Prima Pars
79. Summa I, Q.19, Articles 7–9: God's Will Does Not Change, Does Not Make Everything Necessary, and Does Not Will Evil
Class of 2007-04-19
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/079-summa-i-q-19-articles-7-9-gods-will-does-not-change-does/

[0:00] Up to Article Seven, here, huh? Whether the God, the, whether the will of God is what changeable, right? To the seventh one proceeds. Thus, it seems that the will of God is changeable. You can guess from the starting point that Thomas is going to take the opposite of where he starts. For the Lord says in Genesis, the sixth chapter, "I repent for me to have made man, right?

[0:35] But whoever repents of what he has made has a changeable will. Therefore, God has a changeable will. Moreover, Jeremiah's 18th chapter, from the person of the Lord is said,

[0:56] "I will what speak against the nation, right? Against the kingdom, so that I might root it out and destroy and disperse it. But if that nation or that race does penance, right? Repents of its evil. I also will what repent, yeah, over the evil that I have thought that I might do to it, huh? Therefore, God has a what changeable will.

[1:31] And those two objections must going to be solved by something about the way that some things are said metaphorically of God, right? Just like anger said metaphorically of God. So penance, should be said.

[1:46] Moreover, whatever God makes, he makes voluntarily. But God does not always make the same things. For sometimes he commands that the legal things be observed. I suppose the Old Testament things. Sometimes he prohibits this, and therefore he has a changeable will. Well, this is a different kind of objection, right? But why can't he command different things to different ages, right? Because I might say to my son, you can't use the car because of his age or his inexperience, however it is, right?

[2:27] And another time saying you can because he's ready for this now. Moreover, God does not a necessity will what he wills, as has been said above.

[2:41] Therefore, he is able to will and not will the same. But everything that has an ability for opposites is changeable. Just as what is able to be and not be is changeable according to substance, and what is able to be here and not to be here is changeable according to place. Therefore, God is changeable according to His what will. So God could will that I be, and will that I not be, right?

[3:15] But against this is what is said in the book of Numbers, chapter twenty-three: God is not like a man, that He lies; nor like the son of man—not the son of man, but that He what change, huh? Okay, God no change. Variety is not the spice of God's life. From the time I was a little boy, I always figured I was coming down from my grandfather. You know, variety is the spice of life.

[3:43] Here it's my mother, you know, and it's it's the truth about human life, right? And they would not eat the same thing every day, or something like that, or but same meal all the time in heaven. There,

[4:00] I answer. It should be said that the will of God is altogether unchangeable. And about this, it should be considered that it is one thing to change your will, right? And it's another thing to will the change of some things. I notice,

[4:28] huh? Are you saying the same thing, there, say? I I changed my will, and I will to change. The average person might take this mean the same thing, right?

[4:55] So I say, if I change my will, you're positing a change in your will, right? You say I will to change. You're not positing a change in your will by that fact, but a change in something other than your will, right? Okay. So those are not the same thing, are they? Thomas is pointing out that distinction. Got that?

[5:23] For me to will a change is not the same thing as to change my will, is it? No. For someone is able, the same will remaining immobile, right?

[5:43] To will that now this come about, and afterwards it comes about something what contrary, huh? But then the will is changed. Is someone what?

[6:01] Yeah, what before he did not will, or he ceases to will what he did will, right? Okay. So if I am going to do the steak on the grill, I am willing to what? Change the meat, right? Just just till it's pink, right? Okay, but I am willing to change the meat, right? Am I changing my will by that fact?

[6:29] No, no, no, no. Now he says, but then the will is changed if someone begins to will what he before did not will, right? Or after, or he ceases to will what he did not what, what he did will, right? Okay. So is that true about me in the case of the steak, right?

[7:04] At first I will it to be uncooked, and then I will it to be cooked. No. Now this cannot happen, he says, unless you presuppose a change either on the side of knowledge, right? Or in the disposition of the substance of the one what, willing, right?

[7:37] For since the will is of the good, someone newly, huh, in two ways is able to begin to what will something. In one way, thus that something newly begins to be what, good for him, huh? Which is not without some change in him, just as coming about the cold, one begins, one begins to be good to sit at fire, right? Which before it was not.

[8:18] Simple example, Thomas. Can you imagine Thomas sitting there for the fire and reading this, or dictating this? In another way, that what he newly knows something to be good for him, which before he was what, ignorant of, right?

[8:39] And for this reason we take counsel, right, that we might know what is good for us, right? But it has been shown above that both the substance of God.

[8:56] As well as his science, right, or his knowledge, is altogether what unchangeable, right? Whence it is necessary that his will be altogether what unchangeable, right? So this argument here depends upon seeing a distinction, right, that there's two ways in which you can what begin to will something

[9:24] that you did not what will before, right? Either because something begins to be good for you that was not good for you before, and that supposes some change in you, right? Or because you discovered that something is good for you that already was really good for you, but you just discovered it's good for you, right? Okay. So I discovered that logic was good for me. I discovered that Thomas Aquinas or somebody was good for me, right?

[9:53] And so I begin to to will this, right? So that was a change, right? Or as they got older. right. Maybe some things that were not good for me as a child became good for me as a what? As a man, right? Okay.

[10:12] Um. So medicines now for me are good for me that would not have been good for me at another age. Not sure they're good for me now either, but. Um. But you said I mean, that's due to a change in my condition, right? Huh? Okay.

[10:36] I know people they they take what they call the atomic cocktail, you know, because they have an overactive thyroid. And sometimes the effect of the atomic cocktail is to give you an underactive thyroid. So then they have to give you some medicine too, you know. So the change in you, right, makes something good for you that was not good for you before, right?

[11:01] Okay. So neither substance of God nor does His knowledge ever change, right? So how can He begin to will something He didn't will before? Can something begin to be good for God that was not good for Him before, right?

[11:23] Yeah. Yeah. Now the first two arguments, at least the first one anyway, is going to be in terms of what this being a metaphor. To the first, therefore, it should be said that that word of the Lord is to be understood metaphorically, huh? I can see why you had an article on metaphor there in the first question, right? What the scripture uses metaphors according to a what?

[11:55] Our likeness, right? For when we repent, we destroy what we have made, right? Although this is able to be without a change of will, right?

[12:11] Just as when some man, without a what change of will, sometimes wishes to make something, intending at the same time afterwards to what destroy it, to make a sandcastle or something, right? Something that's fun to knock down, you know. After you. Yeah. Yeah. Thus, therefore, God is said to what repent according to a likeness of doing, in so far as what man whom He made before He wipes out from the face of the earth by a deluge, deluge, huh?

[12:50] Okay. Except for Noah, right? And his family. Now, Thomas in the Summa Contra Gentiles will talk about penance too, and a number of reasons why it's not what said properly in God, right? But there's a general reason that penance is a kind of sadness, and sadness is due to some something bad that's happened, right? And nothing bad can happen to God, so can't be any kind of sadness.

[13:28] But penance also implies is change, and it can't be any change in the divine will. So it must be understood metaphorically, right? Well, sometimes you meet a Christian, you know, and sometimes the fundamentalists, you know, for whom God really what does get angry, right? And they they can't understand this metaphorical use of the word, huh?

[13:55] I suppose it puts the fear of God into you more. He's really angry, not to fall to the hands of an angry God, the way the the preachers used to do, right? I don't know how they understood. Do you? I mean, the the Massachusetts years, yeah, sure. To get the people, yeah, yeah. So I I doubt he made the distinction anyway, huh? I doubt, but anyway. Now this was it, Edwards, something Edwards, John Van Edwards, maybe.

[14:30] Yeah. Okay, the second objection was taken from Jeremiah, where he's talking about first destroying something and then what? If they do penance, he will do penance himself, right? To the second, it should be said that the will of God, since it is the first and universal cause, it does not exclude the what middle causes, as say what's in between the effect and. In whose power it is that some effects be what produced, right?

[15:08] But because all middle causes do not equal the power of the first cause, there are many things in the power and knowledge in the divine will which are not contained under the order of the lower causes, as the raising up of Lazarus, on the eleventh chapter of John. Whence someone looking towards the lower causes is able to say Lazarus will not rise,

[15:43] but looking towards the first cause, the divine cause, is able to say that Lazarus will rise. And both of these, God what wills, to wit, that some things sometimes is in the future according to a lower cause, right? Which nevertheless is not future, in the future according to what some higher cause, or the reverse of this, right? Thus, therefore, it should be said that God sometimes pronounces something future, according as it is contained in the order of lower causes, as, for example, according to the disposition of nature, or of the merits of the person at hand, which nevertheless does not come about because it is otherwise in the divine higher cause.

[16:47] Just as he foretells to Ezekias, dispose your house because you will die and not live, as is had in Isaiah. This is another text, but it's a similar one. But nevertheless, this does not come about because from eternity it was otherwise in the knowledge and the divine will, which is itself what unchangeable.

[17:14] On account of which Gregory says, God changes the sentence, but not what he doesn't change his counsel, the counsel that is saved as will.

[17:27] What he says, therefore, I would do penance, right, is again to be understood to be said metaphorically, huh? For men, when they do not fulfill what they are threatened, are seen to what? Yeah. So his first two ones are basically being solved the same way, but the second one is no more involved by the fact that some things are announced according to the what, and some according to lower causes, yeah.

[18:00] I guess he tells the prophet to go to this guy and tell him, you know, dispose your house, you're going to die, right? And the guy repents or something, and God repents. Maybe related text is St. James. Some of you will say, well, we're going to go tomorrow. We're going to go and make this money. We're going to do this business. Yeah. Whereas you should say, if God wills.

[18:24] Yeah. Because it's within your power to do that in a certain way. Yeah. In nature, you're I'm able to do that. Yeah. But maybe God doesn't will. Yeah. Yeah. I guess the same way.

[18:38] Yeah. And some other cases described by Thomas elsewhere, you know, more at length, you know, and because questions whether the prophets ever say anything false, right? And if he reveals something. This is the way it is according to lower causes. You will later on reveal what it is going to the higher causes. So the prophet is really not what lying about or saying something false about this person, right?

[19:04] Because he's saying what is going to take place by reason of the what? Yeah. Yeah, because then you would say if these conditions persist. Yeah. Yeah.

[19:31] Now the third objection is saying, "Well, God sometimes commands us to slay the lamb. Other times, He prohibits us, right? " My dad-in-law, she brought this thing there with the shape of the lamb, you know, as you make a little cake. Oh yeah. Then we eat the the cake. Oh for Easter Yeah. Yeah. Coconut frosting. Now, to the third, it should be said that from that reason, one is not able to conclude that God has a changeable will, but that He wills change.

[20:17] Okay. But those two things are not saying the same thing, right? Is it the same thing for me to will a change and to change my will?

[20:36] No, good example there, the steak, right? I will to change the steak, right? But there's no change in my will. That's something along the lines. I- I think the resolution. of the Buddhas along this, where the text in the Old Testament, where our Lord speaks of the priesthood of Aaron as being forever. Well, what? happened? So I suppose maybe there was a condition placed on that, as I know many times He would speak of the kingdom or the king, the successor of David, as long as they're faithful you know so many times it's a condition but sometimes Thomas would say, you know, that he's say something about David insofar as he's a figure of Christ, right?

[21:30] When they say his kingdom will be forever," right? Mm-hmm. The same with Solomon, yeah. Many things said of Solomon weren't fulfilled in Solomon himself, but Christ. Yeah, yeah. So, Or one way to skin a cat.

[21:46] Or as a friend of mine says, there's 6 ways you could take out a gallbladder. Now, the fourth objection is a little different, right? He's saying if God can will that something be and not be, then why can't He change His will, right? Okay. And there, the distinction he makes in the Summa Contra Gentiles, but more at length. To the fourth, it should be said that although God to will something is not necessary absolutely, right?

[22:22] Nevertheless, it is necessary from ex suppositione right? in other words God having willed something cannot not will it, because His will is eternity, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will. Now, to us, it looks like you know confining, right? Because if we will something, we could not change our will. We'd be in quite a mess because so often, you know, the circumstances change. Something is no longer seen as good, you know, or we realize something new, so we we have to change our will, right?

[22:56] But God doesn't have that defect, right? It's kind of frightening in some sense to think, you know, that God can't change His will, right?

[23:08] If He wills your salvation, you know, or He wills your damnation, I mean, it's, it's, He's, He's, He's, He's committed. Yeah, yeah. It's interesting, very interesting.

[23:28] Give you time to go on. to the eighth article here. Oh yeah, sure. Okay. Okay. To the eighth one proceeds thus. It seems that the divine will imposes necessity upon things willed, right?

[23:51] Now you might think that because his will is unchangeable, right? Okay. That's what Einstein would think, right? Gets that from Spinoza, right? For Augustine says in the Enchiridion that must be the Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, that no one becomes saved except the one whom God wills to be saved.

[24:22] And therefore, one should ask that he will, right? Because it necessarily will come about if he wills it. Let me think about that. Is that the way you pray?

[24:48] May our prayers be instruments of your divine providence. We're not praying that what his will could be changed, are we? Moreover, every cause which is not able to be impeded produces of necessity its effect,

[25:14] because nature always does the same unless it be impeded, as is said in the second book of Natural Hearing. But the will of God is not able to be impeded, for the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Romans, chapter nine, who is able, who resists his will, right? Who can resist his will? Therefore, the will of God imposes necessity upon the things willed.

[25:49] Moreover, that which has necessity from the before is necessary absolutely, as an animal to die is necessary, because he is composed from contraries. But created things, but things created by God, are compared to divine will as to something before them, from which they have necessity. Since this conditional statement is true, if God wills something, it will be, or it is.

[26:24] For every true conditional statement is necessary. That's what you see of the if then statement, right? The then part has to follow necessarily the if part.

[26:38] Okay. It follows, therefore, that everything that God wills is necessary absolutely. But against this, all good things which come about, God wills to come about. If, therefore, His will imposed necessity upon things willed, it would follow that all good things and necessity come about, and thus would perish free will, as Einstein says, and counsel in all things of this sort.

[27:19] Kind of like an experiment, yeah. Yeah, you know, there's the indetermination that comes to the matter, and the indetermination uh in our will, right? And Einstein was opposed to this indeterminism that came up in the Copenhagen interpretation there. But here it's taken something maybe more known even. Okay.

[27:42] This is a very subtle thing, so let's see what Thomas says. Huh? A lot of people get mixed up on these things. Is this matter particularly? I answer: It should be said that the divine will imposes necessity upon some things willed, but not upon all.

[28:05] The reason for which some want to assign from the middle clause is, because those things which he produces through necessary causes are necessary, and those things which he produces through contingent causes are what contingent.

[28:30] Now, does Thomas say this is correct? Well, this does not seem to be sufficiently said. Thomas says, huh? Okay. On account of two things, yes.

[28:45] First, huh? Because the effect of the first cause is contingent on account of the second cause. From this, that the effect of the first cause is impeded through the defect of the second cause, just as the power of the sun is impeded through the defect of the plants, so it doesn't germinate, right? So I put the seeds in the garden there, and sometimes something comes up, and sometimes it doesn't.

[29:18] Sometimes it flowers, sometimes it doesn't. Same sun shining upon both, huh? But no defect of a second cause is able to impede, but that the divine will will produce its what effect, huh?

[29:40] Secondly, because if the distinction of the contingent from the necessary are referred only to second causes, it would follow that this is outside the intention and the divine what will, which doesn't fit together. Was that for a translation of inconveniens? Fit together, okay.

[30:09] And therefore, it can be said better that this happens on account of the efficacy of the divine will. Now, this is the point that Thomas makes every time he discusses this question.

[30:26] For when some cause is efficacious for what it does, for acting, the effect follows the cause not only according to this that it come about, but also in the way it comes about, right, or in the way it is. For from the weakness of the active power in the seed, it happens that the son is born, unlike the father in certain accidental things, which pertain to the what way of being, right?

[31:05] Since therefore the divine will is most efficacious, not only does it follow that those things come about which God wills to come about, but in the very way they come about, huh? In which God wills them to come about.

[31:25] For he what he wills some things, God wills some things to come about necessarily, and other things to come about what contingently, huh? He wills some things to happen by chance, even, right? Okay. Which makes life much more interesting. Yeah, yeah. They used to compare sometimes the poet, right? Where in his play he has some things happen by chance,

[31:56] and the poet is a bit like God there, right? He arranges some things to take place by necessity, but some things to happen take place by chance, huh? And so he's doing the tragedies and the comedies and so on. There are many events that takes place by what chance, yeah? But the poet arranges them, right? So he, in a sense, is to the events in the play like God is to the events in the real world.

[32:30] So he wills some things, God wills some things to come about necessarily, and some things in a contingent way, and that there might be order in things, right? For the completion of the what universe, huh? And therefore, for some effects, he renders apt necessary causes, which are not able to what fail, from which effects follow of necessity. To some, he adapts defectable, failable, contingent causes, from which effects come about in a contingent way.

[33:24] It is not, therefore an account that the effects will by God come about contingently, because the practical causes are contingent? But an account of this that God wills them to happen contingently. He prepares contingent causes for them. huh Okay. But then put down your pipe and, smoke it, huh?

[33:53] God's causality is efficacious, that not only what he wants to take place does take place, right, but also that it takes place in the way he wants it to take place. Some things by necessity, and some what by contingent, right? And so he prepares for the some necessary causes and for the others contingent causes, yeah.

[34:20] Yeah. And people go, you know, to errors in both directions, right? And some, you know, want to make everything contingent because they all depend upon the will of God, as if that was a contingent cause, which God is not. And others want to go to the other thing and make everything necessary, right, and leave no room for contingency, right? And Thomas, following Aristotle, right,

[34:50] goes to the middle ground, right. All my reports go with the modest truth, Shakespeare says. Nor clipped, nor more nor clipped, but so. Makes the world much more interesting. Chance is contingent. Yeah, that comes under it. Yeah, yeah. Now, that's not the only one though, but. Anyways. You read Shakespeare's Comedy of Errors you see a lot of yeah, chance events, huh? But the same way in the tragedies, right?

[35:40] Yeah. But a sense in in history and in biography, perhaps you know, you have to talk about chance events, huh? Because they can change the whole what world, right? You know. If you hadn't gone there on that day at that time, you would not have met so and so. He didn't go there to meet you, and he didn't go there to meet him, but it changed your whole life.

[36:16] I told you when I first came to Boston. I told you that. I thought, well, gee, if it's getting serious I'll go down to Boston, go down to Boston, and look around, get to know myself in the city. So I'm walking around and so on, and all by myself. So decided to go into this fancy old tobacco shop there, and I got some old cigarettes. Did I tell you about them?

[36:42] No. And so you know, old cigarette series, and those, then she bought old, kind of interesting thing, you know, not American, and so, so I'm smoking and walking around like this. No, no filter. No filter. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Interesting. And finally, get kind of thirsty, right? So I go into one of the hotels there and go into the bar and sit down, order a beer, right?

[37:08] And so a man sits down next to me, you know, and so on. See, he's got a book of poetry, so I figure he must be some academic type, you know. So I strike up a conversation where he's some big shot from Canadian University, right? And he's down taking a course at Harvard in the literature, something like that. And so we get talking back and forth, and so.

[37:26] Finally, so he takes a cigarette. I said. He says, "I smoke only ovals," he says. Now this is the only pack of cigarettes I've bought since I've been in Massachusetts, right? And I don't inhale, so I never get the habit, you know, but but that's why I have the things. So he's writing down his name and address, you know, on a job, you know.

[37:55] That's that's the story a friend of ours told. His son was a young boy learning how to play the piano, and he was really bad at it, but he knew how to learn one song. Yeah. While he plays some Ritchie Ding to him, right? Yeah. And so they decided that maybe we should pay for him to get some instruction. So they invite the instructor over, and she sits down next to him.

[38:16] He's just a boy, and with the with the confidence of a real Irishman, he's an Irish kid. He just, what do you want to hear? And she says, "How about this?" And it was the one song that he knew. She was impressed. He could play just what she asked.

[38:38] He doesn't need lessons. I told you this thing happened to Boulay, like like the sons. He goes down to Florida, right? He's laying on the beach there, so just talking to the guy next to him on the beach, right? And the guy gets so impressed with what Boulay's saying, he wants to hire him for a job. I need to need. But that's what happens; these things, right?

[38:59] Chance events, for the good or for bad, right? Yeah. And you know people are getting shot every day. You know, just in the wrong place, and you know, and a stray bullet or whatever it was.

[39:16] Okay. So now let's look at the reply to objections here. The first objection: No one is saved unless God wills him to be saved, right? And therefore, when Ada asks that he will, because it necessarily will come about if he wills it. Now, to the first, it should be said that through that word of Augustine,

[39:52] there should be understood necessity in things willed by God, not absolute, but what conditional. For it is necessary that this conditional be true, if God. wills this necessarily. This will be right. Now, what's the the Thérèse of Lisieux, right? She wanted to get uh was that Leo the thirteenth to allow her to enter the convent at the age of 15, which is earlier than I guess the. thing What did he say to her?

[40:33] He said, "If God wants it, yeah, yeah. He gave the condition. He didn't say, 'I think I approve you for this, ' right? " And of course, God pulled it right, so she got in. Okay, if he hadn't pulled it, she wouldn't have got in at that age anyway.

[40:57] Okay. Moreover, every cause which is not able to be impeded of necessity produces its effect, because nature always produces the same unless it be impeded. But the will of God cannot be impeded, for the Apostle says in the Epistle to the Romans, "Who can resist His will? Therefore, the will of God imposes what necessity upon things will down. " It's the way Spinoza talks, right? Influencing Einstein, he admits his indebtedness to Spinoza, right?

[41:40] For Spinoza, you know, everything follows from God, like it follows him being a triangle that you have your interior angles going to be right angles, right? Everything follows this necessity.

[41:53] To the second, it should be said, from this fact that nothing is what resists the divine will, it follows that not only do those things come about that God wills to come about, but that they come about contingently or necessarily,

[42:11] because thus He wills them to come about. Okay. So if some if God wills something to happen by chance, it must happen by chance.

[42:28] For reason. Yeah, there's a book of De Koninck that was out of print, and we all wanted a copy of this book, right? And we would you know, sold our soul to get the thing up. So this friend of mine, you know, he's he's invited out down in the city, of Quebec to to dinner. s you know, some guy. He gets down there and something come up, and the guy can't go out to dinner with him or something.

[42:52] Oh yeah. What am I going to do now? He's down there, so oh, he's a little bookshop. You know, he's a bookshop. He works in there. Books in there, he's right there.

[43:05] I'm sure you didn't dare show it to anyone else, right? That'd be too risky. Wouldn't chance that one. So that's a very way Thomas turns us around on the person, right?

[43:23] In sense, he's saying, yes, it is so true that nothing exists the will of God, right? Not only that it will happen, but that it will happen in the way He wants it to happen. If by necessity, it will happen by necessity. If it's by luck or chance or contingently, it'll happen that way. So whatever way He wants it to happen.

[43:50] Another third one here, talking about the conditional. I suppose this is in some way connected with the first one too, because what does this conditional necessity mean? To the third, it should be said that the things that are after have necessity from what is before, according to the way of the things that are before. Whence those things which come to be by the divine will have such necessity as God wills them to have, either absolute or conditional only, right?

[44:26] And thus, not all things are necessary but absolutely, right? Okay. So, you want to go more? I think we can do it Okay. Sure go ahead Okay. Okay. Whether the will of God is of bad things,

[44:54] everything good that comes to be, God wills. But for bad things to come about, is what good? For Augustine says in the Enchiridion, although those things which are bad, in so far as they are bad, are not good, right? Nevertheless,

[45:20] that there be not only good things, but also that there be bad things, is good. Therefore, God wills bad things. Ergo Augustine says there there.

[45:39] Moreover, Dionysius says in the fourth chapter about the divine names that the bad, right, confers to the what, or contributes to the perfection of the what universe. And Augustine says in the Enchiridion, from all things consists the admirable beauty of the universe,

[46:14] in which even that which is said to be bad is well what ordered, right? And placed in its place, it more eminently commends the what good, so that they are more pleasing and more what praiseworthy than they are compared to the what bad.

[46:39] But God wishes everything that pertains to the perfection and the beauty of the universe, because this is what God most of all wills in creatures. Therefore, God wills bad things. Remind me again, you know, what the the poet does in the play, right? If you had all good people, he wouldn't have such a great play, right? The nice guy wasn't laughing. Yeah.

[47:09] And would you appreciate beautiful things if they were not ugly things? Whereas Heraclitus was always saying, you know, it's not good for men to have all they want. It's hunger that makes food good, and all these other things.

[47:30] But there are some goods that couldn't be. There couldn't be the patience of the martyrs without the cruelty of the persecutors, and so on.

[47:42] And Augustine says that what theology developed because of heresy, right? So you can see during the Patristic period how some heretic denies an article of faith and sometimes tries to defend it, right? His error by scripture or by you know something that sounds good in philosophy, and so in order to defend that article, you had to answer the objections and you came to greater understanding because of this.

[48:10] Yeah, That's what I'm saying for there being divisions Yeah, yeah, yeah. Those who are proved, you know. Okay. Moreover, bad things to come about and not come about are contradictorily opposed, but God does not will that bad things do not come to be, right? Because since some bad things do come about, the will of God would not always be what fulfilled. Therefore, God wills bad things to come about.

[48:54] See, there must be some distinction that must be made here. But against this is what Augustine says: the book on the eighty-three questions. That's quite a book, yes.

[49:13] By no wise man does a man become worse, right? But God is more outstanding than any what wise man. Much less by God as an author, then does someone become worse, right?

[49:36] For by that author, when it is said, it is said by that one what willingly. Therefore, not willingly does God make a man what, or God by willing does not make a man worse. But it stands that by any evil or anything bad, something becomes worse. Therefore, God does not wish bad things.

[50:08] I answer: It should be said that since the ratio, definition of the good, is the notion of the desirable, right? So what Aristotle says at the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, the good is what all want. Yeah. So it's kind of inductively there.

[50:30] We talked about that a long time ago, didn't we? Yeah, we had the dialectic about it and so on. But the bad is what opposed to the good. But It is impossible that something bad, as such, right, be desired, huh? Neither by a natural desire, nor by the animal desire, huh? Passions, nor by the intellectual desire, which is the will. But something bad is desired, what? per accidens okay.

[51:13] insofar as it follows upon something what, good, huh? Now the distinction between the per se and the per accidens, in a way, is even before the distinction of simply and secundum quid, right? And this appears in every desire. For the natural agent does not intend lack or corruption, but it intends a form to which is joined the lack of another form,

[51:49] and the generation of one which is the corruption of another, right? So, when the carpenter takes the wood, does he intend to what? To destroy, to destroy the the shape that's in the wood. No. He Intends to give it the shape of a chair or a table or something, which what involves the what elimination of the previous shape it had, huh? That kind of per accidens, right?

[52:21] He's not intending that as such; he's intending the chair or the table, okay? For the Leo, the lion, right, in killing the what? The what? Deer, deer, cervum. Intends food, to which is joined the killing of the what? Animal. Likewise, the fornicator. This is an example now from moral matter, right? The fornicator intends pleasure, to which is joined the deformity of guilt, huh?

[53:05] Now the bad which is joined to something good is the lack of another good, right? Never, therefore, is the bad desired except not even per accidens, unless the good to which is joined the bad, right, is more desired than the good which is what deprived through the bad, huh?

[53:36] But God, what wills no good. More than his own what goodness, but he wills nevertheless some good more than some other good, right? Whence the bad of what guilt? Did you say? Which deprives the order to the divine good? God in no way what wills,

[54:10] but the bad of a natural defect, right? Or the bad of punishment he wills, right? By willing some good to which is joined such a what bad. Just as in willing justice, he wishes what punishment, pain, and in willing the order of nature to be observed, he wishes some things to be naturally what corrupted, yeah.

[54:44] So does God, in that sense, will the suffering of the damned? What did you say? But does he will the suffering of the damned in the way he wills his justice or justice? Because he wills the justice, what? For itself. Yeah, yeah. But that cannot be without the suffering of the damned. He doesn't will the suffering or the pain. Yeah, such. Yeah. Okay. He doesn't will the the the death of the the deer, but he wills the what the dinner of the lion as such, right?

[55:33] He doesn't will the death of the martyrs. Yeah. but that's their pains and points. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Now, I reply to the first objection ground from Augustine there.

[55:55] Although those things which are what Bad, insofar as they are bad, Augustine said, are not good. Nevertheless, that not only the good, but also that to be bad things is good. Okay.

[56:12] To the first, therefore, it should be said that some say. I have a note here down to Hugo, of Saint Victor. So. Some say that although God does not will bad things, he wills nevertheless bad things to be or to come about. Because although bad things are not good, nevertheless it is good that bad things be or come to be. Which they say, therefore, because those things which in themselves are bad, right, are ordered to some good.

[56:54] Which order they believe to be implied in this that is said for bad things to be or to come about. But this is not rightly said, Thomas says, because the bad is not ordered to the good per se, as such, but per accidens. For it is outside the intention of the one sitting, and that from this there follows some good. Just as it is outside the intention of the tyrants that from their persecutions will stand out, be clarified, the patience of the what martyrs, right?

[57:39] And the same thing you say about the heretics, right? Now it's not from their heresy that they intend to build up the understanding of the faith, right? But that is the effect of it. And therefore, it is not able to be said that such an order to the good is implied through this that it is said that it is good for the bad to be or to come about.

[58:05] Because nothing is judged according to that which belongs to it per accidens, but according to that which belongs to it per se. This runs through. De Koninck used to say he could give you the whole history of modern philosophy by neglecting the distinction between the per se and the per accidens, and give you a method of inventing as many philosophies as you want, all which would be would be false, right?

[58:39] And Karl Marx says that man is perfected by making. Is that true per se? Because making is a perfecting of the what? The made per se. It's per accidens that that it's a perfecting of the what? Maker. Maker, right? It's insofar as he doesn't know how to make, and therefore he's not a maker, right? It's certainly not insofar as he's learning how to make by making that he's a maker, right?

[59:22] Because insofar as he's learning how to make, he's not really yet a maker. And the same thing about the teacher. Does teaching perfect the teacher or the student?

[59:35] Yeah, but every teacher might tell you that. Gee whiz, I learn something when I teach. Yeah, but insofar as the teacher is learning what he's teaching, he's not a what? Yeah, because insofar as he's learning, he doesn't know. I'm going to assume he's not a teacher because he doesn't know what he's teaching.

[59:56] It's accidental. It's very accidental to the teacher that he doesn't know what he's teaching. He's not a teacher at all. It's accidental to the teacher that you don't know what you're teaching. You're not a teacher at all. You don't know what you're teaching. How many of your colleagues down the years were manifestations? of that when I was at Laval, you know, you've been teaching the the physics of Aristotle, right, since the 1935, and he said he still sees something new every time he does this, right?

[1:00:36] In the same way, I find that with a great book like that now. In that sense, these books have to be read and reread. Now,

[1:00:49] that's even true about a great work of fiction, right? You know, like C. S. Lewis says, "What do you do if someone says, 'Oh, yeah, I read Homer, I read Shakespeare now. What else is there to read? '

[1:01:04] Okay. Now the second one, the objection here from Dionysius, right? The beauty universe requires the bad. To the second, it should be said that the bad does not work for the perfection and beauty universe except per accidens. Whence this that Dionysius says that the bad is what conferring to the perfection the universe. He concludes, leading in as if to something what unbefitting, right? As if he's arguing to, but an absurdity, right?

[1:01:52] It follows from this. Kind of surprising he says that. Now to the third, mala fieria and non fieris in contradictione opposita. But God does not wish bad things to not come about.

[1:02:20] Because then His will would be frustrated, right? They do come about. To the third, it should be said that although bad things to come about and bad things not to come about are opposed contradictorily, nevertheless to will bad things to come about and to will bad things not to become are not opposed what contradictorily, since both are what affirmative. God therefore neither wills that bad things come to be, nor does He will bad things to not come to be.

[1:03:02] But He wills to permit bad things to come about, right? And this is what good, right? Okay. So God does He want me to sin? Does He will for me to sin? No, that would obviously be bad, right? But does He will that I do not sin?

[1:03:24] If God's will is that I should never sin, then I never would sin, right? Maybe that's true about Christ, not human nature, right? So he he wills to allow me to sin, right? But why does he will to allow that sin, right?

[1:03:48] Because obviously he has to take away free will and so on, right? Okay. So he may allow sin and evils because of greater goods, right?

[1:04:03] Okay, so let's see Up to Article 10 next time. huh? Yeah, we were really flying through. Yeah, but if you understood anything. that's another question.