Prima Pars
90. Aquinas on Predestination (ST I, Q.23, Arts. 5–6): Is It Caused by Foreseen Merits, and Is It Certain?
Class of 2007-06-07
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/090-aquinas-on-predestination-st-i-q-23-arts-5-6-is-it-caused/

[0:00] Name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Amen. God our enlightenment. Guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, angelic Doctor. pray for us and. Help us to understand all eternity. Father and the Son, Holy Spirit.

[0:26] So we're up to Article Five here in Question Twenty-Three, huh? Yes. Whether foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination, huh? So to the fifth one proceeds. Thus, it seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.

[0:51] For the Apostle says, and that's Saint Paul, Romans eight, whom he foreknows, these also he foredestined. And the gloss of Ambrose on the ninth chapter of Romans, I take mercy on the one that I take mercy on. He says, I give mercy to that one whom I foreknow will turn with his whole heart towards me. Therefore, it seems that foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination.

[1:32] More predestination, divine predestination, divine predestination includes the divine will, which cannot be unreasonable. Like the Pope was telling us. Since predestination is the proposal of taking mercy, Augustine says. But there can be no other reason of predestination except the foreknowledge of merits. Therefore, the foreknowledge of merits is the cause or the reason for the predestination.

[2:10] Third objection. Moreover, there is no iniquity, huh? Before God, I suppose iniquity comes from the what? One, one injustice, huh? No inequality, right? Yeah. As is said in Romans chapter nine. But it seems iniquitous or unjust that equal things, unequal things, are given to those who are equal. But all men are equal by nature and by original sin. But there is a inequality to be noted in them, according to the merits or demerits of their own actions.

[2:57] Therefore, God does not prepare unequal things for men by predestinating them and reprobating them, except on account of the difference, except on account of the knowledge of their different merits. So you're convinced by the opposite side? That's pretty good. That last one. Not quite. But against this is what the apostle says in the epistle to Titus: Not from the works of justice which we do, but according to His mercy He saves us.

[3:40] But just as He saves us, so He predestines those who will be saved. Therefore, foreknowledge of the merits is not the cause or the reason for the predestination.

[3:56] So Thomas is going to answer now. I answered should be said that since predestination includes the will, this has been said above. Thus, to inquire about the reason for predestination is like when one asks about the reason for the divine will. But it has been said above that one cannot assign a cause of the divine will on the part of the act of willing. And why not?

[4:29] Yeah. Yeah, Otherwise something would be moved like that, yeah. And God's act of will is His own substance. So if there is a cause of the act of the will of God, then there be a cause of God Himself.

[4:57] But one can assign, or is possible, to assign a reason on the side of the things will, in so far as God wills this to be on account of that.

[5:11] No one, however, was of such insane mind. He hasn't seen the 21st century yet, but who would say that merits were the cause of divine predestination on the side of the act of predestinating?

[5:33] But this is comes under question: Whether on the side of the effect, predestination has some cause. And this is to ask whether God foreorders Himself to give the effect of predestination to someone on account of some what merits.

[6:01] Now there are some who said that the effect of predestination was foreordained to someone on account of merits preexisting in another life, and this was the position of Origen original Democrat,

[6:19] who laid down that human souls were created from the beginning, and on account of the diversity of their works, they obtained diverse statuses, united in this world to what bodies.

[6:35] But this opinion the Apostle excludes in Romans chapter nine, saying that when we are not yet born or done something of good or bad, not from works, but from the one calling has been said that the greater, the older will serve the lesser. Jacob and Isa, I guess.

[6:59] Now there are others who said that merits preexisting in this in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians laid down that the beginning of doing good is from us, but the consummation is from God, as opposed to that psalm I was quoting last time, he gives to his beloved in sleep. This is said no. The Pelagian is saying he gives to his beloved in their waking up.

[7:36] No, well Scripture says he gives to them when they're sleeping, right? So God is entirely before any activity. And thus, from this it happens that to someone is given the effect of predestination, not to another, because

[8:01] one gives himself a a beginning, right, by preparing himself, and not another. But this is against what the Apostle says in the second letter to the Corinthians, that we're not enough to what think anything from ourselves, as it were, from ourselves, as I mentioned last time, Aristotle himself had said this in the *Ethics*, the beginning of this, is from outside from God.

[8:31] But no beginning before can be found than what thinking, right, cogitatio. You can see why Saint Paul, why Saint Augustine, who was much taken up with refuting the Pelagians, right, spoke about the importance of Saint Paul, right, for his understanding of these things, and you can see that in Augustine's works.

[8:55] Whence it cannot be said that there is some beginning in us that exists that is the reason for the effect of predestination. Whence there were others who said that merits following the effect of predestination are the reasons of the predestination; that therefore God gives grace to someone and foreordains it to be given to him, because he foresees that he will use the grace well, just as if a king gives to some soldier a horse whom he knows will use that horse well.

[9:40] But these seem to distinguish between that which is from grace and that which is from free will or free judgment, right? Which cannot be the same from what both. In a sense, when they use in Latin there, free judgment for free will, right, is kind of almost a naming by cause. It's because we have free judgment that we have free will. If our judgment of what is good and bad was determined by nature, then we would not be free.

[10:27] But because at least about means, our judgment is, yeah, then we have freedom of will. So he says these seem to distinguish between what is from grace and what is from free will, as if the same thing could not be from both. You can distinguish between those two things, but not in the sense that something has to be from one and not from the other, right? Or this is from that and not from the other.

[11:03] For it is manifest that that which is of grace is the effect of predestination, and this cannot be laid down as the reason for predestination, because this is in fact included under predestination. If therefore something other on our side was the reason for predestination, this would be something outside the effect of predestination.

[11:36] But it is not, however, distinct what is from free will and what is from predestination, just as it is not distinct what is from what.

[11:50] Yeah, yeah. Okay. So is this thing being moved by the mug or by me? Oh yeah. For divine providence produces its effects through the operations of the second causes, as has been said, and predestination is a part of the providence.

[12:21] Whence that which is through free will is also from what predestination. So it should be said therefore that the effect of predestination we are able to consider in two ways,

[12:40] and one way in particular, right? And thus nothing prevents some effect of predestination being a cause and reason for another effect of predestination, the posterior of the before, the after of the before, according to the.

[13:02] Reason of final cause, but the before of the posterior by reason of a meritorious cause, which is reduced to the disposition of what matter, right? You know how I asked the question about the Hail Mary, huh? You say Hail Mary, full of grace, the Lord is with thee. We take those second words there, full of grace, the Lord is with thee, and I ask students, we're talking about causes.

[13:37] Is she full of grace because the Lord is with her, or is the Lord with her because she's full of grace? God was with her, she's full of grace. Or is it a bit of both, right? You say. But the Lord being with her is like the efficient cause of her being full of grace, and her being full of grace would be like what he says here, the disposition of the matter, right?

[14:04] So that she's a suitable temple in which the Lord can dwell fully, right? So there can be two different kinds of causes involved there. Well, here he's talking about what

[14:19] one's merits, right? Can be in a sense a cause of one's what? Yeah, as it were, what kind of cause? It's a material cause, but in the broad sense, the disposition whereby. But your being saved is a cause of your merits in the sense of what The end yeah being saved is a cause of your merits in the sense of what? The end, yeah. That's the sake of which.

[14:49] Just as if we say that God, foreorders, huh? He's going to give someone glory from his what merits, huh? And then he foreordered he would give someone grace that he might merit glory, right? So grace is a cause of glory in what sense?

[15:17] Yeah, prior cause. But glory because he was giving grace in the sense of the end, yeah. So you can, in that sense, say one thing is a cause of another. But another way one can consider the effect of predestination in general,

[15:38] and in this way, it's impossible that the whole effect of predestination, general, has some cause on our side. Because whatever is in man ordering him to salvation is comprehended or included under as a whole under the effect of what predestination. Even the very being, very preparation for grace,

[16:05] for neither this can come about except through the divine aid. So he gives to his beloved in sleep That's one meaning I was giving to that. very beautiful Psalm 126 the correct number. yeah. But here Thomas quotes not that, but what Lamentations.

[16:24] Convert us, Lord, to you, and we will be converted. But predestination has, in this way, on the side of the effect, for a reason, the divine goodness, right? To which the whole effect of predestination is ordered, as to an end, and from which it proceeds, as from a, but beginning, first moving us towards this. So as you say in the last book there say in the last book there?

[17:00] I am the Alpha and the Omega. Those Greek letters have got a lot of mileage. But I know it's said about three times, you know, something like that, at least in the Book of Apocalypse, Revelation. But finally, you'll say, you know, I am the alpha and the Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the what? End. Of course, beginning refers to the mover. Although in some sense the end is the beginning too, but but a lot of times the the beginning is restricted to the causes that are prior and being

[17:42] to the mover. Okay, now the first objection taken from this text of Paul and the clause of Ambrose To the first, therefore, it, should be said that the use of grace foreknown is not the reason for the what bestowing of the grace, except by reason of what the final cause.

[18:18] What does that mean? What is he saying there? The grace is given in order to bring about the final cause of holiness and union with God, but not it's not on account of any goodness in the thing. Yeah, yeah. That the grace was given. But God foresees that you are going to use the grace well, and therefore achieve the end. So he's already got to that end.

[18:47] Somebody else might not use the grace well, right? He's going to be reprobated. Okay, now the second one is talking about the objection here from Benedict the Sixteenth, right? The g will of God cannot be unreasonable, right? As he said in the Regensburg address. To the second, it should be said that predestination does have a reason, right? On the side of the effect in general, which is the what?

[19:20] Divine goodness. In particular, though, one effect is a reason for another, right? That's a distinction made in the body of the article. He's applying it. to the objection. that says there wouldn't be reasonable what God is doing. Well, in general, there is a reason for all He does, and that's the divine what? Goodness, huh? Augustine says because God is good, we are. He's helping because God is good.

[19:46] We're predestined if we are, right? And but in particular, one thing can be ordered to another in predestination. now the third objection Right, this is the thing that's hard for democratic things. I think I mentioned before that you know the there are three major sources of the modern world and its customs, and just to review those for a second here because one of them is relevant to this.

[20:18] The first major source of the modern world is customs, is the mercantile origin of the modern city in the late Middle Ages, and that gave a kind of mercantile, a commercial stamp, you might say, to our cities,

[20:38] and that took place in the late Middle Ages. The cities were not that important yet, but they were founded by merchants as opposed to the Greek cities, which were founded by aristocrats. And so the world historian McNeill says that the difference in the origin of these cities covered the whole civilization. The word civilization comes from the word city, civitas does. And so in a subtle way it colored the whole civilization.

[21:08] So even the most active commercial cities in ancient times, right, the aristocratic stamp was never entirely lost. And the second major source of the modern world and its customs is the mathematical union of natural science and technical science in the 17th, 18th centuries.

[21:31] Of course, this changed us in an outward way, obviously, with everything that came from this. Everything runs electricity, would that be here, et cetera, et cetera. But it also, as the great physicist Heisenberg said, it changed man's attitude towards nature from a contemplative one to a practical one. What can you do with nature, and so on.

[21:54] And you know how it's very important. I happened to be at the dentist on. Wednesday, and I picked up a copy of the National Geographic there, and I guess they must have had an article in there in the last issue, the previous issue, where some scientist was talking about his belief in God or something like that. And the thing was filled a whole bunch of letters, you know, say, how can he be so superstitious?

[22:16] You know, how can a man who's trained in science possibly say these things, you know? And and it's going back to the Middle Ages, you know, all these superstitions, and I was kind of struck by that, you know, in National Geographic, although they're not quite that, you know, it's not a humanist magazine or something like that, but I mean they're they're really, you know, laying into this sort of thing.

[22:40] Now the third major source of the modern world and its customs is the democratic revolutions and the social condition of relative equality, right, as opposed to the hereditary inequality that you had in ancient times and even medieval times. And de Tocqueville's book, Democracy in America, especially the second volume, right, is the single most important work to understand this. And in that second volume, de Tocqueville talks about the influence of democratic customs upon government, upon our feelings and our manners and our government and so on.

[23:22] He talks about its effect upon the whole life of the mind, and he says all kinds of interesting things. I mean, like for example, he speaks of how aristocratic times. He always contrasts aristocratic times. They look to the past for their poetic inspiration. So the greatest poet there of antiquity, there Homer, right? He looks back to the Trojan War, which is way in the past, and men were, you know, something more than they are nowadays.

[23:51] You know, why we think of Star Wars and like this, we're always like 1984, you know, which is the future with this Mr. Red, Brave New World, and so on, all these science fiction things. They're all set in the future, you know, some kind of a,

[24:09] you know, you go out of present into the future rather than the past. It's curious, huh? But you can study Tocqueville some time to see some of this. He says democracy, especially encourages pantheistic ideas in religion. That's only true, right? And he points to this in German philosophy in the 19th century. If you go through the increasing symbol armor or something with official church texts, you'll see that Rome is always correcting some German theologian for his pantheistic ideas.

[24:48] And Karl Rahner and Jung and so on, Küng rather, they had, you know, they had pantheistic notions and more orthodox wasm the pantheistic notions and this sort of thing, huh? So it seems to be not democratic, right? So democratic customs makes it especially hard for us to understand this aspect of divine

[25:12] foresight, divine predestination, yeah. So to the third, it should be said that from the divine goodness can be taken the reason of the predestination of some and the reprobation of others.

[25:36] For in this way, God is said to make all things in account of His goodness, so that in things divine goodness might be what represented.

[25:52] But it's necessary that the divine goodness, which in itself is one and simple, right? And those are three of the attributes of the divine substance, right? It's perfection or goodness, but there is one and what simple, right? It must be represented in many forms, huh? In things, huh?

[26:15] On account of this fact that created things are not able to attain to the simplicity of God, and hence it is that for the completion of the universe are required diverse grades of things,

[26:34] of which some are high and some have some hold a high place and some a what? Yeah, infimum, in the universe, huh? As opposed to what the original democrat, their origin, right? He said, you know, well, they're all equal and spiritual substances to begin with, right? And some turn to God more or less, and some turn away from God more or less, and that's how God is diversity, right?

[27:05] As if that was not intended by God, right? Why the order of the universe is really the greatest thing in creation, and among other things, he thought that diversity you couldn't have what the order of cause and effect, and therefore nothing like God is being a cause,

[27:32] and that this multi-formness of grades, many forms of grades be conserved in things. God even permits some bad things to what come about, lest many bad, many good things be impeded, right? So the lion wouldn't have any dinner if he didn't have the death of the yeah, and it wouldn't be the the what nobility of the martyrs without the savageness of the persecutors and so on.

[28:08] Thus, therefore, if we consider the whole race of men, the whole human race, as the whole what university of things, if you compare them, right, to see the thing, God wishes in men as regards some whom He predestines to represent His goodness by way of what mercy, taking pity on them, right? As regards others whom He reprobates by punishing to represent His goodness by way of what justice.

[28:46] You know, he said, my first teacher there, custodier there, you're going to give glory to God no matter what He says. If you repent, you're going to give glory to His mercy. If you don't, you'll give glory to His. Justice, but you can't avoid it. He's going to win out anyway, so it's stuck in my mind. I mean, how true that was. He said that Roman Casuri, my teacher of philosophy, that I worked very closely with when I was at the College of Saint Thomas in 1854, 1858 at that time.

[29:21] He's gone now. He's dead. Good man. In this cause, the Apostle signs in Romans chapter nine, saying, "God wishing to show His anger, that's a metaphor for His what? Justice, huh? And to make known His power, huh? Sustains that is permits in much patience, huh? These vessels of anger, right? Aft to what? Perish, right? So he might show the glories, the wealth of his glory in the vessels of mercy, which is prepared in glory, right?

[30:16] And Second Timothy. In a great house there are not only gold and silver vessels, but also wooden ones, huh? Clay ones, some in honor and some in what?

[30:34] Yeah, okay. Chamber pots. This is before the invention of the flushing toilet, right? Oh. But wherefore he chooses these in glory and reprobates them, right? Has no reason except the divine what? Will. Once Augustine says, on the greatest work there, Gospel of John, where wherefore he draws this one and does not draw that one. Um, I do not wish to what judge, huh? Do not wish to judge.

[31:17] Telling you not to judge. If you don't want to what, be mistaken. Just as also in natural things one can assign a reason, huh? Since the first matter as a whole is in itself uniform, right? Wherefore one part of it is under the form of fire, which is the most noble of the elements in the ancient chemistry, and the other under the form of earth, so constituted by God in the beginning.

[31:50] It has a reason for this, so there might be a diversity of species in what natural things. But wherefore this part of matter is under that form and the other one under another one, that depends on the divine will, simple.

[32:09] Just as it depends upon the simple will of the artist that this stone is in that part of the wall and this one in that part, huh?

[32:20] Although the reason of the art has it that some should be here and some should be there, right? Nevertheless, on account of this, there is not iniquity in God, right?

[32:39] If unequal things he prepares for ones that are not unequal. For this would be against the reason of justice, if the effect of predestination was rendered from debt, as if there was odas, right? And not was given from grace.

[33:03] And if it was gratuitous; it wouldn't be from grace. as St. Paul says. But in those things which are given freely or from grace, one can for for his what desire give to whom he wishes, right? More or less. So long as he subtracts from no one but is owed him, right? And this, therefore, is without the what prejudicing justice, huh?

[33:34] And this is what the father of the family says in Matthew twenty in the parable: "Take what is yours and go. " Of course, not listen to me. What I will to do, right? See, that's hard for the democratic mind to kind of fully accept, huh? But those reprobated are not done so without justice, right? But that he gives to some more abundantly than others. There's a reason why he does that in general, right?

[34:06] That makes this diversity. But why this one in particular? And that that depends upon his what simple will, right? Okay. Just like an artist, you know, is going to make a beautiful statue out of this piece of metal, and something else is going to do something as a post or something, right? And and it's just as good marble, maybe the other one, right? But can the marble complain, right?

[34:31] Or St. Paul has the one about the clay, right? He fashioned some vessels that are going to be used for honorable things, like freaking wine or something, and others that are used for unmentionable things and so on. And well, can the clay say it's not right?

[34:52] So that's tough love. huh. Let's go on to Article Six now, Whether predestination is certain. To the sixth, one proceeds thus: It seems that predestination is not certain,

[35:24] because on that in Apocalypse chapter three, hold what you have, let someone else get your crown, right? Take your crown. Augustine says that another would not what take it on unless this one had what failed or lost.

[35:48] So, is possible to acquire and lose a crown, which is the effect of what predestination? Therefore, predestination is not certain. That's interesting how how we're said to to reign with Christ in heaven, right? How kingship is tied up with this seeing the first truth, and of course in the Gospel St. John when he says, "Are you a king?" He says, "Christ says, 'For this was I born, for this I came into the world, that I might give testimony unto the truth testimony unto the truth.

[36:21] ' Right? So the connection there between being king and the truth is interesting. And they use the word crown, right? Shakespeare uses the phrase of the crowned truth, so that's very interesting.

[36:42] I I notice how in in Thomas and in the Scripture itself and so on, sometimes they only mention Christ as being king and priest, and back in the Psalm one or nine and so on, they leave out as being what prophet. But then I think that king involves not only the command and directing our lives, but also his being what prophet. Yeah, yeah, is is setting the truth right.

[37:13] That comes out in other passages mentioned, right? I used to call the statement about contradiction right the king of all statements, because it rules all the others over. Yeah, yeah, oh yeah, oh yeah. I get this.

[37:33] I stick that in the eye. I get that into your mind. Yes, sirree. It made an impression on me. Moreover, the possibly laid down, nothing impossible follows as Aristotle says in the. Book of Wisdom. But it's possible for someone predestined, as Peter, for example, to sin, right, and then to be killed, right. But this taking place, then the effect of predestination would be frustrated.

[38:23] Therefore, this is not impossible. Therefore, predestination is not certain. Moreover, whatever God was able to do, He can do. But He was able to not predestinate predestin whom He predestined. Therefore, now He's able to not predestine him. Therefore, predestination is not what

[38:51] certain. Are you convinced by the opposite side? That was clever. Was it was it Voltaire supposed to have gone through, you know, taking all the objections, just bother his Catholic friends?

[39:06] I see a quote from Voltaire today, or right somewhere. He said, "What he ever prayed for was that my enemies would look ridiculous." But against this is what is said by the gloss on Romans eight, whom He foreknew, He predestined, right?

[39:39] Predestination is the foreknowledge and preparation of the benefits of God, which most certainly, right, by which most certainly, certissime, right, is the Latin. Most surely, right, are freed. Whoever are what freedom.

[40:01] Now Thomas says, "I answer it should be said that predestination most surely, right, and infallibly achieves its effect, right. But nevertheless, it does not place what necessity upon things that the effect from necessity come about. This comes out of what we saw in general about foresight. foresight. For it has been said above that predestination is a part of providence, but not all things which are subject to providence are necessary.

[40:42] But some happen contingently according to the condition of the proximate cause. causes which divine providence orders such effects. And nevertheless, the order of providence is infallible, as has been shown, right. So God, what God's providence is certain, but for some things He orders necessary causes, right? So those things will necessarily happen, right? Other things He has contingent causes, and they're going to take place too, but contingently.

[41:22] That's kind of the marvelous thing about divine providence. And I say that's why they compare, you know, what the poet does in his plot, right, where he makes chance events, right, where someone comes at just the right moment, or

[41:36] he orders these events for what an effect that is pleasing to the audience. And nevertheless, the order of providence is infallible, as has been shown above. Thus, therefore, the order predestination is certain.

[41:57] And nevertheless, the free will is not taken away, from which the effect of predestination comes about in contingent way. So he's just bringing that under what we saw already under providence.

[42:18] And for this, we now to also consider what we said above about the divine knowledge, the divine will. About both of them, we said that they did not take contingency away from things, although they are most what certain, most sure, and unable to fail, right? Fail proof, fail safe.

[42:45] Now the first objection is saying, "What about that crown you could lose, right? " The first, therefore, it should be said, that a crown is said to be as someone in two ways. In one way, from the divine predestination, and thus no one what loses his crown. In another way, from the merit of grace,

[43:16] for what we merit is in some way ours, right? And thus someone is able to lose the crown that he merits. You can say right through a mortal sin that gets into later on.

[43:35] Another takes the crown lost, insofar as in place of it he is what. For God does not permit some to fall but that He raise up others For God does not permit some to fall, but that He what. Raise others. Yeah. Raise up others. Yeah. According to that of Job, chapter thirty-four, he crushes many and numerous ones, and he makes others to stand for them. Thus, in the place of the angels falling, are substituted what men.

[44:20] In the place of the Jews, the Gentiles. He is substituted in the state of grace. Also, regards this that he that he takes the crown of the one falling, that the goods which the other made right, he rejoices in eternal life. In which everyone rejoices about the goods, both by himself and done by what others. Yeah. So I guess to get there, we'll be rejoicing more about what others have done than what we've done. Maybe our sins cause somebody else praying for our company Yeah yeah

[45:15] But St Teresa Visio says there's somebody I don't know about that's praying for me. That's why I haven't. Yeah. So we see all those interesting connections there when you get there, you know.

[45:32] If you get to the other place, I mean, you're not going to be very interested in who helped you to get there. So that rejoices you got to be willing to hate them I suppose.

[45:46] Now the second objection, right, is saying, "Well, can't the man who is predestined sin?" Right. To the second, it should be said that although it is possible for the one who's predestined to die in mortal sin, right, considered by himself, right, considered by itself, nevertheless, this is impossible. It being laid down, insofar as it's laid down for him to be what predestined, whence it does not follow that predestination can what fail.

[46:25] Okay. Of course, there's some things that are possible absolutely, or by themselves, they're not possible given something else, right? Could I be standing now instead of sitting? Yeah. But can I be standing when I am sitting? No. So you have to see that distinction there, right? If you

[46:51] just consider me by myself, my muscles and my times, I could be standing now. But you consider the fact that I'm sitting now, I can't be standing now. Right. Yeah. And so, considering the fact that so and so is predestined, right, then he cannot die in mortal sin. He might commit mortal sin, but he's going to be forgiven or something. Um, but he can't die in mortal sin, right?

[47:19] Even though, if you consider him by himself, apart from the fact he's predestined, yeah, he could die in mortal sin. Okay. Yeah. Okay. Now the third objection is throwing it back in God now, right? Can't God will differently than he does, right? So. To the third, it should be said that predestination includes the divine will, as has been said above, and has

[47:55] been said above that God to will something created is necessary, what? ex suppositione. What does that mean? Well, but what it means though is that, you know, if you consider God's will absolutely, could God both will that I be and that I not be?

[48:26] Would it be impossible for God to will me not to be? Well, oh, you mean either or? Yeah. Yeah. Well, yeah. He could will me to be or will me not to be, right? Okay. But having willed me to be, he can't change his will, right? So, given that God has willed me to be, he cannot what? Will me not to be. Okay.

[48:54] That's a thing we learned before we studied the divine will, which is a interesting thing to study. It's really God Himself, but we break it down this way.

[49:07] As we said above, that for God to will something created is necessary, not absolutely, but ex suppositione Supposing it is, right? On account of the unchangeableness of the divine will. But it is not so absolutely, right?

[49:28] So it ought to be said here about predestination. Whence it is not necessary to say that God is able to not predestine whom he predestines.

[49:45] In the what? Taking this in the composed sense. This is touching upon what the kind of mistake you make of the fallacy of composition and division, right? Okay.

[50:00] The second people say, you know, the sophist would say to you, "Can you be standing when you're sitting?" You say, "Well, if I can't be standing now, then I had to be sitting now. I had no choice of it, right?" So what would you say? Can I be standing when I'm sitting? Not simultaneously. If you take it in composed sense, right? I can't be standing when I'm sitting, right?

[50:32] Okay. But if you take it in the divided sense, you say, at the time when I'm sitting, I could be standing, right? Okay. But I couldn't be standing when I'm sitting. Okay. So he's touching upon that. That's the after the fallacy of equivocation and the fallacy of amphiboly, right? Where the words. Have actually two or more meanings, right? Then you have the fallacy of composition and division, right?

[51:06] That's a very common one. It's in the book on sophistical refutations. Although, absolutely considering, God is able to predestine or not to predestinate, right? But from this is not taken away then the certitude of what predestination.