Prima Pars
78. Summa I, Q.19, Articles 5–6: Nothing Causes God's Will, and His Will Is Always Fulfilled (Antecedent vs. Consequent Will)
Class of 2007-04-19
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/078-summa-i-q-19-articles-5-6-nothing-causes-gods-will-and-his/

[0:00] Article five, huh? Okay. Name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlighten our guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand all eternity. Father, Son, Holy Spirit. Amen.

[0:31] So article four was on whether the will of God is the cause of things, right? And now the fifth article is on whether there can be some cause of the divine will. Saint Thomas. To the fifth, one proceeds thus: It seems that it is possible to assign some cause to the divine will. Gee, Thomas is going to take the opposite side, I guess, for that.

[1:02] For Augustine says in the book on the eighty-three questions, "Who dares to say that God unreasonably constituted all things? But to a voluntary agent, what is the reason for what he does is also the cause of his willing. Therefore, the will of God has some cause. Of course, if you say the will of God has some cause, since the will of God is God, then God would have some cause, and even the act of the will is the same thing as a divine substance.

[1:38] So, got a little problem here, huh? Moreover, second objection: In those things which come about from the one willing, who wills something but not on account of any cause, it is not necessary to assign some cause except the very will of the one willing.

[2:07] But the will of God is the cause of all things, as has been shown. There, if therefore of his will there is no cause, it would not be necessary in all natural things to assign any cause except the divine will, and thus all sciences would become superfluous, which attempt to what assign the cause to some effects, which seems to be unsuitable. Therefore, it is necessary to assign some cause of the divine will.

[2:49] Okay. So why are my teeth in front of a different shape than my teeth in back? Instead of saying to bite as opposed to chew, say because God so wills.

[3:02] Yeah. Moreover, what comes about by the one willing, but not in account of some cause, depends on his simple will. If, therefore, the will of God does not have any cause, it would follow that all things which come to be depend upon his simple will, and do not have any other what cause, which doesn't is not fitting.

[3:39] But against this is what Augustine says in the book of the eighty-three questions. For every efficient cause, every mover maker, is what greater than that which it effects? But nothing is greater than the will of God. Therefore, some cause of it should not be what sought. That's pretty clear there from Augustine, huh?

[4:12] I answer that it should be said that in no way does the will of God have a cause. To the evidence of which it should be considered that since the will follows upon the understanding, in the same way there can happen to be some cause of the one willing that he wills, as there is of the one understanding that he understands. In the understanding, however, it is thus that if apart one considers the beginning or the premise, and apart the conclusion, right?

[4:56] The understanding of the beginning or the premise is the cause of the knowledge of the conclusion, right? So Aristotle defines a demonstration as a syllogism, making us know the cause and that of which it is a cause, and it cannot be otherwise. And the premises of a syllogism are, in a way, the cause of conclusion. In one way, the maker of the conclusion; another way, the matter of the conclusion.

[5:26] Okay, we've talked about that before, and this is very true in the case of our discourse. Huh? If you may recall when we talked about Shakespeare's definition of reason, the ability for a large discourse looking before and after, what was the definition of discourse? Huh? Well, it's coming to know, or in some cases guess, right? Something from something you already know or accept. So one is the cause of the other, right?

[5:57] But there's no discourse in God, neither in his understanding nor in his willing. But there's only one act of understanding, one act of will, whereby he understands and wills himself, and in understanding and willing himself, he understands and wills other things. With the difference, though, that he wills other things freely, right? While he doesn't understand other things freely, but necessarily understands other things. We've talked about that before.

[6:31] But Thomas goes on to point out, but if the understanding, in the very beginning of its knowledge, already saw the conclusion, right? It already looked upon the conclusion by one insight,

[6:49] grasping both, right? In such a one, the knowledge of the conclusion would not be caused from the understanding of the beginnings, because the same is not a cause of itself. Nice axiom there.

[7:10] More general axiom is what? Nothing is a beginning of itself. But nevertheless, he would understand the premises to be the causes of the conclusion. See the distinction he's making there, right? It's one thing where your knowledge of one is a cause of your knowledge of the other, right? And that case, both your knowledge of one is a cause of your knowledge of the other, just as one of these things is in itself a cause of the other, right?

[7:46] But the one who sees in knowing the beginning or knowing the cause of that matter, who knows in knowing the cause the effect at the same time, he knows one to be the cause of the other, but his knowledge of one is not a cause of his knowledge of the other. Is that clear? Yeah. Yeah. See. While in the case of a mind like ours, especially which is discursive, it's knowing one thing is a cause of its knowing another, right?

[8:18] And when we kind of contrasted, you know, our reason with even the senses, you know, sometimes they talk about discourse. You know, they say what discourse means in general, going from one thing to another, right? Well, I can go to the art museum and look at one painting and then look at another painting and another painting, right? Or put on one piece of Mozart and then put on another piece of Mozart and so on.

[8:41] But I don't see one painting through seeing another painting. I don't hear Mozart's Jupiter Symphony through hearing Così fan tutte the opera, right? But reason not only goes from one thing to another, but by knowing one or through knowing one. It comes to know the other, right? Okay. But in God there is only what one act. He's altogether simple. No discourse in God, neither in His understanding nor in His will.

[9:17] Now it's like this, he says, on the side of the will, about which the end has itself to those things which are to the end, as in the understanding the beginnings or the premises to the conclusions. Now this is the comparison that Aristotle is making. This is Aristotle's proportion. He's saying that the the premises are to conclusion like the end is to the what means. Okay. And in the case of us, you can know the premises without yet knowing the conclusion.

[9:57] Okay. Sometimes a mage, you know, something very clear like Euclid, you know, he could take something I already know and bring out something else I didn't know. But bring it out in some way of what I know already, right? And sometimes in willing a certain end, we what?

[10:16] Don't necessarily will the means to that end, right? But when we discover the means to that end, right, then we want to go there, right? So I might have as an end to get some some wine, right? But then my sister-in-law tells me that at BJ's you can get it cheaper than other places. You don't even need a BJ card. And all of a sudden, what? My desire to have wine is a cause of my desiring to go to what?

[10:46] BJ's, right? But in my desiring wine at first, I didn't desire to go to that place, huh? Why God, in desiring or willing, I should say, anything other than Himself, He does so only in willing Himself.

[11:11] So he's making the carrying the comparison out here now that he had in the understanding to the will. Whence is someone by one act wills both the end and by another act those things which are to the end, right? His will in the end will be for him the cause of his willing those things which are for the end, huh? So if I want to understand God, I might want to read Thomas, right?

[11:40] I might find out that he's a good guy to this, huh? So my willing to know God is a cause of my willing to read Thomas, huh? But if by one act he wills the end and those things which are to the end, this would not be what possible one is a cause of the other. Because again, for the same reason that the same thing is not a cause of itself, right?

[12:12] So God's willing the end and God's willing something for that end, one cannot be the cause of the other because it's the same willing. And so it would be the same thing being the cause of itself, right? The More general axiom is nothing is the beginning of itself, right?

[12:33] But nevertheless, it will be true to say that He wills to order those things which are for the end, the things that are the means, right? He orders them to the what? end, huh?

[12:50] God, however, just as by one act He understands all things in His very essence or substance, so by one act He wills all things in His what? Goodness, huh?

[13:09] Whence, just as in God, to understand the cause is not the cause of understanding the effect, but He Himself understands the effect in the cause. So, His willing the end is not for Him the cause of His willing those things which are for the end, but nevertheless, by this one act of His, right, He wills those things which are for the end to be ordered to the end.

[13:45] For He wills this to be an account of that, but not an account of this does He will that. That's a very interesting distinction that Thomas makes there, right? Just

[14:00] summarize it again now. For us, very often, most often, a knowledge of the cause takes place by itself without a knowledge of the effect. More often, we have a knowledge of the effect without a knowledge of the cause, and then what do we do? To find out the cause. Yeah, and our knowledge in one case, our knowledge of the cause, is a cause of our coming to know the effect, like in geometry, right?

[14:33] Okay. So you might know what a triangle is and it has three sides and so on without knowing that the effect of that is to have angles equal to right angles. When you go through Proposition 32 in Book One of Euclid, assuming you've gone for the first 31, then you will see your knowledge of what a triangle is and your knowledge of some other things will be a cause of your coming to know the equality of the angles inside to right angles.

[15:08] And vice versa, you know, when we are reasoning, say, to the existence of God, we know the effects first of God, right? Without knowing God, and then we reason from the effects of God to the existence of God and even to some things we can say about God, so that our knowledge of the effects of God is a cause of our knowledge of Him, like Saint Paul says there in Romans chapter one, verse 20, is it the one the Church quotes in Vatican One, right?

[15:39] That the hidden things of God are made known to the things that have been made, and but in God, this is not true, right? So in seeing the cause, God in seeing the cause sees the effect.

[16:01] So He knows the effect is the effect of the cause. The cause is the cause of the effect, but his knowledge of one is not a cause of his knowing the other. There's only one knowing in God, only one act in God, and the same thing then is saying is true here about the will, right? For us, we often will, and all these high school kids now they they're in just to get to college, right?

[16:27] But they're not sure what college to go to, or who's going to accept them, and so on, right? Okay, but eventually they will, maybe to go to this college, or that college, especially if they get accepted in a number number of places, right? They have to choose. So the willing to go to college is a cause. They're willing to go to Virginia Tech or wherever the college is.

[16:52] And can't happen in the next four years. Yeah, yeah. So in willing to go to college, one doesn't necessarily will to go to this college, right? But one is the cause of the other, right? But God is going to be one act, willing that you go to college and to this college, right? And he's willing, you know, you're going to that college to get that what degree, right?

[17:20] Okay, or meet that professor, whatever it might be. Yeah, yeah, some other catastrophe. Okay. Now, as we apply to the first objection, which is taken from the great Augustine, there, who would dare to say that God unreasonably, right, or without reason, huh, has constituted all things? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the will of God is reasonable, not that something is to God the cause of willing, right?

[18:02] But in so far as he wills this to be on account of that, okay, that's reasonable, right? Now, the second and the third objection is somewhat similar there in terms of what is due to other causes, right?

[18:28] To the second, it should be said that when God wills the effects to be thus, that they what come about from certain causes, that there might be observed what order in things, huh?

[18:46] Okay, since I should say, since God wills effects thus to be, to what way to be that they come about from certain causes, right? In order that there might be order in things, huh? It is not superfluous, huh? Even with the will of God to seek other causes,

[19:10] it would be superfluous, right? If other causes were sought as something first, right, and not as something depending upon the divine what will. And thus Augustine says in the third book about the Trinity,

[19:35] it was pleasing to the vanity of the philosophers. That's me, I guess. Also, to what other causes to attribute contingent effects to other causes? When altogether they were not able to see the cause superior to all other ones, that is to say, the what will of God, right? So it's not really contrary to say that something is what from the will of God as a very first cause, right?

[20:16] It's from something else; it's a secondary cause or is a proximate cause, huh? Now the third one, objection is saying, what comes about from the will, not in account of some cause, depends upon what the will alone, right?

[20:42] If therefore the will of God does not have some cause, it would follow that all things that come about depend upon his simple will, and they do not have any other cause, right? Since there's no no cause or reason why my teeth in front have different shape than my teeth in back, it's up to the will of God. See.

[21:08] To the third, it should be said that since God wills effects to be in account of their causes, huh? Whatever effect presupposes some other effect do not depend on the will of God alone, right? But upon something other, right? But the very first effects depend upon the divine will alone, huh? Whence, if we say that God wills man to have a hand that it might serve his understanding, right?

[21:44] That's a famous example, right? The great Anaxagoras said, "What man is the most intelligent of the animals because he has a hand." And Aristotle says, "No, it's reverse. Because he is the most intelligent of animals, that's why he has a hand." So this is like the tool of tools, right? And able to serve reason and its infinity of what operations, right? But the other animals might have instead of a hand a claw or something, right?

[22:15] Because they have limited things, right? In a claw, to catch the the their prey or something, yeah. Whence, if we say that God wills man to have a hand that it might serve his understanding by doing what diverse works, right? And he wishes him or wills him to have an understanding; that he might be a man, because reason more than anything else is man. And he wishes him to be a man so that he might enjoy God himself, or that he might complete the what universe, huh?

[22:59] Which is not what to reduce beyond the universe there. Any further to any other what created ends, huh? Whence these things depend on the simple will of God, but the others from the order also of other causes, huh? Okay. So to say that there's no cause of the divine will is not to deny that the divine will wills some things to be for the sake of other things,

[23:33] right? So he willed my stomach so I could eat my food, right, and get my nourishment and so on. And but his willing that I should eat was not a cause of his willing that I should have a stomach.

[23:54] But he did will one in order to the other, right? But his willing one was not a cause of his willing the other. You get the subtle distinction that Thomas is making there, right? The way we proceed, or at least me, when I'm doing something, I start to do this and say, "Oh, I have to do this first." Yeah, yeah. But I'll see that. Yeah.

[24:19] And people are confused sometimes. I don't know where to begin. You know, they have to figure out the the means to the end, right? So the willing the end

[24:33] can be without the willing the means, and and can be a cause, but they're eventually willing the means when they come to see the connection between the two. Okay, now we come to Article Six: Whether the will of God is always fulfilled.

[24:54] To the sixth, one proceeds thus: It seems that the will of God is not always fulfilled. So Thomas is going to take the opposite side, right?

[25:08] For the Apostle, that's the what? Saint Paul, by Antonio Macia Incidentally in this same issue there. do you get that No, I don't get the rip outs. My mother sent me. Yeah, interesting. He had an interesting quote there. uh Newmeyer, I mean not Newmeer, but uh um the editor. Um Newhouse. Yeah, Newhouse, yeah, Um he had a kind of interesting quote from the Scottish Journal of Theology, I think it was, some non-Catholic but no Christian, and talking about how you know the evidence is pretty good that both Peter and Paul died in Rome, and the ones under, you know.

[25:51] So I got to think about it. He says Apostle here because he's referring to one of these guys, Saint Paul here. For the Apostle says in the first epistle to Timothy that God wills all men to be what? Save. And to come to a knowledge of the truth. Huh? That's interesting.

[26:20] But this doesn't always come about. Therefore, the will of God is not always what fulfilled, huh? Now, before we look at the reply to objections, you might notice that reply to objection one is is what lengthy. Yeah, it's two or three times greater than the other reply to the other two objections, right? It's longer than the art, it's longer than the court, I think. Yeah, yeah. So that's a very important objection, it seems to me, huh?

[26:57] Moreover, second here, just as knowledge has itself to the true, so the will to what? The good. But God knows everything that is true.

[27:13] Therefore, He wills every good. But not every good comes about, huh? For there are many goods that are able to come about which do not come about. Therefore, the will of God is not always what fulfilled. Now, I would guess, you know, before looking at the answer to this, that you're not seeing exactly the way in which these two are alike, right? I mean, you can say the true is to the understanding as the good is to the will because it's the object of it, right?

[27:50] Okay. But you've got to realize the distinction between the good and the true that Aristotle points out in the sixth book of Wisdom or the sixth book of First Philosophy, sixth book after the books in Natural Philosophy, and that is that the good is primarily in things, and the true is primarily in the mind,

[28:16] and therefore the perfection of the divine mind requires that he what know everything that is true. But since the good is in things, the perfection of the divine goodness, or even the perfection of the divine will, doesn't imply or require that he what will everything to be in itself. In fact, as we saw before, he wills freely, right? Anything else to be? Because his goodness doesn't depend upon them, right?

[28:45] And they don't add anything to his goodness. The goodness of the creature added to God, to use a geometrical comparison, is like a point added to a straight line. How much longer is a point for the line for a point added?

[29:06] Or like a line added to a square, right? How much bigger is a square? Makes us pretty insignificant, right? But we'll see how Thomas answers it.

[29:25] Moreover, the will of God, since it is the first cause, does not exclude middle causes, as has been said in the previous article. But the effect of the first cause is able to be impeded through the defect of the second cause,

[29:45] just as the effect of the moving power of the soul is impeded on account of the what weakness of the. Shins. Yeah. Therefore, the effect of the divine will can be impeded on account of the defect of the second. Therefore causes. Therefore, the will of God is not always fulfilled.

[30:14] But against this is what is said in Psalm 1: 13. All things, whatever that he will, whatever God will, he has made. Right? Okay.

[30:31] Now, what St. Thomas says to say first of all, before we take up the tremendous first objection. Answer: It should be said that it is necessary that the will of God always be what fulfilled.

[30:53] To the evidence of which it should be considered that sense in effect is conformed to the agent according to its form, in the agent's form. There is the same reason in agent causes which there is in formal causes.

[31:16] In forms, it can be thus that although something can fall short from some particular form, nevertheless, it cannot what fall short from a what universal form. For it is

[31:36] possible for something there to be something that is not a man, for example, right? Or is not living. But it is not possible that there be something that is not a being. Okay.

[31:55] It's possible for something not to be a man or living, and not is it possible for something not to be something? Because that's completely universal, something or even being.

[32:11] That's right. That's very easy to see, right? Thomas is using that likeness there to say, whence also the same thing is necessary for the same thing to happen in agent what causes. Huh? For it is possible for something to come about outside the order of some particular agent cause. Huh?

[32:38] But it is not possible for something what come about outside the order of some universal cause. Or most universal cause, under which all particular what causes are included. included. Huh?

[33:03] Because if some particular cause fails from its effect, this is an account of some other particular cause impeding it. But that other one is what contained under the order of the universal cause, whence the effect cannot, can in no way, go out from right. The order of the universal cause.

[33:35] In fact, my old teacher Cassar could say, you know, willy nilly you're going to do honor to God. If you repent and are forgiven, you will glorify His mercy. If you don't repent, you will glorify His justice, right? So willy nilly, gonna you can't escape giving glory to God, huh? You can't escape the order of divine causality.

[34:06] And this also Thomas says is clear in bodily things. For some star can be impeded so that it does not what bring about its effect.

[34:20] But nevertheless, whatever effect from a what follows from some bodily cause impeding it is necessary to be reduced to some what middle causes and universal power of the first what heavens, huh?

[34:43] Since therefore the will of God is universal cause of all things, it is impossible that the divine will does not what achieve its effect, huh?

[34:56] Whence what is seen to recede from the divine will according to one order comes back under it in another, like the example I was giving.

[35:08] Just as the sinner who in himself, or as regards in himself, recedes from the divine will by sinning, right? I'm not going to do his will.

[35:20] He falls into the order of the divine will when he is punished through what his justice. This reminds me of my old teacher Casiré. Maybe he got it from this text, but I didn't say it. You know, not in this context, you know, but that was his point, huh? So the conclusion was you might also glorify His mercy by glorifying His justice, and you can choose in some way between the two, huh?

[35:52] Okay, now we come to the reply to the first what objection, right? Notice in this reply the objection here. Thomas gives a number of solutions, right?

[36:14] And but yeah, yeah. And the the third one is the one he seems to elaborate the most, huh? And maybe that's the the one that strongest. Yeah, the strongest way of of answering, maybe, huh?

[36:35] I notice they go through Catena Aurea sometimes. You know, the the passage he'll give two or three of the, you know, Augustine and Chrysostom and somebody else, and they have a little different way of understanding the same sentence, and they all make sense, right? And I shouldn't say one is good, the others are bad, but I think one seems better than the other. To the first, therefore, it should be said that that word of the apostle, that God wills all men to be saved, right?

[37:04] This is able to be understood in three ways. In one way, that it be a what accommodated distribution, huh? According to this sense, that God wills to be saved all men who are saved, right? Right. Okay.

[37:29] Not because no man is there whom what he wills not to be saved, but because no one is saved whom he does not wish to be saved, as Augustine says, huh? Okay.

[37:47] How'd you get in here? Yeah. In a second way, it can be understood that the distribution is for all the kinds of singulars, right? And not for the singulars of every kind. According to this sense, God wishes, huh, from each status of men, some to be saved, men and women, Jews and Gentiles, huh? The little ones and the great ones, huh? But not all of every state, huh?

[38:42] I was reading in in the Gospel of John there. Latin there Latin there. He calls them in the, is it thirteenth chapter I guess it was, or fourteenth chapter. He calls them filioli little children, right. And he says, when Augustine was, a couple places, he called them servants before. Now he calls them filioli After resurrection, he calls them fratres because they're getting more and more what, improving, right, and getting close and closer, right, you know.

[39:22] So, remember in graduate school there, you know, we're having a seminar with Charles de Koninck, you know, and one of these, you know, two three hour things, you know, there's a little break in there, you know, and then finally kind of close back in, you know, start again. And okay, children, de Koninck could do that to get away with it, you know. This seemed to fit us too, in those where our minds were in those days.

[39:59] Um. Now, what do you think of those first two explanations? Which I don't think are the bestest, but I don't think they make some sense? The second one is similar to what he says in his commentary on John. when Christ says, "I will draw all to myself." Yeah, yeah. Because he says that's not all; that's not everybody. He doesn't say omnes He says omnia, but he says also it's just he'll draw all the elects to himself.

[40:24] Yeah, yeah. He doesn't have to say om, ne. Yeah, Om, ne. that's one way. Yeah, that's good. That this is a kind of distinction that can be applied to other texts that are kind of puzzling. Yeah. That they seem maybe to be.

[40:43] The first time you see it, it seems like an ad hoc invention almost, you know. But after you see a number of places where it's being used, that same distinction then it doesn't seem so arbitrary, you know. It doesn't necessarily seem arbitrary, but it doesn't seem to get to the.

[41:02] I guess maybe the first intention of the of the it just strikes me that way. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, I've been saying Mozart writes well for every instrument. Does that mean that every piece piece that he wrote for that instrument is is great? You know, maybe not, but you know, you can find a very good piece for each instrument. That'd be one way of you know kind of saying that you know.

[41:33] That way. A lot of times we don't really you know stop and think about the way we say these things. One thing that kind of is a little different from this, but but we

[41:53] often say that God is the first cause of all things, right? And some might come back and say, "Well, all things includes God, doesn't it? " Therefore, he's what. Yeah, yeah.

[42:11] Well, that's not true. So, what do you mean? You say God is the first cause of all things. Things inside of himself. Yeah, yeah. Or else you'd have to say we're using "thing" now for something that is in its own existence or something, right? You know, in the in the fourth book of wisdom, Aristotle says that wisdom is about being as being, right? And he reasons from what he's shown in the proemium that wisdom is about the first cause.

[42:45] Well, the first cause, its causality extends to all being, right? So you're looking for it belongs to the same science, you might say, or the same knowledge, to consider being as being in the first cause, because the first cause is the cause of all what. Yeah, yeah, but but he doesn't say it there, right? You see, so you could say either we have to understand in this way that he means all beings except itself, okay?

[43:20] But rather than that complicated way of speaking, we just say the first cause of all beings, or we could say that by being we mean something that has existence, where the have and the have are not the same thing, and therefore he's the cause of all things that have existence. He doesn't have existence; he is existence. But those are two ways of understanding it, right? You know, but sometimes our ways of speaking that you know you could quibble about for a while, you know, but then how do you understand it, right?

[43:53] And these are two ways of understanding it, right? Okay. Now the third one is according to Damascene, right? Now maybe Thomas is going to give this last because maybe it's the best, right? As soon as he elaborates it more, right?

[44:16] And so he might prefer Damascene one place than than Augustine. Third, according to Damascene, is understood about the antecedent will, right? Not about the what consequent will,

[44:39] which distinction is not taken on the side of what the divine will, in which there is nothing before after, right? But on the side of the things what willed, huh? Now he's going to help us to understand this distinction. To the understanding of which it should be considered that each thing, according as it is good, so it is willed by what God.

[45:13] Now something is able, in its first consideration, according as it's absolutely considered, to be good or bad, right? Which nevertheless, when is considered with something added,

[45:32] which is the consequent consideration of it, will be having itself in the contrary way, right? Okay, just as for a man to live is good, right?

[45:49] And for a man to what be killed is bad, according to an absolute consideration, huh? But if it be added about some man that he's a homicide, right?

[46:05] Or living with danger for the multitude, then it is good to kill him, right? Okay. And is bad for him to, be alive yeah. Okay. And incidentally, in this latest issue, there again of the thing, it had the quote from Benedict XVI when he was Cardinal Ratzinger, right? And it's about the abortion and euthanasia, right? And it's a very clear text that you cannot support abortion or euthanasia and be a Catholic, right?

[46:43] Yeah. You know, you know. You can disagree about capital punishment and and war and so on, right? Without being, you know, it's very clear distinction, right? Yeah. You know. Because it comes up, you're discussing, you know, some of the some of the bishops, you know, are announcing they'll not give communion to these so-called Catholic politicians who are publicly supporting abortion and so on. And some people are going to mix it up, you know.

[47:11] Well, you got to be opposed to the death penalty then, too. Well, the distinction there to be to be seen, right? Um. Okay, this it is good for him to be killed. It is bad for him to live. Whence it can be said that the judge antecedently wishes every man to what? To live. But consequently, he wishes the homicide, the murder, to be suspended, huh?

[47:45] Likewise, God antecedently wishes every man to be saved, right? But consequently, he wishes some to be damned, according to the requirements of his what? Justice, huh?

[48:02] Nevertheless, huh? That which we will antecedently, right? We don't will what simply, but secundum quid. Now here we get that same famous distinction, right, between simple and secundum quid.

[48:22] And why is he saying that what you will consequently you will simply, and what you will antecedently you don't? Because the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves, as Aristotle says. In themselves, however, they are in the particular. Okay. So in themselves, you don't have man; you have this man, and not just this man, but this man with his deeds and so on, right?

[48:54] Whence simply we will something according as we will that thing, considered all the circumstances that are particular. And this is the consequent will. Whence it is able to be said that the judge, the just judge, simply wills the homicide to be suspended. But in some respect, secondum quid, he wills him to live, in so far as he is a man, right? Okay.

[49:31] Whence this is more able to be called willfulness than absolute will, right? Okay. And what do you say about our Lord there in the Garden of Gethsemane? There, right? You know, does he will to die or not?

[49:54] Yes. He. He wills to die, but he has a kind of wish of nature to bear suffering. Yeah, yeah. You can say simply he wills to die, right? Because this is the will of his father, right? To die. But in some sense, you can say he he wills not to die, right? Because it is natural. You see. But considering everything, right? Um, uh, you know, it's kind of striking.

[50:25] I was reading in the in the, I think it's the fourteenth chapter of John, right, the Golden Chain there, right, where our Lord is trying to console the apostles for his coming death, right? And all things considered, one of the one of the church fathers, Augustine, one of them says, you know, this is something to laetari, rather than to be sad about, right? I see. And, well, all things considered, you see, um, is the death of our Lord on the cross something to be sad about or to rejoice, right?

[51:06] For obviously it can be both, to some. But simply speaking, it's more a cause to rejoice, right? Than to be sad about, huh? Because of the good brought about by this, the only this way that we that we could be saved, right? If we die we all die. What? If Jesus will die for us, we all die. We have no life. Yeah. Okay.

[51:34] And thus it is clear that whatever God wills simply, right, comes about, right. Although that which he wills antecedently does not come about, right?

[51:49] He uses the same distinction to explain this interesting question about guardian angels. Where, if some harm comes to us, even our damnation, does it make the guardian angel sad? And he uses the distinction. He says, "No, the guardian angel, like God, wills all men to be saved in this thing." Yeah. Uses the same distinction example. But considering the circumstances, he uses the example of a man on a ship, a merchant, doesn't want his goods thrown overboard.

[52:16] But considering the fact that he's in a storm and throwing overboard to save his life, he wants to throw. Simply, he wills them to be thrown overboard. Yeah, yeah. A Aristotle's example in the ethics. Yeah. Oh. I was looking at this new biography there of Einstein, right? Oh. And Einstein didn't believe in free will, huh? Oh. You know that we don't really have have ability to choose, right?

[52:43] Oh. Kind of strange, isn't it? You know, but it comes from his his you know belief in determinism and so on, right? Did he ever marry that woman? No. Oh, yeah, he's married. Yeah, yeah, yeah, twice. I mean.

[52:55] Yeah. There's a quote I saw recently from him. There's something like, my my punishment for rejecting all authority was to being made an authority myself, or something.

[53:14] Well, they asked him about immortality, and he said, "One life is enough for me." They mean mean that to you, you know. It's interesting, you know. Einstein didn't want to be considered, you know, an atheist. only a Milton atheist atheist, right? Because he had this idea of a greater mind, but kind of a pantheistic notion he had. But it's kind of interesting to see in this particular new biography that they, I've seen most of his quotes before, but they're kind of quite pretty good, you know, collected well in the text there.

[53:48] And interestingly, he says there, nevertheless, about the greater mind. But he was influenced by Spinoza, right? Who has this kind of pantheistic notion. But he also got from Spinoza the idea that the soul and the body would be the same thing. Oh wow! So.

[54:08] Name of the biographer? They call. Well, actually, actually, one of the formulators of time, you know, I got interested in Einstein, and so first that would become a popular thing, and I saw this guy being interviewed on, you know, Charlie Rose or Charlie Rose, yeah. And then I saw it in BJ's So, I was buying the groceries I'd be looking at this thing, you know. Maybe I'll buy the book, you know.

[54:36] They have, you know, some interesting quotes there. I have most of them, but they're kind of put together, you know, things. And I was reading the various accounts there between him and Heisenberg and and Bohr, you know. And it gives the time, you know, the famous time when when Einstein was objecting to Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory. And he had these he poses objections, right? And I guess the last objection he gave was, you know, kind of kind of shook up Niels Bohr.

[55:09] And Niels Bohr going, "There's no answer to this, you know. You know, physics is going to be destroyed if this objection is. You know, and I had a picture in one of my other books, you know, of them leaving the conference together, you know, Einstein looking pretty, you know, confident, and Bohr, you know, this worried look on his face, you know, and so on, and and I I know what happened afterward.

[55:30] You see, Bohr stayed up, and he found the defect in Einstein's objection. And the defect was due to Einstein not applying his own theory of relativity to his example. So this kind of finished Einstein, right? So I was looking at this guy's account of it in this this new book, you know, and of course, you know, hoisted his own petards into the old idea, you know, his own theory being used against him, right?

[55:55] And that's kind of interesting, then. And then they covered this conversation with Heisenberg, you know, where Heisenberg, you know, was, you know, speaking of Einstein's theory, you know, from what he thought people had said, right, about it, and Einstein said, well, maybe I didn't say that, but that's really all nonsense. This is really the way it is.

[56:20] It's kind of a controversial thing. It's where Einstein, you know, says that it's not really true what they say about the theory that he was only going to take into account what can be observed, right? And the theory is going to fit just what can be observed. It's actually the reverse, he says. You know, theory determines what you can observe.

[56:44] But there's apparently some truth to that, exactly what that means, you know. This kind of striking thing. Okay. Now the second objection I think is going to be solved along the lines I was guessing, you know.

[57:01] As knowledge is to the truth, so the will is to the good. But God knows everything that is true, therefore He wills everything that is good. To the second, it should be said that the act of the knowing power is according as the known is in the knower, but the act of the desiring power is ordered to things according as they are in themselves. Aristotle says it very briefly, as I mentioned many times in the sixth book of Wisdom, right?

[57:32] But Thomas unfolds the words of Aristotle there, right? Or as a nitwitz, or dimwitz, I should say, and that's extremely important that Aristotle saw that, right? So whatever can have the notion of being or of true, all of this is virtually in God.

[57:56] But the whole does not exist in what created things, and therefore God knows everything that is true. But nevertheless, He does not will every good, right? Except insofar as He wills Himself, in whom is virtually what existing every good, right? But He's not willing every good in itself, right?

[58:24] So if you just think of your parents, you know, and what they say about eggs and sperm and so on, right? How many different people could have been generated from the same parents besides you and me?

[58:38] And all people we're not far about, are they, right? And it's not because we were more more deserving to be. It's something about to thank God for, but you can see that He's not willing every good that could have been, right? All all these other people that could have been besides you and me. I mean, hundreds or thousands or millions, I guess. You know, it's a huge number.

[58:58] I heard the scientists say. You know, but I mean, um. Only one of these could have led to you or me, you know. So God is obviously not willing every good that could be. And not just any one of them, just one of them. Yeah. And and had this awful weather here for for a week or so or more here, and he could have willed to you know quicker end to this bad weather, you know, but he didn't.

[59:26] So he's obviously not willing every good that could be, right? Yeah. The Packers could have won the Super Bowl. Yeah. They got the new pitcher in the Boston Red Sox from the Japanese, right, from Japan, and he's pretty, he's quite a good guy, you know. But his first two games he's lost, right? Oh. But he didn't get really, you know. And first game was like two to one, something like that.

[59:55] So he should have really won. He just wasn't getting runs knocked in by the rest of the team, right? So, you know, but certainly that the good, of his winning could have been arranged, you know, with a few little help from his teammates, so. So there's a lot of the good there that could be that God is not willing, you know.

[1:00:15] Okay. Now the third objection was saying, "Well, God is the primary cause. Couldn't there be things not taking place because of the defect of the secondary causes? " To the third, it should be said that the first cause can be impeded from its effect through the defect of the second cause when it is not universally right. First, not completely universal. And by that he means what containing under itself all causes, right?

[1:00:45] Because in this way the effect in no way is able to evade its order, and thus it is about the will of God. It's not even Hitler or Stalin avoiding the will of God. Take a little break now before we go on to it. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.