Prima Pars
85. Summa I, Q.21 Art. 4 Replies and Q.22 Art. 1: Mercy in Every Work of God; Providence as God's Foresight
Class of 2007-05-10
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/085-summa-i-q-21-art-4-replies-and-q-22-art-1-mercy-in-every/

[0:00] Okay. Now, how do you solve these objections? The first two objections, as we said, were similar, and they take things that God does. One of which is attributed to justice, and the other to mercy. Right. Okay. Well, it's a little bit like the great what? Anaxagoras, the Anaxagorean way of naming things. Anaxagoras said everything is inside of everything. Inside of everything, there is infinity of little pieces of everything else.

[0:35] Then why call this a dog and this a cat and this a tree and this a stone? Well, we call it for what it is most of.

[0:45] And I call that the what? A Anaxagorean way of naming things. And the I think there are a lot of examples of that, as I would say, right? Okay. So when they talk about economies, they talk about the market economy, and now they talk about the command economy, right? I remember years ago reading about the command economy of the Incas, and at certain interval of time, everybody would get a new pair of shoes.

[1:15] Everybody get a new pair of pants. Okay. I sit all the time reading, so I wear out my pants. You are walking around all the time, so you wear out your shoes. So I am getting a new pair of shoes that I don't really need. You are getting a new pair of pants you don't really need, but I do need another pair. of shoes. And you do need another pair of shoes because you've been walking around, right?

[1:42] So what do we do? Yeah, that's market. So yet you wouldn't call this a market economy, would you? Whereas everything's controlled from the center like that, huh? You know, the Russian economy under communism, everything was so-called planned by Gosplan right? Which was a thousand engineers and a thousand economists in Moscow, and they're planning or really misplanning the whole economy, right? You see. But it is the market, you know, in our economy, we call it a market economy.

[2:18] But is there no interference in the economy by the government? I mean, the government, both monetary policy and so on, is going to influence things, right? Sometimes choking off the economy, and sometimes letting things go too far, and so on. So, but we call something by what it has most of all, right?

[2:47] You know, we we call comedy of errors a comedy, right? But there's a very serious scene in there, right, where the father is going to be put to death, right, for being in the wrong city and so on. But so you know, or in Macbeth, you know, there's a little bit of humor stuck in there to relieve the audience a bit. And but we call it one a tragedy, one a comedy because of what it is most of all, right?

[3:19] And when Thomas divides the books of the Bible, you know, we say, well, what is the Psalms? It's a book of what? Prayer, right? And then other books are history books, right? But in the history books, it might be a prayer. And in the Psalms, there's some history and there's some prophecy and so on, right? But we've caught more prayer because it's more of that than else, right?

[3:48] So that's not an unheard of way of speaking, right? That this is artificial to say that we never speak this way, right? Now I would say maybe reading the Gospels again, and how the Gospels proceed, I suppose you'd say it's the modus narrativus, narrating the words and deeds of Christ, right? But yet inside there there will be commands, there will be prayers, there will be you know a lot of other things besides, you know.

[4:22] But it's a whole I'd say modus narrativus. Okay, so Thomas is going to solve that in some in some other way these first two objections, huh?

[4:33] To the first, therefore, should be said that some works or doings of God are attributed to justice and some to mercy. Not as if they're due to that alone, now he says, right? Because in some of them more vehemently appears justice, right? And in others, what? Mercy. Mercy.

[4:56] But nevertheless, in the damnation of the reprobate, right, there appears mercy, not entirely relaxing the justice, but in some way what alleviating it when he punishes them less than they deserve. So there's some mercy there, right? And in the justification of the impious, which we attribute to what the mercy of God, there appears some justice when He relaxes the guilt and so on on account of love, which nevertheless He has poured in most mercifully.

[5:34] as we read about Magdalen, right? Her sins are dismissed, her, her many sins, because she loves much, right? Was kind of a justice there, right? Okay.

[5:48] So we find that someone who's offended us is is very sad that he's done this. We tend to forgive him more easily, right? If he deserves to be forgiven, right?

[6:00] Because he's so sad about what he's done. Kind of what they feel they make a lot for capital punishment to relieve somebody of the sentence because he's repented, yeah, because he's done, you know, he's really reformed, he's really changed, yeah, yeah, So they make that appeal yeah. like He deserves it Yeah yeah yeah Now to the second, it should be said. This is, as I say, some objection that said that Paul seems to attribute the conversion of the Jews to justice, right, and the conversion of the Gentiles to what mercy, right?

[6:34] But he's going to solve it in somewhat similar way as the first objection. To the second, it should be said that justice and the mercy of God appear in the conversion of the Jews and of the Gentiles, but there is some reason of justice that appears in the conversion of the Jews, which does not appear in the conversion of the Gentiles, as that they are what saved on account of the promises made to the fathers.

[7:00] That's kind of an obligation there, you might say, right? That you have towards the what Gentiles, right? So when I explain the Max Gregory way of naming things, I say we call a thing by what it has most of all, either absolutely, right, or in comparison to another, right. And the same thing here, even if there might be more mercy in the conversion of the Jews than justice, still there's an element of justice there that is not found in the conversion of the what Gentiles, right?

[7:38] Because they are not the promised people, right? And so you're not fulfilling a promise that you have kind of an obligation to fulfill. Okay. This is sense. I bring the Max Gregory way of naming things because that's not an unusual thing, you know, similar to the solution to these here.

[7:59] Say Claire. Okay. Now the third objection. Many just are afflicted in this world. Okay. He says that in this also, that the just are punished in this world, there appears justice and mercy. In so far as through these afflictions, some light things in them, right, are purged away, and they are what

[8:35] raised up from the affection of earthly things towards God, right? According to that of Gregory, for the bad things which are in this world so press us that they compel us to go to God, right? That's beautiful. You get the right text there, you know, huh? I was kind of, you know, looking at Weisheipl's, life of Thomas there, you know, during the centennial there, seventh thing, and I guess Thomas had a pretty good memory, right?

[9:11] You know, all these things. But he also mentions, you know, Thomas was a servant. Sometimes he'd speak in Latin, sometimes in the vernacular, but in Italian, I have to say. By those having spent ten years in Paris, he never learned French. So I don't feel so bad about being so lousy in French, you know, a little bit of French. More than ten years in Quebec, but

[9:40] kind of interesting. Okay, now the fourth objection is from creation, right? Okay, you got kind of stretch again. What you mean, right? To the fourth, it should be said that although to creation there's not presupposed something in the nature of things, huh? It's an end of that phrase in rerum natura. I know some of the other Latin or some English. Rerum natura is like we'd probably say in the real world, right?

[10:18] That's kind of the Latin way of saying it. Um. So there's no creature out there to whom something can be owed, right? There's no creature there suffering defect to whom, you know. But nevertheless, he says it presupposes something in the knowledge of God, right? And according to this, also is saved there the ratio justice, in so far as things are produced in being, according as is suitable to the divine what, wisdom and goodness, right?

[10:57] Remember how he said back in the explanation of why this is found and everything. He used the word debitum both. What? Sometimes it's debitum to the creature, but sometimes debitum to God. And here he seems to test something debitum to what? God, because there's nothing the creature yet. So he keeps the idea of justice here. Even in creation, God is acting in a way that is befits his what, wisdom, huh, and his goodness, huh.

[11:30] And is also saved in some way the idea of mercy, right? In so far as thing is changed from non-being to being, huh? So he took pity on my not being. Right. See, that's that's quite a defect, not being. Yeah.

[11:54] Yeah, yeah. So he's very merciful. He chose me to be right. Bring me out of non-being into being. Okay. Who, Ignatius now? Isidore. Isidore, that's Isidore, okay. Okay. okay. Isidore, okay. You guys mixed up. Isidore's coming back? Eventually, yeah. Okay. Let's begin here. Question twenty-two on the providence of God, right? Now let's stop on that word for a moment. Providentia, God. What's the English word corresponding to providence?

[12:40] Foresight right? Foresight. And if you look sometime at the Secunda Secundae, where Thomas takes up prudentia, as it's called in Latin. And there's a question on the integral parts of prudence, right? And one of the integral parts of prudence is Providentia. And the objection, one of the objections to saying that it is integral part of prudence, is the word providentia and the word prudence are really the same word.

[13:17] And if you study etymologically, the word prudentia, it's really a contraction of it. So how can it's the same word really? How can one name the integral part among eight integral parts of prudence? It's like saying foresight is integral part of foresight. Now the the proper English word to name this virtue is foresight, right? But Thomas replies that it's named from its chief or principal part, right?

[13:52] Okay. Now I noticed one time in reading Churchill a lot, you know, Churchill would tend to use the word foresight, right? And in a sense, to a man who has political foresight like Churchill did, can foresee what's going to happen, right? Can foresee the consequences of different courses of action, right? Or a man who has military foresight like MacArthur or somebody can foresee the results of the Incheon landing and so on, right?

[14:21] He's a man that's prudent, right? A man that has a virtue. So it's kind of interesting the word foresight, huh? And of course, it also fits in very well with what the great Shakespeare says, right? That reason is ability to look before and after, right? Because foresight is taken from the word before, right? And so

[14:47] the article, I suppose, or the question could be entitled on the foresight of God. You wanted to use an English word to correspond to it, right? Although we often use the word providence.

[15:04] Now I'm kind of dumbfounded here by Thomas's premium here. Having considered those things which pertain absolutely to the will of God, like the love of God and the mercy and the justice of God, we're not to proceed to those things which regard together the understanding and the will. Right. Now he refers you back to all the way back to what? Question nineteen. When he was first commencing his project, right?

[15:40] Let's just look for a moment back at the premium at the beginning of question nineteen. After the consideration of those things which pertain to the divine knowledge, right?

[15:59] Which he just finished in the eighteenth question, there. We're not to consider about those things which belong or pertain to the divine will. And then he divides this consideration into three parts. So that there first is a consideration of the will of God, right? Secondly, of those things which pertain absolutely to the will of God, right? And that was things like love and mercy and justice. And then that those things which what pertain to the understanding in order to the what will.

[16:41] And that's question twenty-two is the beginning of that, right? So this is the third of three parts, right? Okay. So he calls that in a sense, huh? In the beginning of the in the premium here to question twenty-two, having considered about those things which pertain absolutely to the will, we're not to proceed to those things that regard together the understanding and the will.

[17:08] And this sort is foresight with respect to all things, predestination and reprobation, and the things which follow upon them with respect to men in special, right, in particular, in order to their eternal what salvation, right. Okay. Now the next thing is kind of striking here because now and after the moral virtues like justice, right.

[17:43] In moral science, one considers about what prudence, right? To which providence would seem to what pertain, right? Now in the Nicomachean Ethics, he's referring back to right. Nicomachean Ethics. In the third book, the second half of the third book, you begin to talk about the moral virtues, right? Justice or courage and and temperance or moderation. And then in book four. The rest of the moral virtues that pertain to the passions and exterior goods and evils and so on, and then Book Five we talk about justice, right?

[18:21] So three, at least the second half of it, and four and five are all about the moral virtues, and then comes Book Six where we talk about foresight, huh, or prudence, okay? And so he's comparing his order here to that, right?

[18:38] Um. Now in the commentary of Nicomachean Ethics, Thomas gives two reasons why the moral virtues are considered before the virtues of reason, and one is that they're more known to us,

[18:54] and the other is that by the moral virtues we're disposed for the virtues of reason, and especially for foresight, huh? Your passions are all wacky. You don't have that much foresight in your life, right? Okay. I say what what strikes me here.

[19:15] This Isidore, this Isidore, you're late for class, Isidore Okay. Nine point three. I was so late, am I reading my name Okay name? Okay. But now I think I mentioned before that in the Secunda Secundae, Thomas takes up the virtues in particular. He takes up faith, hope, and charity first, and then he takes up foresight, or prudence, and then justice, and then courage, and then temperance last, right?

[20:01] And in a way, it's reverse order of the ethics, huh? Because in the ethics, courage and temperance are taken up first in Book Three, then justice in Book Five, and then prudence or foresight in Book Six. Now, if you ask me, what is the reason for the order in the Secundae Secundae, right? I would say, well, you're not in philosophy anymore. You're in theology, right? And theology is about God, so what is closer to God, huh?

[20:39] Is taken up before in theology, right? Because God is what you first talk about in theology, and other things are talked about only in reference to God. So he talks about faith, hope, and charity first, because these are the theological virtues that have God as their object, right? So obviously they're closer to God than prudence, justice. Courage, fortitude, temperance, right? Okay. But now, prudence and justice are closer to God than fortitude and temperance, because fortitude and temperance are moral virtues that are about emotions, and God doesn't have emotions.

[21:26] Right? Justice is in the will, and God is a will. And our prudence is in the reason, and God has mind and reason, right? But just as we took up the mind of God, the knowledge of God before His will, so it makes sense to take up prudence before justice, right? So, but the order is just the reverse of the what? Of the ethics, yeah. But now, in this transition, at least from what we just talked about, which was to some extent moral virtues, right, in the will, like justice.

[22:03] Now he's taking up what seems. To be like, what's taken up in the sixth book, of the Nicomachean Ethics, right? Reference to God, and he's kind of comparing to that, right? And thus, after the moral virtues, for in moral science, right? After the moral virtues is considered about prudence, to which providence seems to what? Yeah. Note that.

[22:36] in the Summa Contra Gentiles, providence comes up in the third volume, right? The third volume is about it's three parts. In the first part, he shows like chapters one through sixty-three almost. He shows that God is the end of all things, and then he takes up the providence of God, whereby he directs things to this end, right? In general, and then the third part is providence over what rational creatures, unlike us, in particular, right?

[23:11] Okay. Here, providence is part of the consideration of God in His operation, right? Which is done more in the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles.

[23:33] Okay. Now he gives the division of it about the providence of God. four things are asked, first, whether to God belongs what? Foresight So the question, unasked, is it so, or does it exist? Comes first, right? So we ask before whether God exists. Before we ask what God is, right? So we ask whether providence belongs to God before we go. Okay. Now the second question. Now the second one is the second, third, and fourth are could be divided.

[24:14] against the first, right? And the second one is whether all things come under the divine providence. So it's my stubbing my toe to fall under divine providence. Huh? Losing hair when I comb my hair in the morning. Huh. You know.

[24:39] Now the third article: whether divine providence is immediately about all things. Well, some thing people just thought that kind of God in a general way he extends to all things, but he leaves details to everybody, right? In the same way that the president can't tend to all the details, but he kind of sets the whole picture of it, right? Yeah. And so, in some extent, the president's in charge of the whole executive branch, right?

[25:06] But he doesn't attend immediately to everything. But does God attend immediately to our conversation right here? Everything we're doing today? And the leaves falling off the tree. Was he saying in the gospel that a bird doesn't fall to the ground? Oh meaning the hairs of your header, right? Yeah, When you lose them in the morning, he's got the number. And that's really getting down to the details, right?

[25:28] Okay. Now you can see how the third one follows after the second one, right? But now the fourth one, Whether divine providence places necessity upon things that He's providing for. Well, if you answer that God's providence extends to all things and even down to all the details, right? Isn't He imposing necessity upon all things? Well, no, He's not.

[26:05] It's a little hard to understand. So let's look at the first article, right? To the first one proceeds thus: It seems that providence does not belong to God.

[26:26] For providence, according to Tully, and that's Cicero, right? Sometimes it's come up in reading the Gospels. there, you know, who is Nathaniel? See, is he Bartholomew or not?

[26:45] Yeah, I thought I thought Thomas had said somewhere else that he was, but anyway, I was reading the commentary of John and Nathaniel in the beginning of the Gospel. He appears, and Thomas seems to say that Nathaniel is not one of the apostles, right? And then the question is, why doesn't he choose Nathaniel as an apostle? Well, he's too learned a man, and Christ doesn't want to have the success of the church be attributed to the power or the intelligence, the wisdom, the learning of the men that He has.

[27:15] So He chooses fishermen rather than this learned Nathaniel. But then I notice in the last chapter of John, Nathaniel is one of those that are present. in the last account there, you know, when they draw the fish out. So I don't know. I don't know. But notice, here, it was customary sometimes to give a different name to somebody, right? So here Thomas refers to him Tullium like what's common to do, right?

[27:38] But it's another name for what? Cicero, right? Um, my text gives it is a book de inventione, right? For providence, according to Tully, is a part of prudence. Prudence, however, since it is bene consiliativa, takes good counsel, according to the philosopher in the sixth book of the Ethics, is not able to belong to God, who has no doubt, right? Once he has to take counsel. Therefore, providence does not belong to God.

[28:14] So Aristotle, in the sixth book, he says that there's really, what, like three parts at least of prudence, right? And one is taking counsel, deliberation, and then judgment, and then finally command, right? When you go and do it, my brother Mark, that's a joke, you know, about he and two of his friends there in Quebec, and one guy was very imaginative, and could think of all kinds of things to do, but he had no judgment as to which of these things could be done, right?

[28:47] My brother Mark was not imaginative, couldn't think of all kinds of things to do, but he had judgment as to which of these possibly should be done, right? But being philosophers, they're both a bit lethargic to get going. The other guy would then get them going, you know, and get the canoe or whatever was for the thing. So they divide among themselves the three parts of prudence, right?

[29:10] Well, now his first objection is saying this part taking counsel, you know, you know, like someone says, you know, well, what what can we do? Well, you could do this, or you could do this, or you could do this, you know, and then then that's the first part, right? Then the second part is well, it's better to do this than do this or this, right? For this and this reason.

[29:32] Now let's do it, you know, okay? And I guess Churchill had most of all the third part there, right? He really got people going in a kind of annoying way sometimes, but to do that. So the first part of prudence doesn't belong, obviously, to God because he doesn't have to deliberate about what should be done, right? Okay. So the president called all kinds of people in to say what should we do now about Iraq, you know, and then find he made a judgment, right?

[30:03] And then the command. Moreover, whatever is in God is eternal, second objection. But providence is not something eternal, for it's about existing things, which are not eternal, according to Damascene Therefore, that's the de Fide orthodoxa. Therefore, providence is not in God.

[30:35] Moreover, nothing composed is in God, because God is altogether simple, right? But providence or foresight seems to be something imposed, because it includes in itself will and what.

[30:54] Therefore, foresight is not in God. Against this is what is said in the book of Wisdom, chapter fifteen. You, however, Father, govern all things by what foresight, providence. I guess the book of wisdom is what in Greek, isn't it? We don't have that's the the text, right?

[31:23] So if you don't know a little Greek, you can look up chapter fifteen, verse three. Answer: It should be said that it is necessary to place providence or foresight in God,

[31:47] for every good that is in things is created by what God, as has been shown above. But in things there is found good, not only as regards the substance of things, but also As regards the order of them to an end,

[32:12] and especially to the last end, which is the divine goodness. I think I mentioned before how this comes up. Providence in the Summa Contra Gentiles is my favorite book, right? It comes up in the third book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, right? As I said a little bit earlier, the first part of the third book shows that God is the last end of all things, and then the second part shows that God has providence over all things, directing them in some way to this last end, which is Himself, right?

[32:51] And this is in harmony with that. But notice the distinction he's making between the goodness that pertains to the substance of things, and then that regards their what? Order, which is more in their in what they do, right? Okay. So in the Summa Contra Gentiles, you should take up the substance of these things, the goodness of them, in God's creating them, right? But providence will come in the third book.

[33:31] So he says, "This good of order existing in created things is created by God, since, however, God is the cause of things through His understanding. This is important to see now, and thus is necessary for the to pre-exist in Him, right? The reason of each one of His what? Effects, as is clear above. This is the way he reasons in the Summa Contra Gentiles too. Is necessary that the reason of the order of things to the end pre-exists in the divine mind,

[34:10] but the reason of ordering things to the end is properly what? Foresight. Okay. So military foresight is what? A way of achieving your end, right? Which is victory, right? No substitute for victory, right? That's what MacArthur said, anyway. In war, there's no substitute for victory. Well, God says there's no substitute for the divine goodness. All things are to that, right?

[34:48] Now, notice he pays a little bit the word here. He says the reason of what should be ordered to the end is properly providence, for it is the chief part of foresight,

[35:03] to which. Are ordered the other two parts, and these are some of the integral parts: the memory of things in the past, right, and the understanding of present circumstances, right. In so far as from past things remembered and present things understood or seen, conjectamus, we guess

[35:29] about providing future things, okay. So that's what what Lincoln said, right? If we knew where we came from and where we are, we could see what we have to do now, okay. But the ultimate thing is is the future, now, right?

[35:49] Now it is proper to prudence or foresight, according to the philosopher, who's he? Aristotle. Yeah, yeah. I I I mentioned before how how I guess some of the famous writers on Thomas's life, you know, they maintain that Urban the Fourth brought together Thomas and Moerbeke at Orvieto. You know, the Vatican was involved in a war with Frederick the Second and so on, his successors. So they would go around to Orvieto and sometimes to Teramo and so on.

[36:24] But this time it's at Orvieto, I guess, and that he brought together Moerbeke to do the translations from the Greek, the Archbishop of Corinth, that this is to make these very accurate translations of Aristotle from the Greek into Latin, and Thomas to comment on those things. Okay, and he said, well, not exactly what it was, but there was a meeting between the two, you know, and Thomas was certainly encouraging Merbiki to do this, but he was already doing it, and Merbiki had translated a lot of other things too.

[36:56] As if he was he was trying to get Aristotle's philosophy into circulation, even though it was still somewhat questionable because of the Averroists and so on.

[37:14] So it's proper to prudence, according to the philosopher, in the sixth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, to order other things, right, to an end, either with respect to oneself, right.

[37:31] As a man is said to be prudent who well orders his acts to the end of his life, right, or with respect to others, subject to him, either in the family, right, or in the city, or in the what kingdom, right. Now in the secunda secunda Thomas will distinguish four species of foresight or prudence, and one is the foresight of the individual, right. Whereby he can foresee what is good for him as an individual, right, and what he should do, and then secondly, the foresight of the father of the family, and then the foresight of the military commander, and then the foresight of the king.

[38:21] So he distinguishes four, and it's kind of it's kind of impressive, right? Now, in practical philosophy, there's only three parts: ethics, domestic, political philosophy. There's an apart philosophy corresponding to military foresight, but he puts that, you know, between the foresight of the father and the foresight of the king. So it's it's a very, you know, elevated thing, military foresight. If you have a man like, say, Douglas MacArthur who had that military foresight, and some people regard MacArthur's work in Japan after war as even a greater accomplishment than his his his you know when I was first teaching at Saint Mary's College, we had a man who'd been in MacArthur's administration.

[39:03] there, A very impressive man, you know, but not the president MacArthur was. But he really did a good job of getting Japan on its feet in some reasonable way, right? They're one of our good friends now, in a sense. But here, you know, he doesn't mention the military, does he? But he does mention make a distinction between the city and the king, right? Well, Aristotle in the book on the poetic, I mean, on political philosophy, he stops with the polis, right?

[39:34] Doesn't talk about the kingdom. But Thomas is so common, right? Of course, the king of France, right, was very active in in protecting the monks there, the mendicant monks in in Paris, right? You know, there were some arrows being shot into them, and finally Louis the Ninth, the Saint, and you know, they surrounded him on the garden, right? At one of the crucial times, so Thomas is very much aware of the distinction between the king and the and the and the city, but Aristotle in the political philosophy, he he what limits himself to the to

[40:17] the the polis, huh? Which is an independent, right, city, right, and a kind of ultimate thing. And for him, you know, Paris is just a kind of a conglomeration. You know, I mean, how can you say anything about that that conglomeration, that that mess, right?

[40:39] But in the context of Thomas's writing, there it's natural for him to distinguish between the city and the the kingdom. It's interesting how the you know the Machiavelli was not so good for a lot of reasons, but very influential thinker, right? He's writing basically about the city as Aristotle was, Not talking about the kingdom so much.

[41:10] So these are different species of foresight, right? At least that of the individual respect to himself, the father, the the head of the city, or the king.

[41:24] According to that way, which is said in Matthew twenty four forty five, faithful servant and prudence, right, whom the Lord is constituted over his family.

[41:40] In which way prudence or providence? this is almost a synonym, right? But as I mentioned, if you look at the question on the integral parts of prudence, right,

[41:54] prudence providentia is one of the eight principal parts, right? But kind of the chief part, and that's why Thomas says that prudence is really named from that part. Then he takes up the the subject parts, which are the prudence of the individual, the father, and so on.

[42:16] In which way prudence or providence is able to belong to God, for in God there is nothing that is able to be ordered to an end, since He is the ultimate end, right?

[42:32] So what does he mean there? He's saying that the providence of God is not like the providence of individual man, where I have to what try to direct my actions to the end of my life, right? God is is the end of all things. God has to direct himself to his end, but he directs other things, right, to the end, which is his own what goodness, right?

[43:01] For in God himself, for in God there is nothing able to be ordered to an end, since He Himself is the last end. So the ratio, the order of things to the end, is named providence in God. Whence the great Boethius in the fourth book of Consolation, Consolation of what philosophy, the last work of the great Boethius. That's a great work where you get the definition of eternity comes from that, and the definition of providence comes from that, and other things.

[43:36] It really a magnificent book. There is, if you look up the, they probably have it in Nova but there's a a commentary on it, right? Which is not by Thomas, but it's kind of you know mixed up with his works, but it's it's pretty good, you know. I looked at it, and you know my brother Mark thought it was pretty good, and uses sometimes in his teaching.

[43:56] The providence is what the divine reason constituted in the what beginning of all things, right? Which disposes or orders, huh, all things, huh? For the disposition, huh, is able to be called both the reason of the order of things to the end, as well as the reason for the order of the parts in the whole, right? Sometimes Thomas would distinguish those two, right? That the order of the parts to each other is an account of the order of all of them to the end, right?

[44:46] So the order among the parts of the chair is an account of the order of the whole to sitting, right? And so the order of creatures among themselves an account of the order of all of them to to God, right? But the divine. Disposition, the ratio, the order, is both the order of all things to him, but the order of them to each other on account of the order to him.

[45:11] Okay, but doesn't have any foresight for himself. Doesn't mean anything, right? He's the last end, huh? But it's much more universal than the foresight of the king, right? Extends to all things.

[45:38] Now, going back to your first objection, which spoke about counsel, right? And of course, in human foresight, counsel is something you should take, right?

[45:52] Get a second opinion, they say, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that according to the philosopher in the sixth book of the Ethics, that's the book devoted to the virtues of reason.

[46:09] Prudence or foresight, properly is praeceptiva, kind of commanding, right? Of those things about which eubulia rightly takes counsel, and synesis rightly what judges, right? To give a different name to those three parts, right? And so it's really that last culminating part that is most of all called prudence, right?

[46:34] Whence, although to take counsel does not belong to God, according as counsel is investigation or inquiry about doubtful things, nevertheless to command things that should be ordered to the end of which there is right reason belongs to God, right? According to that of Psalm 148, he has laid down the precept and will not pass away. And according to this, there belongs to God the ratio of foresight and providence.

[47:10] So when you carry these names over to God, you have to what? Drop out whatever is an imperfection in them, right? So our foresight is a habit and a disposition, right? And accident and so on. You have to drop all those out, right? And you drop out anything that pertains to the imperfection of these things, like taking of counsel, right?

[47:35] But notice, as you point out there with Aristotle's words, it's that last part that most of all is called prudence, huh? And not the first part eubulia, means that good counsel, I guess. Synesis is judgment, right? Sensible man, right?

[48:03] Although it can also be said that the what reason of things to be done is called counsel in God, not on account of investigation, but on account of the certitude of knowledge, right? To which what those taking counsel arrive by their investigation, right?

[48:26] So, what did McCarthy do on the way to Dingshan Landing? No, he called up his second command and he went over the thing. That has to be essentially right. This thing to do, right? Then he picked up his Bible and read his Bible. Okay. Why does Thomas bring this second distinction? Well, because the text that comes up here from Ephesians, right? Whence it is said in Ephesians one, who does all things by the counsel of his will, right?

[49:04] That's kind of a daring way of speaking, right? But it's not the deliberation, but the certitude that comes from deliberation. That is the what called counsel, right? And that's not just because of the text there in Ephesians. We had something like that when you talk about the the scientia of God, right? Scientia is a Latin word that they translate episteme by, right? When you read the Posterior Analytics, episteme is an effect of the demonstrative syllogism, right?

[49:44] And the demonstrative syllogism is defined by Aristotle as a syllogism making us know the cause that of which it is the cause and it cannot be otherwise, right? So it's a certitude gotten by reasoning by a syllogism of a particular kind, right? When you carry the word science over to God, do you mean that he syllogizes and reasons? No, but he certainly knows what is the cause and now which is the cause of God otherwise.

[50:13] Now, if you look at that definition there, you can see you drop off off the genus and keep the what difference, right? And Father Bochenski you know, dropped nothing into us. And so often in the carrying over of a name from creatures to God, you drop the genus and keep the what difference. Now, as Aristotle points out, the genus in material things comes from what is material.

[50:41] The difference comes from what is formal, what is actual. So the difference is more able to be carried over to God, who is pure act. The genus in divine substance is forma est, as the great Boethius says, and the Material part is dropped. Okay. So if you go back to then, you know, what's really the substance of of our scientia? What's the demonstration we have? Right.

[51:08] Teaching these guys logic last night and doing one of the theorems in Euclid there, you know, and showing how it involves the different kinds of syllogisms, right? So you drop out that idea of the genus, right? What is our episteme? Well, it's a syllogism, making us know the cause and that of which it is a cause and not otherwise. I can't carry over syllogism to God. Though we understand syllogism doesn't have to syllogize, I drop off that genus and just keep the difference.

[51:37] Okay. But I don't carry over the dialectical syllogism to God, because neither syllogism nor the conclusion, you know, some probable conclusion, if God has some probability there in His knowledge.

[51:56] Yes. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Now the second objection: whatever is in God is eternal, right? To the second, it should be said that to care two things pertain: one is the reason of the order, which is called providence and disposition, and the other is the carrying out of the order, right? Which is called governing. Of which the first is eternal, and second what? Temporal.

[52:34] Interesting the way he settles it here. Now, to the third, there's nothing composed in God, right? And wasn't providence involved? Composition? Yeah, yeah. Aristotle talks about choice. You know, choice is what

[53:04] thoughtful willing, or you know, it kind of involves both. Providence is in the understanding, but it presupposes the will of the end. For no one commands about things to be done in account of the end unless he wills the end. Whence prudence or foresight presupposes the moral virtues through which the desire has itself to the good, as is said in the sixth book of the Ethics. We need to define moral virtue in ethics It's defined as a habit, huh?

[53:43] With choice, huh? Existing in the middle towards us as determined by right reason, that means foresight. So it presupposes, right, something in the appetite, huh?

[54:06] So I want to eat and drink moderately. And what would be the moderate amount for me to eat and drink today drink today, right? Then reason comes in and says, "Well, you've got to give a class, so you don't want to get drunk before you go to class. But you got to operate on somebody, right? " So, other hand, if you're just getting together with your buddies, you're going to talk and talk.

[54:31] You might drink more, right? Huh? But reason has to consider the circumstances and what would be suitable at this time, right? How much shall I eat? I'm going to turn around and offer. I'm going to gladden. Okay. Yeah, yeah. So it might be a different amount, right?

[54:58] Okay, that's the one way of answering it, right? And nevertheless. If providence were equal equally right to regard the will and the divine understanding, this would not this would be without detriment to the divine simplicity. Why? Because the will and the understanding in God are the same thing. Well, I guess we have to stop

[55:28] now. So now we know God is foresight. Now we got to see what's subject to his foresight. huh? Whether his foresight? You know, is like President Bush's, right? Reads the details.

[55:44] You know, I was reading, you know, about the German army. I guess you know one of their successes in the Second World War was that they they gave a certain freedom to the subordinate officers, right, to act according to the circumstances that they were in, right. And that's because we can't foresee what the circumstances are going to be once the battle starts, right? Because They always keep on changing, right?

[56:06] Is that the way God is? You know, he's kind of you know. plainly. He needs the creatures, you know, the details of his plan, carrying out his plan, But is he all the way down to them? It would be interesting to find out. what it is.