Prima Pars
94. Summa I, Q25, Articles 2–4: God's Infinite Power, Omnipotence, and Whether God Can Undo the Past
Class of 2007-06-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/094-summa-i-q25-articles-2-4-gods-infinite-power-omnipotence/

[0:01] In the Name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God our enlightenment. Guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds order and illumine our images and arouse us to consider more correctly. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, Help us to understand what you have written. The. Father and the Son, Holy Spirit, Amen.

[0:25] Let's give you all the saints with the Eucharist, you know. From Saint Francis of Assisi to Saint Thomas Aquinas, he says. Yeah, actually the first quote is from Thomas here, but who do you think it's made for? Augustine, you know. Not from Augustine. It's wrapped to Article Two here, right? In Question Twenty-Five.

[0:48] Question Twenty-Five, Article Two. Thank you. In the Questiones Disputatae de Potentia, this is the first question that corresponds to this. It's almost the same articles, but in a different order. With the power of God is infinite. To

[1:14] the second one proceeds thus: it seems that the power of God is not infinite. For everything infinite or unlimited is imperfect, according to the philosopher in the third book of Physics, Natural Hearing. But the power of God is not imperfect; therefore, it is not what infinite.

[1:38] That's interesting. Now that when you first use the word infinite, it's used for what quantity. And so, for quantity to be lacking its limit is to be lacking something, and therefore, it'd be perfect. So the word infinite has moved a long distance.

[1:57] From something defective to something universally perfect. Moreover, every power is manifested through its effect. Otherwise, it would be in vain. If therefore the power of God were infinite, it would be able to make an infinite effect, which is impossible. So God also has this unused power there power there.

[2:30] Moreover, the philosopher proves in the eighth book of the Physics that if the power of some body were infinite, it would move an instant and no time at all. But God does not move things in the instant, but He moves the spiritual creatures, Augustine says, through time. But the bodily creature through place and time. Of course, the word "time" is said equivocally in those two parts of the sentence,

[3:07] because the time of bodies is like continuous, and the time of the angels is discrete, it's like numbers. According to Augustine in the eighth book on Genesis, to the letter. Therefore, his power is not what infinite.

[3:29] But against all this is what Hilary says in the eighth book about the Trinity. Hilary is the one he quotes the most after Augustine. Augustine the most in the treatise on the Trinity, but he quotes Hilary a lot. That God is of a what immense, virtutis, living, powerful. Immense is a what negative word, right? Who is it? Me. Not a. Go ahead. The table. Anyway, what are you going to say, Father?

[4:08] Yeah, it means literally unmeasured, right? Okay. So Shakespeare often speaks of something being infinite and measureless, right? Okay. So sometimes you see in some of the creeds now that one of the attributes of God is that He's immensus, and it's tied up with His being infinite.

[4:33] But everything unmeasured is infinite. Therefore, the divine power is what infinite. Okay, I answer. It should be said that it has been said in the previous article. According to this, active power, not the passive power, right, is found in God, according as He Himself is an act.

[5:03] But His being is infinite, in so far as it is not limited to something receiving it. As is clear from those things which are said above, when one considered, or we considered, the infinity of the divine essence or substance or the divine nature. So that was the third of the what five attributes of the divine substance. He showed first that it was simple, right, then that it was perfect and good, and then that it was infinite and therefore everywhere, and then unchanging, and therefore eternal, and finally that it was one.

[5:49] Okay. But there before Thomas spoke of two different meanings of the word "infinite," and in one way, a potency in the passive sense. Is limited by form, right? And in another way, form or act is limited by the passive potency that's received in. So when we speak of the first matter as being infinite, we mean it's what considered by itself, it's lacking all act.

[6:24] After we see this form, it would be this kind of thing, and other form would be that kind of thing. But the divine actuality, the divine existence, is altogether simple, not received in any potency. So it's not limited by potency, and therefore, since it's perfect by its actuality, it's not limited in its what perfection.

[6:53] I think if you're going to attach the infinity of God to one of His other attributes, you'd tie it up with His perfection. You mean that He's not what limited in His perfection, right?

[7:09] So for matter to be unlimited is to lack form, and therefore to lack its what perfection, right? But for the divine actuality, the divine existence, not to be received in any potency in the passive sense, is to not be limited in its what actuality, to not be limited in its what perfection.

[7:38] So he says, according to this, active power is found in God, according as He is an act. But His being is unlimited or infinite, in so far as is not limited to something receiving it, as is clear from those things which are said above, when we treated of the infinity of the divine essence.

[8:03] Whence is necessary that the active power of God be infinite? For in all agents we find this: that as an agent is more perfect, so the form that it has by which it acts is to that extent more what powerful in acting. Just as when something is more hot, so it has a greater power to heating things, and it would have a what infinite power to heating if its heat were what infinite.

[8:41] Whence, since the divine essence or nature or substance through which or by which God acts is infinite, as has been shown above in the treatise on the substance of God, it follows that His power is what infinite.

[8:59] So here's another example of how he reasons of what has been shown about the substance of God to something about his power of operating.

[9:10] That shows kind of the order in which you have to consider these things. Now, the first objection is taken from the philosopher, and that philosopher is somebody, as Aristotle could say, Aristotle is somebody.

[9:30] Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the philosopher speaks of the infinite, which is on the side of matter, not limited by form.

[9:44] Of which kind is infinite that belongs to what quantity? Thus, however, the divine essence is not infinite in that way, as has been shown above, and consequently. Neither is his what power infinite in that way. Whence it does not follow that it be what imperfect. Incidentally, when Thomas takes up the infinity of God in the consideration of the substance of God in the Summa contra Gentiles, the order is a little bit different, and it's the fifth and last attribute of God.

[10:25] Question, chapter forty-three there. And right before that chapter, he's shown that God is altogether one. And quite a while before that, he's shown that God is altogether simple. Right. Now, what is the infinity that belongs to quantity? Well, if you're talking about continuous quantity, like a straight line, or a surface, or a body, the continuous is divisible forever,

[10:59] and that's shown, you know, in the sixth book of the physics. And that way, motion is infinite. And so, in the third book of the physics, when he takes up motion, he takes up the infinite right after it. It falls upon motion intrinsically. But then there's another kind of infinity, a discrete quantity, and because the continuous is divisible forever, numbers can get greater forever. So when he begins the consideration of the infinity of God, the first thing he shows in the Summa contra Gentiles is that he's not infinite in either of these quantitative senses.

[11:41] Not in the continuous sense because he's been shown to be altogether simple, has no parts, and there's no infinity in the discrete or numerical sense because he's one. So he leaves it until he's shown both of those things, and then he eliminates that sense of infinite, right? And there goes on to show the true sense in which God is infinite.

[12:08] He's not infinite in his quantitative sense, and quantity is the accident that follows upon matter. But he's infinite in the sense that there's no limit to his perfection.

[12:21] So is he calling that. huh? It's much more explicit in my favorite book, you know. Now the second objection is saying that every power is manifested to its effect. If the power of God is infinite, then he can produce an infinite effect, but that's an impossible thing to have. So isn't there a lot of unused power here, and isn't this in vain then, right?

[12:56] To the second, it should be said that the power of a univocal agent. The whole of that is manifested in its effect. Now, what do they mean when they talk about univocal agent? What do they mean by that?

[13:15] Usually, it's things that just can't be had at the same name; it's always understood in the same way. But in this case, it's referring to things of the same nature, isn't it? Yeah, yeah. So you're limited to producing something the same in kind as you are, right? Okay. So that a dog produces dogs and cats produce cats and human beings produce human beings, right? And so. So the a whole power, he says, of univocal agent is manifested in its effect.

[13:46] For the power, the generative power of a man, can do nothing more than to generate a man. And the same thing we say for a cat: the generative power of a cat can generate only a cat. But the power of an agent that is not univocal,

[14:04] its whole power is not manifested in the production of its effect. Just as the power of the sun is not entirely manifested in the production of some animal generated from putrefaction, that's the old somewhat disproven theory, right? But the sun, in a sense, causality extends to what, not to produce another sun, but to all the animals and plants in the world that depend upon the sun for their existence.

[14:34] Now, it is manifest that God is not a univocal agent. huh But you call him an equivocal agent. Understand that properly. For nothing other can come together with him in species or in genus. In fact, God is not in any genus. So we learned the question on the simplicity of God.

[15:02] Whence it remains that his effect is always less than his power, right? It is not necessary for, therefore, that the infinite power of God be made known in the fact that he, or in this, or by this, that he produces a what infinite effect. Could show him, for example, that he is, what creating things.

[15:30] But now, there's something might say, but does make this power then unused? Huh? Frustrating. But nevertheless, even if he produced no effect, huh? The power of God would not be what. Frustrated. In vain, yeah. Because as in vain, that is ordered to an end, which it does not attain.

[15:59] But the power of God is not ordered to an effect, as to an end. But rather, it is the end of its effect. So the divine power is God Himself, right? And God is the beginning and the end of all things. So God Himself is not ordered to anything like an end. And since the divine power is God, it's not ordered to anything like an end. So you can't say it's in vain because it doesn't achieve its purpose.

[16:28] It doesn't have any purpose. It's kind of a beautiful reminds me of a article or argument comes up sometimes when they're talking about the the Trinity, right?

[16:46] And there's a very important principle in natural philosophy and natural science, which you find not only in Aristotle, but you find it in Einstein and Heisenberg and all the great physicists. And sometimes it's called the principle of what? Simplicity, right? That nature uses no more than is what necessary, right?

[17:14] And Max Born got the Nobel Prize in the 20th century and who worked with Einstein in Berlin, right? You can get the correspondents of Bohr and Einstein. huh? What this has just come out he's in Nassau. But he also worked with Heisenberg and Heisenberg he's just as Heisenberg, and Bohr and so on. But he says the genuine physicist believes obstinately in the unity and simplicity of nature, despite any appearance of the contrary.

[17:49] So it's something natural, right? And Aristotle talks about this. On argues about this from this in the first book of natural hearing, the first book of the physics. So when they come to talk about the Trinity, sometimes it comes up. They say, well, the fullness of the divine nature is found in the Father. Therefore, the Son and the Holy Spirit are what? Superfluous Yeah. Good job. Well, how do you think Thomas answers this kind of objection?

[18:31] Yeah, same way. Because actually, the principle of simplicity is based upon the fact that nature acts for an end. And when less will serve, then it serves no purpose to use more than is necessary. So two arms is enough for a man, right? He might be handy have a third arm and you're trying to open the door of the house and the groceries and so on, but you don't really need a third arm, do you?

[18:59] But you do kind of need two arms. And so you can't apply this to the Trinity because the generation of the Son from the Father and the proceeding of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son is not for the sake of any end. So you can't apply the principle of simplicity to the Trinity. huh? And the same way he's doing here, right? I used to have fun when I was talking about this nature act for an end And in natural philosophy class.

[19:33] we go through the arguments of Aristotle and so on, and I also go through the three main arguments against nature acting for an end. And one of them is trying to show that mathematical chance is enough to explain the good of nature. Therefore, we can invoke the principle of simplicity and say that we don't need. Another kind of cause.

[20:04] So the argument is saying that matter, form, and mover, those three kinds of causes, by mathematical chance, are enough to explain the good in nature. Therefore, we don't need a fourth kind of cause to explain the good in nature. Well, I used to attack it mainly by pointing out that mathematical chance is not enough to explain the good in nature, and therefore you can't invoke the principle of simplicity, right?

[20:33] But then the other thing is kind of amusing is that in invoking the principle of simplicity, they forget that the original reason for the principle of simplicity is that nature acts for an end, like like even Newton says, "Nature is pleased with simplicity." In fact, it affects not the pomp of superfluous causes, right? It would serve no purpose if nature used more than necessary. So in a sense, you're saying that because nature acts for an end, it doesn't act for an end.

[21:03] But then you got to remember that he says once you see it's based on that, right? Then you can't apply it to eternity if the eternity is not for the sake of some end other than itself, right?

[21:14] And the same way it's applied here. No, I might say you know someone goes to college and he gets a degree in medicine or some other practical thing, right? He never puts this to work. You might say, well, it's in vain that he he learned this, right? Because that that degree in medicine and stuff thing is for the sake of healing people and so on. But this is not true about the divine power.

[21:47] It's not for the sake of of creatures, huh? Okay. Now the third argument is again taken from Aristotle and from his statement there in the eighth book of the Physics that if a body's power were infinite, it would move. Yeah.

[22:14] To the third, argument, it ought to be said that the philosopher in the eighth book of the Physics proves that if some body had an infinite power, it would move in none time.

[22:29] And nevertheless, he shows that the power of the mover of the heavens is infinite because it is able to move in an infinite time. In fact, the universe has been moved around, you know, the sky around us. It remains, therefore, according to his intention, that the infinite power of a body, if it were, would move in none time. Not over the power of a what? Bodyless mover.

[23:06] And the reason for this is that a body moving another body is a univocal agent. Whence it is necessary that the whole power of the agent be manifested in the motion.

[23:23] Because therefore, as the power of the moving body of the mover as a body is greater, so it moves faster. It is necessary then that if it were infinite, it would move faster than any proportion, which would be to move in none time. That's also because nature is kind of determined to what, right? So it moves with its whole power. But a bodily mover is an agent that's not univocal.

[23:56] Whence it is not necessary that its whole power be manifested in its motion, that it move therefore in no time. And especially because it moves according to the disposition of its what? Will. That's another point that he makes in all the time. So God can

[24:16] will this much or that much, right? A natural thing goes by its whole power, right? So the fire burns something with its whole power, right? It doesn't say move it so much or so much. Okay. So that's the second article, right? Now the third article would seem to follow upon that, right? If God's power is infinite, then it's not limited. Then he's omnipotent, huh? And that comes up somewhere in the creed, doesn't it?

[24:50] I believe in God the Father, Almighty. Yeah. So, what does this mean, right? To the third, one proceeds thus: It seems that God is not omnipotent,

[25:09] for to be moved and to undergo is something of all things, huh? But God can't do this, huh? Can't be moved, huh? Can't undergo something. For he is immobile, unchangeable, right? Therefore, he's not what omnipotent, huh?

[25:36] Of course, that is overlooking the distinction we saw in the first article, right? Between the active power and the what passive power, right? So, when you're saying God is omnipotent, you don't mean by the passive power, right? But only by the active power.

[25:54] Moreover, to sin is to do something. Yeah. But God is not able to sin, nor to deny himself, as is said by Saint Paul in the Second Epistle to Timothy, second chapter. Therefore, God is not what omnipotent, huh?

[26:17] Moreover, about God, it is said that he manifests his what? Power. Omnipotence through pardoning, especially pardoning. Yes. Mercy. So, therefore, the furthest you might say, right, that divine power extends to is to what? Take pity, be merciful. But there is something greater than to what?

[26:56] Yeah. Which is to create another world, huh? Or something of this sort, huh? Therefore, God is not omnipotent, huh? Kind of strange, argument, huh? I don't think I'm going to call it? that. Moreover, on that of one Corinthians chapter one, God has made what the wisdom of this world stupid. The gloss says God shows the wisdom of this world to be stupid. By showing that to be possible, which worldly wisdom right judges to be impossible,

[27:44] whence it seems that something should not be judged possible or impossible, according to lower causes, as the wisdom of this world judges right, like the the Greeks would laugh at the idea of resurrection, so on. But by the divine power it should be judged. If therefore God is omnipotent, all things are what possible. Nothing therefore is impossible. But the impossible being taken away, then the necessary is taken away.

[28:21] For that is necessary to be, that is impossible not to be. Nothing therefore is necessary in things if God is omnipotent. But this is impossible. Therefore, God is not omnipotent.

[28:41] But again, this is what is said in the Gospel of Saint Luke, chapter one, verse thirty-seven. There will not be impossible before God every word.

[28:55] Thomas, we explain a bit on that text. He kind of think maybe or would it be stupid to wanna use that article from the creed, or said contra, or something on that. He didn't use it though. Would he ever? Would he ever actually? Would he ever use it? Yeah, uses the creed sometimes. Yeah, fact he even comments on sometimes. What's that? Even comments on the creed. Yeah, I know that.

[29:23] Yeah, but as. Yeah. But especially likes to use scripture, especially, huh? Okay. I answer. It should be said that commonly all confess, right, by faith, that God is omnipotent, right.

[29:46] But it seems difficult to assign the what definition or the meaning of omnipotence. For it is doubtful, on doubt, what is comprehended under this distribution, when it is said all things are possible for God, right?

[30:10] But if someone considers correctly, since power or ability is said for things that are possible, when God is said to be able to do all things,

[30:24] nothing is properly understood. Then he's able to do all things that are what possible. And on account of this, he is said to be omnipotent.

[30:38] But notice one of these words that is equivocal. But possible is said in two ways, according to the philosopher in the fifth book of wisdom, fifth book after books on natural philosophy.

[30:54] The whole fifth book of of wisdom, the whole fifth book of metaphysics, is explaining what the meanings of these words, right, that are used, especially in wisdom, right,

[31:10] and in the axioms, the statements known to themselves by all men, and to some extent everywhere because they're the most common ones. And so Thomas says a commentary on that fifth book. So anyway, this is taken from there. The word possible is said in two ways. In one way, with regard to some what, power, some ability. Just as what is subject to human power is said to be possible for man, right?

[31:46] Sometimes you say it's impossible. It's not within my what, power. Now it's not able to be said that God is said to be omnipotent because He's able to do all those things which are possible to the created nature.

[32:10] Because the divine power extends to more things, that can't be the meaning of it. If, however, it be said that God is omnipotent because He's able to do all things which are possible to His power, there will be a circle in the manifestation of the power.

[32:34] For this would not be to say anything other than that God is omnipotent because He's able to do all things He's able to do. It doesn't explain much, is it? Isn't that true? Okay.

[32:47] So how's Thomas getting out of this? Well, there's another meaning of possible. It remains, therefore, that God is said to be omnipotent because He's able to do all things that are possible absolutely, which is another way of saying what possible.

[33:10] Now what is that? What's another meaning? For something is said to be possible or impossible absolutely from the relation of the what terms, subject and the predicate.

[33:24] Possible because the predicate is not repugnant to the subject, as Socrates said. Impossible absolutely. Because the predicate is repugnant to the subject, as for a man to be an ass. Not that far. Yeah, yeah. Takes it off. Something like that, right? Midsummer Night's Dream, and

[33:51] what you do about nothing, right? I'm just going to go explain this second sense. He's kind of excluded the first sense, but I want to, having explained what the second sense is, how this helps to understand what you mean by God being omnipotent. It should be considered, however, that since every agent makes what is like itself,

[34:20] now why is that? Because a flower doesn't make a cat. I don't know. Because it's like God made it. We can see. Inductively, We can see inductively that an agent makes something like itself, right? This is a clear course in the case of, you know, dogs producing dogs and oak tree producing not dandelions but oak trees and so on. At first sight, it's not clear with the carpenter making a house, but he's making the house like the house he's made in his head first, right?

[34:53] He's acting through his mind, so it's like not his nature, but like what's in his mind, acting or. So you can see it inductively, right? Well, what is the reason why the agent makes something like itself?

[35:08] It goes back to distinction between act and ability. Ability now taking the passive sense, huh? And what is it that's communicable to another, act or ability?

[35:22] Act, yeah. And so every agent acts in so far as it's an act, and communicates something of its actuality. Therefore, it's got to make something like itself. That's the reason, see?

[35:39] This is a very common, common principle. We're talking about a cause as such, there, not an accidental cause. It should be considered that since each agent makes or does something like itself, to each active power that corresponds as possible its own object, according to the what definition of that act in which that act of power is founded. Just as the power of eating things, right, refers as to its proper object to what is eatable,

[36:28] but the divine being upon which the definition of the divine power is founded is an infinite being, not limited to any genus of being, but having beforehand in itself the perfection of being as a whole. Whence whatever is able to have the notion of being is contained under the what absolute things that are possible, with respect to which God is said to be omnipotent. He's the cause of being as being.

[37:10] But nothing is opposed to the notion of being except not being. This therefore is repugnant to the notion or the definition of absolutely possible, which is what subject to the divine power. Whatever it is that implies itself to be and not to be together, that supposes the idea of being. And this is not subject to what omnipotence, not on account of any defect of the divine power, but because it cannot have the notion of something makeable or possible.

[37:52] So whatever things do not imply, therefore, a contradiction, are contained under those things that are possible with respect to which God is said to be what omnipotent. So he's saying God can do everything that doesn't involve a contradiction, something both being and not being. But those things which imply a contradiction are not contained under the divine omnipotence because they can't have the what definition of something possible.

[38:29] Hence, it is suitably said that those things do not come about; that God is not able to what make them. Nor is this against the word of the angels. Now, he's going to explain that text in the said contrary, which says it would not be impossible before God omne verbum, right? Okay. Nor is this against the word of the angel saying it will not be impossible before God every word, for that which implies a contradiction cannot be a what, Word.

[39:06] because no understanding can conceive it. Now, when I was a little boy, at least try to put you in the difficult spot by saying, could God make a stone so big He couldn't lift it? You've heard these ones, right? And they seem to have you because if you said yes, then there's something God can't do, namely lift the stone that He made. If you say no, God can't make a stone so big He can't lift it.

[39:33] Then it's something God can't do; He can't make such a stone. Well, the average little kid did not answer that. But what is the proper answer to that? Can God make a stone so big He can't lift it? It's not possible absolutely Yeah, yeah, that implies a contradiction. That's like saying, can God on the blackboard here now, right? But we're watching. No, he wrote on the thing with the Nebuchadnezzar was,

[40:05] could God draw a square circle? No, because that involves a what contradiction, right? And is there a thought of a square circle? I can use the word square circle, right? But can someone understand what a square circle is? We can say it's a circle, it's a square, but can you really put those two together in your head and understand them? No, you put the words together, right?

[40:35] But there's no such thing as a square circle, right? It's not a, it can't be. So he's saying God's omnipotence extends to everything that what does not involve contradiction, right? Everything can have the notion of being, right? That's because he's being itself, right? And so his causality extends to everything that has the character of being. But if something has something opposed to being, then God's omnipotence does not extend to that, right?

[41:10] But that's not really going to be a diminution of his ability, right? Something says there it's more, more appropriately said that they are not able to be than God is not able to be. Yeah.

[41:28] And the first objection was easiest to make. God can't what be pushed around, huh? God can't be hurt, right? Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that God is said to be omnipotent by active ability, huh? Active power, not by a what passive power, right? Like we mentioned before, I used the word power here now, but in English the word power is kind of stuck in the first meaning of potentia or dynamis in, the active sense, right?

[42:04] But if you take the word ability, right? If you say God is able to do all things, right? It's only able in the active sense, not able in the sense of what? God's not able to get hungry, right? Not able to get tired. Not able to walk, huh? But he's not in bad shape because of this.

[42:34] Whence is not being able to be moved or to undergo, right? To suffer is not repugnant to his what omnipotence. That distinction that Aristotle first made is altogether essential to understanding the omnipotence of God.

[42:54] Now the second objection to sin is to do something, right? But God cannot sin, so to the second, it should be said that to sin is to what fall away from a perfect action. Whence to be able to sin is to be able to fail in acting, huh? Which is repugnant to omnipotence, huh? And in

[43:26] account of this, God cannot sin who is what omnipotent, right? So can God be mistaken? See, this is an act of power and ability to think, right? I mean, is that once you, once you've been formed a bit? But to be mistaken is to be able to what? Fail, right? That's really

[43:55] not a lack of power in God that He can't be mistaken. It'd be a lack of power if He could be mistaken, right? Okay. So it'd be a lack of power in Him if He could sin, right? Okay. Time is a little footnote here because of the text of Aristotle and so on. Although the philosopher says in the fourth book of the places that God is able, both God and the good man, right, the spoudaios, are able to do bad things, right?

[44:25] Okay. But how is that to be understood? Aristotle is saying there. But this is understood either under the condition whose. antecedent is impossible, as if we were to say that God is able to do bad things if He wanted to. Okay. Now, as you know, an if-then statement, it can be true even if the antecedent is what. False. Yeah. Yeah. If I am a dog, then I am four-footed, right?

[45:02] Okay. That's true. Okay. So if God wanted to do something bad, He could do something bad. Okay. For nothing prevents a conditional, an if-then statement, right? To be true, whose antecedent, whose if part, right, and consequent then part, is impossible. Just as it said, if man is an ass, he has four feet, huh? Okay.

[45:37] Or it should be understood that God is able to do some things, which now seem to be what bad, which nevertheless, if He did them, would be what good. That's not the way to explain this right? Or he could say that Aristotle, and this is Thomas often points out, which is Aristotle, in logic, for example, he often uses an example from his contemporaries, even though he doesn't agree with it.

[46:02] Hmm. Or he speaks according to the common opinion of the Gentiles, ah, who said that men were transformed or transferred to the gods, as Jove and what Mercury, right?

[46:18] In the very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is saying the different arts and sciences have different ends, right? And among his examples, he gives that the end of the household science is wealth. And Thomas says, well, in the first book of Politics, he shows that the end of the household science is not wealth. Why does he say it here, right? That was the common opinion, right?

[46:41] So he's just taking what people say as a way of kind of getting the idea across to them. So kind of unusual way of style, right? But that's it, and he may speak according to the opinions of his predecessor. I seen that in the Physics. I was reading it the other day. There, he's speaking according to the opinion of Plato, right? And sometimes he'll say we Platonists.

[47:03] did not yet have time to disagree with it. Platonists. Is it to say he's not always clear when he does that? Sometimes. No, no, he does it very clearly. Oh, okay. You see that before

[47:19] he determines the truth himself, right? He may speak, right? It's not essential what he's doing, according to the opinion of his predecessors, huh? Okay. It's kind of striking, you know, in in the third book of the Physics, he shows that there's not infinite material world, right? Assuming just what his predecessors thought about matter, but then when he gets to the book on the universe, where he's thinking about the sun, the moon, and the stars.

[47:49] They thought they were a different kind of matter than down here. Then he resumes the whole question again, does it a second time, and then gives what he thinks according to his own position. So that's kind of a subtle thing, but but Thomas notes it, and some other commentators may have noticed before him too. But it's kind of unusual for man to do that.

[48:14] I know myself sometimes in class, you know, I use an opinion from modern science, which I may or may not accept, you know, but the students accept because they'll kind of get across the idea, illustrate something, but I'm not trying to prove anything by it, but to illustrate it, right? You know, I'll see if hydrogen can be without water, but water cannot be without hydrogen. if it was H2O?

[48:38] Then water is before hydrogen in being, right? Yeah. I don't care if that's true or not, you know. Not my opinion. The chemist's opinion is what is H2O, right? I don't know. Doesn't look like H2O to me. Okay.

[49:13] Now, third one was this argument taken from God's taking what pity on things, huh? He's getting them. parcendo et miserando. How do they translate parcendo in your text? Sparing Sparing, yeah? Sparing and taking mercy. yeah.

[49:42] Now he says the power of God is shown most. of, It should be said to the third objection that the power of God is shown most of all in sparing, right? not punishing and having mercy, because through this is shown that God has the what highest power that He freely dismisses our what sins.

[50:09] For it belongs to one who is not what under a superior law, right? I mean, excuse me, the one who is under a superior law, it is not what is not free to what sins, yeah.

[50:31] That's one way to speak of this, right? Or because by sparing men and taking mercy in them. He leads them to partaking of an infinite good, and himself, who is the last effect of the divine power.

[50:50] Or because this has been said above, the effect of the divine mercy is the foundation of all the divine works. Right. For nothing is owed anybody except an account of that which is given, what, to him by God, with no debt at all to him.

[51:12] But in this is most of all shown the divine power that it pertains to him the first what institution of all goods. Okay. So it's touching upon the fact that God has nothing what presupposing to any creature

[51:32] to his causality. So you satisfied those answers of Thomas. So far. We got him in the next one. Yeah. What's what's the greatest thing God has made?

[52:04] Jesus. Yeah, the incarnation. Yeah. And that's wholly what. It was human nature deserved to be united to the divine person. Unmerited. Holy unmerited. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. That's kind of part of the thing he's bringing out here.

[52:31] Okay. Now the next question and the fourth question. Not involved here, right? To the fourth, it should be said that possibile absolutum, right? The second sense of possibility, distinction of body, the article, is said neither according to superior causes. Nor according to inferior causes. But by itself, right?

[53:05] So you're saying that God, that Socrates, can be sitting, right? That's possible. You're talking about now it's possible for Socrates or God to have him sitting. You're saying that there's no contradiction in sitting belonging to Socrates. Yeah. We say a man can be white. What does that mean? Are you thinking now of by this gene? Or by God? Or do you mean that there's no contradiction? In white belonging to man?

[53:44] No contradiction. Yeah, that's the absolute necessity, right? But the possible, which is said according to some ability or power, is named possible according to the what? The proximate cause.

[54:06] Whence those things which are immediately apt to come about by God alone, as creation, justification of the sinner, right, and things of this sort, are said to be possible according to a superior cause. But those things which are apt to come about through lower causes are said to be possible according to the lower causes. For according to the condition of the proximate cause, effects have contingency or necessity, as has been said above.

[54:44] But in this, the wisdom of the world is regarded as stupid. That those things which are impossible in nature. that those things which are supposed to be possible in nature It judges also to be impossible to God,

[54:59] and thus it is clear that the omnipotence of God does not exclude impossibility and necessity from things. What's the Sadducees are the ones who denied the resurrection, and Christ says in the gospel, "There you were, knowing neither what the power of God. " Scriptures, yeah, but that part knowing not the power of God, you know, is what he's referring to here, right? Because judging it, because it's impossible to nature, that it's also impossible to what To God.

[55:40] God, yeah. And this is apparently what the Greeks do too. The you know Greeks would be laughing at Saint Paul, somebody, but the Christians talking about resurrection, right? It's like today. Well, we can't make something from nothing, therefore God can't make something from nothing.

[56:02] Well, I know I can't make a square circle, but God can. " Now, this article, the fourth article, is a little more particular, right? It's descending now to a particular thing, and not the square circle, but whether God can make the past not to have been, right? What

[56:28] Thomas is going to say? What? It's impossible. Yeah, it's going to involve a contradiction, right? To the fourth, one proceeds thus: It seems that God is able to make what was past not to have been,

[56:47] because what is impossible per se is more impossible than what is impossible per accidens. But God is able to make that which is impossible per se, as the blind man to what illuminate the blind man, or to raise the the dead, right? Therefore, even more, God can make that which is impossible per accidens. But the past to not have been is impossible per accidens,

[57:22] for it happens that Socrates not to have run to be impossible. From this, that it was past, right? Therefore, God can make those that the past thing was not be. Very subtle, hard to read, huh? I was mentioning that the first there's just ten questions in the questions disputatae de potentia potencia, right? And each question has got you know ten so many articles, and the first article, the first question.

[57:56] Of the ten questions corresponds to this question. There's an article in there about this too. It's the very same question. Moreover, God is able to what? Whatever God is able to do, He can do, since His power is never what? Diminished. But God was able to do before God, before Socrates ran, right? That he would not run.

[58:28] Therefore, after his run, God can make it that he did not run. Moreover, charity is a greater virtue than virginity. But God can repair charity that is lost. Therefore, virginity.

[58:51] Therefore, He's able to make that that which is corrupt was not corrupted, huh? But But Jerome now. says just the reverse of this. That God is able to do all. God who is able to do all things, He cannot do make a what? Corrupt thing to be incorrupt. Yeah.

[59:16] Therefore, for the same reason, He cannot make something past that will not be right. As well as people who were no longer virgins, and they suddenly discovered the the great merit of being a virgin, and now they wanted to see if God could do something about this. But God can't do anything about it.

[59:44] I answer. It should be said that has been said above. Under the omnipotence of God does not fall anything that implies a what? Contradiction. But for past things not to have been implies a what? Contradiction. Contradiction, right? For just as it would imply a contradiction to say that Socrates sits and does not sit, right? So also to say that he sat and did not sit.

[1:00:21] For to say that he sat is to say that it was what in the past, huh? But to say that he did not sit is to say that it was not.

[1:00:36] Whence, for the past things not to have been does not come under the divine power. St. Thomas solves it very simply by saying it involves contradiction.

[1:00:53] And this is what Augustine says against what Faust. So you have a lot of these works of Augustine that are contra, contra, contra. That's why that text we looked at, you know, from the Second Vatican Council, you know, said that you should read Scripture first, and then you should read the Church Fathers, you know, and what they did to elaborate this or that article of faith. But then to read Thomas Aquinas to see the order among these different things.

[1:01:24] So it's kind of an ad hoc character to some extent of the development of theology in the Church Fathers, right? Because this heretic denied this article of faith, so we're going to defend this article of faith against this heretic, and we're going to write a contra so and so, and and you get all these kind of piecemeal, you might say. And then when the Middle Ages they start to bring this all together, right, in kind of these great summas, right?

[1:01:51] Although there is some anticipation of those summas in the early. Oh, this too, but not as developed, you know. Or even in the sentence if you're Lombard, right? Not as perfect as Thomas's Summa, but there is a kind of attempt to bring all this together in an orderly way.

[1:02:15] Whoever thus says, if God is omnipotent, right, he can make that those things which were were not made, right? Does not see he's saying this that if God is omnipotent, he can make those things which are true for the very reason they are true to be false.

[1:02:47] And the philosopher says in the sixth book of the Ethics that this alone God is deprived that he can make ungenerated those things which were made, right? What's kind of nice? I mean, he's got he's got the argument, and then he's got the authority of Augustine and the authority of the philosopher. It brings together the three greatest minds.

[1:03:18] Interesting, the philosopher. So he's somebody's, kind of said Aristotle is somebody's. To the first, therefore, it should be said that although the past things

[1:03:46] to not have been is impossible per accidens. If one considers that which is past, namely the running of Socrates, nevertheless, if one considers the past under the notion of the past,

[1:04:05] it not to have been is impossible, not only per se but absolutely, implying contradiction. So, if I ran yesterday, I didn't have to run yesterday. But if you consider the fact that I did run yesterday, that's part of my past. Now I can live with.

[1:04:27] I cannot not have run yesterday. And thus, it is more impossible. Right, then, for the dead to rise, it's more possible, in other words, for the dead to rise than for me not to run yesterday. If I ran yesterday, because that does not imply a what contradiction.

[1:05:03] What is said to be impossible according to some power, namely what nature, right? Okay, so that doesn't involve necessarily contradiction. For such possible things are subject to the divine what power.

[1:05:38] Okay, the second objection. Whatever God was able to do, He is able to do, because His power cannot be diminished, right? So the objection says, but God was able to do before Socrates ran that He did not run. Therefore, after He has run, God can make that He did not run. To the second, it should be said that God, as regards the perfection of the divine power, can do all things, but that some things are not subject to His power is because they what fall away from the notion of something possible.

[1:06:16] Thus, if one pays attention to the unchangeableness of divine power, whatever God was able to do, He is able to do. But some things, before right, yeah, one time had the notion of something possible when they were what, yeah, but now they what fail from the notion of possible when they have been done, and thus God is said to not be able to do them because they cannot come about.

[1:06:59] What is that writing on the wall saying? Now the third objection here about virginity here. That God is able to take away all corruption of mind and body from the corrupted woman, right? But this He is not able to what remove from it that she was not corrupted, huh?

[1:07:31] Just as from some sinner, He is not able to take away the fact that he what sin. And that he what? lost. Yeah. He can restore the charity. Restore. right. Yeah. He can't take away the fact that you lost it. So in a certain sense, he's implying he can even restore bodily virginity, but he can't make you not have lost it. Yeah.

[1:07:58] No. He can't undo that. He can, if you lose charity or lose virginity, whether it's corruption of body or soul, he can restore it as though as though you hadn't lost it. But he can't make it. He can't make it that you didn't lose it. So if I if I commit a sin, I lose charity. God can restore charity in my soul, but he can't make it that I didn't sin.

[1:08:21] I'm still a sinner. He can restore charity. Break your announcement.