Prima Pars
80. Summa I, Q.19, Arts. 10-12: God's Free Choice and the Will of the Sign (Command, Counsel, Prohibition, Operation, Permission)
Class of 2007-04-26
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/080-summa-i-q-19-arts-10-12-gods-free-choice-and-the-will-of/

[0:00] Son of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us and help us to understand all that you have written. Name of the Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. So, in Question 19, Article 10, today,

[0:29] to the tenth, one proceeds. Thus, it seems that God does not have free judgment. That's kind of interesting. Instead of saying what free choice in Latin, you have liberum arbitrium, which means free what judgment actually. And when you go back to the our freedom, it's really based on the fact that our reason can what judge things in an infinity of different ways. And so it goes back to liberum arbitrium that you have freedom in the will.

[1:08] Okay, to this Jerome says in his homily about the prodigal son that God alone is the one in whom no sin falls, nor is able to fall. But the others who are of liberum arbitrium are able to bend in either side to good or to bad. So there, Jerome seems to be denying, you know, that God has free will and saying that belongs to the rest of us, right?

[1:44] Moreover, free judgment is a faculty of reason and will by which the good and the bad is chosen. But God does not wish anything bad, as has been said. Therefore, free judgment is not in God. He can't judge the bad to be good or the good to be bad. So sin doesn't have free judgment, right?

[2:10] But against this is what Ambrose says in the book on faith that the Holy Spirit divides to each one as He wills. That is, and then you have the liberi voluntatis for the free judgment of the will, not by the what service of necessity.

[2:31] Now Thomas, in the body of the article, says this goes back to what we saw before: that God necessarily wills Himself, right, in His own goodness. But He wills us if He does, as what means to His own goodness, and since His own goodness in no way depends upon us, He's free to will us or not.

[3:00] So he says, I answer. It should be said that free will or free judgment we have with respect to those things which we do not necessarily will, to those things we don't will by a natural instinct. Like, for example, I naturally will to be what happy, right? And I can't will to be miserable. Well, we sometimes say that you want to be miserable.

[3:30] For there is no free judgment or free will. It doesn't pertain to free will that we want to be or we will to be what happy, right?

[3:44] But it belongs to a natural what instinct. Whence also other animals, which are moved to doing something by natural instinct, are not said to be moved by free judgment. They don't have this free judgment that we have.

[4:07] Since, therefore, God of necessity wills his own goodness, and we saw that in a previous article, a earlier article. But other things he does not will of necessity, as has been shown above. With respect to those things which he does not will from necessity, he has free judgment or free choice, we could say, right?

[4:31] So he chose us in himself before he created the world. And so you should thank him for that choice he made that you should be. It wasn't because you were more willing to be; you weren't willing at all, or because you more deserved to be than these countless other people could have been. But he freely chose you. Thank you.

[5:00] I guess you know. I remember one time studying the word thanks and the word thinking, I guess they are related etymologically. So if you think, you'll be thankful for it. I mean, the time goes together. One of those connections you have in English. English is kind of good in some ways, you know. Like the English word liking. When we take up love, one of the causes of liking or loving is likeness.

[5:29] So I could say I like you because you're like me. And then you see the two senses of that, right? Or the English word when you take up wanting, this is something we'll come back to. There's no wanting in God, strictly speaking, because want implies that you don't have what you want. And in English, the word "want" is sometimes used to mean not desire. But you're lacking, as in Shakespeare says, you know, by a beast that wants to discourse of reason would have mourned longer in Hamlet, right?

[6:08] What does the word "wants" mean there? Not that the beast wants to discourse of reason, yeah, but because he lacks the discourse of reason. Therefore,

[6:24] that two meanings of the word "want" in English are connected. You desire something that you lack. You want something that you you're wanting it. See, and the same with likeness, and to some extent, you know, think and think for it. Yes, sir. If I remember correctly. Chesterton makes that connection between think and think explicitly. I don't think he doesn't explain it, but years ago I was kind of interested and I was kind of checking up, and it's a logical thing.

[6:53] It's not just coincidence that they're related the two words in origin. So sometimes English has a particular, you know, likeness or goodness. Go back to the first book of natural hearing, Physics. There, matter is said to desire what form, right? But the lack of form doesn't desire form. But when you say matter wants form, you're implying that matter also is what lacking in form. Very excellent those words.

[7:31] Monsignor Dion used to say, sometimes the word in one language is better than in another language for the same thing, you know. And so sometimes you have to choose, you know, the language that has the the good word. Now, to the first, this is the reply to the objection drawn from the authority of the great Saint Jerome, one of the, of course, one of the four great doctors of the East-Western Church.

[7:59] Yeah. In Latin, though it's Hieronymus, that's the way it looks like. To the first, it should be said that Jerome seems to exclude from God liberum arbitrium, not simply, but only as regards what the possibility of being

[8:22] deflected to sin. Okay. To the second one, it should be said that the evil of guilt is said by turning away from the divine goodness, through which God wills all things, as has been shown above. Is manifest that it is impossible for Him to wish what the evil of guilt.

[8:57] But nevertheless, he has himself two opposites. In so far as is able to will this to be or not to be, so God could will that you are or that you not be. Right. So you should be thankful that it's what he willed.

[9:17] Just as we, not in sitting, are able to will to sit and to will not to sit, or not will to sit. Okay. So that's nothing particularly new, because it goes back to what we saw about necessity, right? And what things God wills of necessity, and what things He doesn't, right?

[9:42] So He necessarily wills His own goodness, and He wills other things only in willing His own goodness. But these other things are not necessary for God's goodness, and therefore He has what freedom with respect to choosing you to be or not to be in the whole creation, right? Okay, now we come to the last two articles, which are dealing with whatever this means—the will of the sign, huh?

[10:19] Okay. And in the first article, he's asking whether you should speak in such a way at all, right? And then the second one, having determined that you're good, he divides, the will of the sign. Okay, Now,

[10:40] maybe the best way to lead into this is to take, like he does in the body, the first article. Take the Our Father, right, which we're all familiar with, and the third petition in the Our Father is thy will be done, right? Now, what does the word will mean there? Does it mean the divine will that we've been talking about up to this point? Can God's will be done by us?

[11:13] God's will is God, right? And God is unchangeable, unchangeable, immovable, right? So it's not God's will that's going to be done. So what is that way of speaking then? Evil.

[11:35] No, no. If God's will be done, what does that mean? It means to what? To do what is good, okay? It means to do what God wills that you do, right? Okay. So it's not God's will that is being done, but what God wills that is being done, and that is called will. And Thomas says that's kind of like speaking metaphorically. Okay. It's a sign of his will, right?

[12:05] even when our Lord says in the garden, there, not my will but thine be done, right? What does that mean? Is the will itself of God going to be done? Going to be done to it? With it? No. But what God wills,

[12:26] Christ wants to will, right? It does will, right? Okay. So you do have to have some kind of distinction there, right? Between using the word will to mean the will of God, and then to mean something other than the will of God, which is in some way an object, maybe the divine will, and is in some way a sign of that what will, right? Yeah. Would that be analogous to distinguishing between our own faculty of will in us and the object that we will?

[13:02] Yeah, yeah. But say we may speak the way about a human being too, right? To do my will, right? Do your parents' will? But you're not really doing your parents' will. You're doing what they will. But we speak of it this way, don't we? Okay. To the eleventh, it proceeds. One proceeds thus. It seems that one ought not to distinguish in God the will of the sign, right?

[13:32] Okay. Now, you know, Thomas is going to take the opposite side, right? He always argues against his position first. For as the will of God is the cause of things, so is the knowledge of God. But there are not assigned any signs on the side of the divine knowledge. Therefore, neither ought there to be assigned any signs on the side of the divine what will.

[14:13] Second argument. Moreover, every sign that does not agree with that which is assigned is false. If therefore the signs which are assigned about the divine will do not conform to the divine will, they are false. If, however, they accord with it, they are superfluously assigned. Well, ought not therefore to not to be assigned therefore or designated some signs about his will.

[14:52] But now the objection. But against this is that the will of God is one, since it is the very divine essence, as we saw before. But sometimes is signified, in plural, as it is said in Psalm 1: 10. Great are the works of the Lord, exquisite in all their wills.

[15:19] Therefore, it is necessary that sometimes a sign of the will be taken for the will. Okay. Now Thomas says, "I answer it should be said that in God some things are said properly and some things according to a metaphor, as is clear from the things said before. That's why it was important that he had the tenth article was it where the metaphors are appropriate in Scripture.

[15:51] Now, stop for a moment. The word metaphor. There. What is the etymology of the word metaphor? Bring over, carry over. Fora is carry and meta is over, right? And actually, it has exactly the same etymology as the word translation. Okay.

[16:23] Now we've taken over the word metaphor from Greek and the word translation from Latin, right? Now, though they have exactly the same etymology, and therefore could be kind of equivalent in English, we use the word translation not for carrying over the word, but carrying over the meaning. So I take homo and I translate it by man. I I don't carry the word homo over into English, but I give a word that has the same meaning, right?

[16:59] While in the case of metaphor, you actually carry over the word, right? So you say you rat, okay, or sweet, huh? Okay. So I say the girl is sweet, or we say God is sweet, huh? Taste and see how sweet is the Lord. So sweet there, which first names something to taste, right? Is carried over to what? Yeah, yeah. So the meaning is not carried over; doesn't mean the same thing.

[17:33] We say God is sweet; it's not, it's not really. I can't be sweet, right? But you carried the word over, right? And there is some connection between the two. In the case of metaphor, it's usually by likeness, huh? But you can also carry a word over by some result or effect of it, huh? And so sometimes God is said to be angry, right? Now is there any anger in God, properly speaking?

[18:02] No, no. Um. But the man who is angry punishes somebody, right? And so when God punishes someone, he's metaphorically said to be angry with them, right, huh? Okay. So.

[18:29] So he says, when however some passions, some emotions, right, human emotions, are taken metaphorically instead of God, huh, to the divine predication, this comes about by likeness of effects. Whence that which is a sign of such a passion in us, right? In God, by the name of that passion is metaphorically signified, as with us, huh? Those who are angry are accustomed to punish. Whence that punishing is a sign of what?

[19:09] Anger. And account of this, this punishing is signified by the name of anger, which is then attributed to what God. Likewise, that which is a custom in us to be a sign of will is sometimes metaphorically in God said to be what will. Just as when someone commands something, right, it is a sign that he he wants that to come about.

[19:47] Whence the divine precept is sometimes metaphorically called the will of God. And as in the prayer, this is from the. what. Sermon on the Mount, eh The Our Father appears in which Gospels? Luke Matthew Luke Yeah, but not in Mark or John, right? And it's more complete in Matthew than in Luke. Because in Luke, there is five petitions, but in Matthew, you get all the seven petitions that memorized as a child.

[20:24] But it appears actually in the Sermon on the Mount, which is in chapters something like four, five, and six there in Matthew. Okay, but there is this distance between will and anger, right? Because anger is never said properly of God,

[20:51] since in its chief meaning is included a passion, an emotion, undergoing. But will is sometimes said properly of God, right? And therefore, in God, one distinguishes between the will properly and metaphorically said. The will properly said is called the will of bene placiti? What pleases one, but the will metaphorically is said is a what? The voluntas signi signi, the will of the sign, in that the sign of the will is called the what?

[21:31] Will. Okay. That's a little unusual way of speaking, but apparently you find it in Scripture and you find it in the Church Fathers, and Thomas takes it up here. Now the first objection was saying, "Why don't we speak this way of God's knowledge? " Because that's also a cause of things. He says to the first, therefore it should be said that knowledge is not a cause of those things which come to be except through the will.

[22:03] Now, why is it that the knowledge can't cause anything without the will? Why can't it just be a natural result of knowledge? Yeah, but there's a there's a reason that we gave before, in terms of how reason and will, how knowledge and love are the exact opposites. Not

[22:34] the truth is in us, but goodness is in things. Yeah, and tied up with that is that there's the same knowledge of what opposites, right? Because knowledge is perfected in the knower, and knowing one opposite helps you know the other. So when I teach ethics, my knowing what virtue is helps me to know vice is, and even knowing vice in a sense helps you know what virtue is, right?

[23:04] Um. Or like in King Lear, right? King Lear has three daughters, right? And two are what bad, Goneril and Regan, and one is what good, Cordelia, right? And so the goodness of Cordelia stands out all the more by contrast with the evil of Regan and Goneril, right? And vice versa.

[23:31] In the same way, the father in there has got two sons, and one is good and one is bad, right? One turns against his father, and one is quite faithful, right? So one opposite helps you to see the other opposite better, like black and white. And

[23:52] but is it the same love of opposites? No. So that's an amazing thing, right? Knowledge of virtue helps you to know what vice is,

[24:05] and you can't really know one without knowing the other. But the love of one impedes the love of the other one. So the love of virtue prevents you from loving vice, and loving vice prevents you from loving virtue, yeah.

[24:25] So knowledge, as such, is open to good and bad. I told you about that student when I was first teaching in California, and he said, "What you guys shouldn't be teaching ethics, right?" I said, "Why not?" Well, he says it's the same knowledge of good and bad. So the student learns about the bad as well as about the good. He learns how to be bad as well as how to be good from you guys, and since they're inclined to be bad, they're making it worse.

[25:01] That was the most reasonable objection to teaching ethics that I had ever heard. Although you could say, you know, that the goodness of virtue will shine all the more by seeing the badness of vice, right?

[25:19] So since knowledge enables you to do the good or the bad, to do opposites, you can't do something automatically from knowledge, because then you'd be doing opposites at the same time. So that you do one rather than the other depends upon what the will, see, and the will determines one rather than the other and excludes the other, right?

[25:45] So he's going back to that difference there, right? Knowledge is not a cause of those things which come about except through the will, for we do not make the things we know unless we will to do so, and therefore a sign taken from the effect is not attributed to knowledge as it's attributed to the will. Knowledge extends to both, right? And but the will determines it to one, and so when that one is produced, that it's a sign of will rather than of knowledge, right?

[26:22] Okay. Okay. The second objection is talking about the sign conforming to the will, and if it does, it's it's the it's superfluous. If it doesn't, it's false.

[26:43] To the second, it should be said that the signs of the will are called divine wills, not because they are signs that what God wills, but because those things which in us are but customarily signs of willing are called in God the what divine wills. Just as punishment is not a sign that in God there is anger, but punishment from the fact that in us it's a sign of anger in God is called what?

[27:17] Yeah, that's kind of a subtle thing he's got there. In Article Twelve, he's going to divide this once it's established in general. Now that they can speak this way,

[27:30] so he says to the twelfth one proceeds. Thus, it seems unsuitably. That there are placed five signs about the divine will, huh? I should go up there and be worried about five, right? Yeah, prohibition, precept or command, counsel, right? Operation and what? Permission to use the Latin words here.

[28:05] For those things which God commands us, right? Or counsels us. In us sometimes are what done. And those things which He prohibits, sometimes He permits. Therefore, they ought not to be divided one against the other.

[28:35] Moreover, God does nothing without willing it, huh? As is said in the Book of Wisdom, chapter eleven. But the will of the sign is distinguished from the will of. Yeah, complacence Therefore, operation or doing ought not to be comprehended under the will of the sign.

[29:03] Third objection. Now this gets more to how we're going to divide the five, right? Moreover, operation and permission pertain commonly to all creatures. Because in all of them God does something, and in all of them He permits something to come to be. But command, counsel, and prohibition pertain only to the rational creature. Therefore, they do not come suitably in one division, since they are not of one what order.

[29:45] That's reason for separating the two, I guess. Moreover, the bad happens in many ways. Than the good. There's only one way to hit the bullseye, as they say. Many ways to miss, above, below, so on. Because the good happens in one way, but the bad in all kinds of ways, huh? As is clear through the philosopher in the second book of the Ethics, and through Dionysius in the fourth chapter about the divine names.

[30:21] Therefore, it's unsuitable that with respect to the bad is assigned one sign only, prohibition. But with respect to the good, two signs: counsel and command.

[30:38] I answer. It should be said that these signs of the will are said by which we are accustomed to demonstrate us to will something.

[30:53] Now, one can declare himself to will something either through himself or through what another. Through himself, in so far as he does something, either directly or indirectly, and by happening, per accidens. Directly, when he does something by itself, and in regard to this, there is said to be the sign of operation or doing.

[31:24] Indirectly, however, in so far as he does not impede an operation, for the removens prohibens, the one removing the thing preventing it, is said to be a mover, per accidens as is said in the eighth book of natural, hearing, the eighth book of physics. So when Samson there pushed the pillar and the thing came down, right? He's is he causing the roof to come down? Peractidens would say, right?

[31:58] He's removens prohibens, removing the pillar that holds up the roof, right? Okay. So he says that's a distinction between operation and permission. That's what you're doing yourself, right? Or what you're,

[32:20] yeah, you're doing directly, and as such, and what you're doing indirectly, yeah. Okay. But through another, one declares himself to will something, in so far as he orders the other one to doing something, right?

[32:44] Either by a necessary induction, which comes about by commanding what someone what he wishes, and prohibiting the what contrary, or by some persuasoria induction,

[33:05] which pertains to what counsel. So what does Saint Paul says? You know, something says I have no command here, but I have a counsel, right? Okay. So the church is picked up in that words, right? And when the young man comes to Christ and says, "What must I do to be saved?" and Christ starts to enumerate the commands, huh? and then he says, "Well, I've done all that."

[33:30] You know, and then he says, "Of course, sell everything you've got and come follow me," right? But he's not saying there's a necessity to be saved, right? But he's counseling him, right? This is the better way. So he says, "Persuasoria inductione."

[33:48] I was interested in the words of Thomas there, right? There's induction, an introduction, an inducement, right? They all have the idea of something that's not forcing you, right? So an induction is an argument. Does a conclusion follow necessarily?

[34:13] I cut up one hundred frogs, and they all have a three-chambered heart, and I conclude that all frogs have a three-chambered heart. I think that's correct. But do I know necessarily so? No. If I lived in darkest Africa, I might, by induction, say that all men are black, right?

[34:34] All right, some might say by induction that no man is pink or green. I'd say, right? But if someone finds green men on Mars, I'd be surprised, but and I didn't really know for sure, right? That there's no green men, right? But it's probable.

[34:53] Inducement, huh? What's an inducement? Inducement force you to do something. I want you to buy this car I'm trying to sell, you know. And you're kind of hesitating. You say, "Well, no, I hope." Throw in a, you know, no charge, a four new tires. Or we'll change your oil, you know. Get on the radio, change your oil, you know, for the duration of the car, right, for free, you know.

[35:23] Well, this is going to kind of incline me, but not force me to buy your your car, right? Okay. So often people would do that to throw a little inducement. And the word persuasion comes from what? The word sweet, huh? Yeah. Okay. It's sweeten the deal, you know, make it even more. Yeah, it's very sweet, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.

[35:53] The book I had about how to give a cat a pill. It's very hard to do, you know. They say you make these little meatballs, and you put the pill in one little meatball, you know, the little tiny ones, you know, cat-sized meatball. You toss them. Are you afraid to toss the one that's got the pill in it? Down it goes.

[36:16] No, I can't. No, I can't. Yeah. He's going to force it. So no, so Thomas does that. He divides the five into what? Two and three, right? He divides it into two, and then one into two, and one into three. So he's not violating the rule of two or three, is he?

[36:53] Because therefore, in these ways, he's declared someone to will something, right? Either what he does himself, right, or someone else, right? He tries it. On account of this, these five names sometimes are named sometimes by the name of divine will, as were signs of the what will.

[37:22] Now that command, counsel, prohibition are sometimes called will of God. It is clear through that which is said in Matthew chapter six. join verse ten. That will be done, as in heaven, so also on earth, right?

[37:45] So he says that's referring to those three, right? So honor your father and mother, and don't kill your neighbor, right? But also he puts counsel to that, right? It's interesting.

[38:06] So God, in a sense, Christ there wants the young man to what, sell everything and come follow him, but he's not quite up to it. Okay, it's not good enough to him. Yes, to be to be to a twelfth or something.

[38:25] But that permission or operation now, right? The other two are called the will of God. Is clear to Augustine, who says the ingredient that nothing comes about unless the omnipotent one wills it, right? Either by doing it or by allowing it to come about. Okay, sinendo with fiat. Okay,

[38:54] that's that's the fundamental explanation. Or it can be said that permission and operation refer to the present permission to the bad, right? Operation to the good, but to the future, what prohibition with respect to the bad, with respect to the necessary good, the precept or command, with respect to the what superabundant good, counsel, right? Okay, so the church distinguishes usually what three counsels, right? Okay, and they refer to what?

[39:31] Yeah, yeah. But it goes back, you know, to Socrates' division, right? The Greek philosophers, right? The exterior goods, the goods of the body, the goods of the soul, right? So by the vow of poverty, you are giving up the exterior goods. Chastity, the good of the body, and then by obedience, your will, right? Okay.

[39:57] That's why Thomas sometimes explains the articles of faith about Christ. It was like in the Te Deum, there, right? He became man, right, through Mary, right? And he intended to die on the cross, and as the Te Deum says, after he died on the cross, then he opened the gates of hell, right? But by what? By his descent into hell, by his resurrection, and by his what?

[40:24] Ascension, right? And Thomas ties it up with the three goods, right? Because when he ascended into hell, he what? He gave vision to the what? Prophets there. Resurrection most openly is the body, right? And ascension is the proper place. That's exterior good. So he divides according to the three goods of man. Okay.

[40:53] So you have the council taken up with those three, right? Do you remember that in the Psalm eight there, when he attributes the son of man there, and he says that he rules over the what the beasts and the birds and the fishes, and he takes you know the the sheep and the oxen as the good, right? The small ones and the big ones in the church, right?

[41:20] And then the the bad, right? How does he divide those according to what Saint John says? All through the world is the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, or the pride of life. So the birds are the proud ones, right? And you can see that way Shakespeare does that in the in the Henry plays, right? You know the proud men, you know, watching their birds, you know, one's trying to get above the other one, you know.

[41:44] And so on. It's reflection of it there. And the fish, like the money, right, Because of the importance of the sea for trade and so on. And of course, the beasts are the ones who are into the lust of the flesh, right? So divisions into three there, right? Okay.

[42:16] Now the first objection was saying, well, these things seem to overlap sometimes. The first, therefore, should be said that nothing prevents about the same thing.

[42:31] For someone to in diverse ways to declare it it will something, just as there are found many names signifying the what same thing. Whence nothing prevents the same thing from what being subject to command and counsel, right? In operation and prohibition or what permission.

[43:00] The second objection says God does nothing except willing it, but the will of the sign is distinguished from the will of the what complacence. Therefore, operation ought not to be comprehended under the will of the sign. And Thomas says to the second, it should be said that just as God is able to what

[43:30] to be signified metaphorically to will that which he does not what will by will properly taken. So is able metaphorically to signify, willing that which he properly wills, and whence nothing prevents about the same thing for there to be the will of bene placite, right, and the will of the sign. Just under the example of anger, right? You know, we can speak of God's justice, and then we're speaking properly.

[44:01] We speak of God's anger, and then we're speaking of what? Yeah, but the same thing, right? Whence nothing prevents about the same there being a will of complacence and the will of the sign, but operation is always what, the same with the will of what Complacence. Not however, command or counsel, because this is about the present and that about the what future, and because this is per se an effect of the will, that through another, right, that you're commanding.

[44:51] Now the third objection is interesting because he's saying, well, some of these seem to pertain to all creatures and some only to what, The rational creatures, huh?

[45:04] Says to the third, therefore it should be said that the rational creature is the lord of his own what act, and therefore about him there are signs, special signs, the divine will.

[45:22] In so far as God orders or directs the rational creature to doing voluntarily things, right, and through himself, but other creatures do not act except as moved from the divine doing, and therefore about other things there's no room except for what, operation and permission.

[45:50] Now the fourth objection here about bad taking place in many ways and so on. To the fourth, it should be said that every evil of guilt, although it happens in many ways, nevertheless they all come together in so far as they are what discordant from the divine will, and therefore one sign with respect to bad things is the sign, namely prohibition. But the good things have themselves in diverse ways to the divine goodness, because some things there are without which, what, the enjoyment of the divine goodness we cannot attain that.

[46:37] In respect of these is precept, right? So, what does Saint Paul says? The man who marries off his daughters, he does a good thing, right? The man who puts him in the convent, he has even better thing.

[46:53] But some things there are, which by which we more perfectly, right, attain the divine goodness These is what Counsel right? In a sense the counsels are removing the impediments to the perfection of charity, right? And St. Alphonsus would say, or the Doctor of Divine Love would say, right? Saint Francis de Sales, perfection consists in charity, right? See, but the counsels are removing impediments to the perfection of charity.

[47:39] Or it could be said that counsel is not only about what, but also about avoiding the lesser evils, huh? Okay. Saint Francis de Sales makes the point about cultivating the little virtues, yeah. And I always like to say that so will avoid the little vices. Yeah. As one one of the very famous priests years ago at Assumption,

[48:04] you know, days, you know, you eat between meals. Well, I don't know if that excludes you from heaven eating between meals, but it's de minoribus malis vitandis right?

[48:24] Yeah. My brother Richard used to say to me when I was little, you know, I was eating his candy, you know. He says, "What do you want that candy for?" I said, "there's nothing wrong with eating candy, is there? I says, "If you can't say no to the things that are okay, you'll never say no to the things that are not okay." It's a good good advice, I think.

[48:46] Yeah. Okay, should we take our break between that and the next question? You know.