Prima Pars
95. Summa I, Q25, Articles 5–6 and Q26, Article 1: Could God Make Other or Better Things? God's Beatitude
Class of 2007-06-20
https://berquistcourse.com/course/theology/10-prima-pars/095-summa-i-q25-articles-5-6-and-q26-article-1-could-god-make/

[0:00] Article. Whether God can do those things which He what has not done, right? To the fifth one proceeds thus: It seems that God cannot do what anything besides what He's done, right?

[0:22] For God is not able to do what He has not foreseen and foreordered to be done, but He does not what foreknow or foreorder, order beforehand, himself to make except those things which He has made. Therefore, He can't make except what He's made.

[0:49] Moreover, God is not able to make except what he ought and what is just to come about. But God ought not to make what He has not made,

[1:08] nor is it just that He make what He has not made. Therefore, God cannot make except what He made. Moreover, God cannot make except what is good and suitable to the things made,

[1:25] but to things made by God that is not good or suitable, other than they are. Therefore, God cannot make except what He made. But against this is what is said in Matthew twenty-six: "Could I not ask my Father, and He would show me more than twelve legions of angels?" Saying that to Peter I guess to Peter, I guess.

[1:56] But neither did He ask, nor did the Father show this to what impudiating the Jews, huh. Therefore, God can make what He did not make.

[2:10] Thomas says, "I answer: It should be said that about this some have erred in two ways. For some lay down that God acts as a work of necessity of nature.

[2:26] Spinoza. Everything follows from God, like it follows from the triangle that it has its interior angles to get to right angles. That's where Einstein speaks of his determinism coming from Spinoza, right?

[2:47] For some lay down that God acts as it were from necessity of nature, and just as from the action of natural things, other things do not come about except what come about, as from the seed of man, man, and from the seed of the olive, the olive. So, from the divine operation, things do not come about, or another order of things to flow, except what is now.

[3:15] But as we have shown above, God does not act by necessity nature, but His will is the cause of what all things. Nor is this will naturally, in a necessity, determined to what these things.

[3:37] Whence, in no way, is this course of things coming from God a necessity, that nothing else could come about. Others say that the divine power is determined to this course of things. On account of the order of his wisdom and of the divine justice, without which God can what. Do not.

[4:11] For since the power of God, which is his essence, is not other than the divine wisdom, it can be said suitably that nothing is in the power of God that is not in the order of divine wisdom. For the divine wisdom comprehends the whole ability of his power. But nevertheless, the order in things from the divine wisdom, in which the what notion of justice consists, this has been said above, does not equal the divine wisdom, so that the divine wisdom is limited to what this order.

[4:55] For it is manifest that the whole reason of the order which the wise man, the wise one, places upon things made by himself is taken from the end. When therefore the end is proportioned to the things done on account of the end, the wisdom of the what Maker is limited to this determined order. But the divine goodness is an end without proportion, exceeding created things. Whence, in willing that end, which is himself, right, God is not limited to this one order of things.

[5:33] Whence the divine wisdom is not determined. determined to some certain order of things, that is not possible for another course of things to flow from him.

[5:46] Whence it should be said simpliciter, that God is able to what make other things than the things which he has made. So the second position of Erigena is saying that God's wisdom says, well, this is the only just thing that could be, right? This is the only wise way that the world could be. Therefore, I've got to make it this way.

[6:21] Well, there's more than one way that the world could be. what? Wise and just. and God is made right? and that's because there's no proportion, right? No definite ratio between the order of creatures and the divine what? Goodness, right? So there's many ways that the divine goodness could be served right? In different orders.

[6:54] Now, if you apply to the first objection, God cannot make those things which He does not foreknow and for. To the first, therefore, it should be said that in us, in which is something other, power and essence, right? From the will and the what? Understanding. And also the understanding, something other from its wisdom. And the will, something other from its justice. There can be something in the power, right?

[7:32] That is not able to be in a just will, right? Or in a wise understanding. But in God, it is the same thing: the power and the essence or substance or nature, and the will and the understanding, and the wisdom and the justice. Huh?

[7:56] Whence nothing is able to be in the divine power that is not able to be in His just will and in His wise understanding. Nevertheless, because the will is not determined of necessity to this or that, right? Except perhaps as supposition, right? But if He has willed this, then He must have willed it.

[8:23] Nor is the divine wisdom and the divine justice determined to this order, as has been said, huh? None by the article. Nothing prevents something from being in the power of God that He does not will, right? And that is not contained under the order which He has established in things. And because the will or the power, rather, is understood as carrying out, right? The will, however, as commanding, and the understanding and the wisdom as directing.

[9:04] What is attributed to the ability or power considered by itself, God is said to be able according to an absolute what power, and this is everything in which can be saved the ratio of what of being, as has been said above.

[9:27] What, however, is attributed to the divine power, according as it carries out the command of the just will, this God is said to be able to do with an ordered power.

[9:42] According to this, therefore, it should be said that God is able to do other things of his absolute power than what he is what foreknown and foreordained for himself to do, but he is not able. to what? It's not possible that what he makes some things which he has not foreknown, right? And foreordered that he's going to make. Because his making is subject to his foreknowledge and his foreordaining.

[10:20] Not, however, over, his what ability, which is what natural. There, therefore, God is able to make something because what? Excuse me. Therefore, God makes something because he wills to make it.

[10:39] But not, however, is he able to do it because he wills it. But because such it is in his what. Nature. Clear or not? He's saying God is able to do things that he didn't do, right? But he doesn't actually do something that he doesn't foreordain and foresee, right? And that he wills, right?

[11:29] But he doesn't will everything that he's able to do, right? In fact, he he doesn't will everything that he's able to will. But once having willed, right, then that's determined.

[11:55] But that's again kind of a necessity from supposition, right? Having willed this kind of universe, right, then he can only make this kind of universe, right? But he could have willed some other universe, right? He could have made some other universe. Is that what this question is asking, basically, Article Five? Yeah. Could he make something other than he's made? Like a completely different nature of things. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

[12:23] Basically, he's attacking these two mistakes, right? The one that says God's ability to make he makes a necessary nature, right? Okay. And therefore, he can't make another domain, right? Because of what he is, he has to make this. Yeah. Okay.

[12:43] And and the second error is to say that what God has to make something that's wise and just and so on, right? He can't make a foolish world. What fools, these mortals be As Puck says in Midsummer Night's Dream, right? But God could make a foolish world; He could make an unjust world, right?

[13:12] But is this the only wise and just world He could have made? But ultimately, a world is wise and just because it's ordered to God, and no world is adequately ordered to God, right? But this is the only way the the what the only kind of world that could have been ordered to the divine goodness. Then this world would be kind of what Equal to the divine goodness, huh?

[13:40] Or it would fit it in kind of like two is definitely related to three, right? And this world would be like that to the divine goodness. But the divine goodness being infinite, right? There can be no world that could be adequate to the divine goodness. So He could make more than one kind of world that was a wise world, a wise plan, and a just one, right?

[14:12] But any world that He's made, He has foreseen and forwarded, you could say, and willed, right? And that's only one of those that He could have made.

[14:37] Second argument here: God did not make except what he ought, right? What is just to come about, and so on. To the second, it should be said that God does not owe something to anyone except to Himself. Hence, when it is said that God cannot make except what He ought,

[15:02] nothing other is signified except that God cannot make except what is suitable and just. But this that I call what suitable and just can be understood in two ways. In one way, thus that this that I call suitable and just is before understood to be joined with this verb is, so that it be what restricted to standing for the present things, right? And thus it refers to the power.

[15:40] And thus it is false what is said, for the sense would be that God is not able to make except what now is suitable and just.

[15:53] If our before it is joined with this word or verb. Abel is able, which has the what force of amplifying, and afterwards with this verb est, it signifies something what present in a confused way, and then the speech will be true in this sense. God cannot make something except that which, if he were to make it, right would be suitable and just. Complicated, but yet, hence the objection.

[16:33] It goes back again, I mean, to the idea that nothing that God makes can be what equal to it, right? So not only one way the universe could be suitable and just.

[16:48] And finish that. A third objection: God cannot make except what is good and suitable to things made, and so on. To the third, it should be said that although this course of things is determined to those things which are now, nevertheless, to this course of things is not limited the divine wisdom, the divine power. For although to those things which are now no other course would be good and suitable, nevertheless God could make other things and impose upon them a what another order, right?

[17:42] So people, you know, say you know that God had to make the best possible world. There's only one best possible world, it seems, because best is what unique. Yeah. Okay. I forgot how to make this universe

[18:06] because his goodness and so on. What's wrong with that? Just what you said about nothing that God makes could be equal to himself. Yeah. Yeah. Could God make

[18:24] a creature who is the most like God that a creature could be? In other words, can there be a creature in which no one is more like God, or can there be a creature that is most like God? Well, there could be a creature most like God among those that he has made, but could there be a creature that is most like God?

[18:56] Period. Could there be a creature more like God that he could make? If he can make that rock, that's too big for him to pick up. Yeah, he can do that too.

[19:12] In other words, does that involve really kind of contradiction to say that there is a creature that God could make would be the creature most like God, and no creature could be made more like God than this creature?

[19:32] I mean, some some people think that that the devil was the highest of all the angels, right? Yeah. And Thomas says, well, there's some probability of that. Now, unless he was very malicious, he maybe would not have fallen, right? Yeah.

[19:48] But instead of you know just the natural gifts of these things, could God make someone more like Himself than the highest angel? Is Mary more perfect than merciful or Yeah Oh yeah, oh yeah. I mean, could is there some creature that could be the most like God that creature could be?

[20:24] Yeah, but even even the man in Christ, you know. Is there something possible to God that anyone can do? Yeah. But I think now, if there's an infinite distance between God and the creature, Between all creation as a whole, which is even greater in sense than one member, you know. How can there be one which is what closest, right? It's like saying, you know, can you make?

[20:53] Could you write a number that is the number closest to infinity? There's always a number that's closer to infinity than any given number, right? And there's really a contradiction in saying that I'm going to write down the number that is most like infinity, isn't there? There's always been a number which is closer. So because of that, Aristotle says in the book of Natural Hearing, there, I mean, of Wisdom rather, that the natures of things like numbers, right?

[21:30] And God made all things in number, so on. But is the creature to God like you know, lesser number to greater number? It's like a number is to something that is infinite. God is not it's immensus as we saw. He. He's not measurable, right?

[21:55] So if God is infinite and every number is what measured, right? There can't be a number that is closest or most like infinity, can there? That's be like a contradiction, right? So it seems to me that it's be a contradiction to say that God

[22:21] could make a creature that is most like Him, right? In the sense, could be most like Him in the sense that the ones that He has made is most like Him, yeah. But He could make a creature that is, and

[22:38] which He could not make one more like Him. So, of all creatures, Our Lady is the most closest to God, the most like Him. But you're saying that she wouldn't be able to be considered the most possible, the most like Him as possible, absolutely, because that's impossible to do. Like, she might be the most perfect among all of us, but she's not the most perfect imaginable. Or could the rewind most perfect?

[23:08] Yeah, that's what I'm saying. Yeah. Okay. Yeah. I think if there's an infinite distance, you know, maybe for this, the universe, she's the closest it's going to be. You know. I think after after Christ's nature. In terms of what was defined, say with the immaculate conception, and the Pope refers there to something that she's holier than than than we can think of. Nothing nothing holier can be thought.

[23:30] Okay. I mean, nothing holier can be made by God. We can't think of anything holier, but God might be able to think of something holier. I'm trying to reason that out myself. Yeah. He's able to make something holy, but we can't think of it. We're not able to see it. Mm-hmm. Okay, let's look at this sixth article here now.

[24:04] Whether God could make better things than those that she has made, And he's on to another thing. It seems that God could not make better things than those which He has made.

[24:20] For whatever God has made, He has made most powerfully and most wisely, right? But the better something is, the more potent and wise is it, now.

[24:37] Therefore, God could not make something better than He has made. Moreover, Augustine says against Maximus another contra here, argues thus: If God was able and did not will, right, did not want it, to generate a what son equal to Himself, He would be what envious, right?

[25:12] For the same reason, if God was able to make what better things than He made and did not will them, He would be envious, huh? Aristotle rejects that in the envy in God, right, huh? In the first book of Wisdom, there. But envy is altogether to be what put aside from God, huh? Relegated from God. Therefore, God makes each thing best, right? Therefore, God can't make something better than He made, huh?

[25:48] The best belongs to the best to make the best, right? Hardly, right? Moreover, that which is most and greatly good cannot come about better. For nothing is greater than the maximum, right? The greatest. But as Augustine says in the ingredient, I guess that's the ingredient of faith, hope, and charity.

[26:15] Each of the individual things that God has made are good, right? But the universe of things is very good, alde bona, extremely good. Because from all of them consists the admirable beauty of the what universe, huh?

[26:35] Therefore, the good universe cannot be what better, made by God. Now, if I get down to Homo Christus, right? Moreover, the man Christ is full of grace and truth, and is and He had the Spirit not ad mensuram not limited way, and thus there can be nothing what. Better, than the universe. and created beatitude is said to be the highest good, summum bonum, and thus it cannot be what better.

[27:10] than the universe. And the Blessed Virgin Mary is exalted above all the choirs of the angels, and thus there cannot be better. Not therefore, not all things that God has made can He make some better things.

[27:33] But against all this is what is said by Saint Paul in Ephesians chapter three, that God is potent, right, to make all things abundantius, more abundantly, than we ask or than we can understand. So,

[27:53] the answer should be said that the goodness of something is twofold: one which is of the essence of the thing, just as to be reasonable or to have reason is of the essence of man.

[28:08] And as regards this good, God cannot make something better than it is, although He is able to make some other thing right better than it.

[28:23] Just as He is not able to make four more, right, because if it were more, it would no longer be four, but another number, right? For thus has itself the addition of a substantial difference, an accidental difference. in definitions, has addition of a unit in numbers, as is said in the eighth book of Wisdom, the eighth book after the book of Natural Philosophy.

[28:57] But there is another goodness which is outside the essence or nature of a thing, just as the good of man is to be virtuous or to be wise,

[29:10] and according to such good, God can make what things that are made by Him better, right? But simply speaking, right, God is able to make something better than anything that has been made by Him, right?

[29:43] The first objection: whatever God makes, He makes most potently and wisely. But to that extent, something is better as it is made by. More power and more wisely. therefore, God cannot make something better than He made it. To the first, therefore, it should be said that when it is said that God is able to make something better than He makes it, if "better" is a name, it is what true.

[30:16] For than anything, He is able to make something better. Now, the same thing is able to make better in one way, and in another way, not as has been said. This is just in the body article.

[30:36] But if "melius" is taken to be an adverb, right, and implies the mode on the side of the what maker, thus God is not able to make something better than He made it, because He cannot make something from greater wisdom and goodness than He did.

[30:59] If, however, it implies the mode on the side of the thing made, thus is He able to make something what to make better? Because He is able to give to things made by Him a better way of being as regards accidental things, although not as regards what essential. Yeah.

[31:27] So, could God make things with more wisdom than He did? Could have made me as wise as Thomas Aquinas. He could have made me with more wisdom, or called by Him, God, or enlightened, right? He can enlighten the little boys to say Hosanna, right? So he can enlighten us to see more than we we see, right? But if you're talking the side of God Himself, could He make universe with more wisdom?

[32:04] No, no, because God's wisdom can't be more than it is, right? Okay. Now, the second objection, a little off in a sense, is taken from the Trinity, right?

[32:19] To second, it should be said that it's of the notion of the Son that He be in some way equal to the what Father, right? When He comes to perfection, right? But it is not of the notion of any creature that He be better than what God made. Than what? He be better than He's been made by God, right? Whence there is not a similar what reason for both, right?

[32:59] Now the third objection. Talking about the excellence of the universe, right? All de bona, right? Okay. To the third, it should be said that the universe, supposing these things, right, could not be better, on account of the most suitable order attributed to these things by God, in which the good universe consists.

[33:26] Of which, if one were what better, it would corrupt the what ratio of the order. Just as if one chord was what struck more than suitable, it would corrupt the melody of the what.

[33:52] But God could make other things, right? Or he could add other things to the things made, and thus there would be a what better what. Universe, Universe huh?

[34:12] So he makes the universe what the best it could be given these things, right? Mm-hmm. But he could have made other things. Mhm. So it wouldn't necessarily mean with more wisdom. Yeah. see and the order, Thomas, Thomas De Koninck and Dionne. We'll be distressed. Yeah. Monsignor Dionne used to compare the order among human teachers, you know, a little bit to the order among angels, not as fixed, right?

[34:39] Ah. Angels is very fixed, right? Mm-hmm. And one is illumined by the one directly above him, right, on the way down to the bottom, huh? Yeah.

[34:53] And so, um, meanwhile, Monsignor Dionne alone understood Thomas, and I alone understood Monsignor Dionne. All the way down the line, right? Is it? But that's the way it would be if the angels, right, down. Each one is proportioned to the one right above him.

[35:18] Now, what about? It's a difficult objection here from Christ and Mary, right, huh? So Thomas can say that. To the fourth, it should be said that the human nature of Christ, huh, from the fact that is united to God and created beatitude, right? From this, that it is the enjoyment of God, huh? And the Blessed Virgin, from this, that she is the Mother of God, you all have a certain what?

[35:54] Dignity. Infinite dignity, right? Mm-hmm. From the infinite good that is God, right? And from this part, right, or on this side, there cannot come about something better than them, right? Just as there cannot be something better than what God, So he leaves it at that, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay. Yet one person might see God more perfectly than another person sees God, right? Mm-hmm. In my father's house there are many what mansions, right?

[36:32] And somewhere there's an infinity about these, huh? Even the Mother of God, huh? Something infinite about her dignity, right? Does that throw light on what we were trying to figure out? on the last um, question: Is Saint Thomas basically saying that they're just on a separate level, or? Which Christ and Mary? Yeah. And so it doesn't really relate to our other question before, or that other question was.

[37:10] What he's doing here, I think, is simply explaining in what way there's something infinite about not only the human nature of Christ, right? and the Blessed Virgin, Mother of God, but also even Beatitudo creata, right? Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Now,

[37:35] if you ask the question, could a human being have more grace than Christ had, right? We'll leave that to the Tertia Pars right? Um but if you're talking about beatitudo creata, right, it's clear that there can be what. One person can see God more clearly than another, right? Okay. Even though there's something infinite, right, about seeing God as He is, right, because God Himself is infinite, right?

[38:13] You see? Okay. See. Hmm? The difference is in seeing. Yeah, yeah. You know, when you go back to to criteria that Aristotle gives in the beginning of De Anima, one knowledge is better than another because of the thing known, or because of the way you know it, right?

[38:49] So, do I know better the triangle or God? What would you say? Yeah, yeah. I know better what a triangle is than I know what God is.

[39:05] More adequate to my mind, the triangle than God is, right? But it's better to know God than to know the triangle. Now, Thomas, when he talks about that, if I remember right, he'll say that the criterion from the object makes this knowledge simply better than that, right? So he would say that my knowledge of God is better than my knowledge of the triangle.

[39:37] Make no qualification, right? Now, is my knowledge of the triangle, in some imperfect way, in some qualified way, better than my knowledge of God? We could say I know more clearly what a triangle is, or I know more fully what a triangle is than I know what God is, right? You see? But that's he couldn't have quit, right? Yeah. Yeah. I always say, you know, it's better to hear Mozart in an imperfect machine, right?

[40:14] Than to hear rock and roll on a perfect, you know, system. You know, even though you're hearing it better, than you're hearing Mozart. It's still better hearing Mozart, even, you know. Cuthbert Girdlestone the guy wrote the book on the Mozart piano concertos, you know, talking about the earlier performances are not so good, you know. But even a trickle down to us from these imperfect performances, right?

[40:42] I'd rather hear somebody, you know, playing Mozart perfectly than maybe than hearing somebody playing something else perfectly, right? Because of what's being being played there. This new pope there, he likes it. He plays Mozart, right? That's what they say. He has his piano sent in. I like these little confirmations, you know. Years ago, a friend of mine was reading a biography of Pius the Twelfth. Maybe still pope at the time, but they're describing.

[41:12] But the biography was talking about when he first moved into the Vatican, he became pope there, and he's making sure that his books were put in there, you know, and and especially his his Shakespeare set, right? So that was a good sign for me, right? Because yeah, I'm not a very rectified man morally, but Pius XII, he was a rectified man morally. And then when I heard that Paul VI, you know, his two favorite poets were Dante and Shakespeare, right?

[41:39] Well, that's more confirmation, right? Well, now I guess when Benedict the Sixteenth is going to play to make sure his piano's there so he can play his Mozart. I know I'm not a very rectified man, but this man who's pope now, and so I think he's a very rectified man, and he plays Mozart. It's it's

[42:00] not too frivolous of me, it's very strong in that thing in Eucharist about the Gregorian chant. This is an appropriate thing for the Roman liturgy, he said. You know, I didn't want the the. He's talking about the Roman liturgy, but

[42:28] Father Lamothe there from the college has this Gregorian chant group that he works in. I guess he goes up to the the Benedictine monastery, the one in. No, the one the one in

[42:41] the women's group and what's that? Harvardian? Oh, oh, Portsmouth? No, the one that's near here, right here? Oh, Still River, you mean Saint Benedict's Yeah, yeah, Yeah. I think he got up there and was instructing the monks there in you know singing better the Gregorian chant and doing it well so They go to some of the parishes too. So this is a nice thing that people would read it, you know.

[43:07] Yeah. Mm-hmm. Because I'm thinking there about the politicians, you know, about marriage and man, woman, and all the rest of it. I was thinking, should we produce that thing and take it over to the congressman. Claiming to be, you know, Catholic, and they're simply not. Yeah, abiding this. What we see, you say, and you sin remain. That's what I always want to tell them. They claim, well, we know better.

[43:33] Well, then you're guilty because you say you see. If you were blind, well, there wouldn't be enough. Consistent that you see. Yeah. Yeah. Now we come to the last question here on the unity of God, right? So the Abba's going to cut us off here at the next week. Okay, so we got to get through 26 here next week because it'll be a nice place to break for the Trinity.

[44:06] In fact, the Trinity is. Okay, let's start to look at this divine beatitude here. A few minutes here. I'll make sure we get to this then. So.

[44:18] Last, huh? Ultima, right? Okay. After the consideration of those things which pertain to the what unity of the divine essence, huh? Not to consider about the divine what beatitude. That's the word for the happiness of the intellectual person, huh? And about this four things are asked. First, whether the beatitude belongs to God. Secondly, by what God is said to be blessed, whether it be according to the act of his understanding, whether

[45:06] he is essentially the beatitude of every one who is what blessed. And fourth, whether in his beatitude every beatitude is included, huh? Incidentally, that's the way Thomas ends up the first book of the Summa Contra Gentiles with the consideration of the divine beatitude, huh?

[45:32] So, first, whether the beatitude belongs to God, it seems the first one precedes us. It seems that beatitude does not belong to God. For beatitude, according to Boethius in the third book of the Consolation of Philosophy, and that's in the first books of the Consolation of Philosophy, he takes up happiness, right? He takes up first false happiness because he says that's more known to us. Yeah. And then from that he proceeds to true happiness, huh?

[46:06] So beatitude, according to Boethius in the third book on the Consolation of Philosophy, is a state made perfect, right? By the bringing together of all goods, huh? But the bringing together, the aggregatio,

[46:25] gathering together of all good things, does not have place in God, just as neither composition. It's all together simple, right? Mm-hmm. Therefore, to God there does not belong beatitude.

[46:40] Moreover, beatitude or happiness, huh? Felicity. Is the reward of virtue, according to the philosopher, in the first book of the Nicomachean Ethics? But to God there does not belong reward, just as neither merit doesn't deserve beatitude. Therefore, neither beatitude, right?

[47:17] But against all this is what the Apostle says in the first epistle to Timothy, the last chapter, fifteenth verse, which, in his times, God will show God the blessed one, huh, Beatus, and the only what, the King of Kings and the Lord of Lords.

[47:44] Now, answer. It should be said that beatitude most of all belongs to God, huh? For nothing other is understood under the name of beatitude, huh? Let's let's the Latin there.

[48:02] For nothing else is understood under the name of beatitude. The the meaning of a word is said to be what, understood? Yeah. That's kind of beautiful. The English word understand, right? Because to understand means to know what stands under something, right? So to understand a word means to know what is said to stand under it. And of course, we all say in all languages we all talk about what putting a label upon something, putting a name upon something.

[48:34] So that's under the name, right? In Latin, they have expression impositio nominis, right? The placing upon of a name. Wow. Okay. Of course, the word understanding also fits the word substance very well too, huh? Mm-hmm. Because it's got the same etymology as substance. Okay. So nothing other is understood under the name of beatitude, huh?

[49:07] Except the perfect good of a what understanding nature, right? Of whom it belongs, or to whom it belongs, to know his what sufficiency, right? In the good that he has, and to whom it belongs to happen something good or what bad, right? And to whom it belongs to be the Lord of his own what operations, son?

[49:41] But both of these belong to God. Most excellently. That is to be perfect and to be what, understanding, right? Whence beatitude, most of all, belongs to what? God.

[50:03] So this is the perfect good of the understanding nature, and God is altogether perfect, and He's got an understanding nature, right? Understands. And beatitude must belong to God most of all, right? Huh? This of course is more fully developed in Summa Contra Gentiles, huh? We'll just have to cover that. Yeah.

[50:28] Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the what bringing together, huh, the flocking together there, aggregatio of good is in God not by way of what composition, but by way of simplicity. Because what are multiple in the creatures exist in God simply in a united way, right? So Boethius's definition there is kind of talking about what takes place in the creatures, right? Huh? Where all good things are brought together.

[51:03] Blessed, huh? All this in heaven too, huh? Don't say it, right? Okay. Thomas sometimes quotes that thing, you know, God says to Moses, Abraham, I will show you every good. And Thomas says that is myself. I mean, that's the way of speaking, though. I show you every good, huh?

[51:28] Since every good is in God, but in a simple way, right? But you do use the expression "every good," right? So you kind of go from that.

[51:45] Now the second thing is taken from what Aristotle says. The second objection from Aristotle saying that beatitude or happiness is the reward of what virtue, right? And Thomas sometimes says virtue is the road to happiness, vice is the road to misery, right? Okay. But in the Summa Contra Gentiles, he takes up the virtues of God more explicitly, right? And here, before he takes up the beatitude of God, because the from the ethics we know that beatitude is activity according to virtue and according to the highest virtues.

[52:27] Now, to the second, it should be said that to be the reward of virtue happens to beatitude or felicity in so far as someone acquires beatitude, huh? Just as to be the what? End or limit of generation happens to being in so far as it goes forth from what ability to act.

[52:56] Just therefore as God has been although He is not what generated, so He has beatitude although He is not what merited it. Huh? Okay. So He is beatitude itself. We learned in the Summa Contra Gentiles And he just said He's blessed and then that He's beatitude itself, right? Huh? Okay. You can be closer to beatitude than that, as Thomas says. He gives a number of reasons why God's beatitude is the best.

[53:30] So let's leave this tweet here for the next and last class huh for the summer.