Prima Pars
89. Predestination in the Divine Mind, Reprobation, and Divine Choice and Love (Summa I, Q.23 a.2–4)
Class of 2007-05-31
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/089-predestination-in-the-divine-mind-reprobation-and-divine/

[0:00] We're up to the second article of the twenty-third question. To the second one proceeds thus: It seems that predestination places something in the one predestined. For every action, from itself infers some kind of being acted upon, or passion, or undergoing. If, therefore, predestination is an action in God, it is necessary that predestination be an undergoing in the one predestined? Moreover, Origen says, on the text of Romans one, who is predestined, and so on.

[0:54] That predestination is the one who is not, but destination the one who is. But Augustine says in the book on predestination of the saints, what is predestination except the destination of someone?

[1:13] Therefore, predestination is not except of someone existing, and thus it places something in the one predestined. Moreover, preparation is something in the one prepared.

[1:30] Preparing dinner, is, something in the food, right? But predestination is the preparation of the benefits of God, as Augustine says in the book on the predestination of saints. I remember reading these books of Augustine when I was in high school. You know, my cousin Donnie had a couple of volumes of Augustine's works there.

[1:53] Wow! You really know this stuff is difficult stuff. Moreover, the temporal is not placed in the definition of eternal of eternal, but grace, which is something temporal, is placed in the definition of predestination. For predestination is said to be the preparation of grace in the present and of glory in the future.

[2:23] Therefore, predestination is not something eternal, and thus it is necessary that not be in God but in the predestined. For whatever is in God is eternal. This is temporal. But against all this is what Augustine says: that predestination is the foreknowledge of the benefits of God. But foreknowledge is not in the things foreknown, but in the one foreknowing. Therefore, neither is predestination in the predestined. But in the one predestinating.

[2:59] That sounds like what Father Michael was saying, kind of. So Thomas says, "I answer. It should be said that predestination is not something in those predestined, but in the one predestinating. " Is that right? What he's saying, predestination. For it is said that predestination is a certain part of providence, but providence is not in the things foreseeing, but is a certain reason in the understanding of the one foreseeing, as has been said.

[3:43] So that's the syllogism, isn't it? But the execution, the carrying out of providence, which is called governing, is passively, or being undergone, in the ones being governed. But actively, acting upon, it's in the one governing.

[4:10] Hence, it is manifest that predestination is a certain reason of the order of things to eternal salvation that exists in the divine mind. I get your definition of predestination. But the carrying out of this order is passively or undergone in the ones predestined, but it's actively in God.

[4:43] For the carrying out of the predestination is the calling and the magnifying. What does Mary say? My soul magnifies the Lord. According to that of the apostles, whom He predestined, these also He called. That's the governing, right? And whom He called, these He also magnified, made great. Yeah. Now, just

[5:22] predestination. Then I don't know. I don't quite. What does predestination have to do with the will of God? Well, providence. Well, it's a reason. It's a reason of the order, right? So it's more in the divine mind. It presupposes the will, right? It's a will, the end. So then, okay, then. So he compares it to to what Aristotle says about foresight in the ethics, right? Where presupposes the goodness of the will, right?

[5:55] But it's more. In the understanding itself, the foresight. Okay, that's what I was wondering. It says in the mind, but then, yeah. But then, because reason looks before and after, you can see the connection between that and foresight. Okay, yeah. Now, help me with that—the connection then with foresight and then predestination. So. Well, predestination is a part of foresight. Yeah. So foresight extends to. We said to all things, right?

[6:20] Okay. Predestination only to. To rational creatures. Yeah. Those ones. Okay, I see. So that's why he argues that kind of syllogism that if predestination is a part of foresight and foresight is only in God, right? Then predestination is only in God, right? But the governing or carrying out of this is actively in God, but passively in the creature.

[6:49] So if you know, if I kick you, I'm actively kicking you, and you're passively being kicked, right? Okay. So my kicking you is something not just in me, but my plan to kick you. Just be in me, right? And I mean, obviously, I plan to get a good kick at you, but when I actually kick you, though, then that's in you passively and actively in me. Yeah.

[7:18] My kicking you in a way is you're being kicked. Okay. Now the first objection, right, says that every action infers some passion, so on. Okay. The first, therefore, should be said that actions going out into an exterior matter, transitive actions, infer from themselves some undergoing in the outside thing, as heating a thing or cutting it, right? But not actions that remain in the what doer, as are to understand and to will, and also in us, like to sense, right?

[8:08] Okay. To imagine. And such an action is predestination. Now, why does he have an article or a question here on predestination, not on gubernatio, right? Yeah. Well, in a sense, he's talking about God in Himself here, right? In this part of the Summa. Later on, he'll be talking about God's acting upon things.

[8:36] And such an action is predestination; it's one that remains within the what doer. Whence predestination does not place something in those predestined, but the carrying out of it, which goes out to exterior things, placing places in them some effect.

[8:58] Second objection. This is from the words of Augustine. There, and Augustine also. What is predestination except the destination of something, right? To the second, it should be said, that destination is sometimes taken for the real what sending of something to some end, and thus destination is not except of that which is. Another way, however, is taken destination for the sending or the mission which someone conceives mentally, right, or in his mind, according as we are said to destine what we propose firmly by our mind.

[9:48] And and in the second way, it is said in the second, Maccabees that Eleazar destined not to admit illicit things on account of the love of life, right. And thus, destination is able to be of that which is not.

[10:13] Nevertheless, predestination, by reason of the ante cessionis, the coming before, which it implies, is able to be of that which is not, whichever way destination be taken. Little problem with the word

[10:33] destination. Okay. Now, the third article is taken from the use of the word preparatio, right? And again, Thomas distinguishes two meanings. There's a twofold preparation. One is that of the what? Undergoer, that he might undergo. and this preparation is in the preparer, right? Another is of the agent, so he might act, and this is in the what? Agent. And such a preparation is predestination, insofar as some agent, who is understanding, is said to prepare himself to what?

[11:14] Acting. Insofar as he preconceives the reason for the work he's going to do. And this, God, from eternity, prepares by predestinating, conceiving the reason of the order of some things to their what? Salvation. So anybody's going to influence you for good or for bad in this world, right? And so it comes under God's plan for you.

[11:46] Now, the fourth objection is taken from the statement of this being a preparation of grace. To the fourth, it should be said that grace is not placed in the definition of predestination, as it were, something existing in its very nature. But insofar as predestination implies a relation to grace, as of as a cause has a relation to a what? Effect. And an act to its object. Once it does not follow that predestination is something temporal, right?

[12:24] So I was reading there in St. Alphonsus there, you know. where. He's talking about quoting somebody saying, you know, it's better go to Mary than to go to Christ, because her intercession is so powerful, right? Then he quotes someone else as saying, you know, and she is displeased when you don't come to her. So I got a double reason to go to her, right? You know, why didn't you ask me?

[12:48] You know, sometimes you know in ordinary human beings, right? This idea, you know, that if you'd ask me, I would have done it for you, you know, and he's never asked me, so that's kind of interesting, huh? So God, you know, has in His plan that you're going to get grace through Mary or some other way, right? And but that's because what? I think grace is part of the definition of this, but it's an effect of the foresight, or it's an object of it.

[13:28] Now we come to this difficult Article Three here, whether God. Reprobates, huh? Some man. I don't know if there's a better word to use than reprobate.

[13:46] Rejects. To third one proceeds thus: it seems that God reprobates no man, right? For no one reprobates the one whom he loves. But God loves every man, according to that of the Book of Wisdom, eleven twenty-five. You love all the things which are, and you hate none of those things which you have made, because you didn't make sin, though. Therefore, God does not reprobate. Therefore, God reprobates no man, right?

[14:38] Moreover, if God reprobated some man, it is necessary that thus reprobation would be to the reproved as predestination to the predestined. Now, what does Plato say that likeness is a slippery thing?

[14:59] Especially when you have a likeness between things that are what far apart, A likeness of ratios. So it seems that reprobation is to the reproved as predestination is to the predestined. It seems, right? Yeah. But predestination is the cause of the salvation of the predestined.

[15:22] Therefore, reprobation would be the cause of the loss of the reproved, huh? But this is false, huh? For it is said in the Prophet Osee, "Your perdition, your loss, Israel, is from you. From me only is your aid, your help. " It's a beautiful text there.

[15:51] Therefore, God does not reprobate anybody, huh? Okay. Moreover, to no one should one impute what he cannot avoid. But if God reprobates someone, he cannot avoid that he be lost.

[16:17] For it is said in the Book of Ecclesiastes, chapter seven: Consider the works of God, that no one is able to correct him whom he despises.

[16:31] Therefore, it should not be imputed to men that they perish. But this is false. Therefore, God does not reprobate somebody. You know his problems with Calvin, people like that, right? Probably got on the wrong side of some of these questions here.

[16:51] But against this is what is said in Malachi: "I loved Jacob, but I had Esau in hatred. Hatred." tough, tough words. okay. I answered: It should be said that God reprobates some.

[17:14] Now it has been said above that predestination is a part of providence. Now it belongs to providence to allow some defect in things which are subject to providence, as has been said above. So it doesn't belong to divine providence to eliminate all evil in the world, right? For a number of reasons.

[17:39] Whence, since through divine providence men are ordered to eternal life, it belongs to divine providence that He permit or allow some to fail from the sin. And this is said to what? Reprobate them.

[18:08] Thus, therefore, just as predestination is a part of providence with respect to those who are divinely ordered to eternal salvation, so reprobation is also a part of providence with respect to those who fail from the sin or fall short. yeah. Decidunt. What do they call those trees, deciduous. Yeah. These fall. Whence reprobation does not name foreknowledge only,

[18:52] but it adds something in its definition. Just as providence, has been said above, For just as predestination includes the will of conferring both grace and glory, right? So reprobation includes the will of permitting or allowing, right, someone to fall into guilt

[19:22] and of inferring the punishment of damnation for this guilt. But see, it's kind of interesting to me the his choice of words, like as you pointed out, that they cheat them.

[19:38] And then here permitendi, permit to fall. It it's not quite the same as the predestination, where, in other words, the reprobate, the terms he uses puts it more on the person. Yeah. Whereas the opposite is the case for the predestination. Yeah. It doesn't say predestination is allowing you and I to be saved if we're saved, right? He's actually directing us, right? Giving us the grace and what we need to get there.

[20:11] But in the case he used the word allow, right? Right. You know, he's not he's not directing his men to to sin, right? Or moving them to sin, but he's allowing them to sin, right? Right. Okay. And then he's gonna punish them, right? So it's how do we say it? It's like these two aren't opposites, or there's something a little bit. Well, that's what I was saying about you know what Plato says that likeness is a dangerous thing, right?

[20:38] Mm-hmm. And you remember when I talked about I go back and take very take the most exact proportions there are the mathematical ones, right? And I say four is to six as two is to three. I say well two is to three is the ratio of a prime number to a prime number. Well then four to six is the ratio of a prime number to prime number.

[21:07] Okay. Well that's not in what the likeness consists between these two, right? Okay. Then I say well two is a even number and three is an odd number. So two to three is the ratio of a even number to an odd number. So four is an even number and then six is an odd number, right? So obviously I'm misunderstanding the likeness of these two. So you got to be very careful when you have a proportion.

[21:35] So in what way is four to six as two is to three? What way they are like really? Enables us to say proportional. What is the likeness there? How would you say it? For

[21:50] both two two thirds you use modern. Yeah. What you could probably say would be is it four is the same parts plural of six that two is a three, right? Yeah. So if you imagine the six as having three twos, four is two of those three parts, right? Yeah. Just as two is two of the three ones in in three, right? So you have to even a mathematical proportion you have to see in what way they are alike, right?

[22:22] And then you remember the famous proportion of Aristotle there in the first book of Natural hearing, where he says that the first matter is to say man and dog as clay is to sphere and cube. Well, someone might say, "Well, sphere and cube are two accidents; therefore, man and dog are two accidents." Or, clay is an actual substance; therefore, the first matter is an actual substance. Well, the first matter is not an actual substance.

[22:52] Man and dog are two actual substances. Clay is an actual substance, but the other two, sphere and cube, are not substances. So, in what does the likeness consist? Right. Because you see all these differences, right? Well, the likeness consists that just as the clay is able to be a sphere and a cube, but not at the same time. And when it's actually one, it's able to be the other.

[23:21] But if it became the other, it ceases to be the former. So the first matter is able to be a man or a dog, but not both at the same time. And when it's actually one, it's able to be the other. But if it was to become the other, it would cease to be the former, right? That's where the likeness consists, right? So it's interesting, you know, when Aristotle gives the the tools of dialectic, the third tool is the tool of difference, and the fourth is the tool of likeness.

[23:49] But in the third tool, he speaks of the tool as being the ability to find the difference. He doesn't say the fourth tool is ability to find likeness. He says it's the consideration of the likeness, right? And the Greek word is skepsis so. We get the word skeptic. That doesn't have a sense of being skeptical about it, but it means you've got to consider in what way they really are alike.

[24:11] as he points out, in the fourth tool, you're especially exercised to see a likeness of ratios because they're further apart. But then you especially need skepsis especially need consideration. In what way are these two ratios what alike? Yeah. And maybe when you get to the reply to the

[24:37] second objection, right, we'll see something of that, right? And maybe it's already clear from the body of the article, but maybe spell it out.

[24:47] Now the first one is talking about God loving all the things which are, and is hating none of those things which He has made, right? To the first, therefore, should be said that God loves all men, and also all creatures in so far as He wills some good to all.

[25:10] Not, however, does He will every good to all. In so far, therefore, as to some He does not will this good which is eternal life, He is said to have them in hate or to what reprobate them, right?

[25:29] Now the second objection is the one that's more that we're emphasizing here. To the second, it should be said that in another way has reprobation in causing than predestination.

[25:47] For predestination is a cause of that which is expected in the future life in those predestined, namely glory, and also that which is preceded in the present grace. Isn't there a psalm there? You know, it says God is the one who ties us together, grace and glory, right? God is the giver of grace and glory. It was one of the psalms that says that.

[26:15] But reprobation is not a cause of that which is in the present, namely guilt, huh? But it's the cause of being what Abandoned is the word by God, right? But it is the cause of what is rendered in the future, namely what, yeah. But guilt comes from the free will, right, through judgment of the one who is reproved and is deserted from grace, and according to this is verified the saying of the prophet that your loss is those from you.

[26:59] Yeah. So there he's pointing out the difference, right, in those two. That sort of makes sense. The word reprobator, if you're reproved, because then you you have guilt because you were proved and you fell short. So in sense, if you're damned, it's because of you. You proved, but then you fell short. Yeah.

[27:20] You could say that that reprobation is to punishment more like predestination is to glory, right? But as far as you know, the present, ah, it's not. I like that.

[27:37] Sorry, can you do that one again? Well, I'm going to say what he's saying here and the thing here. Yeah. Is that reprobation is more a cause of the punishment in a way like predestination is a cause of glory, right? But as far as the present is concerned, right, the the good deed, right, predestination is a cause of that. While reprobation is not a cause really of the.

[28:04] Yeah. Yeah. Might be a cause of his abandonment, right? I read the thing in the Summa Contra Gentiles on the Holy Spirit, and you know, in the Summa Theologiae Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas goes more into the heretics, right, and into the scriptural texts that they use deny things. And one of the reasons for denying that the Holy Spirit is God is that one of the Saint Paul don't sadden the Holy Spirit, right?

[28:36] Well, I mean, yes, saddens the Holy Spirit, that he can't be God, you know, and so on. And but Thomas explains this as a metaphor, right? And just like when you say God is angry, right, the like this consists not in having this emotion, but in the effect, right? Now, when you're angry with somebody, you're going to punish them.

[28:59] And so when God punishes us, he's metaphorically said to be angry with us, right? Well, what is the the the sadness, right? Well, if you sadden me in your company, if you make me sad, you know, I'm going to leave you. And so when God leaves or abandons somebody, right, he's said to be what saddened by what they've done, right?

[29:28] I know, you know, the time you told little kids in the grade school or something, you know. You know, you know, don't make God make God sad. And probably the kid understands this, like making mommy or daddy sad, right? Making daddy sad when you don't behave or something, right? But it's not that way with God, right? He's not really sad. But the effect of being saddened by something, you give it up, right?

[29:59] I can see as a student, right? If if someone doesn't, or Shakespeare says, huh? You know, he's talking about philosophy and so on. If you take no delight in what you're studying, you're not going to get any profit out, right? So if you if you are saddened by the study of economics or like that, then you're going to give up the study of economics or whatever it might be, right?

[30:21] What they call it, the dismal science or something. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But if you take no delight in it, you you give it up, right? And so if God abandons you, he said metaphorically to be sad, right? Because he does something that is like the effect of sadness in us.

[30:46] Now the third objection is saying, well, if God reprobates me, then he's responsible for my damnation, right? So on. To the third, it should be said that the reprobation of God does not take away anything of the power, right, or ability of the one reprobated.

[31:08] Whence, when it's said that the one reprobated cannot but attain grace, right? It should not be understood according to an absolute impossibility, but according to a what condition? Yeah.

[31:27] Just as it's said above that the predestined is necessarily saved by a condition or what necessity, because it does not take away freedom of the will.

[31:42] Whence, although someone is not able to attain grace who is reproved by God, nevertheless, in this sin or that he what falls, right? Then this happens from his own what free will. Whence he merits right that reputed to him in what guilt Okay. I really haven't studied Calvin. but. I think he got a little bit off of this, didn't he? Oh yeah. He probably exaggerated the likeness of reprobation to predestination.

[32:26] Yeah. Yes, that's part of the problem with the Tocqueville, right? You wanted to reject this idea of determinism, right? Because he's a great believer in human liberty.

[32:39] And you know, Gobineau was at one time his his secretary, right? You know, then Gobineau went off crazy ideas about races and so on, and became very popular with the anti-Semitic circles around Wagner and so on. Goes all the way down to Hitler, you know. And and and and Tocqueville very angry with him, you know, very very he finds his ideas very dangerous, you know. But a person could obviously misunderstand this whole teaching here, you know, and think that reprobation is saying that God is the cause of your damnation, right?

[33:21] And when it's perditio ex te, from you, huh? But I always have a lot of fun with that, I say, you know, if you do good, you should thank God for it, right? But if you do something bad, you should blame yourself, huh? It seems unfair, right, that that you have to take responsibility chiefly for the bad you've done, and you can't take responsibility chief for the good you've done.

[33:51] Someone else gets gets the credit for it, but that's that's the way it is. I don't think most people could accept that, you know. They had they find it hard to accept, right? If I'm responsible for the bad I've done, then I'm going to take credit for the good I've done, right?

[34:10] That's that's that's a very that's missing the point, missing the truth. You can't take credit for it, but you still get the benefit. That's what I always call the grace is kind of like an IOU from God. He gives you the IOU, but he's telling he's going to pay you something in the fifth because you don't deserve it. He has good.

[34:43] Do we get to answer one more article? here? Yes. Yeah. So, Article Four: Whether the predestined are chosen by God? To the fourth, one proceeds thus: It seems that the predestined are not chosen by God.

[35:03] For as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter, the Divine Names, just as the bodily sun emits its light, not choosing right among them, but it emits its light upon all bodies, right? Huh? So God is goodness, huh? That's another good example. Light is being a slippery thing, right? Because in what way is God

[35:29] extending or bestowing goodness upon things like the sun shining upon bodies, right? Well, everything that is gets some kind of goodness from God, right? Huh? There's a certain likeness there, but maybe you're what? not all the same goodness Yeah, yeah.

[35:48] But the divine goodness is commuted, is communicated, especially to some according to the partaking of grace and what, glory. Therefore, God, like the sun, without choice, communicates grace and what, glory, huh? Which pertains to what predestination?

[36:16] One question. Sorry. Why why this question? This article, or but maybe it's coming back to that where I was kind of this maybe this is now where we're coming into the will. Yeah, choice names more the act of the will, you know, although it involves reason too. But it's usually taking this naming more the act of the will.

[36:41] And so, therefore, the reason why this would come after the other ones because of the will follows. What is known? God would will to reward those who are saved. Once he foresees he saves, he wills it so in some way. Choice. That's right. How the question comes up?

[37:11] Yeah, since he's, I don't know, asking is choice a cause of predestination, right? Okay. Moreover, he says, second objection: choice is of those things which are, but predestination from eternity is of those things which are not. Therefore, some are predestined without what? Yeah. Maybe he's thinking a little bit too much of our choice, right?

[37:48] Moreover, choice implies a certain discretion, discrimination. But God wills that all men be saved, as is said in one Timothy chapter two. But predestination, therefore predestination, which foreorders men to salvation, is without what choice, huh? But against this is what is said in the Epistle to the Ephesians. He chose us in Himself before the constitution of the world. That's a beautiful quote.

[38:31] So you say you got to thank God for choosing you to be to begin with, and then for choosing all kinds of other things too.

[38:41] Now, trying to answer Father's question, I answered should be said that predestination, in its what, rationum, maybe that's its definition or meaning, presupposes choice, right? Okay. And choice presupposes love. The reason for which is that predestination, as has been said, is a part of providence. Providence, however, as prudence,

[39:21] is a reason existing in the understanding that is what commanding, right, Of the order of the order of things to an end. But something is not commanded to be ordered to the end except there be a will of the end.

[39:42] Whence the predestination of some to eternal life presupposes by reason that God wills their what salvation, to which pertains choice and love. Love, in so far as he wills for them this good of eternal salvation, for to love is to will good to someone. So Aristotle says in the rhetoric.

[40:17] But choice, in so far as what he wills this good to some before others, since some he what. Yeah. But choice and love are ordered otherwise in us and in God.

[40:45] For in us the will and loving does not cause the good, but from the pre-existing good we are incited or aroused to love it,

[41:05] and therefore we choose someone whom we what love. And thus choice precedes love in us. Now, interesting that of course, not a Latin word there. If you Latin text, it's dilectio, right It comes from the word what choice right And so you know in the text in, right? It comes from the word what choice, right? And so, you know, in the text, in the treatise on love, there in that prima secundae he had the word amor, which we translate by love sometimes, right?

[41:39] How do you translate dilectio, right? But sometimes I translate by phrase, and they call chosen love, right? But in God it is inverse. For the will of Him, by which He wills good to someone by loving them, is the cause that that good is had by Him before others. And thus it is clear that love is presupposed to what choice in definition, and choice to predestination. Whence all those predestined are chosen and what loved, huh?

[42:28] So what does he say? He's saying that because. Because God loves us and has chosen us, therefore He has what predestined us, right? Okay. Now, the first one there is a text of Dionysius comparing God to the Son, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that if one considers or the communicating of the divine goodness in general without choice, right, He communicates His goodness in so far as there is nothing that does not partake something of His what goodness.

[43:19] But if one considers the communicating of this or that good, huh, He does not give it without what choice? Because some goods He gives to some, which He does not give to others. Keep Thomas a much better mind than me.

[43:39] And thus, in the bestowal of grace and glory, one should pay attention to what choice. So He chose her to be the Mother of God, right? And therefore, there was a collatio of grace. That's why she's full of grace.

[44:11] Okay. So, in some way, God is like the Son. In some ways, He's what not, right? Okay. Panos has a quick question. Yeah. So He chose her to be the Mother of God, and we said that love comes before choosing, right? So He loved her. Yeah. That's it. Just trying to get it down in my mind. So He loved Our Lady first, and then He chose her, gave her the grace to be the Mother of God, and chose her as a consequence.

[44:43] Okay. Notice that text. You know that they have it was in the article three there in the first objection. The Dei just omnia cui sunt, right? You wouldn't say He chose all things which are so much, right? Because that implies a certain discretion there, right? To give to one which you don't give to maybe another, right? Yes. Okay. And you know, kind of these famous things of of origin, you know, where he thought that all creatures were created equal to begin with.

[45:34] And then some had to sin, and some sin more than others, and some turn more to God, and so on. So then they got stationed. Yeah. Why? The truth is that God, you know, chose creatures to be unequal, right? And partly so there could be order among them, right? And partly so there could be cause and effect, right?

[46:01] And so creatures could partake of what causality, right? So if we all do the same things, there wouldn't be any teaching, right? And yeah. And Thomas says, you know, that the order of causes is even better than the order of effects, because the cause is better than the effect. So if you didn't have causes, you'd have the misaligned order of causes.

[46:32] When you read Aristotle's texts, especially in some books like the Metaphysics, there, the fourteen books of wisdom, where would I get without Thomas's commentary? You know. Yeah. You know, you stumble around and and you see these these modern, you know, what's the trend to these modern scholars? You know, are trying to work on their own, you know, and and they can't understand the text of Aristotle, right?

[46:57] So you need kind of an order there, right? To proportionate, huh? You know, you read the first commentators in Aristotle. and. All they do is kind of paraphrase them, and they don't even paraphrase them accurately, you know. And you know, it takes a long time for it to build up, you know. Trying to get to Thomas, the guy who fully is capable of understanding Aristotle and explaining it to us.

[47:32] But then you need people like De Koninck or Monsignor Dionne, you know, to proportion Aristotle and Thomas to them, you know. Deaconic would go through the text of Thomas, you know. So just teaching how to read Thomas, that's all. And then you can go out to somebody standing with them on your own, you know. But you have to realize how carefully you have to read these people, huh?

[47:53] Do you think did Saint Thomas use Averroes and Addicenna in order to learn from them, or learn things from them? Yeah, but he also sees certain mistakes in them too. And I mean, for that matter, you know, Albert the Great and Thomas both say that Plato and Aristotle are the chief philosophers, huh? But Aristotle, that doesn't mean that Thomas makes them equal, right? Because he calls Thomas the philosopher by antonomasia Aristotle calls Homer the poet, right?

[48:24] Yeah. But if you read Plato's dialogues, you can see how much Aristotle. Learned from Plato, right? Even though some things he disagreed with, right, and had reasons for disagreeing with them, you know. There's a story told though of Plato coming into the academy and just Aristotle there one day, and he says the mind of the school was here. This kind of thing, you know. You've heard me talk about that, huh?

[49:02] If that's true, there's no envy in Plato recognizing his pupil was being superior to him. And then you know, Albert is supposed to have arranged a conversation himself and Plato there in front of the students. And of course, Thomas excelled, and he says this guy you call a dumb ox, he's got to be right around the world. And then Albert, who lived much longer than Thomas, at the end of his life, you know, they say went down to Paris to defend the teaching of Thomas, you know.

[49:31] And and then take the beautiful example of you know Haydn Mozart right, where Mozart can excel Haydn and Haydn recognized it. There's no jealousy, no no envy, you know. But when you read the thing about envy in the Gospels there, you realize this is behind the rejection, you know, of Christ by the Pharisees and so on. Realize that terrible thing, envy is. It's diabolical, he says in the Book of Wisdom.

[49:56] There is it. By the envy of the devil, death came into the world, sin came into the world, and you know I actually had some text there from some of the English novelists, you know, who are somewhat perceptive about human beings and saw that envy is the great thing, you know, that men are more apt to have the fault of envy than not to be merciful, right?

[50:22] Of course, you see in America, right? You know, when somebody gets injured or something, and people kind of come to their help, you know, they'll contribute money to a stranger, you know, who's in need, you know. It's a generosity of Americans, you see. That's not our most common fault than the lack of generosity or lack of pity. But in sense, you're relieving somebody who's below you in the sense because of what's happened to them and so on.

[50:44] And some they need you, right? But what the novelists describe is so funny. He says they say it's hard for a man to bear good fortune well, you know, get that, you know, you know. But he says even harder for his friends to bear his good fortune.

[51:02] And and some of them see it as diabolical, which it is envy, you know. And the you know I see it as a philosopher in the history of philosophy. You know, I think that you know it's envy, you know. And you read you read David Hume, he talks about Aristotle. Oh, he's he's nothing now anymore, you know. You know, nobody reads him anymore, you know. Yeah. Even today, you know, I mean, in the crazy way we live in, you know, I mean, there's there's more.

[51:32] You know, papers and Aristotle are better than anybody else, even now, today. You know, despite the confusion that goes on now, not that they're very good for the most part, but they still, you know, and you know, if you look at introductions to philosophies, the most common work would be the Apology of Plato, right? I mean, you just can't get away from these guys at some point.

[51:52] But they don't really, you know, sit down and learn from these guys like they should. So. Someone who wins the lottery is a good example.

[52:09] He doesn't know what he's going to do all without his money. It's even harder for his friends to swallow his great fortune. But everyone else in Canada, you know, they made a study of people who had won these large sums of money, and they're all just about. Less happy than they were before they won, the money And they went through crazy things they got divorced. You know, I mean these are being crazy things, and and now they're more miserable than they were before they won the money.

[52:41] And most people think, you know, you know, if I get that money, I, I, be happy for life, you know. And so, it's not so. They, they, uh,

[52:56] when I was in high school, the professor was saying, money isn't everything, you know. And this class cynic there said, you know, that's true, but what it is a no buy. You know, the idea, but you see, but it these people end up being unhappy, you know, despite that.

[53:16] So, where are we now? Okay. Just as a second. Second objection, yeah. Okay. That when the will of the one choosing is provoked to choosing by the good already existing in the thing, right, then is necessary that choice be of those things which are right. So Aristotle in the Books on friendship talks about true friendship. You know, you choose your friends, right? It's not just a matter of feeling, right?

[53:57] But you, you choose them, right? As happens in our choice, right? But in God, it is otherwise, as has been said, right? And therefore, as Augustine says, God chooses what those things which are not,

[54:18] but neither does He what er who chooses, huh? Now the third objection is taken from God wishes all men to be saved, right? Well, this goes back to the distinction between the antecedent and the consequent will. To the third, it should be said, it has been said above, that God wishes all men to be saved antecedently, right? Which is not simply to will, but secundum quid, huh?

[54:52] Not however, consequently, which is simpliciter to will, huh? So it's again that distinction between simply and secundum quid, huh? Now, if I was back at college, I'd probably say to students, you know, for antecedently, I want you all to pass the course.

[55:10] But after I correct exams, my will may not be that you all pass. So simply speaking, I don't will you all to pass. Considering your merits and demerits. you're skipping class, and you're, you know, you're being asleep in class, and so on.

[55:34] Okay. This, this is not. Next article is too long to go into now. It's been 4: 15 here, so.