Prima Pars
77. Summa I, Q.19, Arts. 3–4: Absolute vs. Suppositional Necessity in God's Will; God's Will as the Cause of Things
Class of 2007-03-29
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/077-summa-i-q-19-arts-3-4-absolute-vs-suppositional-necessity/

[0:00] To the third, one proceeds thus. It seems that whatever God wills, He wills for necessity. Thomas is going to take the opposite thing, right? Going to maintain that God necessarily wills Himself, but willing Himself, He doesn't necessarily will anything else.

[0:28] Okay, everything eternal is necessary, but whatever God wills, He wills eternity. Otherwise, His will would be changeable. Therefore, whatever He wills, of necessity He wills.

[0:48] Moreover, God wills things other than Himself insofar as He wills His own goodness, but God wills His own goodness of necessity. Therefore, He wills things other than Himself of necessity.

[1:16] Third objection: Whatever is natural to God is necessary, because God is necessary to be through Himself, in the beginning of all necessity, as has been shown above. That was one of the arguments, I guess, The third argument is of God, right? The things we know are able to be and not be, so they don't have existence through themselves, right? Therefore, they must have existence through something that cannot both be and not be, and that's something necessary to be.

[1:50] But as you know from logic, some necessary things can have a cause to their necessity, and what is necessary to another, you suppose, that something is necessary to be through itself, and that's God. Okay.

[2:10] So whatever is natural to God is necessary, because that's what God is. What is necessary to be through itself and the beginning or source of all necessity?

[2:22] Necessary is one of the words Aristotle takes up in the fifth book of Wisdom, and it's in the first of the three parts. And sometimes I like to kind of imitate Aristotle's famous fragment. You know, most people don't realize Aristotle wrote dialogues just like Plato did, and we know the titles of some of these dialogues, but they've been lost.

[2:52] And Plato gave lectures in the what academy, right? In addition to the dialogues he wrote, and some people say the dialogues were written to be read by people who were hoping to get into the academy, and they would read them. Under the direction of a student already in the academy, and if they got interested in these things and made some progress, they might be admitted to the academy and the lectures in the academy.

[3:21] Right. So it's kind of a paradox that Plato's dialogues have come down to us, but his lectures are lost, although there is some, you know, reference to them in Aristotle, right? While in the case of Aristotle, what has come down to us seems to be concise, formal lectures, right?

[3:45] But the dialogues have been lost. So you get kind of a, a, um, um, unbalanced view of these two guys, right? Okay. It's like Homer's comic book has been lost, right? And Shakespeare's tragic works have been lost, and this is comedy's. You get a very unbalanced view of Homer and Shakespeare, both of whom could write tragedy and comedy. They excel in both. So I think it's Cicero, you know, says that Aristotle's dialogues even greater than Plato's, right?

[4:25] But there is a famous frame that has come down to us in many forms here from the dialogue in philosophy, and it goes like this: Either you ought to philosophize or you ought not to philosophize. What do you think? If you say you ought to philosophize, then do so. If you say you ought not to philosophize, going to have to philosophize to show why not.

[4:52] So in either case, you must philosophize, huh? Okay. And I remember seeing a conversation there between two famous scientists there, and one scientist was saying, "Of course, my philosophy is to avoid philosophy. " Because I know it's a trap, he says. I know it's a trap, see? And so the scientist said, well, Yeah, then you've got to bring in philosophy as a scientist. " And also sometimes they

[5:26] do that with the word necessary, right? Is it necessary to understand the word necessary? What would you say, Isidore? You say it is necessary to understand the word necessary. You better try to understand it, right? If you say it's not necessary to understand the word necessary, right? Going to have to think about the word necessary means to show why it isn't necessary. So in any case or either case, you must what consider the word necessary.

[5:58] It's a very important word. Okay, it's ruined the third objection, right? Whatever is natural to God is necessary because God is necessary to be to himself. And he's the beginning of cause of all necessity. This has been shown above. But is natural what?

[6:29] But is natural to Him to will whatever He wills, because in God there is nothing apart from nature, as is said in the fifth book of Wisdom of Aristotle. Therefore, whatever He wills of necessity He wills.

[6:51] Moreover, what is not necessary to be and to be possible not to be, these are equivalent. go together. If therefore it is not necessary for God to will something of those things that He wills, it is possible for Him to not will it, and it is possible for Him to will that which He does not will. Therefore, the will of God is contingens ad utrumlibet right? It's what we speak of our own will, right?

[7:24] So as opposed to the contingency that you have in nature, where for the most part it does something, but sometimes, rarely, it fails, right?

[7:35] So for the most part in nature it produces a man with two arms and two legs, but occasionally a man is born without an arm or a leg or something like that. But the will seems to be what kind of equidistant from anything to eat steak or not to steak, to eat candy or not to candy, right? So

[7:55] now, if God is contingens ad utrumlibet, He would be something imperfect, right? Because everything contingent is imperfect and changeable. Got an awful lot of objections to this particular article, right? It's a very important one.

[8:12] Moreover, from that which is to both, right, does not follow any action except it be inclined by something else to one of them, as the commentator says in the second book of the Physics. If therefore the will of God, the commentator, who's the commentator by the way? Averroes Yeah, because he seemed to have commented all of Aristotle's works, and somehow you'd have a double commentary, you know, a short one and a longer one, and so on.

[8:40] So he got the title of the commentator, right? But I think you know we can seize it from him and say Thomas is the commentator. Thomas still follows the the customary way of referring to him as a commentator. Sometimes you call me Averroes sometimes you call me commentator. If therefore the will of God in some things has itself to either willingness or not willing, right? It follows that he would be what determined by something else to one of these effects, and that should have some prior cause.

[9:16] Now the sixth objection is what overextending the likeness there between the understanding and the will. Moreover, whatever God knows, right, not only himself but other things, of necessity he knows, right. But just as the divine knowledge is the divine essence, so also the divine will. Therefore, whatever God wills, of necessity he wills, right. Or you could develop like I was saying. You could say, what God knows things other than himself by knowing himself.

[9:52] Likewise, he wills things other than himself by willing himself, right? But in knowing himself, he necessarily knows things other than himself. Therefore, in willing himself, he necessarily wills things other than himself. Well, that's what would as Plato say. Likeness is a dangerous thing; it's a slippery thing, you know. In the Sophist, the dialogue called the Sophist, appropriately right? And so,

[10:20] in understanding, as we said before, a likeness of ratios, proportional likeness, you have to consider to see exactly in what way they are alike. Remember the example we had when Aristotle is talking about the first matter. The first matter is to what man and dog, like let's say clay is to sphere and cube.

[10:48] Well, sphere and cube are two accidents. So man and dog are two accidents. Or clay is an actual substance. So the first matter is an actual substance. No, that's not the way in which these two ratios are alike.

[11:08] They're unlike in those ways, right? But they're alike in that just as the clay is able to be a sphere and a cube, but not both at the same time, and when it becomes one of them, these it remains able to be the other, but if it became the other, it would cease to be the former. So likewise, the first matter is able to be a man or a dog, but not both at the same time.

[11:32] And when it's actually one, it's able to be the other, but if it became the other, it would cease to be the former, right? So you've got to think about that, right? I took the simple example from math, right? Four is to six as two is to three. But two to three is what an even number to an odd number. So four is to six as an even number to an odd number, right?

[11:54] Or two and three are what prime numbers, right? So four and six must be prime numbers too. Well, you're misunderstanding the likeness, right? In what way is four to six like two to three?

[12:17] Yeah, four is the same parts as six that two is the three. And if you have a hard time seeing that, just think of four as being two twos and six as being three twos. So four is the same parts as six, right? It's two of those three parts that are twos, just as two is two of those three parts that make up three. Okay, so you have to see in what way they're alike, right?

[12:48] Okay, but there may be some important differences. And so, what's very important here is to see the likeness, right? That in some way God willing things other than Himself is like is knowing things other than Himself. He wills things other than Himself in willing Himself, right? Just as he knows things other than Himself in knowing Himself.

[13:21] But the difference is that he necessarily knows things other than himself in knowing himself, but he doesn't necessarily will things other than himself in willing himself. And you have to see what is the reason for that, right? Okay. And it goes back in a way to the the difference, in part, just not the whole explanation of it, but the difference between knowing and what willing, right? Because knowing extends to the thing in itself.

[13:54] Why willing? Why I mean, willing does. Why knowing is in the knower, right? So if there is something that God didn't know, there would be what, some ignorance in God, right? Some defect, right? But there'd be no defect in God if he didn't will anything other than himself. Those things outside him wouldn't be though. That's all. There'd be no defect in him. See,

[14:23] because he's under no obligation to will them. Necessity. And you know, God's willing. I mean, these other things do they add something to God's goodness?

[14:45] Well, Thomas says the creature has no goodness except by partaking of the divine goodness, right? And then he gives a little likeness there, just as Duane Berquist and the arm of Duane Berquist are no more than Duane Berquist, right? Or this book and page one o nine, you know, is no more than this book alone, isn't it? Because one o nine is just a part of.

[15:21] So God in creatures is no more than God alone. And then the other way Thomas sometimes leads us by the hand, right? He points out that there is a what infinite distance between the divine goodness and us.

[15:41] And therefore, our goodness is to God's goodness not like a shorter line is to a longer line, which would add something to the length of that longer line. But like a point is to a line. Now he had a point to a line, and how much longer is the line?

[15:59] Nothing. So our goodness added to God's goodness is no more than God alone, right? And you realize how how gratuitous his creating us was, right? Because it's not really. Making things better, more good than he did create us. We really added nothing to that. It's something really to think about to be thankful for.

[16:38] But against this is what the apostle says in in the epistle to the Ephesians, chapter one, who does all things according to the counsel of his what will. Now that's kind of almost metaphorically to speak of counsel in God, right?

[16:57] But the things that we do from the counsel of the will, we do not will of what necessity. Therefore, not whatever God wills does He will from what necessity.

[17:13] Now Thomas is going to point out some things about the word necessary here. Right. There's many reasons why it's necessary to understand the word necessary. Yeah.

[17:24] I answer. It should be said that something is said to be necessary in two ways. To wit, absolutely, and by what supposition. Now something is absolutely necessary is judged absolutely necessary from the relation of its terms,

[17:50] as because the what predicate is in the very definition of the subject. Just as necessary for a man to be a what animal, right? Or because the subject is of the definition of the predicate, as is necessary for a number to be odd or what even, right?

[18:13] But thus it is not necessary for Socrates to sit. But once it is not necessary absolutely, but it can be necessary what, from a supposition. For supposing that he is sitting, is necessary for him to sit when he sits. But absolutely speaking, is necessary for him to sit, right? So I'm necessarily sitting when I'm sitting, right? I'm not absolutely necessarily sitting, am I?

[18:47] Now about the divine things willed, this should be considered. That something God wills is necessary absolutely. But this nevertheless is not true about all the things that He wills.

[19:07] For the divine will has a necessary relation to its own what goodness, which is its own what object, right? Whence God wills of necessity. His own what goodness, huh? Just as our will of necessity wishes beatitude or happiness, so you don't choose to be happy rather than miserable. Although sometimes speak that way, you know that somebody is, because

[19:40] as Thomas says, virtue is the road to happiness, and vice is the road to misery. And every day you pick up the newspaper, you can see that what people are miserable because of their vice, right? Um, but does one choose to be miserable? No. Strictly speaking, one chooses something that will lead to misery, right? Or one chooses something that will lead to happiness, right? But you don't strictly speaking choose happiness or what? Necessarily, and naturally, will happiness?

[20:19] huh Just as any other ability or power has a necessary relation to its own and object, as sight to what color, right? Because it's of its very definition that it tends towards that thing. But things other than himself, God wills, in so far as they are ordered to his own goodness, as to a what end? Now this is the key thing now to see why he doesn't will the other thing necessarily.

[20:59] Those things which are for some end or directed towards some end, we do not will necessity in willing the end, right? Except such things without which the end is not able to be.

[21:16] Just as we will food, wishing the conservation of our life, right? And the boat, wishing to go across, huh? But not thus of necessity do we will those things without which the end is able to be. Just as the horse to what taking a journey,

[21:42] because without this we're able to go, and there is the same what reason of the things. When, since the goodness of God is perfect, and is able to be without other things, since nothing of perfection is added to him, right, from other things, it follows that things other than himself he wills, but not by what absolute necessity, huh? And nevertheless, they are necessary from supposition. What does that mean?

[22:25] Supposing that he does will them, right? He is not able not to will them, because he can't change his will. His will is one act, right? So he can't will me not to be now, see. But

[22:43] that's necessary on supposition, right? Having willed me to be, having chosen me to be, I don't know why. Um uh I mean, you see, all these people who could have been, right? Your parents could perhaps have married someone else, right? And other people would have been born, right? Am I more deserving to be these other people? That would be kind of presumptuous, right, to say that, huh?

[23:10] Or that that that I made you know better use of my gifts than other people would have made use of their gifts, right? You know. I don't think that, huh? So it's very free in his part, right? But having chosen me, he can't what? Yeah.

[23:33] Of course they'll be an article later on, whether the will of God is changeable, but the answer can. Now the first objection is saying everything eternal is necessary, but whatever God wills, he wills from eternity. Otherwise, his will would be changeable. Therefore, whatever he wills, of necessity, wills. Well, Thomas says, well, in one sense that's true, but some by absolute necessity, namely the divine goodness itself, right?

[24:04] Others by necessity from what? Supposition, right? Okay. Now, second objection: God wills things other than himself insofar as he wills his own goodness. But God wills of necessity his own goodness, right? Therefore, does he will other things of necessity? To second, it should be said that O God of necessity wills his own goodness.

[24:37] Nevertheless, of necessity, doesn't will those things which he wills on account of his own goodness? Why? Because his goodness can be without them, right? Okay. So that's a simple principle, right? In willing the end, you don't necessarily will everything that

[24:59] is ordered to that end, right? If that end can be without that, do you see that? You see that even in our own will, right?

[25:25] Third objection: Whatever is natural to God is necessary, because God's very nature is to be per se and et cetera, necessary to be through itself.

[25:41] To the third, it should be said that that is not natural for God to will something of those other things which he does not be able to do. not will of necessity. But nevertheless, it's not unnatural either, or against nature, but it's what? Yeah. So the voluntary is something different from the natural and the what? Unnatural, right? Okay.

[26:16] Aristotle, of course, had already talked about that, huh? The the will and nature, are different causes. Of course, Shakespeare says nature cannot choose its origin. Distinction between nature, there choice.

[26:42] Now the fourth objection: what is not necessary to be is able not to be. If therefore it is not necessary for God to will something of those things which He wills, it is possible for Him not to will it, right?

[27:09] And it is also possible for Him to will that which He does not will. Therefore, the divine will is contingent in to both sides. Therefore, it's imperfect. Because everything contingent is imperfect and changeable. Now I was going to get out of this.

[27:30] To the fourth, it should be said that sometimes some necessary cause does not have a necessary relation to some effect, which is an account of the defect of the effect and not an account of the defect of the cause.

[27:55] Just as the power of the sun does not have a necessary relation to something of those things that happen contingently, not on account of the defect of the power of the sun, but on account of the defect of the effect, not necessarily going forth from its cause. And likewise, that God does not of necessity will anything of those things which He wills does not happen from the defect of the divine will.

[28:27] That's not made up yet, so to speak, But from the defect which belongs to the thing willed, according to his very notion, because it is such that without it there can be what the perfect goodness of God, which defect follows every created good.

[28:52] So when we see God as He is, we'll realize how superfluous we are. So it'd be good to say uh this superfluous creature, right? To see God as He is, right?

[29:09] How could one be satisfied with something superfluous, right? Myself or other creatures that matter, right? Okay. The fifth objection now: don't you need something outside to determine you to which one you choose? To the fifth, it should be said that the cause that is from itself contingent, right, is necessary that it be determined by something exterior to an effect. But the divine will, which has from itself necessity, determines itself to willing,

[29:59] to which it has a relation that is not what necessary. Okay. Now the sixth objection is taken from the likeness between. his knowing other things by knowing himself, right? Is willing other things by willing himself, right?

[30:24] To the sixth, it should be said that as the divine being in itself is necessary, so also the divine willing and the divine knowing.

[30:36] But the divine knowing has a necessary relation to what the things known, not, however, the divine willing to the things willed other than himself. Now, what's the reason for this? Which is because

[30:57] knowledge is had about things according as they are in the knower. But the will is compared to things as they are in themselves. Now that's the distinction that Aristotle brings out in the sixth book of wisdom. It's very brief, you know. You look at the text there in the last reading of the sixth book. But the true and false are primarily in the mind, he says. Good and bad in things.

[31:23] And that's a very important distinction. Okay. We talked about that before, right? One result of that we talked about before is that there's the same knowledge of opposites. So if you know what virtue is in ethics, you can also do that know better what vice is. And the reason why we have black and white is because opposites are better known together, right? So it's a famous thing, and Socrates talks about it in the Symposium that there's the same knowledge of opposites.

[32:10] Okay. Can I know what abnormal blood pressure is as well as what normal blood pressure is? But is there the same love of opposites?

[32:26] If I love health, I can't love sickness, right? If I love beauty, I can't love ugliness, right? So why is that? That the love of one opposite excludes the love of the other opposite. Why the knowledge of one opposite doesn't exclude the knowledge of the other opposite? As I say to my students, you know, I know your your ignorance better than you know it yourself.

[32:58] So I know knowledge and ignorance at the same time, right? Okay. I know knowing blindness. I know sight. Okay. But you can't what? If you love knowledge, you can't love ignorance. If you love sight, you can't love blindness, right? Okay. What's because in things one opposite what excludes the other, right? But in knowing one opposite doesn't exclude the other; it's a help to it, right? So knowing is primarily getting the known into the mind, and that's where opposites can be together.

[33:38] While will is going out to things themselves, where one opposite excludes the other. Okay, that's just one example of this, right? Okay. I used to say to students, you know, I'd quote Aristotle there in the proemium to the three books about the soul, where he says all knowledge as such is good.

[34:02] And I'd say, well, is that true about love? Is all love as such good? And why is all knowledge as such good, but all love as such is not good?

[34:22] What's interesting that even knowledge of the bad is good, but love of the good of the bad is bad, right? Because love of the bad attaches you to the bad in itself, right? Why knowledge of the bad doesn't attach you to the bad, and as Boethius says, you have to know the bad to avoid it, right? So even in logic, we study the various kinds of mistakes so we can avoid them, right?

[34:58] Okay, so Thomas is is bring out this famous distinction that Aristotle, which is what a student he is of Aristotle, which is because knowledge is had about things according as they are in the know. And that's why we mentioned before that the first act of the mind is sometimes called in Latin as simplex apprehensio, simple grasping, right? You grasp what I'm saying, you know. But that means that you what contain it in your mind, right?

[35:30] When I grasp something with my hand, it's contained in my hand, right? When I grasp something with my mind, it's there. But does that describe love grasping? You know, think of the ambitious man or something like that, you know.

[35:49] But the will is compared to things as they are in themselves, right? Because therefore all other things have necessary being according as they are in God, right? But not according as they are in themselves do they have absolute what? Necessity, right? So if they are to themselves what necessary, an account to this, whatever God knows, of necessity He knows, right? Absolute necessity, but not of whatever He wills.

[36:24] Does He of necessity will, right? Okay. So if God didn't know all other things, knowing Himself, then He would be necessarily what ignorant of some things, and there'd be a defect in God, right? He wouldn't be knowledge itself.

[36:43] But in willing Himself, He doesn't have to will other things, because in willing other things, He's willing something outside of Himself, right? And willing something outside of Himself it adds nothing to his goodness, huh? And there's no way necessary to His goodness. Do you see? That's a very important difference, huh? See, this is part of understanding the divine will, right? You know, when Thomas is talking about the great question of whether the world is eternal or not, right?

[37:16] And he argues, you know, that the philosophers argue on both sides, and but really, by natural reason, you can't determine whether the universe is always there or not. And by faith, we know that it has a beginning. And Thomas said the one reason why it had a beginning is that this manifests the divine independence of the world. If the universe had always been, you might think, well, He had to do it, you know, just like the way Spinoza talks, right?

[37:48] You know, the universe follows from God, like it follows from a triangle that has interior angles to right angles. It's kind of absolute necessity, you know, that follows, huh?

[38:01] And that's not the way it is. So you realize the absolute independence that God has of things. He's a very independent person. Or persons, I should say.

[38:18] Yeah. Okay, so let's take a little break now, Let's. Okay. Article four: Whether the will of God is the cause of things. To the fourth one proceeds thus: It seems that the will of God is not the cause of things, for as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter about the divine names, here Dionysius making comparison between the sun and God, right? Just as our sun, not reasoning or choosing before, right, but to his very being enlightens all things, right?

[39:09] They are capable of partaking of its light. So the divine good, to its very essence, sends forth the rays of its goodness, right, to all existing things.

[39:24] But everything that acts through the will acts as what reasoning and choosing one thing before another. Therefore, God does not act through the will. Therefore, the will of God is not the cause of things. But there is certain likeness between the two, right? I was thinking about before some of you came in maybe this text here, you know, in Saint John, right, where he's saying that I am the light of the world, right, and the light of life, and so on.

[39:56] We sometimes call Christ the Son of Justice, S-U-N. Okay. And you say, well, okay, couldn't you kind of say that the sun is the cause of both the enlightening of the world, right, but also of life, right? You know, and so in that sense, the sun is like Christ, right?

[40:21] But you don't want to overextend that like this, right? As if God naturally what bestows these things, just as the sun naturally bestows light. But there's a nevertheless a likeness there, and sometimes you see this in the Church Fathers too, that the sun enlightens the earth before it warms it, and so God enlightens the mind with the light of faith before he warms the heart with charity.

[41:01] So like in the Eusebius there, you know that quote from Saint Augustine, by believing we might come to hope, and by hoping we might come to love, right? So there's certain likeness there, right? But nevertheless, God giving us the gift of faith, it's a gift, right? Or The love of God is unlike the sun, which naturally it produces light first and then warmth. But there is still a metaphorical likeness there.

[41:33] So again, the likeness is a slippery thing, as Plato says in the Sophist. I think it is, and it's a dangerous thing, right? Because likeness is the cause of what deception, right? And that's why why the imagination is said to be the cause of what deception, because imagination is taken up with the likenesses of things.

[41:58] Who was it? Shelley, I think it was, in the art of poetry. You know, he says reason likes the differences of things, but you know, the imagination likes the likenesses of things. And in fact, what is the poet making? But a likeness of things. And his favorite thing on speeches is the metaphor, which is a likeness. So years ago, when I was first looking at the four tools of dialectic, Aristotle puts the tool of difference before the tool of likeness.

[42:30] And so my idea was, well, likeness without seeing difference is a cause of deception, right? So he puts the tool of difference before the tool of likeness, which must be odd, like that, he's done, well, observation on my part, but it is kind of striking that he does that. Yeah. So you might misunderstand the likeness here, the great Dionysius here.

[42:57] More of that which is through its essence is first in each order, just as in the order of things fired is first what is fire through its very essence. Okay, now that's of course, almost like the old principle that what is so through itself is before and the beginning or cause of what is through another, right? So if the sugar is sweet through itself, right, it's before the coffee, which is not sweet through itself, right?

[43:37] And it's a beginning or a cause of the coffee being sweet. But God is the very first agent, therefore He is acting through His very essence, right?

[43:54] Which is His nature. He acts, therefore, through His nature, not through His not through will. Therefore, the will of God is not the cause of things.

[44:11] I say this principle here is that what is so essentially is before what is so by partaking, right? So reason can be reasonable without the emotions being reasonable, and emotions are reasonable only by partaking of reason in some way. They've been habituated, disposed to follow reason.

[44:39] Moreover, whatever is a cause of something through this that it is such is a cause by nature and not by will. But fire is a cause of what heating because it is hot. But the artist is a cause of the house because he wants to make it. But Augustine says in the first book about Christian doctrine that because God is good, we are.

[45:09] But God, therefore, God through His own nature is a cause of things and not by will. Moreover, of one thing there is one cause, but of created things the knowledge of God is a cause. Therefore, the will of God ought not to be laid down to be the cause of things.

[45:34] But against this is what is said in that interesting book called Wisdom, the 11th chapter, verse twenty-six. In what way could something remain unless you willed it?

[45:51] I answer: It should be said that it is necessary to say that the will of God is the cause of things, and that God acts through will and not by the necessity of what nature, as some have estimated,

[46:11] which appears or can be made to appear in three ways. First, from the very order of agent causes of makers. For since both understanding and nature act on account of an end, as is shown in the second book of the physics, right? Second book of natural. It is necessary that for an agent acting by nature, both that the end be predetermined, right, and the means necessary for that end, that both of these be determined by some what superior understanding.

[47:01] Just as the arrow is predetermined its end in a certain mode of it by the what archer, right? Whence it is necessary that the one acting by understanding and will is before the one acting by what nature. Nature doesn't know the end, right, and the order of things to the end. So it has to get its end from some superior understanding and will that knows, right, and determines the end.

[47:40] Whence, since first in the order of agents is God, is necessary that through understanding and will he what acts. Secondly, by from the very notion of a natural agent, to which it pertains that it produce what one effect. Now this is the famous distinction that Aristotle points out in the ninth book of Wisdom, when he distinguishes between active ability and passive ability, right, and then he distinguishes among active abilities between reason or will on the one hand and nature, that nature is determined to what, right? Why reason or will is open to opposites, and this is because nature is acting through the natural form, which is one, and it's making something like that.

[48:42] But reason and will are acting through knowledge, and it's the same knowledge of opposites. So if I possess the medical art, I know how to maybe save your life and how to end it. And nobody better than doctor knows how to end your life quickly and without anything, you see. So he's open to opposites, right?

[49:07] And Shakespeare himself talks about this in the Coriolanus, right? Nature not being able to be more than one thing. And that's why why custom is like nature, huh? It kind of determines you to one definite thing. Therefore, it's an endangering custom, right? Huh? It strikes me, you know, nowadays, huh? And I was just talking to a friend of mine who was a chemist and so on. But it's a common opinion, you might say, among all scientists, that every thought is an hypothesis to be tested by its consequences, huh?

[49:45] And probably to go along also with Einstein, that every hypothesis is free to imagine, right? So in that sense, there's no stability at all in the life of the mind. There's nothing that you naturally know.

[50:00] There you see the force of custom, custom that comes from modern science. So secondly, from the notion of a natural agent, to which it pertains to produce one effect, right? Because nature, in one and the same way, acts unless it be what impeded, huh? And this is because, according as it is such, so it acts. Whence, so long as it is such, it does not make except such.

[50:40] For everything acting by nature has determined being. Since, therefore, the divine being is not determined, undetermined, but contains in itself the whole perfection of being, it is not possible that it act by what necessity of nature. Unless perhaps it were to cause something undetermined, infinite in being, right? Which is impossible, as is clear from the things above. It does not act, therefore, by necessity of nature, but

[51:21] but the determined effects proceed from the infinity. From the infinite perfection of it, according to the determination of its will and its what, understanding.

[51:38] Okay. Third, from the relation of effects to cause. For in this way, effects proceed from an agent cause, as they preexist in it, because every agent makes what is like itself. But effects preexist in a cause according to the way of the cause. Whence, since the divine being is a divine understanding, they preexist in it effects according to an understandable way. Whence, in an understandable way, they proceed from it.

[52:14] And thus, consequently, by way of will. For the inclination to acting, what is conceived by the understanding pertains to the will. The will, therefore, of God is the cause of things. Aristotle makes that meaning more clear there in the ninth book of wisdom, where he says that since there's the same knowledge of opposites, right?

[52:42] An effect can't proceed naturally from knowledge, right? Because then you'd have what the doctor making you healthy and sick at the same time, and his knowledge enables you to do either one. So something other than the knowledge. Yeah, he wants to heal you, so he makes you healthy, or he. He hates you and he wants to finish you off. He's in the, pay of the KGB or something, and so then uses knowledge another way, right?

[53:13] Um, why natures are already what determined to one or two opposites, huh? So in the presence of paper, the fire would naturally just burn, right? You won't, it can't cool it, right? But the patient or the man in presence of the doctor, the doctor's knowledge is open to doing both of these things, right? So it has to be determined by the will to do one rather than the the other, right?

[53:41] So Aristotle saw that, right? Now the first objection is taken from Dionysius' comparison of God to the Son. To the first, therefore, it should be said that Dionysius, through those words, does not intend to exclude choice from God simply, but secundum quid. I'm surprised he's making that distinction here.

[54:13] In so far as what, not to just some things alone does he what communicate his goodness alone, but to all things, right? In so far as what. Choice implies some kind of discretion, right? So he makes his reign to fall on the just and unjust, right? Okay, Christ is talking about how you are supposed to pray even for your enemies, right? You're going to take God, right?

[54:40] So is he saying that God's goodness is indiscreet? In some ways, I like this. There, you know, the God seems to bestow good things upon, you know, opposites, right? And doesn't the last judgment may be a little bit different? Divine indiscretion. Yeah. But you

[55:09] also say, I think this is like a metaphor, right, to compare God to the sun, right? But there is a certain likeness there, right? Some way they must be alike. Some way God is even like a stone like a stone. The metaphor is always based upon likeness, huh? But there is considerable difference between a stone and God. Okay. Second objection said: Moreover, that which is through its essence is first in each order.

[55:41] Okay, what is so essentially right? It's before what is so by participation. But God is the first agent; therefore, he must be acting through his own essence, which is his nature.

[55:57] He acts, therefore, through nature, not through will. To the second, should be said that the essence of God is his understanding and his willing, right? And from this, therefore, that he acts through his essence, it follows that he acts by way of understanding and will. Although there is

[56:20] no light cast upon this by the by the what the Trinity, right? Because God the Son proceeds from God the Father by way of nature, rather than by way of what? Yeah. God doesn't choose to generate something like that. And again, the the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, per modum naturae, right? In a way, huh? Because God naturally what wills his own goodness, huh?

[56:57] And so in that sense, something natural is before something what? Yeah, the sense of voluntary and sense of chosen, right? Okay. Now you got to be careful too about about

[57:15] this distinction between nature and reason, or nature and will, right? Because there is something of nature in the reason, and something of nature in the will. But there are some things we naturally understand, and some things that we naturally what will, right?

[57:37] Of course, the second person of the Blessed Trinity proceeds by way of what God, what God naturally understands, right? And the Holy Spirit by what He naturally wills. But we proceed by what he doesn't naturally will, but freely wills, huh?

[58:02] Now the third objection taken from Augustine says, "Because God is good, we are right." How is that to be understood? To the third, it should be said that the good is the object of the will, and therefore, to this extent, it is said that because God is good. we are, insofar as his goodness is to him the reason for willing all the things, right? Okay. So we're not saying that it's proceeding naturally from the divine goodness.

[58:34] The divine goodness just naturally breaks out into the creature, right? Can't help but overflow itself, right? Um, but because the divine goodness is the what primary object of his will, right? So in loving his own goodness, um, he loves, he chooses, right, to spread it around so far as possible in us creatures, right?

[59:10] Fourth objection: of one thing there is one cause, but of created things, the knowledge of God is the cause. Therefore, the will God ought not to be laid down as the cause of things. But obviously, these two, although they're the same, they're they're ordered in a certain way, right? To the fourth, it should be said that of one and the same effect, even in us, right, is a cause knowledge as directing, right, of which is conceived the form of the work and the will as what commanding, right?

[59:48] And so, in Aristotle, talks about choice. He says, "Well, is it, you know, deliberative will, or is it willing deliberation? " You know, I mean, it involves both. And I'll come up here when you get to this, to the third part of this, to this on the will, right?

[1:00:06] And Aristotle talked about that too in the what, in the, the De Anima, right? So in a sense, he's saying the first cause is the good, right? That's the end goal. And then it's known by reason or by the senses, and then through that moves the what will or the other part. So there's a there's a unity there, right? Of order there among the causes.

[1:00:37] Um. For the form, as it is in the understanding, is not determined to this that something be or not be in the effect, except through the will, right? That goes back to the fact that it's the same knowledge of opposites, right? So if I possess the knowledge of grammar, I can say you are my students or you is my students. You know, my knowledge of grammar enables me to speak correctly and incorrectly, right?

[1:01:07] Opposites, right? Open opposites, right? I I is your professor and you are my students, right? I can say it just as well, right? And so it depends upon my will whether I want to speak correctly or incorrectly, right? Grammar enables me to do both. I can come into class and teach, or I can come into class and deceive, right? Because my knowledge enables me to do both, right?

[1:01:31] When I give an exam in logic or something like that, you know, I want to try to catch the students, and so I know what kind of an argument will convince them, right? You know, I'll give you an example where. I say,

[1:01:55] every mother is a woman. No man is a woman. Therefore, no man is a mother. Right? Is that good argument? How about this? Every mother is a woman. No man is a mother. Therefore, no man is a woman. That's good. See, most students will think that's good, right? Because it's true that every mother is a woman, and it's true that no man is a mother, and it's true that no man is a woman, and there's some connection between the fact that no man is a mother and no man is a woman, but that's a conclusion actually follows.

[1:03:01] But I know they'll think it follows. See, but I know that. See, but if if I give an argument the same form like this, and I say, every dog is an animal, no cat is a dog, therefore no cat is an animal, they wouldn't be deceived by that. I know that. So I give the example where the premises are true, and the conclusion is true, but yet the conclusion doesn't follow.

[1:03:29] So I, you know, know that from my knowledge of logic, right? You're you're familiar with deception. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And Mozart has this piece of music, you know, that you can buy. It's called a Musical Joke, right? And it has some obvious musical mistakes in it, right? But then there are more subtle ones that Mozart is pointing out. So he's showing you how not to write music.

[1:03:55] You know, it's fairly high. It's in the five hundreds. You know, it's called a musical joke. That's pretty interesting. for the people to play it. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, it's one piece of Mozart I haven't bought yet, although I've heard it, you know, on the radio. Just can't wait.

[1:04:13] I think it's kind of a nice piece in some ways, you know, but it's got subtle mistakes in it, you know. So Mozart knows how to do that, right? And. Shakespeare sometimes, you know, a little bit in the plays, you know, he makes a little bit of fun of amateur actors and so on. So he knows the the bad as well as the good. He can do both by his his great art.

[1:04:35] So we we played the third objection there, right? Oh, we're down the fourth objection. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Whence the speculative understanding says nothing about doing, right?

[1:05:00] But the power is the cause is carrying out because it names the immediate principle of operation. But all these in God are one, right? But even in us, where there are many, they can still be what causes a one effect, huh? Because of the order that's among them. Okay. So the order is taught by Aristotle in the third book on the soul. He takes up the moving powers, huh?

[1:05:26] But then you talk about how they're all united around the good, right? Because the good as known moves the will or the desiring power to desire that good, and then that moves the arms or legs eventually, right? So they they have an order, therefore they can all be causes of one effect. But if it's the order of God, these can be because they're one the same thing.

[1:05:53] Okay. So the will of God is the cause of things, huh? Now we got to talk about another article, what? You know, I think we may have better wait because we did this one time the way. Okay. Because we'll be we'll be meeting next week.