Prima Pars
92. Book of Life (Q. 24, a. 2–3), God's Operations, and Water and Fire as Metaphors for God
Class of 2007-06-14
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/092-book-of-life-q-24-a-2-3-gods-operations-and-water-and-fire/

[0:00] In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightenment, guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illuminate our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. pray and. Help us to understand all that you've written. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. So we're up here to the second article on the Book of Life.

[0:33] Whether the Book of Life is only with respect to the life of glory of the predestined. To the second one proceeds thus: It seems that the Book of Life is not only with respect to the life of glory of the predestined. For the Book of Life is a knowledge of life. But God, through His own life, knows every other life. Therefore, the Book of Life is especially said with respect to the divine life, and not only with respect to the life of the predestined.

[1:16] That's an interesting objection. Moreover, as the life of glory is from God, so also the life of nature. If, therefore, the knowledge of the life of glory is said to be the Book of Life, so also the knowledge of the life of nature should be called a Book of Life.

[1:44] Moreover, some are chosen for grace who are not chosen for the life of glory, as is clear through what is said in the Gospel of Saint John, chapter six. Have I not chosen twelve of you, and one of you is a devil? So he's so he's chosen even the one who is a devil, huh? From the devil. But the Book of Life is a writing down of the divine choice, as has been said.

[2:13] Therefore, also it is with respect to the life of grace. So it covers all the bases there: the life of nature, the life of grace, and the life of God Himself, in addition to the life of the glory of the saints and so on. So he's going to exclude all those in some way or other. But against this, it is said that the Book of Life is a knowledge of predestination, as has been said.

[2:41] But predestination does not regard the life of grace, except in so far as it is ordered to glory. For those are not predestined who have grace, and they fall away from glory. But the book of life, the book of life, therefore, is not said except with respect to the life of glory.

[3:06] I answer: It should be said that the book of life, as has been said, implies the writing down or certainly writing down or in knowledge of those chosen to life. Now, that choice is the key word here. Going to be answering objections. The one is chosen for that which does not belong to him by his very nature,

[3:33] and also to that one is chosen that has the notion of an end. Now, you don't choose the end, but you choose the means to the end reference to the end, for the soldier is not chosen written down that he might be armed, but for this that he fight. That's that's the end. For this is the proper office or the own its own office, you could say, to which the military is ordered.

[4:08] But the end above the existing above the nature is the life of glory, as has been said. Whence, properly speaking, the book of life regards the life of glory. That's what it was chosen for. Now, what about God's life? Because knowing His own life, He knows other lives and so on. Well, to the first, therefore, should be said that the divine life, even insofar as it's a glorious life, right?

[4:43] It's natural to God. Whence with respect to it, there's no choice, and consequently, no book of life. For we do not say that some man is chosen to have sense or any of those things which follow upon nature.

[5:07] Whence also from this is clear the solution to the second objection, which is taken from the actual life. For with respect to the natural life, there's no choice nor a book of life. So choice is the key thing there, right? What does Shakespeare say? Nature cannot choose your origin.

[5:28] Do. You choose to be white or black, or be a two-footed animal Or four-footed animal. Do you make this choice? Now, the third objection now is going to be going to this next article too about being deleted from the book of life.

[5:50] To the third, should be said: This is the one now. From the life of grace, right? Third life that we had excluded from the book of life, in a way. To the third, it should be said that the life of grace does not have the notion of an end, but the notion of that which is towards an end. Whence one is not said to be chosen for the life of grace, as if that's what he's ultimately chosen for.

[6:18] But in so far as the life of grace is ordered to what glory, and on account of this, those who have grace and fall out from glory are not said to be chosen simpliciter, but secundum quid, not simply, but in some way, right? That's the distinction we said is what runs all the way through philosophy, but apparently all the way through theology, right? And the the second

[6:58] kind of mistake outside of speech, right, is a mistake for mixing up simply and in some not simply, but in some way. And if you study philosophy, you'll find that all the way through, starting with Meno's observance there in logic of this kind of mistake.

[7:20] And likewise, they are not said to be written simply in the book of life, but only secundum quid, in some imperfect way. huh Insofar as

[7:35] there exists about them in the ordering and knowledge of God, that they were to have some order to eternal life, according to the what participation of grace.

[7:49] So the sooner you understand that kind of distinction, you'll see it coming up. again and again, right? But you'll find that even in the we said many times before, but the first distinctions there of what is involved is kind of distinction.

[8:16] Did you come to be when you walked in this room? No. In some way, you did. I came to be yes, as I was. Yeah. In the state that I was after I walked in the room. Yeah, you came to be in this room. You didn't come to be simply, right? But when you were generated or something, then you came to be simply, right? Yes. If you leave this room, where you cease to be?

[8:39] In some way, you'll cease to be in this room, right? But that's being in a qualified sense. Are there chairs in this room? Yes. Are there chairs and the trees out there? Absolutely. Yeah, but you have to qualify, right? Some way, right? And in the thing on fallacies, there that some people think is by Thomas, some people doubt it, you know. Okay, Vice Admiral thinks that between you know the time he's locked up there between first former co-students, but anyway, when, he's talking about this kind of mistake for mixing up simply in some respect.

[9:26] So, per se and secundum quid? He says that this goes back to the perfect and the what? Imperfect, right? Okay. So, in the case of the great Mino, there, the great dialogue there, you know, there the mistake and the argument of Mino is based upon the assertion that

[9:53] you can't know in some way what you don't know. Now, can I know what I don't know? Can the scientist who's looking for the cure for some kind of disease, right? Does he know what he doesn't know?

[10:15] If he didn't know in some way what he didn't know, right, it wouldn't make any sense to pay him to do research, right? On the other hand, if he knew simply without qualification, you wouldn't have to pay him either because you already have. I mean, I'm going to tell you what it is. but I mean, you don't have to pay him to do research because you already had the answer, right?

[10:39] And so that's really kind of a beautiful thing. I always tell the students, you know, in ethics, talking about these things, that all day long you're doing something what? Bad, because in some ways good. Or you're not doing what's good to do, because in some ways bad, right? And notice there's nothing so good in this world that it doesn't prevent you from doing something else that is good.

[11:13] So you could look upon anything good as in some way bad, right? And I always say to them, you know, if someone annoys you at work, should you murder them? No, that's bad. Yeah, but it gets rid of annoyance in your life. So in some way, so I say this is not such a strange distinction, right? Because you always all day long you're doing something bad because in some ways good, or you're not doing what's good to do, like get up and go to mass, say, because in some ways bad, it prevents you from having another hour of sleep or something, right?

[11:53] So I mean, you know, and that means you can always find you can always find a reason for not doing what you should do. And a reason for doing what you shouldn't do, but you have to—you have to make this kind of mistake. As Aristotle says there? You know, the man who who does wrong, he's mistaken. What kind of mistake is it? Well, this is kind of the one.

[12:15] So I mean, it runs through the whole of philosophy. I just gave an example there from logic and one from from ethics, right? But it dominates wisdom, right? You know, the division of being as being is of that kind, and so

[12:34] once you get kind of a hand on this kind of distinction, it's not so surprising. That ethical one is like what Chesterton says, where he says, "If a man could shoot his mother-in-law right between the eyes at 50 paces, I'd say he's a good shot, but I wouldn't say he's a good man."

[13:07] Now, this same distinction is going to come up in the next article, see, Whether someone is what deleted. Rubbed out from the book of life. To the third one proceeds thus: It seems that no one is blotted out from the book of life.

[13:28] For Augustine says, By the way, I saw. Was it April? Was it that John? I mean that Benedict the Sixteenth went up to Pavia. I guess that's where the remains of Augustine. Oh yeah. Yeah. And he's, you know, making kind of a personal pilgrimage and. He was acknowledging his debt to Augustine, in particular, his debt in his first encyclical, you know, and charity and so on. I didn't realize that where Augustine's remains were.

[14:02] I don't know how they got up there. Did you? I mean, I'm sorry, I don't remember the exact place. Pavia. Yeah, it's in Italy.

[14:13] Yeah, yeah. There was a major relic of Saint Augustine's arm. It's supposed that the one he broke with is in the monastery of Saint Anthony of Padua, the Augustinian monastery of Saint Anthony of Padua. first before you came across the system that was major relics. Yeah. Yeah, I think there's a picture of it there in the

[14:38] Capitulary Report. I think was I saw it. So I was going to bring it in. I was a bit distracted, but. For Augustine says in the twentieth book of the City of God that the foreknowledge of God, which cannot fail, is the book of life.

[14:52] But from the foreknowledge of God, nothing can be subtracted. Likewise, neither from predestination. Therefore, neither from the book of life can someone be deleted.

[15:08] Moreover, whatever is in something is in it in the manner of that in which it is. Whatever is received is received, according to the mode of receiver. Can't say that quite, but. But the book of life is something eternal and unchangeable. Therefore, whatever is in it is there not in a temporal way, but in an unchangeable and unable to be deleted way.

[15:35] Moreover, deletion is opposed to scripture writing. But someone is not able newly to be written, right, in the book of life. Therefore, to be deleted. So why is he going to go on try to answer this, right? Well, here's the said contra. It is said in the book in the Psalm sixty-eight. They are what deleted from the book of the living. That's pretty definite.

[16:07] So Thomas says, I answer. It should be said that some say that from the book of life, no one is able to be deleted. Truly, secundum rei veritatem. But someone is able to be deleted, according to the opinion of men, right? For it is customary in scriptures that something is then said to come about when it becomes known. Now I know you love me, God says. Now it's been made known.

[16:39] That's kind of a subtle way of saying that. And according to this, some are said to be written in the book of life, in so far as men opine, think that they are written there, on account of the present justice which they see in them.

[17:00] But when it appears, either in this age or in the future, that they have fallen away from this justice, then they are said to be what deleted, right?

[17:15] And thus also it's expounded, right, in the gloss. And in my edition, it says what? Cassiodorus right? He went to Augustine, I know. And thus this deletion is expounded, huh, in the commentary on the sixty-eighth psalm, right? I gave the quote again we had in the second contra there. Okay.

[17:52] But because to not be deleted from the book of life is laid down among the rewards of the just, according to that of the book of the Apocalypse, Revelation chapter three verse five, who thus conquers will be clothed in white garments, and I will not delete his name from the book of life. That's another reference to deleting, huh? Which is promised to the saints, not only in the opinion of men, right?

[18:29] Okay. It is able to be said that to be deleted or not to be deleted from the book of life, not only should be referred to the opinion of men. He's doesn't seem to be entirely rejecting that opinion, right? But he says there's something more here to be said. But also as regards the thing itself.

[18:59] Now he's going to explain how this can be said, secundum rei, veritatem, not just according to the opinion of men. For the book of life is the writing down of those ordered to eternal life. To which one is ordered from two things, to wit, from the divine predestination, and that's the first thing. And this ordering never fails. If you are ordered to eternal life by the divine predestination, then you can never be removed.

[19:37] from that, huh? And from grace, right? Because grace, by its very nature, is ordered to eternal life. Does Christ speak of it as well? Yeah, eternal life. That's cool.

[19:59] Whoever has grace from this very fact is worthy of eternal life. And this ordering sometimes fails, because some ordered from grace that they have to having eternal life, they nevertheless fall away from it through mortal sin. So be careful. this is the scripture. huh? lest you fall. So those who are ordered to having eternal life from divine predestination are simpliciter, right? Simply written in the book of life, because they are there written as ones are going to have eternal life in itself, right?

[20:55] And these are never deleted from the book of life. But those who are ordered to having eternal life, not from divine predestination, but only from grace.

[21:12] Now, those who what are ordered from predestination also are by grace to eternal life. But now he's talking about those who are not ordered to having eternal life from divine predestination, but only from grace, right? That they have this order, not from the divine predestination, are said to be written in the book of life, not simply, but secundum quid, in some way, some imperfect way,

[21:45] because they are there written to have eternal life, not in itself, but only in its what cause. And such are able to be deleted from the what book of life,

[22:02] which deletion does not refer to the knowledge of God, as if God knew foreknew something and afterwards became ignorant, but to the thing what known. Which God knows before to have been ordered in eternal life, and afterwards not to be ordered when they fell away from grace.

[22:32] So that distinction is kind of anticipated in the reply to the third objection of the previous article, where you had the same kind of distinction, right?

[22:42] And there he's talking about, you know, just refer to the life of what grace, right? Or just to the life of glory. He says, well, simply the life of glory, right? But the life of grace in some way. And here he says, well, can you be deleted from the book Well, not if you're there simply, but if you're there in in some way, right?

[23:07] If you're ordered to eternal life by divine predestination, then you're there simply, and if you're ordered to divine life by grace. Alone, and not by divine predestination, then you're written there only in some way. So notice once you know this distinction between simply and in some way, then in a particular matter where this distinction is going to come up, you have to understand what makes it to be simply so, and what not simply so, right?

[23:39] I know in ethics you say, in general, what is a good human act, right? Is it a pleasant human act? Because a pleasant human act can be good in some way, or is good in some way, but is it good simply? Not necessarily, no. So what does it mean to be good simply in a human act?

[24:14] It means to be reasonable. So a reasonable human act is a good human act simply speaking, right? A pleasant human act is a good human act only secundum quid, huh?

[24:36] So you have to realize what makes it to be so simply. Well, here he's saying what makes it to be simply written in the without qualification written in the book of life, huh? Predestination, yeah, yeah. And if you're ordered to eternal life by having grace, but not by divine predestination, then you're only written in imperfect way there, right? Secundum quid. huh Okay. You can't really avoid that that distinction, that kind of distinction.

[25:22] Now the first objection says, well, the foreknowledge of God cannot fail, and so on. Well, Thomas has already made the distinction, but he gives it again here. To the first, therefore, it should be said that this deletion, as has been said by the article, does not refer to the book of life on the side of God's what foreknowledge, right? As if in God there is some what changeable, changeable, changeableness, but on the part of the things foreknown, which are in fact what?

[25:58] Yeah, yeah. The second objection is saying, well, book of life is in God, is unchangeable, right? Eternal. To the second, therefore, it should be said that though things in God. Are unchangeable in an unchangeable way. Nevertheless, in themselves, they are changeable, right? And to this pertains the deletion of the book of what life, huh? Just as God knows what changing things in an unchanging way, right?

[26:39] Yeah. I used to say, you know, even you know when you take up the definition of motion, say in natural philosophy, or the definition of time. The definition of time is timeless, huh?

[26:56] And the definition of motion is unchanging, right? There's no change in the definition. Of course, we used to have you know interesting times because one thing we find out about changes is something unlimited about change, huh? And therefore, it seems opposed to what a definition is because the word definition comes from the word for limit, huh? So how can you have a limit of an unlimited thing, huh?

[27:24] But in fact, we know things a different way than they are without being false. You can have a good knowledge of the bad, right? You can know the bad in a good way. You know, Boethius says you can't, you know, avoid the bad unless you know the cause of the bad, right? So the man who knows the cause of the bad, right, and has a good knowledge of the bad.

[27:57] Does that make his knowledge of the bad false? No. the sinner has a bad knowledge, Maybe you can call it not knowledge at all a bad opinion about the bad huh knowledge at all,

[28:10] a bad opinion about the bad, huh? Even that is good. Okay, now let's look at the third objection again. Here, that deletion is opposed to writing, right? But someone cannot be newly written in the book of life. There can no more can be deleted them. To the third, should be said. In that way in which someone is said to be deleted from the book of life, it can be said that he has written there.

[28:52] What de novo, huh? Either according to the opinion of men, right? So he didn't exclude that opinion entirely, did he? He said there's something else to be seen. Or according as newly he has an order to eternal life through what grace, huh?

[29:13] Which also is comprehended under the divine knowledge, although it's not new to him. So God doesn't newly know what's new, as we know newly what's new. Look who's here! Actually I have to come out of class tonight, teaching the Greek philosophy or philosophy. Some, some what's new, Same old thing.

[29:45] You're the thing about Socrates? Someone said, "You know, on Socrates, he says you're always saying the same things about the same things. So, depending what you guys do, always say opposite things about the same thing because they're always contradicting themselves, right?"Now we're up to the divine what power, right?

[30:10] And then we had the divine beatitude. After that, and then we'll be up to what? Question Twenty six will begin then. Question twenty-seven. Because I always remember that twenty-seven because as Thomas says in Scripture, if you have to be square of a number, right, or even the cube of a number, it has the same symbolism as the original number.

[30:39] Well, I mean, if three has some particular meaning, right? Oh. Then nine will have that same symbolism. Okay. Well, twenty-seven is three times three times three, right? Yeah. So it's kind of significant. It's a cube of three, and three is the what? Trinity, right? That's great. So that's why I remember twenty-seven. Yeah. And

[31:03] I don't remember. How many questions there are in the Trinity? There are so many. Twenty-seven. No. Nine. There's seventeen. Significance that Augustine has. Yeah. Yeah. I have to kind of introduce the thing at the trivium graduation, right? And and so the former headmaster calls me up and he says, "Are you gonna be there? I said, Okay, I'll be there. " Yeah. He says, "You know, we got seventeen graduates.

[31:30] " You know. I said, "Oh boy! " So now I know what I'll say. You know. When I got when I got though to the campus, I said, "I have to make sure it's seventeen. " And I said, "How many? " No, oh, I was wrong. Sixteen. Oh. There he goes. Yeah. I was gonna, you know, because seventy was a symbol of those who are saved, right?

[31:49] Nice, nice way. You know, he said, "Oh, what a wonderful idea you had there, " you know. And I said, "All set, the seventeen, " you know. And talk about those that fell short. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Some who dropped out. Secundum.

[32:12] Now, after the consideration of the divine knowledge and the divine will, right? And of those things which pertain to the divine knowledge and divine will, it remains to be considered about the divine power. Okay. Let's just look for a second back to question fourteen. There we did the introduction, right?

[32:44] Because in the beginning of question fourteen, right before it here, let's just review that for a second. The premium there before question fourteen. This kind of premium to the whole treatise on the what operations of God, right? So he says after the consideration of those things which belong or pertain to the divine substance, right? Okay. So that was when he considered the what simplicity of God, the perfection of God, the infinity of God, the unchangeableness of God, and unity of God, right?

[33:24] And the things that kind of attach to one of those five, right? And I think I mentioned before how in the other Summa, the Summa Contra Gentiles, the consideration of divine substance has those five parts too. As a somewhat different order in which the five are taken up, but it's revolves around those five.

[33:46] And in both Summas, you take up the substance of God before His operation, right? Okay. It remains to consider about those things which pertain to His what operation, okay? Now recall for a second, right? In all creatures, the substance and the operation are two different things, and there is a real distinction between the substance of any creature, whether it be the angel, or man, or the dog, or tree, and what it does, right?

[34:24] So we have our knowledge starting from creatures. We have this distinction in mind between the substance of a thing and its operation, and so when we turn to God, we have two thoughts in mind.

[34:39] But we find out eventually the substance of God and the operation of God are the same thing, right? But the there is two different considerations by us because we're going from what creatures to God, right? Okay. And you know my little mathematical comparison there, right? Okay. You say just to simplify life here.

[35:11] You say this is the substance and this is the operation and this isn't the creature, right? And they correspond these two different points though to

[35:26] over here to God where both the substance and the operation are one and the same point, right? One the same thing, right? But if we knew this point from creatures and say this is the end of the line called S, and this is the end of the line called what O, yeah, and so we're coming back to God, but we're going from the many towards the what the one, right?

[35:51] But the many comes from the fact that these are many creatures, right? Instead, there would be no God, but we have to what negate that distinction as being a real distinction in God, right? What is the distinction in our what knowledge, right? Okay.

[36:14] And as I mentioned before, in the consideration of the substance of God, although we have the same five parts in both Sumas, the order is a little bit different. But in both Sumas, you take up the existence of God first. You show that God exists. I know as Thomas says, if God doesn't exist, we can forget about theology. There's no point of theology. so you can have the existence of God first, always, then the substance of God, right?

[36:40] Then the operation of God, right? And as you'll find out, you've got to understand the operations of God to be able to understand, well, so far as I can, the Trinity, right? So the order of those four seems to me is kind of unchangeable. You follow that order in the both Sumas and in the Compendium of Theology, which is not as extensive, but still has a lot to say.

[37:05] So he's pointing out now what he's just finished, right? The consideration of the divine substance, and now we're going to consider about the divine operation, right? Yeah. Now he makes a distinction here, right? And because a certain operation there is which remains in the doer, and another kind which proceeds from the doer to some outside effect, right? Exterior effect. Now this is a distinction that Aristotle makes in the ninth book of Wisdom, right?

[37:42] Okay. An activity or doing like seeing or hearing or smelling or tasting, or an activity like loving or understanding remains in the doer and has no exterior effect as such, right?

[38:01] But making of some sort, right? Cutting or pounding or so on, is an activity that has an exterior effect, right? Yeah. Aristotle says all kinds of things about these two operations, right? But the operation that has an exterior effect seems to be a perfecting of the thing made. So making a chair is a perfecting of the chair, not a perfecting of the carpenter as such, right? And and teaching is a perfecting of the what?

[38:42] Yeah, not of the teacher as such, right? Okay. Now this, as I said before, huh? You got to be careful here because you can be deceived, even the wise are deceived, as Aristotle says, by the accidental. And that's the first kind of mistake outside of speech: the mistake of the accidental, mixing up what is so as such and what is so by happening,

[39:14] the accidental. And you say, well, does making a chair perfect the carpenter? Well, if he makes the same chair over and over again, right, he's probably not learning anything about making a chair, making the same kind of chair over and over again, right? And yet, he might be making the chair very well each time, right? And if a man makes McDonald hamburgers or something like that or hot dogs all day long, right, barbecues, you know, Texas barbecue, he may make pretty good barbecue, you know, and so on, but he's not learning anything, right?

[39:55] So it's accidental to making that the maker be in any way perfected, right? But now, if a man is making different kinds of things, he might be what improving his his art, but that's still accidental. See, see, making as such is a perfecting of the thing made. In the same way for teaching, right? And you know, unless you're teaching something very rudimentary, right? The teacher seems to always be learning something as he teaches.

[40:32] And some of his teachers will say, "Yeah, I understood the subject better every time I teach it." But again, that's still accidental to teaching, right? Because in a sense, one is a teacher as such through one's knowledge, right? To what you know, you're trying to communicate what you know. So if you're learning what you're trying to teach, I think I'm staying ahead of the students as they say when they first start out.

[41:00] I'm kind of a common joke, right? Yeah. But to the extent you don't know what you're teaching, in other words, you're not teaching, right? Okay. So it doesn't belong to teacher as such to be ignorant of what he's teaching. No, it belongs to teacher as such to know what he's teaching, and therefore the teacher as such is not learning anything in teaching, but the student is learning something.

[41:26] So teaching belongs to the practical order in that sense. Now I mentioned before how Karl Marx, right, tries to see man's perfection to be found in this activity of acting upon things outside of you, and he gives that some plausibility because the man who doesn't just do the same thing over and over again, like in a production line or something, and turns a screw in each car, but he is improving himself, right?

[42:02] And so you know, or like you know, John Dewey said we learn by doing, right? Well, Marx said something like that. We learn by making, right? But he's still it's all accidental, right? So the perfection of this kind of activity is not a perfection of the one who's making and doing it, but of the thing made or done. But the other kind of activity, the one that remains in the doer, is a perfecting of the what doer himself.

[42:34] So my hearing the music of Mozart is not a perfection of the music of Mozart at all, but it's a perfecting of my ear, right? And my understanding.

[42:47] Beautiful theorem that I came across the other day there in Euclid, huh? You know, it's very simple. I'm not going to go through the proof here, but I was talking in the sixth book there. If you have two lines. And you want to find the line that's the mean proportional between those two. What does that mean? It means a line such that the longer line is to it as it is to the shorter line.

[43:14] How do you find that line? Have any idea? Or, or for that matter, is there always a mean proportional between two lines? Hasn't it do a doubling here? Can you? Well, let's call this line A. We'll call this line C, right? Yeah. And A is a longer line than the shorter one. Is there always a third line you can find such that A would be to B as B is to C?

[43:42] That would be called the mean in the middle proportional, right? Okay. Just like numbers, don't we have? Let's say nine is to six is what? Six is to what? Four, right? Okay. Six is to four. Right. Six is to four. Is that right? Yeah. Okay. You could do. You could

[44:13] always find between two numbers a mean proportional, could you? You know, between let's say nine and seven, are mean proportional? Is some number that nine is to the same way that it is to seven? No, no. Well, how about in straight lines? Is that possible?

[44:34] And more generally, how do you find the mean proportional, right, between these two lines? Well, very simple. You just take the two lines, take A here and C, and make what one line out of them, right? Divide. Then take it here and construct the semicircle, right? Oh. And this line right here is mean proportional. Yeah, yeah. Beautiful. Yeah. So what is what is that now? This line here will be mean proportional between these two lines.

[45:13] Okay. That goes back to earlier theorem where. In a right angle triangle, these what sides are proportional? You know, you got to go back to that theorem, and you go back to another theorem where equiangular triangles are proportional to sides, right? But it's a beautiful thing, you know. Absolutely. You know, just that's perfection of my understanding, right? And and my by seeing Titian's painting of the Assumption, right, that's perfection of my eye, right?

[45:45] Because my seeing that beautiful painting, you know, perfection of painting, right? It's perfection of my eye, right? But seeing God as He is, face to face, right? Loving God, that's a perfection of the knower and the lover, right? And it doesn't change God at all. It doesn't affect Him at all. That you know and love him, right? But your knowing God as He is and your loving God is a perfection of you, the knower and lover, right?

[46:16] God gets absolutely nothing out by loving him. No, but he's really pleased, right? He enjoys it. Yeah, yeah, but it doesn't add anything to his joy. It doesn't gain anything.

[46:32] It's like it's like you said before, but it's like adding a point to a line. Does it add anything to the line? Does it add anything to the line? So it's like that's the way with us and God. We're not adding that very small line to a large line, adding a point to a line. It's no longer than it was. Just a point of different parts. I'm sorry.

[47:00] Can you just explain how that related then to what you're saying? Is it because oh, I'm just saying I'm saying the activity that remains in the doer, right? Yeah. Like sensing, right? Okay. Understanding, loving, right? Yeah. That is a perfection of the doer, right? Yeah. See, but the activity that goes out to exterior effect, a kind of making, right? That activity, that's a perfection of the thing made, not of the what maker, right?

[47:30] Yeah. Now some people, they say Karl Marx and other people, John Dewey, and so on, they see making as a perfecting of the maker, right? And it's his greatest perfection, from Marx, right? But in a sense, they're making the mistake of the accidental. It's accidental that the maker is perfected by his making. God, in no way, was perfected by his creating the world.

[47:58] And so our beatitude is going to consist in in the activity, in that kind of activity that remains in the doer, right? But it's going to be the most perfect of of those activities remaining in the doer, right? Most perfect object we can have, and so on. And that's why our Lord says to Martha and Mary, right? You know, Mary has chosen the better part, and it will not be taken away from her.

[48:23] She's chosen the contemplative part, right, rather than the practical part, and it will not be taken away from her because practical will cease with this this life, right? And

[48:39] but the the contemplative part will be will continue to be perfected in the next life, huh? Okay. Now, so he's making distinction in God between these two things, huh? Okay. But we'll find out they're not as distinct in God as they are in us, okay? For first, he says he calls a distinction, and because the operation there is a certain operation which remains in the doer, right?

[49:16] A certain one which goes forward to an outside effect, right? First, we will consider the knowledge and the will. For to understand is in the one understanding, and to will is in the one willing, right? And afterwards, we'll consider about the power of God, which we're about to come to, right? Which is considered as the beginning of the operation of God, proceeding to some exterior what effect, right?

[49:49] Now, again, comparing this to the other Summa, right? In the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles, he considers the understanding and willing of God. But in the second book, he considers God as the beginning of all things, right? He takes up the power of God, right? But here in the Summa, they're taken up together, right? One, but one after the other, right?

[50:16] Okay. Then he goes on to we'll read the rest of the premium, but the things he attached to consideration of the divine what understanding, right? Namely, to what to be alive, right? And to what have truth and falsity, which is tied up with that, and so on. Okay. So this is kind of the major what division, right? Now, again, to relieve the weary ear, we should have a little.

[50:57] Yeah. Okay. Okay. Then I was going to give you a little bit of symbolic theology, but I'll give you symbolic theology when you come back. Okay. Get to his blood in his seat. You want symbolic theology now? Yes. Okay. Okay. Now, I think it's it's marvelous when you talk about metaphor, which is the main kind of symbolic theology. It's very interesting to take the two metaphors of water and fire, right?

[51:40] You say God is water, and God is fire, and both things are said in what Scripture, right? In many places, huh? The reason why I take these two metaphors is because of the contrariety of water and fire. That water is what wet and cold, huh? And fire is hot and dry, right? If both of these are said of God, that can't be said of God properly, right?

[52:17] Because that would be a contradiction. He'd be both cold and hot, and therefore hot and not hot, cold and not cold, dry and wet, and dry not dry, wet and not wet. So when you consider those two metaphors together, then you see clearly that it's being said metaphorically. Now, metaphor is based upon what likeness, right? And so, in what ways God like water? Remember, one of my students there got interested in this metaphor of water, right?

[52:52] So we're looking at these psalms, you know, and it seems that there's. Just three psalms of thirst for God in the Psalms. As a hind longs to running waters, you know, God, you are my God, whom I seek for you, my flesh pines and my soul thirsts. That there are parts, life is without water. And there's one in each of the three parts of the Book of Psalms.

[53:22] So, why is God metaphorically said to be water? Well, one reason is in terms of what of life, for life-giving, right? That's very clear in that Psalm 62. Oh, God, you are my God, whom I seek for you, my flesh pines and my soul thirsts. That there are parts, life is without water. In the course, you know, the first philosopher, Thales, right? He said that water is the beginning of all things.

[53:54] And so, I consider that statement philosophically first, but then I usually have a theological footnote. I say, "Well, is water the beginning of all things? " Well, not properly speaking, no. But the beginning of all things, such as God, right, is called water metaphorically, right? And Aristotle says what influenced Thales to guess that water is the beginning of all things was its importance for life and seeds having to be moistened for them to germinate and so on.

[54:26] So, one reason why God is said to be water is because water is what life-giving, right? Okay. Now, another reason why God might be said to be water is because He washes us, right? Washes our sins, right? So,

[54:45] washing our sins. Maybe another reason why God is called water would be going back to that 62nd Psalm there, because He satisfies the thirst of the soul. He satisfies the desire. Thou hast made us for thyself, okay? So He satisfies

[55:08] the thirst, not so much of the body, but the soul. That He satisfies the body too, but that's minuscule compared to satisfying the something infinite about the thirst of the soul, right? And Thomas will argue, you know, one of the reasons for saying that God is infinite, right, is that the thirst of our soul could not be satisfied except by something infinite, and therefore, that

[55:41] our soul would be in vain, right? The natural desire would be in vain, which is contrary to what we know about natural desire. I think I mentioned Heisenberg's student who said about this in the physicist's conception of nature, right. He pointed out that it was at the time of the Renaissance when they gave up the study of theology, that they gave up also the idea that the universe was finite, and therefore that the universe was what they guessed there was not the infinite, right?

[56:17] And so it became kind of a substitute for God. And then he gives the the example when he's giving a lecture one time on modern physics, and of course what characterized the physics in 20th century is discovery of all these limits, and finally turned out that even the universe appeared to be limited, according to Einstein, in in size and maybe even in time. And he talked about how he was giving a lecture this one time, and the physicist got very angry about it.

[56:50] So he went to see him afterwards privately to see what his complaint was, and he said, "Do you have any objections, any arguments against what we're saying? " "No, I don't have any. I just can't stand the idea that the universe is finite. " So you get to wonder about this, right? You know that somehow a universe that was limited could not satisfy the scientific mind. And then he went back and realized that of course, you know, the very early philosophers thought the universe was infinite, right?

[57:19] The Aristotle, under his influence, the idea of the universe is finite, and that was kind of the standard thing. But then some thought any much reason now, and they went back to the idea that the universe was infinite, but at the same time they gave up the study of theology, which is in order to knowing something infinite, okay? There are probably many other reasons for that, just just the reason why God might be said metaphorically to be water, right?

[57:43] He's the source of life. He watches us for our sins. He alone satisfies the thirst of the soul, right? Now, why is God metaphorically called what fire, right?

[58:00] Well, you could actually apply fire to God, maybe even more so than water, but you could apply it to the substance of God, to the operation of God, and to the distinction of the three persons. We may see this done in the Church Fathers and so on. Well, if you go back even to the early Greeks, there were the four elements, huh? Earth, air fire, and water.

[58:35] And Empedocles said there were four elements, huh? Earth, air, fire, and water. As Aristotle points out in the first book of Wisdom, he kind of contrasted fire with the other three, right? Fire was the active thing, right? And the others were more the passive, the being acted upon. And you find that in Parmenides, he doesn't, you know, he descends to talk about the. Sensible world, okay. Well, God is what pure act that dominates the whole consideration.

[59:04] Divine substance, right? It's pure act. So, fire, because of its active nature, right, is a metaphor for the divine substance, which is pure act. Now, the operation of God, you have understanding, the willing, and then we're going to pick up the power, right? Well, fire by its light represents the divine understanding. By its warmth, the divine love, and by its ability to transform things, to move things, the divine what power, right?

[59:36] So those three things come up there. Now, when they apply it to the Trinity, they say, well, from fire there proceeds what light, and then warmth, right? And so, from God the Father proceeds the light, the word enlightens every man, and then the fire, which is the what Holy Spirit, right? Of course, sometimes they point out too when they compare this to faith, hope, and charity, right?

[1:00:07] That the sun enlightens the world before it warms it, and so God enlightens our mind with faith before He warms our heart with charity, right? That kind of fits the Trinity too, because the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but from the Father to the Son. So it's a beautiful metaphor, right?

[1:00:30] But here it corresponds to the three-part series: we take up the divine understanding first, then the divine will, and now last the divine power. So it's beautiful.

[1:00:47] This comes up too, you know, the Kasurik. They talk about the the burning bush, right? That the fire represents the burning bush represents what the word made flesh, right? But the fire represents the divine nature of Christ, and the bush is human nature, like I am the vine, and so on, right? But the fact that the fire does not consume the bush, which arouses the wonder, right?

[1:01:13] That's the wonderful thing about the about the incarnation that the human nature is intact and not swallowed up in the divine nature, and the two natures coexist. It might seem impossible for them to coexist, um,

[1:01:27] like Aristotle says, you know, in the fourth theory of the four elements, if if fire was infinite, right, would destroy the elements, right? So I think for the you know divine nature would swallow up the human nature and like a drop of water in the in the fire or something, you know, and no, and the burning bush represents it, right? And that that wonder that that Moses has, right, is a wonder about the incarnation.

[1:01:53] So let's take a little break here, and then we'll go into the divine power, powerful topic. Yeah.