:41] Thinking, and thanking. Yeah, yeah. Well, they're actually, related. yeah. You think, you think. Mm-hmm. Yeah.