Prima Pars
81. The Eleven Emotions and Summa I, Q.20, Art. 1: Is There Love in God?
Class of 2007-04-26
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/081-the-eleven-emotions-and-summa-i-q-20-art-1-is-there-love/

[0:00] Okay, just get a little bit here from the Summa Contra Gentiles When you get in the in the Prima Secundae of the Summa here, the distinction of the emotions and the names of the emotions,

[0:18] and Thomas following Aristotle and Plato and so on will distinguish about eleven different emotions. They can subdivide some of these, but it's basically eleven different emotions. But they're divided into two groups, huh? One group is called in Greek Epithumia

[0:47] but in Latin they call it the concupiscible appetite, right? Naming it from this wanting or sense desire. The other group is called in Greek Thumos, it's an o and s there,

[1:06] and in the Latin they'll call it the irascible appetite, naming it from one of the passions or emotions that stands out, anyway. Now, what is the basis for distinction between these two groups of emotions?

[1:28] Well, the concupiscible appetite arises from what is agreeable or disagreeable to the senses. So, if something is agreeable to the senses, then you like it or love it, huh?

[1:49] Now, if you don't have what you like or love, like you don't have any candy, then you want some candy, right? But if you get what you like or love, you get some candy. Now you have joy or pleasure, right?

[2:09] Well, one of my grandsons was saying, "what great days was," and my wife said, "Why? Oh, the jelly beans." Okay. So liking or loving is the fundamental emotion there, right? And it gives rise to wanting or desire in the absence of the good that you like, and to joy or pleasure in the possession of the good that you like or love. Now there are three other emotions, huh?

[2:47] When something is what bad, huh, in the sense of painful or disagreeable to the senses. So I hate salmon. Okay. Now I try to avoid it. I turn away from it, right? If I'm forced to eat it, I'm sad and gloomy, right, at the table.

[3:16] Find something fishy about fish. Sometimes, okay. So there's six different emotions in the concupiscible appetite. Now, if there was no difficulty ever in getting what is pleasing to the senses, or in avoiding what is painful or disagreeable to the senses, or in getting rid of something that causes pain to the senses, then the concupiscible emotions would be all the animal would have.

[3:55] But sometimes, when you want something good, it's hard to get, right? And then there are two emotions that can arise, right? If you think you can overcome the difficulties of getting what you want, right? Then wanting gives rise to hope. If you think you cannot, then it gives rise to despair, right?

[4:28] So hope and despair are concerned with a difficulty about getting what you want and whether you can overcome that or not. Now aversion, which is turning away, don't we have a good concrete word in English? But just take the Latin word, turning away. Sometimes you think you can. There's no problem, right? If I step on an ant in the house here and I step on it, but no big deal, huh?

[5:01] But sometimes, you know, I have a bully there or something. Some things want to avoid, but it's difficult to avoid. Then they can arise fear if you think you may not be able to avoid it, or boldness if you think you can what? Overcome it, right? Then, okay. So fear and boldness arise from aversion when there's a difficulty in avoiding what you're turning away from, and hope and despair arise from wanting when there's a difficulty in getting what you.

[5:37] want. Now, anger arises from what? Sadness, huh? When you think you can get rid of what is causing the sadness, but it's some difficult to get rid of, right? So if you're stepping on my shoes and I say, "Do you know you're stepping on my foot?" and you say, "So what?" Right? Probably causes some anger, right? Get you off my my foot, right? But if you don't think you do anything about it, just maybe you have more fear, okay?

[6:16] But nothing in your irascible emotions will arise from joy, because joy or pleasure, you're satisfied, right? Okay. So these are the eleven what emotions, right? Now you can distinguish each of these emotions sometimes, but they're objects, right? Okay.

[6:38] Like melancholy, loneliness, right? Envy, right? All different kinds of sadness, but the basic distinction is into these eleven emotions. Now this distinction of the emotions is important for obviously understanding yourself and other people, right? And understanding even the animals, right?

[7:03] It's very important for what understanding fiction, right? Aristotle says a tragedy what purges pity and fear, right? Pity being a form of sadness, right? And fear and comedy, right? Purges what joy and hope, okay? Um, it's very important for understanding music, and in classical music, the major keys are used more for love, wanting, and joy, and hope and boldness, right? While the minor keys are used for hate and aversion and sadness, and for fear and for despair and for anger.

[8:12] So Mozart represents anger in the C minor piano concerto and the D minor piano concerto, right? In the minor key. And sometimes Mozart will develop the concerto hope returning to despair, and the melody will come back, but in the minor key now.

[8:33] And you know fear, right? Represented often in D minor and the Don Giovanni and so on. This is also very important for rhetoric, right? Because Aristotle mentions how people are persuaded by emotional appeals and so on. So he talks about a number of these emotions that are important in the courtroom and so on, and how to arouse those emotions and how to calm them down, right? And so, if I'm feeling anger or hatred towards the man who's on trial, I'm more apt to find him guilty.

[9:14] I'm more apt to punish him more than I would if I feel pity for him and I like the guy, and so on. I might overlook what he's done or leave and give him a lesser penalty. So these have got a lot of things. Now they're also very important in ethics because a number of the virtues

[9:39] are concerned with these emotions, right? So the first virtue you take up in ethics is courage, right? And courage is concerned with fear and boldness, right? Then you take up temperance or moderation. That's concerned with what is pleasing to the senses, and

[9:59] then you take up Magnanimity, right, which is concerned with hope, and then mildness, or meekness. but mildness is very better huh That Christ has learned me, from a meek and humble heart, that's concerned with anger, right? Mildness, huh? So you can see that to understand these emotions is useful for understanding music, right? For understanding what fiction, right? For for rhetoric, right? And so on for for ethics, right?

[10:32] You have to know that in order to understand what some of the virtues are about. Patience is more concerned with sadness and things of that sort, huh? Moderating those things. Now, Thomas, in the

[10:51] first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, before he talks about the love of God, he mentions how the names of some emotions are carried over, right? The words themselves and applied to the acts of the will,

[11:11] and you can distinguish in the emotions a bodily aspect, right? And there's no body in the will. The will is not a body, and that's dropped out when you carry the word over, right? But then there's a formal aspect, right?

[11:32] There's an object and or a way of having an object, and so on, and that can be carried over to the will, right? So as a Christian, you've heard of fear of the Lord, and you've heard of theological virtue of hope, for example, right? You speak of charity as being a kind of love, and so on, right? Well, these are not emotions, but the name of an emotion has been carried over, but part of the meaning is dropped out, namely the bodily aspect of it, the the passion aspect of it, the bodily change goes on, right?

[12:12] Thump thump thump for fear, and so on, right? But still, the will will turn away from some things, right? That are difficult to avoid, right? Okay.

[12:27] So then Thomas will do a third thing there in the Summa Contra Gentiles, and he'll say, now, can any of these eleven names be carried over to God, properly speaking? Some like anger are carried over metaphorically, but can any be carried over properly to the divine will? And he says, well, some of them cannot at all, because they have what?

[12:59] An object that is something bad, right? And nothing bad can happen to God, right? So these emotions like hate, diversion, sadness, cannot be found in God,

[13:14] except perhaps metaphorically, right? Let's say that properly. Ah, some like wanting, although their object is something good, but it's a good that you lack. Well, God is all good, so there can't be any wanting in God, properly, right? But God possesses all good, so it makes sense of joy in God, gaudium, in Latin,

[13:49] and there's joy over something you love, and love can be had for something when you have it, and not just like wanting you don't have it. Okay. That's why it's appropriate the philosopher is called a lover of wisdom, right? Because that doesn't say whether you have wisdom or don't have it, right? You can love wisdom either case, but as you start to acquire some wisdom, you love it even more.

[14:15] So Thomas says of these six names, of the six passions or emotions in the, um, in our, sensitive appetite, only two can be carried over properly to God, and when they're carried over of course, they drop out any bodily, changeable aspect, just keep the formal aspect. Okay.

[14:44] Of course, nothing's difficult for God, right? So do any of the other ones come in for God? Anything bad that God has a hard time avoiding.

[15:01] So, some of these could hardly be said of even metaphorically, fear, right? Okay, or despair. But again, these are for ones that are the future you don't have yet, right? So they can't apply to God. And anger, for many reasons, right? Anger rises from sadness, but there's no sadness in God. There can't be anger in God, except metaphorically speaking, as Thomas says in the end. So he concludes that only two of the names can be carried over, right?

[15:36] And in the Summa Contra Gentiles in the first book, he first shows that there's joy in God, and then he argues from that as well as some other ways there must be love in God, right? Well, all that is not here, right? In this part, although he does take up these loving emotions in the prima secundae, because it's appropriate. and it's going into the virtues and the emotions which are involved in the virtues and so on.

[16:04] So he takes them up there, right? He doesn't go through this. He doesn't assume Contra Gentiles. And I notice now he's going to take up the love of God, but he doesn't really have a question on the joy of God, right? So there's no things in one be assumed as is that in the other, right?

[16:28] Okay. Then we ought to consider about those things which absolutely pertain to. The will of God. Now, in the desiring part of the soul, are found in us both the passions of the soul, and he mentions now Gaudium right? Gaudium amor et huius modi, and he perhaps mentions Gaudium amor because he's thinking about God and the omnipotent. And the habits of the moral virtues, right? As justitia fortitudo et huius modi, but Aristotle will say in the Ethics, fortitude is about the emotions of fear and boldness, and don't aren't found in God.

[17:17] So fortitude be said of God maybe only metaphorically, but justice is in the will and is about the acts of the will and so on. And so justice could be said properly in God.

[17:35] Again, Thomas in Summa Contra Gentiles is more expansive at this point because he'll recall the virtues of the Nicomachean Ethics, and which ones can be carried over and applied to God, right? But the ones Thomas is emphasizing here are justice, right, and misericordia, right. Now, misericordia is kind of interesting word because there, I don't think it's going to be said properly of God. It originally comes from a metaphor, right?

[18:04] Because misericordia is the Latin word for what? Pity, right? Originally, and therefore the word for what? Kind of sadness right? And so, you already had the Latin word. I mean, the Greek word for this, Kyrie eleison right? Kyrie eleison We go back to the Greek word for pity, okay? But again, it's not an emotion of God; it's an act of the will. He is willing to relieve our what misery?

[18:36] Okay. Not as having a feeling or emotion about our our misery, huh? So he's going to consider in this question twenty, huh, the love of God, right? And then question twenty-one, both the what justice of God and the mercy of God, huh? This is a little more particular and a little more pleasant to read now than the the question of the will of God, right?

[19:12] So, about the first, he says the love of God, four things are sought, right? First, whither in God there be love. And it's interesting to use the word amor, right, which is originally taken more from the emotion, right.

[19:37] Rather than the more intellectual word dilectio, right, which I translate sometimes as a chosen love, right, because it's taken from the word choice. So, whether in God there be love, right, and then whether God loves all things,

[19:58] and third, whether He loves one thing more than another, and whether He loves more the better things. Okay, this is very interesting to talk about the love of God.

[20:16] Thomas always starts on the wrong side. My my old teacher, Kasurik, used to joke a little bit about how they recognize your soul the next world when you don't have your body there, right, before the resurrection, right? He says, "Well, some guys, you know, their thinking is always messed up before he gets straightened out. That's how I recognize you you see.

[20:44] Or Thomas's soul maybe before the resurrection, you know. See this guy, he always thinks the opposite of what he thinks, and objects to what he thinks is the truth, right? Before he gets into the things, that's how I recognize Thomas.

[21:02] What you see in the in the Summa Theologiae, though, is an abbreviation of the quaestiones disputatae, because you take the quaestiones disputatae that come down to us of St. Thomas, there might be in an article ten or fifteen objections on one side, and maybe five or ten objections on the other side. Why here you have it kind of condensed to usually about three objections on the side that's you know against the truth, right, and then just kind of a sed contra very briefly using authority, right, the other side.

[21:36] So it's sort of for beginners, right? Kind of a little a little dialectic, right? But it's Plato who taught us this in the well, the Meno and the dialogues, right? Aristotle, the father of logic, teaches it in logic.

[21:58] To the first one proceeds thus: It seems that love is not in God, right? That's the first objection. For no passion, in English we call that an emotion, right, or undergoing, or a feeling, sometimes, right? But maybe emotion is the best word. For there is no passion, no emotion in God, no feelings,

[22:29] but love is a what? Yeah. Therefore, love is not in God. Well, now it's very important to see this: that the first meaning of amor, right? It names a what? Emotion, a feeling, and that goes back to the beginning that says what? We name things as we know them, and our knowledge begins with the senses. So, the other word for emotion there, the feelings, right, shows they're tied up with the senses.

[23:01] I feel bad. I feel sad today. I feel, you know, angry, or I feel, you know, feel fear. Right? It's something sensible. So we name the sensible first,

[23:13] and so we often fall back upon the first meaning of a word, earlier meaning word, before we what get to the meaning we want. So Thomas never hesitates to give that kind of objection. That's it. It straightens us out, and we say, "Okay, that's the first meaning of amor, " but then can it be carried over to an act of the will? See, and I always have a joke there at the little Polish philosopher when I was in college.

[23:39] You know, I was always using the syllogism, right? The rigorous argument. Syllogisms are an argument in which some statements laid down another follows necessarily. He was getting so frustrated with my syllogisms. He said one day in class, "Mr. Berquist, do you have an emotional attachment to the syllogism? " I said, "I might have an emotional attachment to a girl, but not to the syllogism. " See, but my will is attached to syllogism, right?

[24:05] Because I understand the perfection of the argument called the syllogism, right? So, my will loves that. So the the love of wisdom is a what? An act of the will. The love of the girl might be an emotion. Would be an emotion first, anyway.

[24:34] Moreover, love, anger, sadness, right, and things of this sort are divided against each other, right? But sadness and anger are not said of God except metaphorically. Therefore, in neither what love is seen to be opposites, right?

[24:56] Moreover, the great Dionysius says in the fourth chapter about the divine names. Incidentally, you know, if you ever look at Thomas's commentary on the divine names of Dionysius, he would divide the works of Dionysius about the names of God. And there's one book of Dionysius, which is this one here called the Divine Names, which is about the names said properly of God. And then there's another book of Dionysius called Symbolic Theology or Metaphorical Theology, which is about the names said more metaphorically of God.

[25:32] Then there are other books that deal with other names. Where Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of Divine Names, "the love is a power that unites,"

[25:45] but this has no place in God since He's simple. Therefore, in God there is no love. That's kind of an interesting objection. But against this is what is said in the first epistle of Saint John that God is what agape in Greek. The Greeks have many words for love, right?

[26:15] Okay. I used to have fun there with Plato in the Symposium because he argues this way, Socrates, that the philosopher is not wise. Right? The philosopher is a lover of wisdom. Now, the man who loves something wants it. The man who wants something lacks it. Therefore, the philosopher must lack wisdom. And

[26:49] then I'd I pick out a sumptionist uh uh seminary, you know, and I'd say, What about God, right? If God loves something, then he must want it. If he wants it, he must lack it. Is it? Well, notice what Socrates is doing. He's reasoning with probability, right? You might say that just about everything we like or love, we want, because we don't fully have the things we like or love, right?

[27:14] But is it necessarily true that the one who loves something wants it? No. If he already has what he wants, loves, then he has joy in not wanting. That's the way God is, huh?

[27:34] Now, I answer. It should be said that it is necessary to place love in God, and this is the key thing he says, you know. You notice how Thomas looks before and after, right? Because primum is defined by before, right? For the first motion of the will and of any desiring power is what love.

[28:06] For since the act of the will and of any desiring power tends to something good or what bad, right? As in its own object, right? But the good, more chiefly and through itself, is an object of the will and of desire. But the bad only secondarily and through another, in so far as it's opposed to the what good, yeah.

[28:36] It's necessary, therefore, that those are naturally priores before, right? The acts of the will and desire that regard the good then actually what before those which regard the the bad, okay?

[28:56] As what joy more than what sadness, huh? And love than hate, huh? That famous picture of Churchill, you know, that done by that Canadian photographer who's very good at getting pictures of people, and he's got kind of a really tough expression on his thing. Well, I guess the way he got it was to take away his cigar.

[29:26] Yeah, the stubbornness and the even over the age or whatever, Churchill, right? But if I love my cigar, then I'm going to get sad to take my cigar away, right? Or angry, right? So you can see those passions about the bad that kind of arise from the passions, passions about the good.

[29:50] So even joy is more what fundamental than sadness, right? And love than what hate. And then he gives the principle there. This is an axiom, right? Always, what is through itself is before what is through another.

[30:10] And sometimes he'll say, you know, that the through itself is before the through another, and a beginning or cause of it. So, using the sensible, right? Sugar is sweet through being sugar. So sugar is sweet through itself. The coffee is sweet. Sugar. Yeah, so it's not sweet through itself, but through another, right? Now the sugar can be sweet without the coffee being sweet, but not vice versa.

[30:40] So it's before the second sense of before. But it's also a beginning and a cause of the sugar being sweet. Now that's that's a fundamental principle which he's using here in talking about the acts of the will, right? But we apply it, you know, in logic, in philosophy, to knowing, huh? What is known through itself? The per se notas, they say in Latin, is before what is known to another, and it's a beginning and a cause of our knowing the other things, huh?

[31:14] The known to another. If A was known to B and B through C, and nothing was known to itself, would anything ever be known?

[31:25] What if? There'd be an infinity of things you'd have to know before you could know anything. You couldn't begin to know anything. I take a simple example. Sometimes, are there some words whose meanings are known through other words? Yeah. Yeah. And you may be too lazy to go to the dictionary, but if you go to the dictionary, you learn the meaning of one word through other words, right?

[32:04] Now, is the meaning of all words known through other words? See the problem I have. I go and look up a word in the dictionary, and use some other words to explain that one. I got to learn what those words mean. Look those up, and I can look up the words they're used to explain those. This would go on forever, right? Would ever learn anything that way?

[32:31] Furthermore, I come into this world knowing no words, right? So the first words I learned, can I learn through other words? No. At least I have a little tape there of my firstborn, Paul. You ever seen the high chair? I'm getting him to say the word cookie. Cookie. Yeah. Do you want a cookie? You see. Now he, you know, likes the cookie, right? And so, without any prompting, after a while, he'll say someday cookie, right?

[33:08] Like after his meal, cookie. So how did he learn the meaning of the word cookie? Through other words. Association. Yeah. Yeah. See. So the word was not learned through other words, right? And so as words we know, but not through other words, through which we know all the other words we know. What is per se, right? Known through itself, is before what is known through another, and a beginning or a cause by knowing another.

[33:39] They say the best way to learn a foreign language is not to associate the word with the word in your own language meaning the same thing, but to associate with the object itself, right? La main, Not hand, but la main, you know, une like like Kate there in Shakespeare's Henry the Fifth, right? Now, which she's associated elbow, you know, trying to say this word, son, rather than associated with the French word.

[34:15] So that's an axiom, right? The what is through itself is before what is through another, right? You know, it's kind of interesting to come back to the first argument for the existence of God, the existence of the unmoved mover, right? Okay. Well, could you apply this axiom? Semper semper quod est per se, prius est eo quod est per aliud Always what is through itself is before that which is through another.

[34:43] Yes. Yeah. So you could say a moved mover, and certainly are moved movers, right? Like if I move that briefcase by by this book, right? The book is a mover, so no question about the many moved movers in this world. But a moved mover is it a mover per se or per alia?

[35:08] Per alia. Yeah. Yeah. So it must be before it a mover per se, and that would have to be a mover, an unmoved mover, one that moves other things without being moved itself and not to be moved by another, right? Yeah. So you could apply that to all kinds of things. But here he's applying it to the to the acts of the will, right, or even the emotions, son, and pointing out how the.

[35:44] Emotions that regard the good are more fundamental than those that regard the what bad, right? But then among those that regard the good, he goes on in the next page of my text here.

[35:58] Again, what is more common is naturally what before. Hence, the understanding before has an order to the common truths, then to some what particular truths. It goes back to what we learned in the beginning of natural philosophy, right? That the general is before the particular.

[36:24] Now there are some acts of the will and desire regarding the good under some special condition. As gaudium, joy, right, and pleasure, right, which are not about the good, period, but about the good present and had,

[36:43] and desire and hope, which are about the good not yet achieved, but love regards the good in general, whether it be had or not had, right.

[37:00] Whence love naturally is the first act of the will and of desire. So wanting candy, what is not just that candy is good, but you don't have the candy, right? Pleasure eating candy, you got to have the candy to get that pleasure. But liking candy, that can be what, whether you have it or don't have it, right? It's more fundamental to like candy. If I didn't like candy, I wouldn't want it when I don't have it, and I wouldn't take joy when I didn't get.

[37:43] it. Okay. One Christmas there, my brother was over in Italy, and they sent us a box of these chocolates. You know, with the real liquors in them, not just the you know imitation. You couldn't get in the states in those days, right? So these are really good. I remember my friend Jim comes over, you know, and he says, oh, that's not real. He says, he talks a couple in his mouth, and...

[38:11] So I said, I think I'll bring a couple of these up to Monsignor Dion, you know. And he said, no, he doesn't. He doesn't have any sweet tooth, you know. Okay, so you got to like candy, right? If we're going to rejoice to get this, right? It's going to you know wasted on him.

[38:41] So love regards the good in general, whether it be had or not had, right? Whence love naturally is the first act of the will and desire. And an account of this, he says, all the other emotions of the desiring power presuppose love or liking, right? As a first, what root? For nothing, for no one desires something unless it be a good that they love or like.

[39:15] Nor does someone rejoice except about the good love that he now has. Hate is not except about that which is contrary to the good. What love done?

[39:31] So I didn't love truth, I wouldn't hate falsehood, right? And likewise, sadness, right? And others of this sort, manifestly refers to love as to its first what beginning, huh?

[39:50] Whence, in whatever there is will or desire, is necessary that there be love, right? For if you remove the first, you remove all the others. It has been shown, however, that in God there is will. That was the previous question as well. Whence is necessary to posit or place in God love, huh? Okay. Now just for everybody here, just I use the word love and liking, you know.

[40:21] And I think in English, right? This is another example of how the common name is kept by one of the particulars, and a new name is given to one.

[40:51] So if I'm a lover of wisdom, do I like wisdom or not? Yeah. Okay. But sometimes you divide liking against loving, right? So my daughter was saying about some food, I don't like this, I love it. Okay. Well, then your distinction is the two, right?

[41:13] And so as a professor, you're not gotta kind of be careful. If. I say I like the student, we're not getting in trouble. I say I love the student, I might get in trouble, right? Um. So what is loving as opposed to liking?

[41:33] Add something. Yeah, there is a certain intensity, right? Okay. You see it. While liking, the weaker one, doesn't add anything significant, right? Okay. Now, yeah, something like that with knowing, it's the same before too. Now, sometimes you will say to somebody, "Do you know that's so, or you just think it's so, right? Okay. Now, if you ask me who's going to be the next president of the United States, I might tell you what I think, right?

[42:10] But if you pin me down and say, now, do you really know who's going to be the next president? I'd say no, I don't really know. Okay. But now, if you ask me about something I really know, like I know that two is half of four. I don't just think that. But if I know that two is half of four, do I think that two is half of four?

[42:33] Yeah. So, thinking can be used, right? To include knowing as well as the thinking that is opposed to knowing, right? See, so I might say, I think so and so is going to be the next president of the United States,

[43:04] but I don't know. But I do know that two is half of four. But I also think it's half of four, right? So, why does noing get the rename?

[43:20] There's a difference here. Yeah, it adds something noteworthy, right? Namely, the idea of being sure or certain, right? Okay. Why this keeps the common name, right? Because doesn't add something noteworthy, right? Okay. We've talked about this before, right? Sometimes we divide animal and we get a separate name we want to do man and beast, right? But sometimes it's just a beast. We keep animal for the beast, right?

[43:56] And we divide man against the what? Yeah. Why does man get the new name and the beast keep the common names? Yeah, because man adds something noteworthy, namely that he is what. National. Yeah.

[44:16] And when I philosophize, I'm doing something. People may not be aware of it, but I'm doing something, right? See. Now, when I make a chair, I'm doing something too. I know.

[44:32] But I might give a new name now to this dude called making, right? Because in the case of making it as a product. right? You see the chair or the table I get through making it, right? I get through doing my philosophizing. You can't see anything. But I get the show for it. What's off in my head, right? See. Even though this doing is is a better doing than that doing, right?

[44:56] But here, there's something that it has in addition. That there's a you know a pietas there in Rome, right? Okay. And I keep the bucket in the movie pietas to pointer right

[45:13] So the way liking and loving can be what can be distinguished, right? Okay. So loving is an intense liking, right? And therefore, it gets the name love, right?

[45:38] I don't know if you have that exactly in Latin, though, right? What word did you use? Thomas in this prima secundae would distinguish between amor and dilectio, right? Because amor names more the emotion, right? And dilectio comes from the word choice, dilectio. So I sometimes translate dilectio by a chosen love, right? But you know, the love that's in the will we call it dilectio, there, right? But here he keeps the word love, right?

[46:11] And Dionysius talks about that the Greek word eros, right? You know, which originally has very much this sensual meaning, right? But it's applied to God, right? It's an intensity of the word, right? That makes it good, huh? So we got through the body of this article. and let's look at the objections, right?

[46:49] He says, "No passion, no emotion, no feeling, is in God, but love is a passion. Therefore, love is not in God. That's in the first figure of the syllogism, right?

[47:07] To the first, it should be said that the knowing power does not move us except through the what? Desiring power. And just as in us, the universal reason moves by reason of the what? Particular reason, as I said in the third book about the soul. So the intellectual desire, which is called the will, moves in us through the what? Sensitive desire, right? Incidentally, that's why these things are named.

[47:44] Appetitus, which is the common word used here for intellectual appetite and the sense appetite, and sometimes we'll speak of natural appetite. But appetite actually has the idea of what? A thing is called appetite, desire, right?

[48:00] Yeah. Now, the aroused appetite is named from anger, right? But why is it named from that? Why does that stand out? Well, because what Shakespeare says, huh? Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirred, right? And desire seems to be in wanting more like emotion. You're seeking something, right? See, why joy or pleasure is more like being at rest, right? Okay. So you speak of something beautiful as restful, right?

[48:34] Because it causes delight. So we name things, yeah, yeah. Even though in the divine appetitus, there's no appetite. Whence the proximate mover of the body in us is the sense desire, right? Whence always the act of the sense desire is followed by what? Some change, transmutatio, change your word, of the body, and most of all around the heart. You

[49:16] felt that here sometime, I'm sure. Which is the first beginning of motion in the animal. Thus he says, the acts of the sense in desire. Those eleven we talked about it before. In so far as they have a bodily change annexed to them, their meaning are called what? Passions.

[49:43] So the Greeks always speak of a curdling around the heart, you know, all that. Okay, but the pump, the fear is marvelous. But not, however, an act of the will. Okay, you don't have any bodily thing there. As the will, like the reason, is what Immaterial, right?

[50:03] Love, therefore, and joy and pleasure, according as they signify acts of the sense desire, are passions, or we could say anything emotions, feelings. But not, however, as they signify the acts of the understanding, the intellectual desire. And thus they are laid down to be in God, as acts of the will, not as what emotions or feelings. So they say it's more clear in the Summa Contra Gentiles how the word is being moved, right?

[50:38] That you're this being moved by dropping out part of its meaning, right? The material aspect of the meaning, and keeping the formal aspect. So we'd like to know my favorite word there, road, right? We speak of a road in our knowledge. Well, I didn't originate that way of speaking. The Greeks speak of a road in our knowledge. The road. Road. R O A D. Yeah. Now, when you take the word road and you carry it over to the to the natural road in our knowledge, say, the first road in our knowledge, you drop out the the material aspect, right?

[51:16] The the stones or the asphalt or the cement or whatever it is, right? But you keep the formal aspect that there is a order in the road, maybe before and after, right? And so the before and after in our knowledge is called a what? Road in our knowledge. But that's not the original meaning of road, right? So my son Paul was a little boy there, and I asked him one day come back from class and said, Paul, what do you think of the basic road in human knowledge?

[51:45] And he says, "Are cars and trucks on it?" So he's stuck in the first meaning, right? In a sense, his objection is, you know, stuck in the first meaning. But Thomas gives it because that's where we begin, right? And you say, "Well, why do we speak of a road in our knowledge?" Well, because of this before and after. So if I drive to Boston, I'm going to hit Framingham before I hit Boston, right?

[52:12] There's before and after along the road. We've got to drop out the material aspect of it and just keep the idea of the before and after, right?

[52:23] The same way here with these emotions, right? The names of the emotions are carried over, but you drop out part of their what meaning?

[52:36] The other famous example of that in the De Anima is the word what passio, applied to what sensing and to understanding. Aristotle says understanding is an undergoing, because it's acted upon by its object, right? But the first meaning of undergoing involves the body and even something kind of contrary to your nature, right? I'm under the weather a little bit here. My nose, right? That means I've been acted upon by the weather in a way that's not good for me, right?

[53:10] When act upon your mind, right? It's for the good of your mind, right? Your mind is being perfected when the teacher acts upon the mind. Although the student might not always know this.

[53:24] This one guy was, you know, talking about his first teaching in college, you know, and looking down at the student and said, and this expression seems to be, "Why are you doing this to me?" Because if you act upon them, you know, in a way that's that's painful to them, right? And perhaps it is in the beginning, you know.

[53:48] You know the famous remark of Samuel Johnson, huh? As he was in the 18th century, right? And as the century went on, they didn't beat the boys so much, right? So he says, but they're not learning as much either. So he says, but they gain at one end, they lose at the other end.

[54:16] So love, and joy, and pleasure, according as they signify acts of the sense desire, are passions, emotions, feelings, right? Something bodily. Not over, according as they signify acts of the intellectual desire. And thus they are posited in God. Whence the philosopher says, and that's the way he often refers to Aristotle, by Antonio antonomasia, right? He's the philosopher. Whence the philosopher says in the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics that God rejoices by one simple operation.

[54:55] Enter into your what, Toward your master? And same, and for the same reason, he loves without what feeling. It's kind of funny because the great C. S. Lewis there, right, is trying to describe the love of the angels, right? If you say that the angel love, he has no feeling in his love, it seems kind of, you know, weak to us, right? Because of our way of knowing.

[55:26] But C. S. Lewis trying to overcome that says that the love of the angels is ferocious. No idea how strong it is, huh? That's kind of interesting, huh? Because in the angels, there's not this dichotomy of the sense desire and influences are, which in us are often some kind of conflict, right? And so the angel goes, the whole angel goes, right? You have no idea of how much he goes, right?

[55:54] And he either goes towards the good, and that's it, or he goes towards the badness, and so on. Why we are kind of pulled back and forth. The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak, you know. This conflict in us. So it's not that the love of the of the angels is is without feelings. It's an intensely, it's like much more ferocious and and strong than anything we've got, you know.

[56:22] I mean, our love hardly is. worth. the title there, right? That's what that Pope John Paul II said in his catechetical lectures on the angels, back some years ago. He said that the angel loves with full force. Yeah, yeah. And therefore, they see that the angels' position in the order of grace is proportional to their position in the order of nature, right? Because they go the whole thing to us.

[56:54] Why we? It's different because we can, you know, fight against our body more or less, right? And therefore, by efforts we can, you know,

[57:06] Washington can be above the bishop or somebody, you know, Because she's overcoming more. Okay. Now the second objection here. I'm just going to go into it a little bit more like the Summa Contra Gentiles. To the second, it should be said that in the passions or emotions or feelings of the sense desire, you can consider something as it were material, right? To wit, the bodily transformation or change, and something as it were, formal, which is on the side of the desire.

[57:55] Just as in anger, this is the common example. As I said in the first book about the soul, what is material is the what, The kindling of the blood around the heart, right? Or something of this sort. Okay. But the formal thing is the desire for what revenge.

[58:15] But again, on the side of what is formal, in some of these is designated some imperfection, as in desire, right? Which is of a good not had, right? And in sadness, which is of a bad thing had, right? And therefore, there's the same reason about anger, which presupposes what sadness, huh? But some, in their formal aspect, now, right? Designate no imperfection, as love and what joy. Because love is just about the good, that doesn't involve imperfection to be, inclined to the good, and joy is about the good had, right?

[59:06] Since therefore none of these belong to God, according to what is material in them, that's the first thing that Thomas points out in Summa Contra Gentiles. But also those things which imply an imperfection in their formal aspect. Cannot belong to God except metaphorically, on account of a likeness of the effect. This has been said above. But the things that do not imply imperfection are said of God properly, and those are just two of those eleven: Amor and love, and Gaudium, right?

[59:44] I mentioned in the Summa Contra Gentiles, it's a little more developed, right? Because you have a chapter on the joy of God, right? And then you reason from that, among other arguments, to there being love. But nevertheless, this love and joy in God are without what passion, without any bodily change.

[1:00:16] Yeah, that's love and joy. Okay, now this distinction he's going to make here. The third is something he does when he talks about love in the prima secunda, which is the treatise on love, kind of the fundamental treatise I know about love. Love is a power that unites and concretiva, kind of making things. But God's simple and so on. He says, "to this Third, it should be said that the act of love always tends to two things: to wit, in the good which someone wishes to another, and in the one to whom one wishes good.

[1:01:06] For this is properly to love something to wish good for it. So if I love you, I will or want good things for you, right? So to some extent, both you and the good I wish for you are not just my love, right? And sometimes they call one the the love of wishing well, the love of friendship, the one to whom you wish something good, and the love of wanting for the good that you wish for this person.

[1:01:39] That distinction made more explicitly in the prima secunda. Whence, in that someone loves himself, he wishes good for him, right? And thus, that good one seeks to unite to himself, in so far as one is able to do so. And to that extent, love is said to be a what uniting power, kind of from us. But also in God, but without what composition, because that good that he wishes for himself is not other than himself, who is through his very what substance or essence or nature.

[1:02:23] Good, huh? Okay. You heard the famous conversation between Christ and Saint Thomas. Thomas is supposed to have taken in the Tertia Pars of the Summa Theologiae, he's writing about the incarnation about Christ, and he asked God, "you know, is this Is this, you know, good for the crucifix? " The crucifix answered, You've written well, Thomas. " I went to the College of Saint Thomas, so they had the statue of Saint Thomas there, coming between the two main buildings, and they had the Latin there, "Bene scripsisti de me Thoma You've written well, Thomas, right?

[1:02:57] Okay. Okay. Oh, but I want to finish that, yeah. And so, and Christ said, "you've written well, Thomas. What will you take as your reward? " Thomas says, "Nothing but you. You alone, you know. " So, that's the good that God wills himself, right?

[1:03:27] In this offer that someone loves another, he wishes good to that person, and thus he uses the other one as if he were himself, referring the good to him as to himself, and for so much love is said to be a what? Concrete power, huh? Because it what? Gathers to itself, right? Having itself to the other as to itself. So the second commandment of love is said to love our neighbor as ourselves, right?

[1:04:04] And thus also the divine love is a vis concretiva, without composition, which is in God, right? Insofar as He wills what? Good to other things. Okay. When I would teach that those two kinds of love, what they call the amor concupiscentiae and the amor amicitiae, I'd say now, for the candy you have only the love of wanting. His candy is not the one to whom you wish good.

[1:04:40] Yourself is the one you wish good to, and candy is the good you want for yourself or the wine, right? But you're going to consume the candy, you're going to consume the wine, so it's not the good of the wine. It's your good, okay? For yourself, you have only the love of what? Wishing well. Now for another human being, you can have what? Either one, yeah. That's the trick, right?

[1:05:05] See, in the second commandment of love, you're said to what? Love your neighbor not as you love wine or candy, because then you'd be loving them as as only as something good for you, right? But you should love them as you love yourself. They say you should wish good to them just as you wish good to yourself. And that's kind of a key thing, right? And so I used to always, you know, appeal to the gentlemen in the class.

[1:05:31] There, I said, now when you go to the mixture, what kind love do you have for the girl out there? She's beautiful. She'd be good for me, right? To like be thankful to have this. So you begin by having the love of wanting, listen. And that's not enough, right? To have the love of wanting, huh? But people enter into marriage having only the love of wanting, maybe for another person.

[1:06:00] And if you don't have the love of wishing well to the other person, maybe your marriage will not last. You know. Remember our girl student saying, you know, reflecting these things, saying, you know,

[1:06:14] affected upon the stability of her parents' marriage. You know, she came from a couple that were, they were stably married and so on. But she realized that they really did wish well to each other. Listen. Why, if, if let's say for the man, if the woman is just the good that he wishes for himself, he's not really wishing well to her.

[1:06:38] Okay, we'll come back to this soon when we get to the previous. So there is love in God, then, right? I think we got to stop now. We're now going to go on next time with article two, whether God loves what all things, huh?